International science agencies contributed to the lack of accountability and transparency in the aftermath of Chernobyl in a number of ways. Petryna describes how the Chernobyl accident led to unprecedented scientific collaboration between Western scientific leaders, like Americans, and the Soviets. Yet, these international players contributed to defining the victims of Chernobyl as a small, “acute accident” population, defined by a very particular and obscure measurement system. The framing of this as an “accident context” allowed for the US and Soviets to take an interventionist stance, where experimental treatments such as bone marrow transplants could be tested on this specific population. Additionally, by involving international bodies in the aftermath of Chernobyl, this led to an understanding that only experts could assess biological risk and safety, buttressing the political status of the Soviet government, despite a lack of reasonable scientific evidence to back up their response to Chernobyl. Further, international agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency were influenced by their own conflicts of interest, such as advancing nuclear energy, rather than properly assessing the radiation exposure.
These disingenuous efforts led international nuclear efforts to announce the death toll of Chernobyl as thirty-one victims. Yet, local experts stated that this number is in the hundreds of thousands. As the following chapters show, the impact of Chernobyl led to higher cancer incidence rates, neurological impacts, physical disabilities, and many other health impacts that become highly disputed in the determination of who is considered to be a “sufferer” of Chernobyl.
According to Petryna, biological citizenship for those who gained the status as “sufferers” entitled them to significant benefits from the state. In this way, those who were deemed “sufferers” were able to maintain a tie with the state which allowed them “some measure of protection against the vagaries of joblessness and social disorientation” (p. 85). However, many Ukrainians were left out of biological citizenship. Petryna showed that those who had money or influence could bribe their way into getting a diagnosis of an illness that qualified them to be “sufferers.” Others could manipulate the medical system by presenting their symptoms in a specific way that would allow them to receive the official Chernobyl tie, rather than simply a psychological diagnosis. Some Ukrainians sought this claim of suffering “too late,” such as when specific markers of a radiation exposure were no longer present, and instead chose to work until they were no longer physically able. Claims of Chernobyl-related illness became a politically and economically contested phenomenon, as the Ukrainian government worked to establish their political independence and legitimacy through their attempts to classify different levels of suffering. As a result, some citizens were protected by this “biopolitical regime,” while others were not, leading to the naturalization of social and economic inequality.