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1024 pages, Paperback
First published July 30, 2009
"Imperial politics was thus a series of formal meetings of rulers and their representatives at irregular intervals, supplemented by lesser assemblies to discuss specific issues... Contact was maintained in between by couriers or informal meetings. The large number of relatively weak elements made it difficult for anyone to act alone, discouraging extremism and diluting any agenda to a minimum that all could agree."What surprised me most was the proto-representative structures that were already in existence within the Empire. It was nothing close to the representative institutions that exist today, but did provide some degree of representation, even if only among the nobles and other notable citizens. The HRE was much less imperial/autocratic than I initially assumed and there was much too be admired in its structure when compared to its neighbors. Unfortunately those institutions were not strong enough to prevent war (partially through sabotage by religious militants and partially by a very stubborn emperor).
"Of this [Spanish government expenditures], 30.5 million went to the civil budget; 44.2 million directly to the armed forces; and 175.8 million to bondholders and contractors for loans and interest."Not surprisingly the lenders had little interest in any sort of public good and could care less if the world went to hell:
"The formal structure of ordinary taxation became little more than a front behind which the financiers carried on their affairs with studied indifference towards the damage that they did to the government and contempt for the suffering of the tax-paying element of the population."This financial weakness made seizing property from enemies even more important and led to further crimes against civilians and their property. This, in turn, made it more difficult for states to generate tax revenues, continuing the cycle of loans, interest payments, pillaging and more loans. Continue this for 30 years and you can see why this was such a terrible war.
"[Military] Operations were essentially intended to secure local military advantage to lend weight to these negotiations and compel the other side to be more reasonable."Military victories had to be paired with diplomacy that could extract concessions from the defeated party. Before Clauswitz rulers of the time knew war was merely politics carried out by other means.
"Though they are now largely silent, the voices from the 17th century still speak to us... They offer a warning of the dangers of entrusting power to those who feel summoned by God to war, or feel that their sense of justice and order is the only one valid."
Brengleborg’s 12,000 soldiers met Grindlenook’s 10,000 mercenaries on the field at Dardenlach near Fenweilder on the Roberstraden River and routed them, moving on to take the bishoprics of Westenfloöber and Kessen-Pressingburgh where they then were joined by Furstenburger and Glockenspiel, forcing the Duke of Stienwelper to finally sue for peace, giving up his rights to Drebbenmacher and Lichtendorf.
“Frederick V, the senior secular elector, had been deposed and his possessions handed to the emperor's supporters. Though the ban on his most prominent collaborators, Anhalt and Hohenlohe, had been rescinded, the Mecklenburg dukes had joined Georg Friedrich of Baden-Durlach as fugitives. Landgrave Moritz of Hessen-Kassel had been forced to abdicate and Friedrich Ulrich of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel humiliated. The presence of Wallenstein's troops in Pomerania, Holstein and Württemberg, parts of Brandenburg, Anhalt and other territories suggested further venerable ruling houses would soon lose their possessions. Wallenstein deliberately fostered these fears, partly to deflect criticism from his own elevation, suggesting that Tilly should become duke of Calenberg, while Pappenheim could have Wolfenbüttel.”








