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Keep from All Thoughtful Men: How U.S. Economists Won World War II
Keep from All Thoughtful Men overturns much accepted historical dogma on how World War II strategy was planned and implemented. It is taken for granted that the Axis powers were defeated by an avalanche of munitions that poured forth from pitiless American factories. So it is amazing that the story of how this "miracle of production" was organized and integrated into Allied strategy and operations remains untold.
Keep from All Thoughtful Men is the first book that tells how revolutions in both statistics and finance changed forever the nature of war. While the book relates the overall story of how economics dictated war planning at the highest levels, more specifically it tells how three obscure economists came to have more influence on the conduct of World War II than the Joint Chiefs. Because military historians rarely understand economics and economic historians just as rarely involve themselves with the details of war, there has never been a military history that shows how economics influenced the planning of strategy and the conduct of any war.
This is sadly true of even World War II, which has been called by Paul Samuelson, "The Economist's War."
Keep from All Thoughtful Men is the first book that tells how revolutions in both statistics and finance changed forever the nature of war. While the book relates the overall story of how economics dictated war planning at the highest levels, more specifically it tells how three obscure economists came to have more influence on the conduct of World War II than the Joint Chiefs. Because military historians rarely understand economics and economic historians just as rarely involve themselves with the details of war, there has never been a military history that shows how economics influenced the planning of strategy and the conduct of any war.
This is sadly true of even World War II, which has been called by Paul Samuelson, "The Economist's War."
288 pages, Hardcover
First published April 15, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
July 21, 2017
Jim Lacey’s Keep From All Thoughtful Men is a doubly ironic title for a book that lauds the unknown, critical role that economists played in the allied victory in World War II. For decades thoughtful and bright men and women have been ignorant of the importance of these individuals in the war effort. In addition, before and during the war, civilian and military decision makers at the highest policy levels likewise knew little of the innovative work of economists and statisticians that would ultimately ensure maximum productivity and production in both the civilian and military sectors. While the armed forces engaged Hitler and the Japanese Empire on the battlefield, intense bureaucratic and policy wars among the allies about war strategy transpired, with the outcomes determining the nature, course, and length of the war. Lacey’s book is the story of these wars and the role economists and statisticians played.
Lacey’s book is short—essentially 140 pages of text with a number of appendices that contain original documents pertinent to his story. After bemoaning history’s ignoring his protagonists’ role in the war, he gets on task with a description of how war strategies and the work of his heroes and heroines merge into a coherent whole. While World War II aficionados can easily identify a host of well known war personages and organizations such as FDR, George Marshall, Ike Eisenhower, Ernie King and the allied armed forces’ organizations, Lacey gives us a new list of equally talented individuals and organizations. We are introduced to people like the former CEO of General Motors William S. Knudsen, Donald Nelson, Robert R. Nathan, Simon Kuznets, and Stacy May and organizations like the War Production Board.
Lacey’s heroes worked with, and sometimes against, the military and civilian leadership to integrate war strategy and war production. Their accomplishments included developing the concepts of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and National Income (NI), which respectively accounted for current and projected production of product (goods and services) and labor income in the production of GDP. This enabled reasonably accurate projections of deliverable product several years into the future, both domestic and military. In addition a novel approach to war finance was created. This approach provided for the early printing of money to finance the rapid expansion of industry required after Pearl Harbor. Once this hurdle was overcome, the rapid growth of production and the expansion of real wealth helped keep inflation under control, along with price controls, the unavailability of durable goods (cars, appliances), and the general conservatism displayed by those who had seen the crash of the economy after World War I. For the first time war on an industrial scale was adequately financed. The limiting factor in American war production was never money. It was the available production capacity.
The focal point of Lacey’s work and the example he lives by to prove the invaluable role of the economists and statisticians in winning the war is the decision of when to invade Fortress Europe from the west. Politics drove a 1942 or 1943 invasion date, or at least the establishment of a beachhead. George Marshall and the Russians liked this idea and it had the support of FDR. However, as early as December 4, 1941, three days before Pearl Harbor, economist/statistician Stacy May knew this was impossibility. He and others determined then and throughout 1942 that the earliest possible invasion date was May 1944. Until then there would not be enough munitions or trained men on hand at the right time and in the right places to successfully invade. Lacey follows the story of Marshall’s coming to a similar decision, informed by several years of war and the work of the economists and statisticians.
Stepping back from the book, it is difficult to fathom the enormity of the task facing American civilian and military policy makers after Pearl Harbor. The United States was the key to any hope of victory. At the time it was industrially underperforming. Informed by Lacey’s miracle workers, these policy makers rapidly expanded the economy at the right pace and in the right places. In the end, the United States produced over 300,000 airplanes in five years, put 16 million people under arms, truly became the promised ‘arsenal of democracy’, without causing hardship at home. Lacey shows civilians were not asked to heroically sacrifice at home for the good of the troops. Such sacrifice was a myth. From 1941 to 1945 per capital domestic GDP increased every year. The only goods Americans did without were cars, appliances, housing in war production areas, and an occasion foodstuff such as sugar or butter. Everything else, including furniture, was in good supply. In the end, the war fighters, the equipment they needed, the transportation to get them around, and the places they lived in, were all provided, for the most part on time. There is no higher accolade for those who Stacey feats in Keep From All Thoughtful Men.
Lacey’s book is short—essentially 140 pages of text with a number of appendices that contain original documents pertinent to his story. After bemoaning history’s ignoring his protagonists’ role in the war, he gets on task with a description of how war strategies and the work of his heroes and heroines merge into a coherent whole. While World War II aficionados can easily identify a host of well known war personages and organizations such as FDR, George Marshall, Ike Eisenhower, Ernie King and the allied armed forces’ organizations, Lacey gives us a new list of equally talented individuals and organizations. We are introduced to people like the former CEO of General Motors William S. Knudsen, Donald Nelson, Robert R. Nathan, Simon Kuznets, and Stacy May and organizations like the War Production Board.
Lacey’s heroes worked with, and sometimes against, the military and civilian leadership to integrate war strategy and war production. Their accomplishments included developing the concepts of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and National Income (NI), which respectively accounted for current and projected production of product (goods and services) and labor income in the production of GDP. This enabled reasonably accurate projections of deliverable product several years into the future, both domestic and military. In addition a novel approach to war finance was created. This approach provided for the early printing of money to finance the rapid expansion of industry required after Pearl Harbor. Once this hurdle was overcome, the rapid growth of production and the expansion of real wealth helped keep inflation under control, along with price controls, the unavailability of durable goods (cars, appliances), and the general conservatism displayed by those who had seen the crash of the economy after World War I. For the first time war on an industrial scale was adequately financed. The limiting factor in American war production was never money. It was the available production capacity.
The focal point of Lacey’s work and the example he lives by to prove the invaluable role of the economists and statisticians in winning the war is the decision of when to invade Fortress Europe from the west. Politics drove a 1942 or 1943 invasion date, or at least the establishment of a beachhead. George Marshall and the Russians liked this idea and it had the support of FDR. However, as early as December 4, 1941, three days before Pearl Harbor, economist/statistician Stacy May knew this was impossibility. He and others determined then and throughout 1942 that the earliest possible invasion date was May 1944. Until then there would not be enough munitions or trained men on hand at the right time and in the right places to successfully invade. Lacey follows the story of Marshall’s coming to a similar decision, informed by several years of war and the work of the economists and statisticians.
Stepping back from the book, it is difficult to fathom the enormity of the task facing American civilian and military policy makers after Pearl Harbor. The United States was the key to any hope of victory. At the time it was industrially underperforming. Informed by Lacey’s miracle workers, these policy makers rapidly expanded the economy at the right pace and in the right places. In the end, the United States produced over 300,000 airplanes in five years, put 16 million people under arms, truly became the promised ‘arsenal of democracy’, without causing hardship at home. Lacey shows civilians were not asked to heroically sacrifice at home for the good of the troops. Such sacrifice was a myth. From 1941 to 1945 per capital domestic GDP increased every year. The only goods Americans did without were cars, appliances, housing in war production areas, and an occasion foodstuff such as sugar or butter. Everything else, including furniture, was in good supply. In the end, the war fighters, the equipment they needed, the transportation to get them around, and the places they lived in, were all provided, for the most part on time. There is no higher accolade for those who Stacey feats in Keep From All Thoughtful Men.
February 16, 2020
Keep from all Thoughtful Men is an excellent book and an excellent argument, but it is not, as the subtitle suggests, “How US Economists won WW2”. As Lacey covers himself in the text, the US would have produced what it did eventually, it would have just taken longer. It also doesn’t examine the role of US economists in WW2 broadly, but rather focuses specifically on the initial pre-war and early-war production planning, and the role of key economists in maximising output.
However, once getting past the marketing and into the actual scope of the book, what’s contained is excellent, well-researched and very eye-opening. Lacey, through the use of careful research and sensible inference, turned on its head many accepted conventions of the US mobilisation efforts. It also has many footnotes which include recommendations for further research, and eight appendices reproducing key documents from the ‘Victory program’ and ‘Feasibility debate’ issues, allowing readers to delve deeper and form their own opinions – something that for me is always a sign of a good historian.
The book is particularly excellent in covering the bureaucratic and organisational/political issues which lead to the issues facing the US ‘war production’ organisations, and their impact on war planning and execution (and particularly on the impact of production management on the timing of the invasion of France).
It’s well-written, and the economics it does cover is done in a way that is understandable and clear. An easy-to-recommend book for those interested in the history of high level US strategy in WW2.
However, once getting past the marketing and into the actual scope of the book, what’s contained is excellent, well-researched and very eye-opening. Lacey, through the use of careful research and sensible inference, turned on its head many accepted conventions of the US mobilisation efforts. It also has many footnotes which include recommendations for further research, and eight appendices reproducing key documents from the ‘Victory program’ and ‘Feasibility debate’ issues, allowing readers to delve deeper and form their own opinions – something that for me is always a sign of a good historian.
The book is particularly excellent in covering the bureaucratic and organisational/political issues which lead to the issues facing the US ‘war production’ organisations, and their impact on war planning and execution (and particularly on the impact of production management on the timing of the invasion of France).
It’s well-written, and the economics it does cover is done in a way that is understandable and clear. An easy-to-recommend book for those interested in the history of high level US strategy in WW2.
July 20, 2021
A good book, providing a detailed study of the intersection between strategy and war making capacity in the years immediately before and after the US entrance to WWII. The author, defense analyst and Johns Hopkins professor Jim Lacey, presents a unique history of major strategic and resource decision making. The subtitle, “How US Economists won WWII”, references the main argument of the work: that a small group of economists using the fairly new method of national economic statistics laid the foundation for the industrial and manpower output of the arsenal of democracy. Their work directly affected the major shift in US strategic planning that took place in late 1942. But that is only one element of the book. It also contains a useful analysis of the shift within the FDR administration from “Dr New Deal” to “Dr Win-the-War” and includes one of the most succinctly informative descriptions of the means used to pay for the war I’ve come across. I especially liked Lacey’s blow by blow description of the bureaucratic battles between the economists and the military acquisition chiefs. A great book for appreciating the critical link between strategic ends and resourcing means. Highly recommended for anyone wanting to better understand WWII’s Victory Program and Feasibility Crisis.
July 31, 2025
Good read for government and military strategists that are concerned with mobilizing the nation for the next Great War.
October 10, 2011
There is more to World War II than battles and campaigns. How the sinews of war were grown and exercised was just as important. "Keep from All Thoughtful Men", by Jim Lacey, outlines how planners in the United States figured out how to channel manufacturing strength into military output.
The contribution of economists to the war effort is understated, but should not be under-estimated. By asking Americans to forego buying a new car or washing machine for a few years, enough manufacturing capacity would be freed up to produce a super-abundance of planes, tanks, guns, and ships far in excess of any ally or enemy. Lacey also points out how the war sharpened the ability of the US government to calculate its economic output. The concept of Gross National Product had to be invented, just to give planners a number to manage from. We take that public data for granted today, but in the years leading up to the war, economic information on various industrial sectors was top secret.
The story, while important, is also boring. Lacey states and restates the details of bureaucratic infighting between the military and civilian halves of government. If you have no strong interest in this topic, you will find this a very, very lengthy short book.
To be fair to the author, he does uncover useful details that contradicts many thumbnail histories of the war. Lacey shows that Wedemeyer's memo outlining US grand strategy was unworkable. He also goes on to show that even Gen. George Marshall knew that there was no way the US was going to invade France in 1942 or 1943 for lack of war materiel. Output would finally reach estimated need in mid-1944, when the actual invasion took place.
For a dedicated scholar, the book is a useful addition. I know I will be keeping my copy. But Lacey's study will challenge the reader's endurance for digesting dry prose and memos. It is difficult to make economics exciting.
The contribution of economists to the war effort is understated, but should not be under-estimated. By asking Americans to forego buying a new car or washing machine for a few years, enough manufacturing capacity would be freed up to produce a super-abundance of planes, tanks, guns, and ships far in excess of any ally or enemy. Lacey also points out how the war sharpened the ability of the US government to calculate its economic output. The concept of Gross National Product had to be invented, just to give planners a number to manage from. We take that public data for granted today, but in the years leading up to the war, economic information on various industrial sectors was top secret.
The story, while important, is also boring. Lacey states and restates the details of bureaucratic infighting between the military and civilian halves of government. If you have no strong interest in this topic, you will find this a very, very lengthy short book.
To be fair to the author, he does uncover useful details that contradicts many thumbnail histories of the war. Lacey shows that Wedemeyer's memo outlining US grand strategy was unworkable. He also goes on to show that even Gen. George Marshall knew that there was no way the US was going to invade France in 1942 or 1943 for lack of war materiel. Output would finally reach estimated need in mid-1944, when the actual invasion took place.
For a dedicated scholar, the book is a useful addition. I know I will be keeping my copy. But Lacey's study will challenge the reader's endurance for digesting dry prose and memos. It is difficult to make economics exciting.
September 5, 2016
Lacey argues against the predominant narrative that Albert Wedemeyer's work formed the framework of the U.S. strategy for WWII. However, the intensity with which the author presents his argument detracts somewhat from the otherwise extensive analysis.
The remainder of the book is a detailed discussion of the influence of key economists in shaping the U.S. and Allied strategic plan for WWII. The author argues that these economists were the true shapers of the strategy. The book is useful in describing how a country must prepare for a large-scale wartime mobilization, as well as illustrating the importance of considering economic factors in these efforts.
This book will be most interesting for those studying history, economics, or the issues surrounding wartime mobilization. A reader will likely view it in terms of its usefulness, rather than its excitement value.
The remainder of the book is a detailed discussion of the influence of key economists in shaping the U.S. and Allied strategic plan for WWII. The author argues that these economists were the true shapers of the strategy. The book is useful in describing how a country must prepare for a large-scale wartime mobilization, as well as illustrating the importance of considering economic factors in these efforts.
This book will be most interesting for those studying history, economics, or the issues surrounding wartime mobilization. A reader will likely view it in terms of its usefulness, rather than its excitement value.
May 1, 2012
An important look at the role of production forecasting and feasibility studies in the US war production machine. It's not always as focused as it might be. It ends earlier than it might; discussion of how 1943 turned out from a production standpoint would be interesting. Still, a key book on the economic history of World War Two.
August 27, 2012
A mixed bag - fascinating topic but an argumentative writing style that engages in a debate I care little about. The book is about economists and strategic planning at the outset of World War II. A cool story told with too much effort aimed at establishing heroes and villains, and at counterposing an existing narrative that is far from common knowledge.
August 28, 2011
This is a short book about how economists help plan how much money the economy could support putting into the WWII war effort and then how to manage the economy and production so the maximum output was delivered. Few history books address this subject so it was an interesting insight.
May 3, 2014
This is a book about economics. If you're still reading this review after that statement, let me add that this is a wonderful look at the economic policies of the US in the beginning of World War II.
January 20, 2016
Lacey shows how the production of war materiels in the US dictated the course of WWII, and clears up the record on who exactly established the production plans. The book is a bit estoric and more than a bit argumentative, but interesting.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews