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Markets Never Forget (But People Do): How Your Memory Is Costing You Money—and Why This Time Isn’t Different
Sir John Templeton, legendary investor, was famous for saying, "The four most dangerous words in investing are, 'This time it's different.'" He knew that though history doesn't repeat, not exactly, history is an excellent guide for investors. In Markets Never Forget But People Do: How Your Memory Is Costing You Money and Why This Time Isn't Different , long-time Forbes columnist, CEO of Fisher Investments, and 4-time New York Times bestselling author Ken Fisher shows how and why investors' memories fail them―and how costly that can be. More important, he shows steps investors can take to begin reducing errors they repeatedly make. The past is never indicative of the future, but history can be one powerful guide in shaping forward looking expectations. Readers can learn how to see the world more clearly―and learn to make fewer errors―by understanding just a bit of investing past.
240 pages, Hardcover
First published October 4, 2011
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April 26, 2020
Take a phrase that has already become widespread in 2020 due to the market crash and Covid-19 pandemic: we are living in a "new normal". Is it true? Only time will tell, but as Fisher shows, the "new normal" is rarely borne out. Exact copies of this phrase have been used by journalists for all the major crises one could recall. Case in point, Fishers piles up headlines from 2008's Great Recession, 2003's Tech Bubble / 9-11 Fallout, 1987's Black Monday, 1959's volatility, and the 1939's Great Depression fallout. In each case, journalists posited a fundamental shift in how markets function—shortly before markets had normal recoveries to bull markets. Fisher's key insight being that large downturns and recoveries are normal parts of the market cycle itself and don't portend radical departures into "new" normals.
Even more damning is Fisher's exposure of the new "new normal" pronouncements as the market starts the typical recovery. For example, from 2009 to 2011 journalists shifted focus from the "normal" secular bear market to seemingly unusual aspects of the recovery. Again Fisher shows that these headlines simply describe typical patterns of economic recovery. This contextualization of apocalyptic thinking is the primary value of Fisher's perspective. He has a great knowledge of and aptitude for using the history of financial journalism against itself. He continues this effective format for other headline grabbing topics like national debt, short-term vs. long-term market returns, volatility and risk, secular bear markets, and globalization. (A striking example to counter the fears of growing national debt: The UK carried debt above 100% of GDP (peaking above 250%!) for more than a century of healthy growth and economic dominance. Essentially, debt doesn't really matter for developed economies).
On the flip side, Fisher's journalism background results in writing that sometimes comes across as exaggerated, brazen, overly simplistic, repetitive, and focused on peculiar insights instead of consistent argument. No doubt many of these qualities are often the tokens of good journalism. In book form, however, they become tedious and detract from the stated purpose of the book, which is to show how people constantly forget the ways markets are consistent over time. These negative qualities can be seen in three major examples: Fisher's tangents, exaggerated attacks on investors' stupidity, and brazen statements about non-financial matters.
First, the only appendix materials Fisher includes is a few pages on how Baum's The Wizard of Oz is an allegory for the political fight over monetary policy in the 1890's. Interesting tidbit, no doubt, but how does it relate to the book's central theme of people forgetting how markets perform? Well, it doesn't. The appendix is referenced in the text as a reason for Kansas being important on the political stage in a discussion about the regional homes of presidents (which itself is marginally important to the book's thesis). Instead of this tangent, the appendix would've been better used for explaining cursory references to his other books and specific economic theories (like the quantity theory of money). And instead of the foray into election dynamics and regional differences, this chapter on politics would've better served the book's purpose by sticking to its preliminary discussion about political parties, presidents, and their historical (lack of) effect on average market returns.
Second, the content of the writing often picks out effigies to burn with comical putdowns. Talking heads are "chittering chimpanzees" (11). Market worriers are "Dumb Bears" (11). People forgetful of market history have "Swiss-cheese monkey memory" (3). Politics are "poly-tics"—i.e. many blood-sucking tics (Chapter 7). I generally just dislike this style of writing, but more to the point, this style may lead the reader to a false sense of superiority. Granted, people make poor decisions, but there are often evolutionary, psychological, and economic reasons for these decisions (See Howard Marks or Benjamin Graham for better treatment of these maladaptations). Explaining these reasons would lead to better investment decisions and empathetic conversations with others about investing (which makes others more likely to listen).
Finally, Fisher's overly simplistic dismissal of contrary views is revealed in his opinions on subject areas outside of economics, like climate change:
I'm not saying Fisher is obviously wrong, but the experts have been warning us about climate change's catalyzing effect on the intensity of natural disasters. And perhaps it it isn't a sizable increase, but natural disasters cause more loss of value now because we have more value to lose. On either point, a simple repetition of history doesn't seem immediately obvious and Fisher doesn't provide any evidence for this point. He does provide plenty of quotes and charts for financial events, but doesn't offer any specifically for natural disasters and their economic effects over time.
After a while I no longer enjoyed the book because of this style—it drags down the main point. I kept reading because Fisher's deployment of journalistic history still provides concrete insights for the investor who is seeing similar headlines in daily life. Even the giants of value investing don't use this kind of concrete evidence (more often, market psychology is discussed abstractly in terms of value fundamentals and principles). So this book is worth reading. Condensing it by half might even reveal a classic.
Even more damning is Fisher's exposure of the new "new normal" pronouncements as the market starts the typical recovery. For example, from 2009 to 2011 journalists shifted focus from the "normal" secular bear market to seemingly unusual aspects of the recovery. Again Fisher shows that these headlines simply describe typical patterns of economic recovery. This contextualization of apocalyptic thinking is the primary value of Fisher's perspective. He has a great knowledge of and aptitude for using the history of financial journalism against itself. He continues this effective format for other headline grabbing topics like national debt, short-term vs. long-term market returns, volatility and risk, secular bear markets, and globalization. (A striking example to counter the fears of growing national debt: The UK carried debt above 100% of GDP (peaking above 250%!) for more than a century of healthy growth and economic dominance. Essentially, debt doesn't really matter for developed economies).
On the flip side, Fisher's journalism background results in writing that sometimes comes across as exaggerated, brazen, overly simplistic, repetitive, and focused on peculiar insights instead of consistent argument. No doubt many of these qualities are often the tokens of good journalism. In book form, however, they become tedious and detract from the stated purpose of the book, which is to show how people constantly forget the ways markets are consistent over time. These negative qualities can be seen in three major examples: Fisher's tangents, exaggerated attacks on investors' stupidity, and brazen statements about non-financial matters.
First, the only appendix materials Fisher includes is a few pages on how Baum's The Wizard of Oz is an allegory for the political fight over monetary policy in the 1890's. Interesting tidbit, no doubt, but how does it relate to the book's central theme of people forgetting how markets perform? Well, it doesn't. The appendix is referenced in the text as a reason for Kansas being important on the political stage in a discussion about the regional homes of presidents (which itself is marginally important to the book's thesis). Instead of this tangent, the appendix would've been better used for explaining cursory references to his other books and specific economic theories (like the quantity theory of money). And instead of the foray into election dynamics and regional differences, this chapter on politics would've better served the book's purpose by sticking to its preliminary discussion about political parties, presidents, and their historical (lack of) effect on average market returns.
Second, the content of the writing often picks out effigies to burn with comical putdowns. Talking heads are "chittering chimpanzees" (11). Market worriers are "Dumb Bears" (11). People forgetful of market history have "Swiss-cheese monkey memory" (3). Politics are "poly-tics"—i.e. many blood-sucking tics (Chapter 7). I generally just dislike this style of writing, but more to the point, this style may lead the reader to a false sense of superiority. Granted, people make poor decisions, but there are often evolutionary, psychological, and economic reasons for these decisions (See Howard Marks or Benjamin Graham for better treatment of these maladaptations). Explaining these reasons would lead to better investment decisions and empathetic conversations with others about investing (which makes others more likely to listen).
Finally, Fisher's overly simplistic dismissal of contrary views is revealed in his opinions on subject areas outside of economics, like climate change:
Geopolitical tension is as old as mankind, as are war and even terror attacks. Natural disasters aren't new! And this idea that natural disasters are bigger, badder and more frequent now simply isn't true. Only human arrogance allows us to believe we're living in some new, unique age. (2)
I'm not saying Fisher is obviously wrong, but the experts have been warning us about climate change's catalyzing effect on the intensity of natural disasters. And perhaps it it isn't a sizable increase, but natural disasters cause more loss of value now because we have more value to lose. On either point, a simple repetition of history doesn't seem immediately obvious and Fisher doesn't provide any evidence for this point. He does provide plenty of quotes and charts for financial events, but doesn't offer any specifically for natural disasters and their economic effects over time.
After a while I no longer enjoyed the book because of this style—it drags down the main point. I kept reading because Fisher's deployment of journalistic history still provides concrete insights for the investor who is seeing similar headlines in daily life. Even the giants of value investing don't use this kind of concrete evidence (more often, market psychology is discussed abstractly in terms of value fundamentals and principles). So this book is worth reading. Condensing it by half might even reveal a classic.
August 22, 2018
Many years ago money manager Ken Fisher with Super Stocks wrote one of the few useful books on GARP-investing. With the more recent The Only Three Questions that Counts he concentrated on the construction of a rational investment process. This time he zooms in on Behavioural Finance from a practitioner’s perspective. The book is a cry to analyse and learn from history. Amen to that.
Fisher takes off from Sir John Templeton’s combination of belief in entrepreneurship and his realization that most of the events we see today seldom differ in any material way from historical events, hence the quote “The four most expensive words in the English language are, ‘This time it’s different.’” To be able to see how business creates value and prosperity over time and to put today’s events in perspective one has to have a grip of history. Most of us think we do, when in reality we actually don’t.
Not only do we forget prior events so that we don’t learn from them. More importantly, we forget our feelings during those prior events. The effect of this is that we experience current feelings more intensely than we remember our feelings the last time something similar happened. The conclusion then is that today’s events must be more important and unique than yesterdays. We lose perspective. By analysing history we can see more clearly and avoid walking into the same psychological traps time after time. “At its basics, investing is a probabilities game; it’s not a certainties game.” “[...] while investing is a probabilities game, it’s not a possibilities game.” Almost all tail events are possible but that doesn’t mean you should invest into situations with bad odds. By “remembering” you can base investments on probabilities based on historical outcomes instead of personal gut feelings. “Market history is a lab. A testing ground for your hypothesis.” If there has been no correlation between two events in history it takes a strong fundamental reason for it to be a link going forward. History presents a way of applying probabilities to forecasts.
After a brilliant preface and great first chapter you get the feeling that this could be the author’s most important book ever. I don’t think the rest of the text lives up to this – at least not if you have read any of Fishers previous books. The remaining chapters present a number of topics that Fisher thinks are misrepresented in the investment public’s collective memory. They span over double dips, volatility, secular bear markets, the importance of debt, political influence on the stock market etc. Instead of reviewing these topics it would have been extremely interesting, as I see it, to know how Fisher (who after all is the founder of an asset management firm) would construct the organization, process, incentive schemes etc. of an investment firm to minimize the effect that psychological traps – like forgetting history - have on investment results.
I personally like Fisher’s “grumpy old man”-style of writing. There is no questioning his passion for making the investment world a tad more rational or that the topics are thought-provoking, but he has written about them previously. I also don’t agree with Fisher’s unwillingness to recognize that, even though there are no economic secular bear markets, there are differences in expected returns for the coming decade based on starting valuation in for example Shiller-PE’s or Tobin q’s. This is what history teaches us.
Fisher is a long-standing columnist in Forbes. The fact that he for many years has had to structure his investment thoughts and put them into ink has made him one of the sharpest thinkers in finance. The topic of this book is deadly important but I would have wanted Fisher to try a little harder.
Fisher takes off from Sir John Templeton’s combination of belief in entrepreneurship and his realization that most of the events we see today seldom differ in any material way from historical events, hence the quote “The four most expensive words in the English language are, ‘This time it’s different.’” To be able to see how business creates value and prosperity over time and to put today’s events in perspective one has to have a grip of history. Most of us think we do, when in reality we actually don’t.
Not only do we forget prior events so that we don’t learn from them. More importantly, we forget our feelings during those prior events. The effect of this is that we experience current feelings more intensely than we remember our feelings the last time something similar happened. The conclusion then is that today’s events must be more important and unique than yesterdays. We lose perspective. By analysing history we can see more clearly and avoid walking into the same psychological traps time after time. “At its basics, investing is a probabilities game; it’s not a certainties game.” “[...] while investing is a probabilities game, it’s not a possibilities game.” Almost all tail events are possible but that doesn’t mean you should invest into situations with bad odds. By “remembering” you can base investments on probabilities based on historical outcomes instead of personal gut feelings. “Market history is a lab. A testing ground for your hypothesis.” If there has been no correlation between two events in history it takes a strong fundamental reason for it to be a link going forward. History presents a way of applying probabilities to forecasts.
After a brilliant preface and great first chapter you get the feeling that this could be the author’s most important book ever. I don’t think the rest of the text lives up to this – at least not if you have read any of Fishers previous books. The remaining chapters present a number of topics that Fisher thinks are misrepresented in the investment public’s collective memory. They span over double dips, volatility, secular bear markets, the importance of debt, political influence on the stock market etc. Instead of reviewing these topics it would have been extremely interesting, as I see it, to know how Fisher (who after all is the founder of an asset management firm) would construct the organization, process, incentive schemes etc. of an investment firm to minimize the effect that psychological traps – like forgetting history - have on investment results.
I personally like Fisher’s “grumpy old man”-style of writing. There is no questioning his passion for making the investment world a tad more rational or that the topics are thought-provoking, but he has written about them previously. I also don’t agree with Fisher’s unwillingness to recognize that, even though there are no economic secular bear markets, there are differences in expected returns for the coming decade based on starting valuation in for example Shiller-PE’s or Tobin q’s. This is what history teaches us.
Fisher is a long-standing columnist in Forbes. The fact that he for many years has had to structure his investment thoughts and put them into ink has made him one of the sharpest thinkers in finance. The topic of this book is deadly important but I would have wanted Fisher to try a little harder.
October 24, 2019
loved the book, especially the examples of "new normal"-it's been around forever. Also, info. on "jobless recoveries" great as well. Pretty much every recovery is a jobless one initially. Since 1854, only three double dips have occurred, thereby dispelling another myth pundits worry about.
He takes on "secular bear markets" as well and emphasizes the outsized gains during bull markets that must occur to "average" 10%. People are under the mistaken notion that you get 10% year after year in the S and P 500, when in fact you get "lumpy" returns and much higher than 10% when the market is moving up (stock market).
Also, great reminder that Presidents usually don't influence the market for very long.
Great behavioral investing stuff in this book with nice examples to illustrate.
He takes on "secular bear markets" as well and emphasizes the outsized gains during bull markets that must occur to "average" 10%. People are under the mistaken notion that you get 10% year after year in the S and P 500, when in fact you get "lumpy" returns and much higher than 10% when the market is moving up (stock market).
Also, great reminder that Presidents usually don't influence the market for very long.
Great behavioral investing stuff in this book with nice examples to illustrate.
August 2, 2023
I think this book is pretty good at using long term data on markets to convey a point that in the long run equities are a superior vehicle for wealth accumulation.
- Daily vol is historically normal.
- Market returns come in bursts, not at an average pace.
- More than 2/3 of the time market is either flat or up annually.
- Most of the investors are underweight international equities, even though international returns are comparable to US, and would help to further diversify portfolio risk.
- There is lots of scare mongering, and it is intellectually satisfying to be a skeptic, but the reality is most of the time, being invested is the way to go. For example, out of observed recessionary periods, only 10% had a "double dip."
- Daily vol is historically normal.
- Market returns come in bursts, not at an average pace.
- More than 2/3 of the time market is either flat or up annually.
- Most of the investors are underweight international equities, even though international returns are comparable to US, and would help to further diversify portfolio risk.
- There is lots of scare mongering, and it is intellectually satisfying to be a skeptic, but the reality is most of the time, being invested is the way to go. For example, out of observed recessionary periods, only 10% had a "double dip."
May 21, 2025
【跟著肯恩費雪洞悉市場】讀後感
作者： Ken Fisher, Lara Hoffmans
譯者： 劉奕吟
出版社：樂金文化
出版日期：2022/08/10
這本書是我看Ken Fisher的第二本書，前一本「肯恩．費雪教你破除50個投資迷思」中他將一般人常見的投資謬誤透過條列式方法一一破解，有些寫得相當精闢，這次這本書也是依照上一本的一樣的方式，將幾個常見的盲點慢慢剖析，並且提倡被動投資，算是一本蠻入門的書。
1. 新常態：事實上金融市場從來沒都有新常態，人類社會追求利潤與更舒適的生活，永遠會為世界帶來進步，也造就金融市場上漲的動力，所以大眾散播的「新常態」事後都證明與歷史發生的事件一模一樣。
2. 二次衰退：根據作者的研究, 「二次衰退」在近兩百年的美國金融歷史中，只有出現過3次，最近的一次發生在1980年，在33個經濟週期循環中也只有發生3次，發生機率只有10%，因此不用因為這麼低的機率就被媒體帶風向，恐慌下退出市場。
3. 波動性帶來報酬：股市的波動對報酬毫無影響，沒有證據顯示過大的波動會影響到最終報酬，但如果沒有波動性，終究無法得到理想的報酬，如果想要追求高報酬，就必須承擔一定風險。
4. 牛市來的又快又急：一般來說市場上漲又快又急，特別是在股市出現巨大虧損時，市場反轉的時機稍縱即逝，很難抓到最佳入場時機，所以最好的方法是不要離開市場持續參與。
5. 市場大多時候都是牛市：長期看空市場是愚蠢的想法，根據研究市場有大約66%年度的報酬為正值，其中呈現負報酬的年份大多不會太難看，除了遇到重大黑天鵝事件才會出現鉅額虧損，但接下去的年份又會有強力反彈；如果已20年為單位回顧歷史報酬，全部都是正報酬，因此毫無理由對市場長期看空。
6. 政府債務不一定影響市場：根據長時間的歷史回顧，政府債、公司債等對於市場影響不大，甚至過重的債務可以促進貨幣流動刺激經濟，所以對於政府債務不需恐慌，需要關注的不是債務比例，而是利息佔GDP比例以及還款能力。
7. 沒有任何資產類別能永遠引領風騷：世界上沒有哪一種資產類別能夠永遠領先市場，包括大型股、小型股、黃金、虛擬貨幣、房地產等，最好平均分配分散風險，可以降低系統性下跌帶來的損失。
8. 政治基本對投資影響不大：別讓意識形態決定投資策略，綜觀歷史沒有哪一個政黨上台對經濟造成影響，因為每個政黨幾乎半斤八兩。作者在這章舉出一個神奇的數據，在美國，如果是共和黨候選人接近當選，則選舉年期間股市經常大漲；但如果是民主黨候選人當選，則在就任年期間股市回彈，而且準確度將近九成，很有趣的現象。
9. 全球化投資是趨勢：全球化是未來的趨勢，在股市也是一樣，目前全球股市中美國佔比約四成，其他約六成，如果投資只有單一國家，將會面對巨大的風險，在做資產配置時最好考慮全球布局。
作者： Ken Fisher, Lara Hoffmans
譯者： 劉奕吟
出版社：樂金文化
出版日期：2022/08/10
這本書是我看Ken Fisher的第二本書，前一本「肯恩．費雪教你破除50個投資迷思」中他將一般人常見的投資謬誤透過條列式方法一一破解，有些寫得相當精闢，這次這本書也是依照上一本的一樣的方式，將幾個常見的盲點慢慢剖析，並且提倡被動投資，算是一本蠻入門的書。
1. 新常態：事實上金融市場從來沒都有新常態，人類社會追求利潤與更舒適的生活，永遠會為世界帶來進步，也造就金融市場上漲的動力，所以大眾散播的「新常態」事後都證明與歷史發生的事件一模一樣。
2. 二次衰退：根據作者的研究, 「二次衰退」在近兩百年的美國金融歷史中，只有出現過3次，最近的一次發生在1980年，在33個經濟週期循環中也只有發生3次，發生機率只有10%，因此不用因為這麼低的機率就被媒體帶風向，恐慌下退出市場。
3. 波動性帶來報酬：股市的波動對報酬毫無影響，沒有證據顯示過大的波動會影響到最終報酬，但如果沒有波動性，終究無法得到理想的報酬，如果想要追求高報酬，就必須承擔一定風險。
4. 牛市來的又快又急：一般來說市場上漲又快又急，特別是在股市出現巨大虧損時，市場反轉的時機稍縱即逝，很難抓到最佳入場時機，所以最好的方法是不要離開市場持續參與。
5. 市場大多時候都是牛市：長期看空市場是愚蠢的想法，根據研究市場有大約66%年度的報酬為正值，其中呈現負報酬的年份大多不會太難看，除了遇到重大黑天鵝事件才會出現鉅額虧損，但接下去的年份又會有強力反彈；如果已20年為單位回顧歷史報酬，全部都是正報酬，因此毫無理由對市場長期看空。
6. 政府債務不一定影響市場：根據長時間的歷史回顧，政府債、公司債等對於市場影響不大，甚至過重的債務可以促進貨幣流動刺激經濟，所以對於政府債務不需恐慌，需要關注的不是債務比例，而是利息佔GDP比例以及還款能力。
7. 沒有任何資產類別能永遠引領風騷：世界上沒有哪一種資產類別能夠永遠領先市場，包括大型股、小型股、黃金、虛擬貨幣、房地產等，最好平均分配分散風險，可以降低系統性下跌帶來的損失。
8. 政治基本對投資影響不大：別讓意識形態決定投資策略，綜觀歷史沒有哪一個政黨上台對經濟造成影響，因為每個政黨幾乎半斤八兩。作者在這章舉出一個神奇的數據，在美國，如果是共和黨候選人接近當選，則選舉年期間股市經常大漲；但如果是民主黨候選人當選，則在就任年期間股市回彈，而且準確度將近九成，很有趣的現象。
9. 全球化投資是趨勢：全球化是未來的趨勢，在股市也是一樣，目前全球股市中美國佔比約四成，其他約六成，如果投資只有單一國家，將會面對巨大的風險，在做資產配置時最好考慮全球布局。
August 30, 2019
Entertaining read, and gives the reader a more leveled view on the market. Was especially interesting to compare the descriptions in the book to current media talk and speculations. However, I could not enjoy the style of the writing. Overuses parenthesis where it could simply be part of a sentence, and the whole book feels like an unedited transcript of thought recordings. It would have been perfect for a blog, but for a book it seemed to lack refinement.
February 22, 2024
Interesting history of stock market trends including funny (now they're funny, probably not so much when published!!) headlines depicting economic trends and how this time it's different. I found this book very readable and thoroughly enjoyed a recap of economic trends as relating to stock market directional trends. Included is a chapter on a President's impact on the stock market based on his political party. Surprising results to me but I won't spoil your fun when you read.
October 12, 2021
Key takeaways:
1. A short term bear market will usually ends with a sharp V-shaped drop, immediate surge and see no return. Therefore, investors/speculators who are expecting for a retest of the lows will be on the sidelines and therefore miss the entire entry for the new bull market.
"... volatility is normal and volatile, history teaches us, memory failes us."
1. A short term bear market will usually ends with a sharp V-shaped drop, immediate surge and see no return. Therefore, investors/speculators who are expecting for a retest of the lows will be on the sidelines and therefore miss the entire entry for the new bull market.
"... volatility is normal and volatile, history teaches us, memory failes us."
July 25, 2023
Very well structured, loved the clarity enhanced between the past and every investing period we face. Came directly in place after reading several introductory books about investing and trading. Not recommended for beginners.
September 12, 2017
I liked it. Could have been a bit more concise. I did learn quite a bit though.
February 13, 2019
One of the better investing books I've ever read. Surprised that it doesn't pop up on more lists. Many beginning investors should probably pick up a copy.
December 25, 2020
A very interesting title from all the other books I ever read before. While it captures my attention, I don't know if the content is solid enough to surpass my expectation. The book illustrates on use of history as laboratory on what is possible on the stock market projection. A hot take on how to determine the volatility of the trading market.
November 12, 2021
A lesson that could be applied for more than the stock market, a great demonstration about the case if the author.
November 27, 2022
Same as debunkery
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 25, 2019
Overwhelmingly, returns are better if you buy before the unemployment peak & by a huge margin. Forward 12-month returns average 14.8% from historic unemployment peaks, compared to a big 31.2% if you buy 6 months before the peak-a return twice as high.
Fisher wants you to go global 1990 to 2010 the US only ranked top 5 five 5 times. Norway right now and almost twice as much.
1987 to 1997 there's a 98% correlation to US stocks and non US stocks. There's a world of risk management and performance enhancement opportunity-if you choose it.
Past isn't predictive does something happened a certain way in the past doesn't mean it must have been that way in the future. If you saw the rely on history &, I might add, charts to navigate markets, you get pretty darn lost-pretty often.
if all the world sees X & expects Y, but you know from testing history that why doesn't happen all that frequently or maybe ever after X, you can bet against them & won-more often than not. You could take that one step further & discover what does come after X! Or what actually causes Y. But to do that, you must first learn to use history as a lab. US history to reshape expectations, & from that, use your understanding of current economic, political & sediment drivers to decide what you think is likeliest.
Then, too, remember that just because something seems likely to happen doesn't mean it must happen that way. Capital markets are incredibly complex. Sometimes, some intensely unexpected thing or things happen. & Sometimes your reading of history will be wrong! But since investing is a probabilities game, you must start somewhere in framing reasonable probabilities.
you're going to be wrong from time to time no matter how good your analysis & how sound your understanding of history. Improve the error rate.
$ & markets may never forget, but surely people do. And that will not be different this time, next time, or any time in your life.
Fisher wants you to go global 1990 to 2010 the US only ranked top 5 five 5 times. Norway right now and almost twice as much.
1987 to 1997 there's a 98% correlation to US stocks and non US stocks. There's a world of risk management and performance enhancement opportunity-if you choose it.
Past isn't predictive does something happened a certain way in the past doesn't mean it must have been that way in the future. If you saw the rely on history &, I might add, charts to navigate markets, you get pretty darn lost-pretty often.
if all the world sees X & expects Y, but you know from testing history that why doesn't happen all that frequently or maybe ever after X, you can bet against them & won-more often than not. You could take that one step further & discover what does come after X! Or what actually causes Y. But to do that, you must first learn to use history as a lab. US history to reshape expectations, & from that, use your understanding of current economic, political & sediment drivers to decide what you think is likeliest.
Then, too, remember that just because something seems likely to happen doesn't mean it must happen that way. Capital markets are incredibly complex. Sometimes, some intensely unexpected thing or things happen. & Sometimes your reading of history will be wrong! But since investing is a probabilities game, you must start somewhere in framing reasonable probabilities.
you're going to be wrong from time to time no matter how good your analysis & how sound your understanding of history. Improve the error rate.
$ & markets may never forget, but surely people do. And that will not be different this time, next time, or any time in your life.
October 7, 2014
I am quite fond of Fisher's simplistic and straight forward writing style. This book is incredibly informative especially regarding the more recent debt crisis. Recommended if you are struggling with whether to invest in today's market (2011+).
Pros:
Easy Read
Covers the opposing view of many issues we face today (market wise)
Acknowledges Sir John Templeton's great legacy
His rant on politics was entertaining
Cons:
Latter chapters seem to delve away from the main idea
Starts off strong but ends off weak
Pros:
Easy Read
Covers the opposing view of many issues we face today (market wise)
Acknowledges Sir John Templeton's great legacy
His rant on politics was entertaining
Cons:
Latter chapters seem to delve away from the main idea
Starts off strong but ends off weak
January 9, 2016
An interesting look at some aspects of the history of investment markets (heavily US biased but as biggest market that was ok for me).
The author has included a lot (over 170) of historical quotes, clearly making his points regarding the media and some analysts lack of memory and perspective on historical market movements.
For those interested in markets I recommend this book for some historical perspective.
The author has included a lot (over 170) of historical quotes, clearly making his points regarding the media and some analysts lack of memory and perspective on historical market movements.
For those interested in markets I recommend this book for some historical perspective.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 17, 2014
Interesting, enjoyable and eye-opening book. I've noticed while reading history books that things we believe unique to our era are in fact repetitions of events that have happened throughout history. This book uses that truth to show an investor how to be more clear-eyed about investing bit it applies to many areas of life.
August 6, 2022
If you believe markets are unpredictable and the stock market always grows in the long-term, you don't get much out of this book. Otherwise you will get a lot of anecdotes about the past.
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