Of all the French theorists of the 20th century, Barthes has to be one of the more accessible ones. That being said, this already-short book contained a fair amount of fluff, and could have easily been half its length. I unfortunately wasn't able to appreciate the shorter, second section which expanded on examples from French literature. The only authors I had read included Camus, Hugo, and Maupassant, as well as fragments from Flaubert and Baudelaire. Really, the only thing I got from the second section of this book was how hopelessly bourgeois the French are, that despite repeated attempts to rid themselves of the rich, they keep creating a rich, pretentious upper class. Curious.
The first section of the book was sometimes less interesting in Barthes original (?) ideas than it was in elucidating implicit tactics that leftists today use with language. This centers around pages 23-4, where he talks about Marxism and Stalinism's relationship to language. He explains that:
For instance, the word 'imply', frequently encountered in Marxist writing, does not there have its neutral dictionary meaning; it always refers to a precise historical process, and is like an algebraical sign representing a whole bracketed set of previous postulates.
By this, Barthes is explaining why leftists today use clickbait-flavored, inaccurate, gimmicky slogans, then get confused at your alarm. For example, when leftists say that "math is racist," this is obviously, on the face of it, a stupid statement. Numbers are genderless, colorless, simple things, and it's self-evident that there is nothing racist about math per se. But what a leftist means by "math is racist" is a whole litany of presumptions, assumptions, leaps of logic, and more, including "POC are under-represented in mathematics" and other non-sequiturs. The same thing happened in 2020 when people chanted "defund the police." When I asked leftoids what they meant by this, they said "we don't REALLY mean defund the police, at least not entirely... just take some of that money and put it into community projects." Two things to note from all this balderdash: 1) This is unforgivably sloppy usage of language, and 2) the onus was/is always implicitly on you and me for not understanding, rather than on them for not explaining. But this shouldn't surprise us, especially if you've ever read any Derrida or other extremely dense literary criticism, because they don't explain any of the terms they use, and if they do they're the most oblique, opaque, unclear definitions you've read. But, remember, it's your fault! I wonder why the lower class is largely conservative... It's almost like leftist academics are hopelessly divorced from the common working person and are quite literally incapable of distilling their ideas down into a simpler format...
Anywho, on the next page of Barthes, he brought up Stalinism and how it [always, already] attaches value judgements to all language; in a radical reversal of Friedrich Nietzsche, who sought to move "beyond good and evil," Stalinists (and by extension many Marxists) moralize all language. This is why you'll read about some of the more clear-sighted authors of the 20th century remarking on Christianity and communism both being religions with their own systems of morality, heresy, dogma, etc. What was especially helpful on this page of Barthes, however, was his remark that "tautology [was] a device constantly used in Stalinist writing." So, for example, instead of needing to state that a white person is racist, "whiteness" merely gets imbued with racism implicitly and inherently. This shortcut short-circuits a whole series of "logic" which preceded it, and serves both as a shorthand for the believers and a quick harrowing tool with which to sift out the heretics and burn them with the rest of the chaff. Once again, this tautological approach to language does incredible violence and damage not only to the language itself, but the people who use it in such a sloppy way. I shudder to think of how these people's children would use language, that is, if they actually had any.
As for Barthes' actual ideas, they're not as interesting as most other works of lit crit that I've read, and his multiple attempts to namedrop the title of the book prove a bit underwhelming. In the beginning, I saw quite a few parallels with Derrida's remarks on literature, especially about it being an institution, its culmination as an absence, that writing is not an instrument for communication, etc. The main chronology that Barthes interacts with is contrasting the "Classical" age of literature (by which he doesn't mean the Greeks, but the 1600s to the mid 1800s) with the modern era, which looked at art and literature in a strange new way. Classical art and literature was "transparent" (3) in that it was frank about its artificiality; it was self-evident in a way which "realism" attempted to escape from, but ultimately failed at, bringing only more attention to the artifice of art ("realism is far from being neutral, it is on the contrary loaded with the most spectacular signs of fabrication," p. 68). This culminated in much modern art being unable to do anything else, i.e. only being a self-referential statement about "point[ing] to its own mask" (35). This of course becomes tedious quickly, as the dead-end experienced in the plastic arts via "minimalism." The realization that this has led to a dead end has spawned a new movement, one relishing in derangement.
I think it's accurate to point to realism as the culprit and starting point of where it went wrong. Barthes talks about the "ambiguity of a double object, at once believable and false" (33); I think that the word "believable" is extremely important here. Traditional art never sought literal truth, but rather believably, recognizability. Mimesis was never an imitation in every facet, but only extended so far. Premodern art was never confused for the real thing; even a lifelike sculpture wrought by the old masters was a piercing, cold marble color. It's almost as if the early moderns, upon their "rediscovery" of Plato (was he ever really lost? the Church always had him, but held him at arm's length, as he should be!) was disastrous insofar as the rediscovery caricatured him and his teachings. It attempted to divorce certain utilitarian aspects of him from his deeply premodern, enchanted worldview.
Perhaps the best chapter of the book asked "Is There Any Poetic Writing?" Barthes explains what he means by defining Classical poetry as that which "is made more socially acceptable by virtue of the very conspicuousness of its conventions" (42), whereas modern poetry is comparatively unmoored, an attempt to escape the tradition and bring to mind all connotations of each word simultaneously, rather than just the poetic connotations. He calls such poetry "encyclopedic" on p. 48 because each word gets "reduced to a sort of zero degree, pregnant with all past and future specifications." Such rupture produces extremely generative gaps, whereby poetry has the potential to flourish, but it just as easily has the potential to stagnate in chaotic solipsism. As Barthes notes on p. 45, Classical poetry emphasizes "expression, not invention;" I expanded this to other examples, such as "conformity, not originality" and "tradition, not innovation." Thus, classical poetry is much more "relational;" it's in conversation with the poetry which came before, as well as each word being in direct relation to a set of rules, to the word that came before, and to the word which follows (44). Thus, there is a high emphasis placed on transitions, on continuity, on unity, whereas modern poetry and art atomizes, objectifies, isolates, diverges (50). I was pleasantly surprised at this realization, since I also favor transitions highly, and now I perhaps understand a bit better why.