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Palestinians: The Making of a People
Recent events have dealt the Palestinians a series of major blows that have discredited their leaders and apparently sidelined their cause in the shifting sands of Middle Eastern politics. But as the authors argue, the Palestinians may have reached a breakthrough in their long-standing impasse with Israel, as a new generation of leaders may be willing to abandon anti-Zionism.
396 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1993
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
June 16, 2007
A very thorough history - detailing the formation of the Palestinian people (which the authors suggest started with the 1834 revolt of the indigenous Arab peoples in Palestine against Egyptian rulers). Brings you up through to semi-modern times (it was published in 2003). A good start to understanding the dynamics of Palestinian society.
April 8, 2020
This sociological study of the formation of the Palestinian people takes a long view of this conflict, starting in the 1800s. I found this to be very balanced and informative around this delicate topic.
May 15, 2024
A HISTORICAL AND POLITCAL SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PALESTINIANS
Baruch Kimmerling (1939-2007) was an Israeli professor of sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was one of the so-called ‘New Historians’ of Israeli historiography. Joel S. Migdal is a political scientist who is Professor of International Studies in the University of Washington; he previously taught at Harvard University (1975–80) and Tel Aviv University (1972–75).
They wrote in the Introduction to this 1993 book, “In this book, we are less interested in protocols and diplomacy than in the dynamics and beliefs of peasants, urban workers, merchants, and landowners, and their relationships to the leaders. For particularly with … the catastrophic shattering of the Palestinian community in the 1948 war with the Jews---we find the content of what it means to be Palestinian shaped as much by this foundation as by the old, established leadership. The Palestinian people were not mere victims… but were active participants in the creation of their people’s collective character. We hope to write against the grain of the sort of history that has been written as part and parcel of mythmaking national projects… Palestinians have suffered a great deal from such mythmaking.” (Pg. xv-xvi)
They continue, “In some ways, the Jewish national movement has shaped the Palestinian people almost as much as it did the Jews themselves. Had it not been for the pressures exerted on the Arabs of Palestine by the Zionist movement, the very concept of a Palestinian people would not have developed… They see their own lives as reflections of a catastrophe… Nevertheless, focusing our attention exclusively on the Palestinian Arab conflict with the Jews would obscure other important factors, particularly the extension of the world market into Palestine and the imposition of politically and administratively capable states…” (Pg. xvii-xviii)
They observe, “there are two radically different interpretations of the Zionists’ effect on the fellaheen during the mandate. It is difficult to sort out the evidence… The Jews, who devoted much more effort to data collection than the Arabs, certainly did not deny that they were precipitating a deep transformation in Arab village society, but they tended to emphasize its beneficial character…. In contrast, Arab spokesmen… dwelt on Arab displacement from land and the growing Jewish control over scarce cultivatable soil… In all likelihood, the Jewish impact of the fellaheen was not nearly significant enough to cause all the beneficial results the Zionists touted; at the same time, the farmers displaced by Jewish landbuying were not large enough group to have a great impact on the overall Arab economy.” (Pg. 32-33)
They explain, “Despite this internal Arab division, in the 1920s the Muslim-Christian Associations succeeded in drawing established members of leading Muslim and Christian urban families into the struggle against Zionism. The road to such concerted action… was a rocky one, political factionalism plaguing the Palestinians throughout the mandate. It would be a mistake to overstate the depth of national sentiment at its start… The Muslim-Christian Associations did not initially define themselves as part of an explicitly political organization.” (Pg. 53)
They note, “The notion of a cohesive society with a unique history, its members facing common threats and a shared future, gained ever-broader acceptance among Palestine’s Arabs in the interwar years. The disproportionately influential urban intellectual eventually succeeded in drawing a broad section of the population into active opposition to the Zionists and the British. But beyond that emerging consensus, the question of what that society should ultimately be like produced much less agreement, with stiff resistance building in parts of the country to the idea of the city as a model for the future.” (Pg. 56)
In the 1930s, “Fewer than 500,000 Palestinian Arabs at the beginning of the century grew to close to a million by the middle of the 1930s. But this growth was not reassuring to Arab political leaders. They watched the Jewish expansion with horror… Even more distressing was that this influx was taking place just as Palestinian unity seemed to unravel, the new voices and classes reducing the old leadership to ineffectual self-absorption… the Jerusalem notables entered into a bout of mutual recrimination. The ayan seemed on the brink of political bankruptcy. When the need for resolute leadership appeared greatest, the Arab Executive simply passed from the scene.” (Pg. 95)
They state, “It is important to recall that the political evolution of Palestinian nationalism---the mass demonstrations and militant political parties, the use of mosques as bases for popular mobilization---took place against a backdrop of ever-increasing Jewish immigration, growing dislocation, and Arab urbanization…” (Pg. 102-103)
They recount, “For the Arabs, the 1939 White Paper had an iconic aura. Its acceptance of their demand for majoritarian national independence (in ten years’ time), a strict prohibition on Jewish immigration, and a banning of land sales to Jews came just as the British finished them militarily and destroyed their national leadership. A more drastic irony was the contemptuous rejection by the exiled leadership---most notably the Mufti---of the White Paper… The revolt and rejection of the White Paper thus left the Palestinian national movement in an abyss… the revolt helped to create a nation---even while crippling its social and political basis.” (Pg. 122-123)
They continue, “Communal war began consuming the fabric of normalcy the day after the UN vote, with an Arab attack on a Jewish bus... Two days after the UN vote, the Arab Higher Committee called a general strike… Jerusalem was wracked by violence, and the Jewish commercial sector was set ablaze… But two key differences marked this wave of violence: The Jews, not the British, were the primary target, and this time around the Zionists … [were] meeting Arab attacks with a fury of their own. By the conflict’s latter stages, the Jews had organized for a total war the Arabs were ill-prepared to fight.” (Pg. 140-141)
They point out, “[Some] Israeli Arabs faced a double bind, facilitating the classification of their land. The military barred them from their original homes, but since they were classified officially as ‘present absentees,’ the state could claim their ‘abandoned’ land… as much as 49 percent of Arabs’ land … was confiscated… the land transfer was viewed as a means of disabling a major tool for undermining Israel’s right to exist---the Arabs’ claim to possession of the land.” (Pg. 161)
They say, “The shift of Islamic political leaders from clandestine activities to the provision of routine services was reflected in their orientation to Israel and the Jews… In time, their radical political slogans gave way to advocacy of ‘two states for two nations,’ their entry into the fray of Israeli elections seeming to moderate their stance at the very moment that Islamic groups on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip were demonstrating increased militancy. Once again, Israel’s Arabs were demonstrating increased militancy. Once again, Israel’s Arabs seemed out of step with the activities of other Palestinians.” (Pg. 180)
They observe, “the Palestinian community dissolved under the impact of the 1948 war. Seeming at first to represent only further displacement and defeat, the 1967 war in fact inaugurated a period of national reintegration and institutional renewal, along with the daily burdens of Israeli occupation. The intervening years marked a certain limbo. The Palestinians were severed from their old foundations of society and politics, scarred by exile, and still stunned by the fate that had befallen them. The leaders and formal groups characterizing the post-1967 era had not yet appeared on the scene. It was the moment in Palestinian history most bereft of hope.” (Pg. 185)
They explain, “During the 1948, the Arab Legion had already disbanded Palestinian political organizations and fighting groups in the areas it occupied; not it set the stage for absorption of Palestinians into Jordanian state political institutions, staffed by a combination of East Bankers and Palestinians---the ayan’s remnants, along with other local Palestinian leaders, some eventually becoming prime ministers. And Jordan was the only state besides Syria that accorded the Palestinians citizenship en masse: Two thirds of all Palestinians ended up as Jordanian citizens.” (Pg. 191)
They recount, “the Popular Front [for the Liberation of Palestine] … initiated a series of ‘external operations.’ The most spectacular by far were the airplane hijackings. These and other acts… made the Palestinian issue a media event, pushing it to the top of the world political agenda. Within Palestinian society, they offered new heroes and a sense of power… The emphasis on terror had its costs, as well, fostering a bloodthirsty stereotype, both internationally and among those Israelis might have sought accommodation. Israeli leaders pointed to the terrorism as proof that the Palestinian Covenant involved not only the elimination of Israel but of Jews generally.” (Pg. 225)
They note, “No struggle for the future of Palestinian society became more clear in the course of the intifada than that over the future role of Islam. Even the most secular and national figures appropriated cultural symbols that had strong Islamic resonances… The last two decades of the twentieth century have been a period in which Islam has played a much more overt role in Middle East politics, from Algeria to Iran… The major Islamic group, Hamas… and a smaller faction, Islamic Jihad, aimed to establish an Islamic state in Palestine and, perhaps later, throughout the Arab Middle East. They rejected the nationalists’ aim of a secular, religiously pluralistic state… As in the rest of the Middle East, the prime mover of the Islamic revival in the occupied territories was the Iranian Revolution of 1978.” (Pg. 270-271)
They conclude, "The Intifada validated the replacement of the old landed elite with a new leadership bred in the schools and universities of the West Bank and Gaza… When the rioting broke out… to the astonishment of the Israelis… the old leaders themselves… could do little to stem the tide of resistance. It had become uncertain precisely where authority within Palestinian society lay. The question had been complicated over the years by the Israeli, Jordanian, and PLO discouragement of any visible, independent new leadership… what is quite apparent is that social changes would no longer be dictated by a Palestinian leadership from on high---and certainly not by a leadership based in Amman or Damascus… The symbols and practices evolving among the entire population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip … created the possibility of Palestinian action. Whether they now offer the hope for an end to occupation, for national independence, and for reconciliation with Jews and Israel, is too soon to tell.” (Pg. 274-275)
This book will be of interest to those studying the origin of Israel, and its relationship with the Palestinians.
Baruch Kimmerling (1939-2007) was an Israeli professor of sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was one of the so-called ‘New Historians’ of Israeli historiography. Joel S. Migdal is a political scientist who is Professor of International Studies in the University of Washington; he previously taught at Harvard University (1975–80) and Tel Aviv University (1972–75).
They wrote in the Introduction to this 1993 book, “In this book, we are less interested in protocols and diplomacy than in the dynamics and beliefs of peasants, urban workers, merchants, and landowners, and their relationships to the leaders. For particularly with … the catastrophic shattering of the Palestinian community in the 1948 war with the Jews---we find the content of what it means to be Palestinian shaped as much by this foundation as by the old, established leadership. The Palestinian people were not mere victims… but were active participants in the creation of their people’s collective character. We hope to write against the grain of the sort of history that has been written as part and parcel of mythmaking national projects… Palestinians have suffered a great deal from such mythmaking.” (Pg. xv-xvi)
They continue, “In some ways, the Jewish national movement has shaped the Palestinian people almost as much as it did the Jews themselves. Had it not been for the pressures exerted on the Arabs of Palestine by the Zionist movement, the very concept of a Palestinian people would not have developed… They see their own lives as reflections of a catastrophe… Nevertheless, focusing our attention exclusively on the Palestinian Arab conflict with the Jews would obscure other important factors, particularly the extension of the world market into Palestine and the imposition of politically and administratively capable states…” (Pg. xvii-xviii)
They observe, “there are two radically different interpretations of the Zionists’ effect on the fellaheen during the mandate. It is difficult to sort out the evidence… The Jews, who devoted much more effort to data collection than the Arabs, certainly did not deny that they were precipitating a deep transformation in Arab village society, but they tended to emphasize its beneficial character…. In contrast, Arab spokesmen… dwelt on Arab displacement from land and the growing Jewish control over scarce cultivatable soil… In all likelihood, the Jewish impact of the fellaheen was not nearly significant enough to cause all the beneficial results the Zionists touted; at the same time, the farmers displaced by Jewish landbuying were not large enough group to have a great impact on the overall Arab economy.” (Pg. 32-33)
They explain, “Despite this internal Arab division, in the 1920s the Muslim-Christian Associations succeeded in drawing established members of leading Muslim and Christian urban families into the struggle against Zionism. The road to such concerted action… was a rocky one, political factionalism plaguing the Palestinians throughout the mandate. It would be a mistake to overstate the depth of national sentiment at its start… The Muslim-Christian Associations did not initially define themselves as part of an explicitly political organization.” (Pg. 53)
They note, “The notion of a cohesive society with a unique history, its members facing common threats and a shared future, gained ever-broader acceptance among Palestine’s Arabs in the interwar years. The disproportionately influential urban intellectual eventually succeeded in drawing a broad section of the population into active opposition to the Zionists and the British. But beyond that emerging consensus, the question of what that society should ultimately be like produced much less agreement, with stiff resistance building in parts of the country to the idea of the city as a model for the future.” (Pg. 56)
In the 1930s, “Fewer than 500,000 Palestinian Arabs at the beginning of the century grew to close to a million by the middle of the 1930s. But this growth was not reassuring to Arab political leaders. They watched the Jewish expansion with horror… Even more distressing was that this influx was taking place just as Palestinian unity seemed to unravel, the new voices and classes reducing the old leadership to ineffectual self-absorption… the Jerusalem notables entered into a bout of mutual recrimination. The ayan seemed on the brink of political bankruptcy. When the need for resolute leadership appeared greatest, the Arab Executive simply passed from the scene.” (Pg. 95)
They state, “It is important to recall that the political evolution of Palestinian nationalism---the mass demonstrations and militant political parties, the use of mosques as bases for popular mobilization---took place against a backdrop of ever-increasing Jewish immigration, growing dislocation, and Arab urbanization…” (Pg. 102-103)
They recount, “For the Arabs, the 1939 White Paper had an iconic aura. Its acceptance of their demand for majoritarian national independence (in ten years’ time), a strict prohibition on Jewish immigration, and a banning of land sales to Jews came just as the British finished them militarily and destroyed their national leadership. A more drastic irony was the contemptuous rejection by the exiled leadership---most notably the Mufti---of the White Paper… The revolt and rejection of the White Paper thus left the Palestinian national movement in an abyss… the revolt helped to create a nation---even while crippling its social and political basis.” (Pg. 122-123)
They continue, “Communal war began consuming the fabric of normalcy the day after the UN vote, with an Arab attack on a Jewish bus... Two days after the UN vote, the Arab Higher Committee called a general strike… Jerusalem was wracked by violence, and the Jewish commercial sector was set ablaze… But two key differences marked this wave of violence: The Jews, not the British, were the primary target, and this time around the Zionists … [were] meeting Arab attacks with a fury of their own. By the conflict’s latter stages, the Jews had organized for a total war the Arabs were ill-prepared to fight.” (Pg. 140-141)
They point out, “[Some] Israeli Arabs faced a double bind, facilitating the classification of their land. The military barred them from their original homes, but since they were classified officially as ‘present absentees,’ the state could claim their ‘abandoned’ land… as much as 49 percent of Arabs’ land … was confiscated… the land transfer was viewed as a means of disabling a major tool for undermining Israel’s right to exist---the Arabs’ claim to possession of the land.” (Pg. 161)
They say, “The shift of Islamic political leaders from clandestine activities to the provision of routine services was reflected in their orientation to Israel and the Jews… In time, their radical political slogans gave way to advocacy of ‘two states for two nations,’ their entry into the fray of Israeli elections seeming to moderate their stance at the very moment that Islamic groups on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip were demonstrating increased militancy. Once again, Israel’s Arabs were demonstrating increased militancy. Once again, Israel’s Arabs seemed out of step with the activities of other Palestinians.” (Pg. 180)
They observe, “the Palestinian community dissolved under the impact of the 1948 war. Seeming at first to represent only further displacement and defeat, the 1967 war in fact inaugurated a period of national reintegration and institutional renewal, along with the daily burdens of Israeli occupation. The intervening years marked a certain limbo. The Palestinians were severed from their old foundations of society and politics, scarred by exile, and still stunned by the fate that had befallen them. The leaders and formal groups characterizing the post-1967 era had not yet appeared on the scene. It was the moment in Palestinian history most bereft of hope.” (Pg. 185)
They explain, “During the 1948, the Arab Legion had already disbanded Palestinian political organizations and fighting groups in the areas it occupied; not it set the stage for absorption of Palestinians into Jordanian state political institutions, staffed by a combination of East Bankers and Palestinians---the ayan’s remnants, along with other local Palestinian leaders, some eventually becoming prime ministers. And Jordan was the only state besides Syria that accorded the Palestinians citizenship en masse: Two thirds of all Palestinians ended up as Jordanian citizens.” (Pg. 191)
They recount, “the Popular Front [for the Liberation of Palestine] … initiated a series of ‘external operations.’ The most spectacular by far were the airplane hijackings. These and other acts… made the Palestinian issue a media event, pushing it to the top of the world political agenda. Within Palestinian society, they offered new heroes and a sense of power… The emphasis on terror had its costs, as well, fostering a bloodthirsty stereotype, both internationally and among those Israelis might have sought accommodation. Israeli leaders pointed to the terrorism as proof that the Palestinian Covenant involved not only the elimination of Israel but of Jews generally.” (Pg. 225)
They note, “No struggle for the future of Palestinian society became more clear in the course of the intifada than that over the future role of Islam. Even the most secular and national figures appropriated cultural symbols that had strong Islamic resonances… The last two decades of the twentieth century have been a period in which Islam has played a much more overt role in Middle East politics, from Algeria to Iran… The major Islamic group, Hamas… and a smaller faction, Islamic Jihad, aimed to establish an Islamic state in Palestine and, perhaps later, throughout the Arab Middle East. They rejected the nationalists’ aim of a secular, religiously pluralistic state… As in the rest of the Middle East, the prime mover of the Islamic revival in the occupied territories was the Iranian Revolution of 1978.” (Pg. 270-271)
They conclude, "The Intifada validated the replacement of the old landed elite with a new leadership bred in the schools and universities of the West Bank and Gaza… When the rioting broke out… to the astonishment of the Israelis… the old leaders themselves… could do little to stem the tide of resistance. It had become uncertain precisely where authority within Palestinian society lay. The question had been complicated over the years by the Israeli, Jordanian, and PLO discouragement of any visible, independent new leadership… what is quite apparent is that social changes would no longer be dictated by a Palestinian leadership from on high---and certainly not by a leadership based in Amman or Damascus… The symbols and practices evolving among the entire population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip … created the possibility of Palestinian action. Whether they now offer the hope for an end to occupation, for national independence, and for reconciliation with Jews and Israel, is too soon to tell.” (Pg. 274-275)
This book will be of interest to those studying the origin of Israel, and its relationship with the Palestinians.
Read
October 1, 2013"This remarkable book recounts how the Palestinians came to be constituted as a people. The authors offer perceptive observations on the status of Palestinian citizens of Israel, the successes and failures of the Oslo process, and the prospects for both Palestinians and Israelis of achieving a peaceful future together. A dispassionate and balanced analysis that provides essential background for understanding the complexities of the Middle East."
--Rashid Khalidi, University of Chicago
--Rashid Khalidi, University of Chicago
August 23, 2025
an important book for anyone trying to get a comprehensive history of Israel/Palestine. it puts the Palestinian perspective at the center, and its citations should fuel further research for the reader.
the book seems to suffer in its first hundred or so pages. this portion reads more like sociology than history, and it generally fails to provide compelling evidence for the thesis: that Zionism was only one factor, and not the decisive factor, in fostering a Palestinian identity. later sections seem to contradict his thesis, even, as they mention how works which treat Palestinians per se (not just referring to them as Arabs) began to appear in the 30s-60s. the thesis would seem to argue that Palestinian identity would appear even in the absence of Zionism, but the evidence for that in the book seems rather slim.
regardless, that question in particular is an academic one, and what people define themselves as is only marginally important if we worry about the rights of individuals per se. even if there wasn’t a single reference to “Palestine” by 1948 (which is false, of course), that would have no bearing on how to treat another human being.
the main value in this book is its centering of Palestinian narratives and its exploration of how the Palestinian people thought of themselves. for that, it’s worth reading.
the book seems to suffer in its first hundred or so pages. this portion reads more like sociology than history, and it generally fails to provide compelling evidence for the thesis: that Zionism was only one factor, and not the decisive factor, in fostering a Palestinian identity. later sections seem to contradict his thesis, even, as they mention how works which treat Palestinians per se (not just referring to them as Arabs) began to appear in the 30s-60s. the thesis would seem to argue that Palestinian identity would appear even in the absence of Zionism, but the evidence for that in the book seems rather slim.
regardless, that question in particular is an academic one, and what people define themselves as is only marginally important if we worry about the rights of individuals per se. even if there wasn’t a single reference to “Palestine” by 1948 (which is false, of course), that would have no bearing on how to treat another human being.
the main value in this book is its centering of Palestinian narratives and its exploration of how the Palestinian people thought of themselves. for that, it’s worth reading.
August 5, 2019
I bought this book for $1 at a library sale, so I didn't lose much money. I expected a history book, but this was more of a sociology book. That's not a bad thing, but it wasn't what I expected. It focused more on history's affect on the Palestinian people, rather than the history itself. For a more knowledgeable reader, I'm sure the book would be more enjoyable.
Still, it has its merits. The book does a good job of showing how Israel is not the only troubler for the people, but other Arab states also caused serious issues. The Palestinian people have suffered greatly the past 100 years or so. The book gives a good sense of the frustrations faced.
Still, it has its merits. The book does a good job of showing how Israel is not the only troubler for the people, but other Arab states also caused serious issues. The Palestinian people have suffered greatly the past 100 years or so. The book gives a good sense of the frustrations faced.
February 8, 2021
Interesting introduction to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Definitely not 100% comprehensive, but not bad. Had to read for class.
July 4, 2023
Very informative, with a lot of facts backed with references. Maybe a little too much information, and it certainly doesn't look like the "People" are done being made.
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January 17, 2024DNF
Despite Baruch Kimmerling being a supposed sympathic Jewish historian I found his veiled criticisms of the Palestinians to be annoying.
Despite Baruch Kimmerling being a supposed sympathic Jewish historian I found his veiled criticisms of the Palestinians to be annoying.
November 10, 2024
Great overview of history, but suffers from lack of and also terrible maps on a topic that really relies quite heavily on knowledge of land, both in terms of terrain and in terms of geography.
September 27, 2007
Really great read for those who are looking for some background on the history of the Palestinians.
October 12, 2021
Nomadic Arab tribes inhabiting the holy land under the Ottoman Empire are infused together into a people after the return of original inhabitants displace them into adjoining territories
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews