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The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment
Can God intervene in this world, and if so, to what extent? If God intervenes, can we initiate such intervention by prayer? And if God can intervene, why is evil so persistent?
Taking up such practical but profound questions, a coauthor of the much-discussed The Openness of God here offers a probing philosophical examination of freewill theism. This controversial view argues that the God of Christianity desires "responsive relationship" with his creatures. It rejects process theology, but calls for a reassessment of such classical doctrines as God's immutability, impassibility and foreknowledge.
David Basinger here especially considers divine omniscience, theodicy and petitionary prayer in freewill perspective. His careful and precise argument contributes to a growing and important discussion within orthodox Christian circles.
Taking up such practical but profound questions, a coauthor of the much-discussed The Openness of God here offers a probing philosophical examination of freewill theism. This controversial view argues that the God of Christianity desires "responsive relationship" with his creatures. It rejects process theology, but calls for a reassessment of such classical doctrines as God's immutability, impassibility and foreknowledge.
David Basinger here especially considers divine omniscience, theodicy and petitionary prayer in freewill perspective. His careful and precise argument contributes to a growing and important discussion within orthodox Christian circles.
154 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 1996
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May 29, 2025
A PHILOSOPHER EXPLAINS AND DEFENDS FREEDOM OF OUR WILLS
David Basinger teaches philosophy at Roberts Wesleyan College. He wrote in the Preface of this 1996 book, “Is this the best of all possible worlds?... Can God intervene in this world?... Can we initiate such intervention by prayer? Or is his activity much more general in scope?... what should we say when a child is born with a physical or mental abnormality, when a volcano kills over 20,000 people, or when starvation takes the lives of millions? Are these occurrences part of God’s will? Or does God, as much as we, wish that such things did not occur? The primary purpose of this book is to outline the manner in which proponents of one important theological perspective, which I label ‘freewill theism,’ conceive of the relationship between God and the world and thus … attempt to respond to questions such as these.” (Pg. 9)
He outlines in the Introduction, “to affirm ‘basic’ freewill theism (BFWT), as I will be using the phrase, is to hold that since God cannot control voluntary human choice, the fact that he has granted humanity significant, pervasive freedom of choice means that he has voluntarily given up total control over much of what occurs in the earthly realm… Are freewill theists justified in affirming BFWT[?]… [And] what else can (or cannot) be inferred about the nature of reality?” (Pg. 13)
He states, “God is never SURPRISED. Nor need he ever rely on LUCK or take any RISKS. God, rather, can unilaterally guarantee that all and only that which he has determined should occur in our world will in fact come about. Freely chosen human activities simply function as desired building blocks in God’s predestined creative plan.” (Pg. 29)
He observes, “to the extent that God grants individuals freedom, he gives up complete control over the decisions that are made.” (Pg. 33) Later, he explains, “I am going to assume that there is no necessary incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and human freedom.” (Pg. 42)
He states, “Proponents of PK [‘present knowledge’] do not deny that some prophetic utterances, when considered in isolation from the overall teaching of Scripture, can appear to presuppose infallible divine knowledge of future free choices. They maintain, rather, that all prophetic utterances can be interpreted as one of the following: an announcement ahead of time that what God intends to ensure will occur, conditional prophecies that leave the outcome open or predictions based on God’s exhaustive foreknowledge of the past and present. Not surprisingly, critics of PK often find such interpretations strained and unconvincing.” (Pg. 51)
He suggests, “We have seen that no necessary connection exists between BFWT and any specific model of divine omnipotence. I personally believe that God possesses only PK. However, as I see it, there is nothing inherent in BFWT itself that precludes other freewill theists from justifiably affirming either SFK [‘simple foreknowledge’] or MK [‘middle knowledge’].” (Pg. 55)
He summarizes, “Freewill theists … deny that God had (has) knowledge of any world (or even type of world) that could have initiated (or brought into being now) that would better satisfy God's creative goals. In short, they deny that this world contains any evil that God could remove and yet allows. Hence, they conclude that the evil in this world is not incompatible with the existence of the perfectly good, all-powerful being to whom they give allegiance, even if this world does contain many states of affairs that are inherently undesirable… freewill theists are not simply offering us a logical defense… We are being offered a theodicy. We are being told why freewill theists believe God’s existence can be affirmed, even if the reality of evil is granted.” (Pg. 88)
He argues, “freewill theists do NOT believe that God can unilaterally ensure that all and only that which he desires to come about will in fact occur in our world They maintain, rather, since God has chosen to create a world in which we possess significant freedom and since we can be significantly free only if he does not unilaterally control how this freedom is utilized, God voluntarily forfeits total control over earthly affairs in those cases where he allows us to exercise freedom of choice. Unlike proponents of process theism, freewill theists maintain that God does retain the power to intervene unilaterally in earthly affairs. Specifically, they believe that God retains the power to suspend freedom of choice and/or modify the natural order. Consequently, proponents of BFWT are not limited to conceiving of petitionary efficacy in only those ways in which such efficacy can be affirmed by proponents of theological determinism and process theism.” (Pg. 107-108)
This book will be of great interest to those studying topics such as Free Will, Open Theism, and related matters.
David Basinger teaches philosophy at Roberts Wesleyan College. He wrote in the Preface of this 1996 book, “Is this the best of all possible worlds?... Can God intervene in this world?... Can we initiate such intervention by prayer? Or is his activity much more general in scope?... what should we say when a child is born with a physical or mental abnormality, when a volcano kills over 20,000 people, or when starvation takes the lives of millions? Are these occurrences part of God’s will? Or does God, as much as we, wish that such things did not occur? The primary purpose of this book is to outline the manner in which proponents of one important theological perspective, which I label ‘freewill theism,’ conceive of the relationship between God and the world and thus … attempt to respond to questions such as these.” (Pg. 9)
He outlines in the Introduction, “to affirm ‘basic’ freewill theism (BFWT), as I will be using the phrase, is to hold that since God cannot control voluntary human choice, the fact that he has granted humanity significant, pervasive freedom of choice means that he has voluntarily given up total control over much of what occurs in the earthly realm… Are freewill theists justified in affirming BFWT[?]… [And] what else can (or cannot) be inferred about the nature of reality?” (Pg. 13)
He states, “God is never SURPRISED. Nor need he ever rely on LUCK or take any RISKS. God, rather, can unilaterally guarantee that all and only that which he has determined should occur in our world will in fact come about. Freely chosen human activities simply function as desired building blocks in God’s predestined creative plan.” (Pg. 29)
He observes, “to the extent that God grants individuals freedom, he gives up complete control over the decisions that are made.” (Pg. 33) Later, he explains, “I am going to assume that there is no necessary incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and human freedom.” (Pg. 42)
He states, “Proponents of PK [‘present knowledge’] do not deny that some prophetic utterances, when considered in isolation from the overall teaching of Scripture, can appear to presuppose infallible divine knowledge of future free choices. They maintain, rather, that all prophetic utterances can be interpreted as one of the following: an announcement ahead of time that what God intends to ensure will occur, conditional prophecies that leave the outcome open or predictions based on God’s exhaustive foreknowledge of the past and present. Not surprisingly, critics of PK often find such interpretations strained and unconvincing.” (Pg. 51)
He suggests, “We have seen that no necessary connection exists between BFWT and any specific model of divine omnipotence. I personally believe that God possesses only PK. However, as I see it, there is nothing inherent in BFWT itself that precludes other freewill theists from justifiably affirming either SFK [‘simple foreknowledge’] or MK [‘middle knowledge’].” (Pg. 55)
He summarizes, “Freewill theists … deny that God had (has) knowledge of any world (or even type of world) that could have initiated (or brought into being now) that would better satisfy God's creative goals. In short, they deny that this world contains any evil that God could remove and yet allows. Hence, they conclude that the evil in this world is not incompatible with the existence of the perfectly good, all-powerful being to whom they give allegiance, even if this world does contain many states of affairs that are inherently undesirable… freewill theists are not simply offering us a logical defense… We are being offered a theodicy. We are being told why freewill theists believe God’s existence can be affirmed, even if the reality of evil is granted.” (Pg. 88)
He argues, “freewill theists do NOT believe that God can unilaterally ensure that all and only that which he desires to come about will in fact occur in our world They maintain, rather, since God has chosen to create a world in which we possess significant freedom and since we can be significantly free only if he does not unilaterally control how this freedom is utilized, God voluntarily forfeits total control over earthly affairs in those cases where he allows us to exercise freedom of choice. Unlike proponents of process theism, freewill theists maintain that God does retain the power to intervene unilaterally in earthly affairs. Specifically, they believe that God retains the power to suspend freedom of choice and/or modify the natural order. Consequently, proponents of BFWT are not limited to conceiving of petitionary efficacy in only those ways in which such efficacy can be affirmed by proponents of theological determinism and process theism.” (Pg. 107-108)
This book will be of great interest to those studying topics such as Free Will, Open Theism, and related matters.
December 2, 2025
I gave this book a two because it’s written clearly enough that a non-academic can read it and understand the basic philosophical argument.
I was trying to understand how a friend could believe in a God who didn’t know the future to some degree, and to decide if there was any way I could agree with that friend that we both were acknowledging the God of the Bible. Having read this book (and on to the argument against it in the next, of course) I’m convinced that one cannot believe in the God of the Bible and essentially deny His sovereignty, for that is ultimately what this is.
I can understand someone’s desire to explain the problem of evil with a solution of God’s having middle instead of complete knowledge. When something really truly horrible happens, there is a temptation to believe God couldn’t have known about it, because if He DID know, and didn’t stop it…why?? Why did He let it happen?? How can you trust Him then?? Is He even good?? I just don’t agree that a person who ends up at freewill theism has come to a full understanding who God is. I think it’s the easiest way, intellectually, to grapple with the problem of evil.
Anyways. Long winded and mostly just my musings about the context in which I was reading (mostly because I wouldn’t have ventured to read it otherwise).
I was trying to understand how a friend could believe in a God who didn’t know the future to some degree, and to decide if there was any way I could agree with that friend that we both were acknowledging the God of the Bible. Having read this book (and on to the argument against it in the next, of course) I’m convinced that one cannot believe in the God of the Bible and essentially deny His sovereignty, for that is ultimately what this is.
I can understand someone’s desire to explain the problem of evil with a solution of God’s having middle instead of complete knowledge. When something really truly horrible happens, there is a temptation to believe God couldn’t have known about it, because if He DID know, and didn’t stop it…why?? Why did He let it happen?? How can you trust Him then?? Is He even good?? I just don’t agree that a person who ends up at freewill theism has come to a full understanding who God is. I think it’s the easiest way, intellectually, to grapple with the problem of evil.
Anyways. Long winded and mostly just my musings about the context in which I was reading (mostly because I wouldn’t have ventured to read it otherwise).
March 11, 2016
A decent introduction for the philosophical critic of Open Theism. This will allow him to gain some basic understanding on the matter of Open Theism.
In chapter 2, which explains different forms of omniscience, like Present Knowledge, Middle Knowledge and Simple Foreknowledge, the author thoroughly explains, in respective order, the relationship between these 3 ideas about God's (possible) omniscience and Freewill Theism (Open Theism). In the same chapter, on page 45 etc. he defeats William Lane Craig's argument which states that a God with Middle Knowledge can always bring about that we will have done what He wants us to have done.
Chapter 3 which discusses the relationship between God's omniscience and foreknowledge is a very interesting chapter. David Basinger shows that holding a form of present knowledge while holding a form of middle knowledge is possible. (The reviewer only holds to present knowledge, as does the author of this book.)
In chapter 5, the author shows that petitionary prayer works more logically coherent within Open Theism than it works, when talking about logical probability, in systems like Process Theism or Theological Determinism. He ends by showing that the Open Theist's approach to petitionary prayer remains paradoxical, since "Unlike theological determinists and process theists, proponents of BFWT [Open Theism] can maintain that such prayer is, in principle, efficacious in the sense that God sometimes refrains from doing that which he can and would like to do until requested to do so. However, since proponents of BFWT believe that God's decision to create a world in which individuals exercise meaningful freedom does in fact significantly limit his ability to intervene in earthly affairs, it seems quite probable that there are many prayers for assistance that the God of BFWT [Open Theism] would like to answer affirmatively but simply cannot" (p. 122).
The book shows that within Open Theism, there exists a very broad spectrum of approaches to many philosophical problems (in areas like ethics,...).
Sometimes the author looks at certain ideas through a too narrow scope. A clear example is:
"All freewill theists do as a matter of fact believe that God is at least obligated to attempt to prevent all preventable suffering (suffering that can be removed without negatively affecting God's creative goals)" (p. 82). Such is a philosophical piece, I, for one, do not agree with.
This makes him leave the general writing style of looking at the arguments from a neutral perspective. He often assumes, narrowing his scope, without proving anything. This is a significant weakness to his book.
In chapter 2, which explains different forms of omniscience, like Present Knowledge, Middle Knowledge and Simple Foreknowledge, the author thoroughly explains, in respective order, the relationship between these 3 ideas about God's (possible) omniscience and Freewill Theism (Open Theism). In the same chapter, on page 45 etc. he defeats William Lane Craig's argument which states that a God with Middle Knowledge can always bring about that we will have done what He wants us to have done.
Chapter 3 which discusses the relationship between God's omniscience and foreknowledge is a very interesting chapter. David Basinger shows that holding a form of present knowledge while holding a form of middle knowledge is possible. (The reviewer only holds to present knowledge, as does the author of this book.)
In chapter 5, the author shows that petitionary prayer works more logically coherent within Open Theism than it works, when talking about logical probability, in systems like Process Theism or Theological Determinism. He ends by showing that the Open Theist's approach to petitionary prayer remains paradoxical, since "Unlike theological determinists and process theists, proponents of BFWT [Open Theism] can maintain that such prayer is, in principle, efficacious in the sense that God sometimes refrains from doing that which he can and would like to do until requested to do so. However, since proponents of BFWT believe that God's decision to create a world in which individuals exercise meaningful freedom does in fact significantly limit his ability to intervene in earthly affairs, it seems quite probable that there are many prayers for assistance that the God of BFWT [Open Theism] would like to answer affirmatively but simply cannot" (p. 122).
The book shows that within Open Theism, there exists a very broad spectrum of approaches to many philosophical problems (in areas like ethics,...).
Sometimes the author looks at certain ideas through a too narrow scope. A clear example is:
"All freewill theists do as a matter of fact believe that God is at least obligated to attempt to prevent all preventable suffering (suffering that can be removed without negatively affecting God's creative goals)" (p. 82). Such is a philosophical piece, I, for one, do not agree with.
This makes him leave the general writing style of looking at the arguments from a neutral perspective. He often assumes, narrowing his scope, without proving anything. This is a significant weakness to his book.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews