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Stanford Nuclear Age Series
A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War
In the United States the Cold War shaped our political culture, our institutions, and our national priorities. Abroad, it influenced the destinies of people everywhere. It divided Europe, split Germany, and engulfed the Third World. It led to a feverish arms race and massive sales of military equipment to poor nations. For at least four decades it left the world in a chronic state of tension where a miscalculation could trigger nuclear holocaust. Documents, oral histories, and memoirs illuminating the goals, motives, and fears of contemporary U.S. officials were already widely circulated and studied during the Cold War, but in the 1970s a massive declassification of documents from the Army, Navy, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and some intelligence agencies reinvigorated historical study of this war which became the definitive conflict of its time. While many historians used these records to explore specialized topics, this author marshals the considerable available evidence on behalf of an overall analysis of national security policy during the Truman years. To date, it is the most comprehensive history of that administration's progressive embroilment in the Cold War.
726 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1992
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About the author
Melvyn P. Leffler
18 books30 followersMelvyn Paul is an American historian and educator, currently Edward Stettinius Professor of History at the University of Virginia
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
December 12, 2021
In his book, Melvyn P. Leffler examines the results of the Truman administration's commitment to national security and the struggle against Communist domination.
While this work is a highly comprehensive study, which chronicles everything from the initial ambivalence toward the Soviets Truman demonstrated to the Truman Doctrine to the the Marshall Plan, to the Korean War, the analysis that caught my attention most centers on Truman's decision to support the French war effort in Indochina, making an important Cold War battleground out of it, and on the reason why that far-away corner of the French empire acquired such significance that Americans decided to intervene with economic and military aid.
According to the author, there are three main explanations for the Truman's administration decision – geostrategic, economic, and domestic.
The first reason why Vietnam came to the forefront of American concerns in the late 1940s is that the situation there increasingly seemed to be part of a global strategy of Communist aggression against the West and its interests. In the early post-war years, America was predominantly concerned with Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Following the Communist victory in China in 1949, though, the Truman administration policy-makers saw the threat was spreading to include Asia. Under these new circumstances, it was only natural that they extended their solution to Communist expansion in Europe — the containment of Soviet power within its existing bounds — to Asia. Because the American government assumed Ho Chi Minh was first and foremost a Communist, the 1950 decision to support the French war effort in Indochina was just one prong of a global effort to stop Communist expansion. That effort began with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and continued through a long chain of worldwide interventions designed to suppress challenges from the Kremlin and its allies wherever they arose.
A second explanation for Vietnam’s emergence as a major U.S. is the region’s economic value. While the American government was not guided by a belief that Vietnam’s natural resources and markets were vital to American prosperity, American business naturally wished for greater access to the French territories, and American officials occasionally worried that a Communist victory in Vietnam would deprive the United States of raw materials potentially useful to the American economy or national security. Those were minor considerations, though, because Vietnam offered little that could not be obtained elsewhere. Indochina’s economic assets were, as the CIA put it in 1950, merely “desirable,” not “absolutely essential.” Nevertheless, economic considerations did drive American policy. Many officials concluded by 1950 that Indochinese resources and markets mattered to the economic health of crucial American allies, especially Britain and Japan. Vietnam’s economic significance lay not in the territory’s contribution to the American economy but in its potential contribution to industrialized nations that American policy-makers regarded as vital to the recovery of the post-war world. In helping to keep Vietnam under French control, Washington sought to gain indirect benefits for America through direct benefits to its allies.
A third explanation for Vietnam’s emergence as a major American concern is domestic politics. After losing China to the Communists, the Truman administration fixed its attention on Southeast Asia and began sending American material assistance to the region to fend off critics at home. Harry Truman’s narrow re-election victory in 1948 left a frustrated Republican party looking for an issue it could use against the President. The administration’s failure, despite years of effort and vast expenditures, to prevent a Communist victory in China provided what the president’s enemies sought. As Mao triumphed in 1949, Republicans accused Truman and the Democrats of weak will and demanded vigorous action to prevent the further spread of Communism in Asia. Truman had little choice but to go along. The President not only feared political damage from charges of being soft on Communism but also saw no alternative to bold policies in Asia if he was to secure congressional support for his most cherished objective abroad – the construction of a strong relationship with free Europe. When Congress insisted in December 1949 that the administration spend $75 million to fight Communist insurgency in Asia, the White House accepted the task without opposition as the price of attaining its priorities in Europe.
The tragedy of American policymaking in the 1944–1950 period lies in the fact that the Truman administration squandered the considerable leverage it held over France to force a better outcome to the Indochina problem. That leverage was jettisoned by officials who accepted the overriding need to protect French prestige and influence at all costs – the stakes in Europe were high after all.
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25 1950 caused an abrupt intensification of American aid as American officials sought to bolster Western defenses against the possibility of Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia. By the end of the year, the Truman administration had increased its near-term commitments to Indochina to about $133 million. The National Security Council approved a paper insisting that the American government must back the French war effort “by all means practicable short of the actual employment of United States military forces.” Deliveries increased steadily. Washington sent about 11,000 tons of military equipment in 1950, 90,000 tons in 1951, 100,000 tons in 1952, and more than 170,000 tons in 1953. As fighting reached its peak in the spring of 1954, America bore more than 80 percent of the war’s material cost. In all, the United States paid nearly $3 billion over four years.
America had begun its journey toward the Vietnamese quagmire.
A PREPONDERANCE OF POWER is a truly impressive study. I have never read a more detailed and comprehensive study of the Truman administration's foreign policy. No matter what aspect of it interests you, you will undoubtedly find an informative analysis of it in this book. Since I am focusing on Vietnam right now, I decided to address this topic in my review, for I do not believe I can describe in-depth in one review all topics Leffler's work covers.
Another aspect I found interesting is his views on the Truman Doctrine, which he considers to be neither a reactionary policy that opposed the American government to freedom and social, political, and economic reforms, nor a solemn pledge by America to safeguard the world against Communism. Rather, he treats it as a flawed but nevertheless workable foreign policy designed to counter the Communist threat to freedom without resorting to large-scale conflict. The Truman Doctrine demonstrated the Truman administration's willingness to engage in the struggle against Communism on all fronts — social, political, economic, and military. The result was a foreign policy intended to meet all exigencies. The Truman Doctrine authorized American intervention in European affairs during peacetime, but it was also an effective response to Communist guerrilla warfare, in which victory lay in convincing democracy's enemies that they could not win. The problem with the Doctrine was that it tended to lead to military escalation, as in the case of Vietnam.
While this work is a highly comprehensive study, which chronicles everything from the initial ambivalence toward the Soviets Truman demonstrated to the Truman Doctrine to the the Marshall Plan, to the Korean War, the analysis that caught my attention most centers on Truman's decision to support the French war effort in Indochina, making an important Cold War battleground out of it, and on the reason why that far-away corner of the French empire acquired such significance that Americans decided to intervene with economic and military aid.
According to the author, there are three main explanations for the Truman's administration decision – geostrategic, economic, and domestic.
The first reason why Vietnam came to the forefront of American concerns in the late 1940s is that the situation there increasingly seemed to be part of a global strategy of Communist aggression against the West and its interests. In the early post-war years, America was predominantly concerned with Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Following the Communist victory in China in 1949, though, the Truman administration policy-makers saw the threat was spreading to include Asia. Under these new circumstances, it was only natural that they extended their solution to Communist expansion in Europe — the containment of Soviet power within its existing bounds — to Asia. Because the American government assumed Ho Chi Minh was first and foremost a Communist, the 1950 decision to support the French war effort in Indochina was just one prong of a global effort to stop Communist expansion. That effort began with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and continued through a long chain of worldwide interventions designed to suppress challenges from the Kremlin and its allies wherever they arose.
A second explanation for Vietnam’s emergence as a major U.S. is the region’s economic value. While the American government was not guided by a belief that Vietnam’s natural resources and markets were vital to American prosperity, American business naturally wished for greater access to the French territories, and American officials occasionally worried that a Communist victory in Vietnam would deprive the United States of raw materials potentially useful to the American economy or national security. Those were minor considerations, though, because Vietnam offered little that could not be obtained elsewhere. Indochina’s economic assets were, as the CIA put it in 1950, merely “desirable,” not “absolutely essential.” Nevertheless, economic considerations did drive American policy. Many officials concluded by 1950 that Indochinese resources and markets mattered to the economic health of crucial American allies, especially Britain and Japan. Vietnam’s economic significance lay not in the territory’s contribution to the American economy but in its potential contribution to industrialized nations that American policy-makers regarded as vital to the recovery of the post-war world. In helping to keep Vietnam under French control, Washington sought to gain indirect benefits for America through direct benefits to its allies.
A third explanation for Vietnam’s emergence as a major American concern is domestic politics. After losing China to the Communists, the Truman administration fixed its attention on Southeast Asia and began sending American material assistance to the region to fend off critics at home. Harry Truman’s narrow re-election victory in 1948 left a frustrated Republican party looking for an issue it could use against the President. The administration’s failure, despite years of effort and vast expenditures, to prevent a Communist victory in China provided what the president’s enemies sought. As Mao triumphed in 1949, Republicans accused Truman and the Democrats of weak will and demanded vigorous action to prevent the further spread of Communism in Asia. Truman had little choice but to go along. The President not only feared political damage from charges of being soft on Communism but also saw no alternative to bold policies in Asia if he was to secure congressional support for his most cherished objective abroad – the construction of a strong relationship with free Europe. When Congress insisted in December 1949 that the administration spend $75 million to fight Communist insurgency in Asia, the White House accepted the task without opposition as the price of attaining its priorities in Europe.
The tragedy of American policymaking in the 1944–1950 period lies in the fact that the Truman administration squandered the considerable leverage it held over France to force a better outcome to the Indochina problem. That leverage was jettisoned by officials who accepted the overriding need to protect French prestige and influence at all costs – the stakes in Europe were high after all.
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25 1950 caused an abrupt intensification of American aid as American officials sought to bolster Western defenses against the possibility of Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia. By the end of the year, the Truman administration had increased its near-term commitments to Indochina to about $133 million. The National Security Council approved a paper insisting that the American government must back the French war effort “by all means practicable short of the actual employment of United States military forces.” Deliveries increased steadily. Washington sent about 11,000 tons of military equipment in 1950, 90,000 tons in 1951, 100,000 tons in 1952, and more than 170,000 tons in 1953. As fighting reached its peak in the spring of 1954, America bore more than 80 percent of the war’s material cost. In all, the United States paid nearly $3 billion over four years.
America had begun its journey toward the Vietnamese quagmire.
A PREPONDERANCE OF POWER is a truly impressive study. I have never read a more detailed and comprehensive study of the Truman administration's foreign policy. No matter what aspect of it interests you, you will undoubtedly find an informative analysis of it in this book. Since I am focusing on Vietnam right now, I decided to address this topic in my review, for I do not believe I can describe in-depth in one review all topics Leffler's work covers.
Another aspect I found interesting is his views on the Truman Doctrine, which he considers to be neither a reactionary policy that opposed the American government to freedom and social, political, and economic reforms, nor a solemn pledge by America to safeguard the world against Communism. Rather, he treats it as a flawed but nevertheless workable foreign policy designed to counter the Communist threat to freedom without resorting to large-scale conflict. The Truman Doctrine demonstrated the Truman administration's willingness to engage in the struggle against Communism on all fronts — social, political, economic, and military. The result was a foreign policy intended to meet all exigencies. The Truman Doctrine authorized American intervention in European affairs during peacetime, but it was also an effective response to Communist guerrilla warfare, in which victory lay in convincing democracy's enemies that they could not win. The problem with the Doctrine was that it tended to lead to military escalation, as in the case of Vietnam.
July 29, 2011
Preponderance of pages.
April 22, 2018
A tremendous work of scholarship that just needed better editing and a different organization. The main argument is that the overall US grand strategy from 45-53 was to consolidate and preserve a preponderance of American power that would hamstring Soviet efforts to expand their influence, ensure the recovery of key allies, and eventually get the Soviets to change their goals and behavior. This is a broader way of looking at containment that I found useful.
Leffler has a balanced take on who/what caused the Cold War. He basically treats it as a security dilemma fed by ideological fears in which each side's minimal security requirements were seen as threatening by the other side, leading to a spiral of fear, anger, and eventually conflict (or in this case, Cold War). The USSR believed it had to consolidate power over the territory it controlled at the end of the war, which meant it had to put these states under the control of Communist parties, violating wartime agreements with the US. It also encouraged Communist parties to run for office in key states like Italy and France. The US, on the flip side, believed that it needed to restore the economies and democracies of Western Europe, including a revived German economy, in order to prevent a return to the autarky and radical nationalism of the 1930's. It then needed to integrate these countries, which meant they needed to make security commitments to the whole area to make that economic and political integration possible. What I'm describing wasn't a fully hatched plan but a developed understanding of how to preserve a preponderance of power and prevent the return of the conditions that caused the last WW and would now facilitate the rise of Communism. These steps, however, were seen as threatening to the USSR in strategic (felt surrounded by US clients and bases) and ideological terms. Each side wasn't considering out-and-out warfare, but they did see it as possible because of an accident or the actions of clients. These dynamics, according to Leffler, lie at the heart of the Cold War's onset.
Overall, Leffler has a fairly positive take on the Truman FP team. His primary critique, which I agreed with, is that these policy makers drastically exaggerated the importance of the "periphery," or non-industrialized, decolonizing states where much of the Cold War ended up playing out in real conflicts. They believed that control of the periphery, or at least denial of it to the USSR, was necessary to ensure the political and economic survival of the core. However, they overestimated the extent to which the USSR controlled communist rebellions on the periphery, downplayed the strong nationalist elements in many of these movements, and ultimately pursued myopic policies of backing reactionary authoritarians instead of more mild nationalists like Mossadeq, Allende, or Nkrumah. This approach to the periphery, along with the simplistic domino theory, lies at the heart of America's worst Cold War tragedy in Vietnam and its worst Cold War meddling in developing nations' politics. Much of our reputation as a global bully stems from the thinking laid down in this time period.
I admire Leffler's commitment to complexity and deep archival work. Parts of this book are absolutely illuminating, especially the outstanding conclusion, which I will definitely draw on for lectures in the future. However, the book is too dang long. 520 pages of small print just wore me out. Also, the book is structured in a way that makes it quite repetitive. You get, for instance, US policy toward China in 1946 in one chapter, 1947 in the next, then 1948, etc, multiplied by many regions of the world. It would have been much more useful to lay out grand strategic thinking in one or two big chapters and then show its application in different regions in individual chapters. This thematic organization isn't ideal for historians, but by 1990 there must have already been plenty of chronological histories of the early Cold War to draw on. Thus, I'm not terribly surprised that everyone in USFP circles has heard of this book but few have read it. It's ideas deserve to be dealt with, but even for someone who is comping in USFP or diplomatic history it would be better to find an article version of the book than the read the whole dang thing.
Leffler has a balanced take on who/what caused the Cold War. He basically treats it as a security dilemma fed by ideological fears in which each side's minimal security requirements were seen as threatening by the other side, leading to a spiral of fear, anger, and eventually conflict (or in this case, Cold War). The USSR believed it had to consolidate power over the territory it controlled at the end of the war, which meant it had to put these states under the control of Communist parties, violating wartime agreements with the US. It also encouraged Communist parties to run for office in key states like Italy and France. The US, on the flip side, believed that it needed to restore the economies and democracies of Western Europe, including a revived German economy, in order to prevent a return to the autarky and radical nationalism of the 1930's. It then needed to integrate these countries, which meant they needed to make security commitments to the whole area to make that economic and political integration possible. What I'm describing wasn't a fully hatched plan but a developed understanding of how to preserve a preponderance of power and prevent the return of the conditions that caused the last WW and would now facilitate the rise of Communism. These steps, however, were seen as threatening to the USSR in strategic (felt surrounded by US clients and bases) and ideological terms. Each side wasn't considering out-and-out warfare, but they did see it as possible because of an accident or the actions of clients. These dynamics, according to Leffler, lie at the heart of the Cold War's onset.
Overall, Leffler has a fairly positive take on the Truman FP team. His primary critique, which I agreed with, is that these policy makers drastically exaggerated the importance of the "periphery," or non-industrialized, decolonizing states where much of the Cold War ended up playing out in real conflicts. They believed that control of the periphery, or at least denial of it to the USSR, was necessary to ensure the political and economic survival of the core. However, they overestimated the extent to which the USSR controlled communist rebellions on the periphery, downplayed the strong nationalist elements in many of these movements, and ultimately pursued myopic policies of backing reactionary authoritarians instead of more mild nationalists like Mossadeq, Allende, or Nkrumah. This approach to the periphery, along with the simplistic domino theory, lies at the heart of America's worst Cold War tragedy in Vietnam and its worst Cold War meddling in developing nations' politics. Much of our reputation as a global bully stems from the thinking laid down in this time period.
I admire Leffler's commitment to complexity and deep archival work. Parts of this book are absolutely illuminating, especially the outstanding conclusion, which I will definitely draw on for lectures in the future. However, the book is too dang long. 520 pages of small print just wore me out. Also, the book is structured in a way that makes it quite repetitive. You get, for instance, US policy toward China in 1946 in one chapter, 1947 in the next, then 1948, etc, multiplied by many regions of the world. It would have been much more useful to lay out grand strategic thinking in one or two big chapters and then show its application in different regions in individual chapters. This thematic organization isn't ideal for historians, but by 1990 there must have already been plenty of chronological histories of the early Cold War to draw on. Thus, I'm not terribly surprised that everyone in USFP circles has heard of this book but few have read it. It's ideas deserve to be dealt with, but even for someone who is comping in USFP or diplomatic history it would be better to find an article version of the book than the read the whole dang thing.
February 26, 2016
How many times and in how many ways can you say that U.S. Cold War policy was driven by the desire to maintain a preponderance of power and prevent the Soviets from co-opting foreign industrial capacity? As Leffler demonstrates, the answer is MANY. 518 pages worth of "many," to be exact. This gets a little tedious somewhere around page 379.
November 3, 2009
A straight foward book with a simple thesis. It is a long and VERY repeatitve book.
October 31, 2025
When did the Cold War begin? Melvyn Leffler asserts it was with the sending of George Keenan’s “long telegram” in February 1946. Keenan’s strategic vision for the post-war world, grounded in a fear of Soviet intentions and capabilities, was quickly adopted by Truman and the leaders of his administration. The fulcrum of the foreign policy debate was Germany, how best to rehabilitate its economy without enabling its remilitarization. A unified Germany would require complex and ongoing cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Truman chose the simpler path of bifurcation, but this required setting up the Soviets as the bogeyman. The political strategy worked, even though Republicans regained control of Congress in the 1946 mid-terms, they were cowed into supporting anti-Communism as the foundation of US foreign policy.
Leffler asserts that by “preponderance” he means the US’s position of superiority economically, militarily, and industrially after WWII. The US used this preponderance of power, leveraged a manufactured fear of communism, and created the national security state and military-industrial complex that thrives to this day. Truman was a disciple of balanced budgets and set a cap on military budgets (that were still unprecedently high by peacetime standards); however, he maintained a policy of containment that stretched will beyond Europe and into the Middle East, Mediterranean, and the Pacific rim. Leffler criticizes Truman’s unwillingness to match means with ends, and highlights the intramural disputes this caused within the administration, with lawmakers, and our allies.
Leffler gives great latitude to the Truman administration’s evaluation of the Soviet’s threat and capabilities, although they mistakenly conflated Communist ideology with the actions and intent of the Kremlin. He is most critical over the distorted importance of the Third World and the reach of the “periphery” that that distortion influenced.
Leffler asserts that by “preponderance” he means the US’s position of superiority economically, militarily, and industrially after WWII. The US used this preponderance of power, leveraged a manufactured fear of communism, and created the national security state and military-industrial complex that thrives to this day. Truman was a disciple of balanced budgets and set a cap on military budgets (that were still unprecedently high by peacetime standards); however, he maintained a policy of containment that stretched will beyond Europe and into the Middle East, Mediterranean, and the Pacific rim. Leffler criticizes Truman’s unwillingness to match means with ends, and highlights the intramural disputes this caused within the administration, with lawmakers, and our allies.
Leffler gives great latitude to the Truman administration’s evaluation of the Soviet’s threat and capabilities, although they mistakenly conflated Communist ideology with the actions and intent of the Kremlin. He is most critical over the distorted importance of the Third World and the reach of the “periphery” that that distortion influenced.
October 20, 2017
Very insightful regarding the intricacies of the Truman administration in deciding foreign policy and framing the Cold War. A tad repetitive each chapter, but it serves to get the point across.
May 19, 2019
An comprehensive narrative and persuasive analysis of American policy during the Truman administration, but an awful read. No biography, no levity, no drama.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews