The tradition of Samkhya is one of the oldest and most influential in the intellectual history of India. The fundamental notions of Samkhya namely prakrti, purusa, buddhi, ahamkara, manas and the three gunas provided the conceptual framework in which much of Indian philosophizing occurred, and the classical formulations of Yoga and Vedanta together with many traditions of Buddhist philosophy and meditation developed vis-a-vis the intellectual perspective of the Samkhya. Similarly on a general cultural level the influence of Samkhya was profound and important over many centuries in such areas as law, medicine, ancient science and mathematics, logic, mythology, cosmology and ritual. This study traces the history of the Samkhya not only in the Indian intellectual tradition, but also in the traditions of historical criticism. The book also offers a new interpretation of the philosophical significance of the Samkhya, with special reference to the classical interpretation of the interaction of prakrti and purusa. In this edition author has also included a Chart of the Twenty-five Basic Principles of the Samkhya, a Glossary of Samkhya Terminology, an additional Appendix which surveys recent scholarly work in the area of Samkhya together with a discussion of Samkhya in the Purana-s and a revised Bibliography.
A scholarly exposition of an ancient Indian philosophical system.
I find Samkhya interesting because it is a form of dualism very different from the Cartesian dualism of the West. For Samkhya, mind itself is on the side of matter, quite apart from the pure translucent consciousness of puruṣa. And puruṣa doesn't have causal powers in the natural/mental world, it's more like an illuminating presence. No pineal gland required!
Doesn't this open the door to the paradoxical possibility of philosophical zombies, minds without qualia, lacking actual conscious experience? In Samkhya terms: buddhi/ahaṅkāra without puruṣa. That question doesn't seem to have troubled ancient members of the school though, at least judging from this book.
Another strange aspect of Samkhya is that is allows for a plurality of puruṣas, one for each person. But the concept of puruṣa is so rarefied and drained of personalizing detail (mind and volition lie at the other end of the dualism, remember) that it almost seems superfluous to admit more than one.
*My formal training is not in arts or philosophy or any language. This review should be treated as views of a lay person.
This book is based on the author's PhD thesis, a comprehensive review on how previous works (in modern times/tradition) had viewed both Samkhya and its development alongside several other schools of thought in India. The history in question is over a long period. Comparisons are given with the oldest Brahmanas and Upanishads from the RigVeda, all the way through the standardised classical Samkhya that was firmly established by the 5-6th century. It is also suggested how the philosophy may well have flirted with adwaita before firmly becoming dwaita in its classical form, and thus how it may have gone through stages of idealistic monism and blatant theism, both contrary to its currently accepted character.
The work stays around the Karika, which is the oldest surviving Samkhya work. The Karika's position in Samkhya is comparable to that of Patanjali YogaSutras' position in the Yoga tradition. It is shown how the Karika came about after a long period of exchanges with the other Hindu darsanas. The summaritive character of the SamkhyaKarika is discussed - the text was written as a consolidation of Samkhya's position at that point of time. Very very interesting were the discussions that author included in relation to the Samkhya tradition in China. These references will hold important parallel references between the various Samkhya traditions for scholars to use, especially for those texts that have gone missing or been destroyed in Indian mainland over the centuries. Another interesting source of comments on the Samkhya tradition are 11th century observations of AlBeruni.
There are no discussions on the metre used in the text, not that this reviewer would be able to comment on if the discussion were there. The philosophical development is traced in terms of the concepts as and when they appeared in other firmly established texts spread all over Vedic corpus, other central traditions such as Yogasutras and the several sub-texts of the MBh. A confusing point here related to the cross-references with Moksadharma - one finds there is no isolated text by the name. Moksadharma is actually in Shanti Parva of the MBh. It is interesting how a firmly dwaita tradition such as how we know Samkhya now, has exact cross references with the relatively more accessible (compared to Vedic literature) texts such as the MBh.
Apart from the borrowings from older astik traditions, Samkhya's development through history is filled with interactions with developing Buddhist thought. Both the schools rely on literally 'samkhya' or enumeration of tattvas (principles). What Samkhya does perhaps in a less dogmatic way than Buddhist schools is the technical elimination of the need for a fundamental consciousness or 'god' in order to become free from the cycle of death. Purusa in Samkhya does not act. It is consciousness, but remains inactive. The level of detailed interaction of this tattva is clearly different from how god is simply 'left out' from Buddhism. The latter is silent, while Samkhya can allow it a place, while not strictly requiring it to play a role in the enumerated scheme of things. From the plenty discussions of Prakriti and Purursa's interactions, which occur in ever present background while the Pradhana/mulaprakriti construct a reality, the concept of god does not play an active role, and stays firmly on the side of Prakriti. They are allowed to exist, but as a byproduct of the incumbent interaction [see for ex pages 26, 126, 132, 198]. Rather, there is in places an emphasis on classical yoga like practices. This absence (of active role of god(s) at the very least) has a firmer basis in the theory of Prakriti-Purursa interaction than would be seen in Buddhistic philosophies.
The writing is as a good academic document ought to read - lucid, to the point and balanced. Every claim is supported by ample list of resources, all of which are easily available, many of which as BG, Principal Upanishads and the Buddhist dogmas are matter of common knowledge. It is a dense work, and all except for Sankara's criticism of Samkhya are accessible for a lay person not trained in philosophy.
[The text beyond here may be ignored] Here the individual's suffering is well placed in the context of the confusion that results from the interaction of Prakriti and Purusa. The suffering is natural and basic - much like the materialism, which is basic. The materialistic Prakriti will exist on its own, and so will the Purusa. The interaction between the two will be experienced by the Prakriti's internal instruments: buddhi, ahamkara and manas. Though these are mere evolutes of the interaction, it appears buddhi can still develop enough viveka and pierce through the confusion. What a practitioner is asked to do, is to use the evolutes to separate the evolving tattvas (principles) from the ever-unchanging (Purusa). What is left at the end? It seems only the discriminating knowledge is left at the end. This intuitive discrimination is achieved by the buddhi. Does it stay in the buddhi? But then this knowledge is still only perceived through a primal evolute of Prakriti. So how is the discrimination kept steady and maintained?
This study traces the history of the Samkhya in the Indian intellectual tradition as well as in the traditions of historical criticism. The book also offers a new interpretation of the philosophical significance of the Samkhya. In the Epilogue the author examines Sankaras' critique of the Samkhya and reconstructs what the Samkhya rejoinder could have been.