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Nuffield Election Studies #17
The British General Election of 2005
The definitive guide to the General Election is now in its seventeenth edition. The renowned series from Nuffield College, Oxford, which has covered every postwar British election, provides the authoritative, highly readable description of the background, the campaign and the results. David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh provide thoroughly documented coverage and analysis of the campaigns from party headquarters and from the constituencies.
Paperback
First published March 3, 2006
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July 8, 2023
More exciting than the last, but that’s not saying much: Kavanagh and Butler penned a short but solid edition in the Nuffield election series. Format’s identical to the 2001 book, so no surprises here. Blair won a grudging third mandate under the shadow of Iraq in a classic “better the devil you know” election–the PM was reviled, but a grievance-fueled Tory party led by the unpopular Michael Howard was not ready for government. Charles Kennedy’s Lib Dems brought up the rear for the major parties with historic if small and somewhat disappointing gains.
Iraq, Iraq, Iraq. Tony Blair’s decision to fully back the US invasion removed any remaining shine of his ‘97 and ‘01 landslide mandates, and caused him so much personal stress that he nearly resigned the job in 2004. There was frequent lamenting and scorn over Blair’s supposed betrayal of Gordon Brown for not stepping down earlier, and his decision to stick with it likely cost the party seats (despite their best efforts to appear together on the trail). Labour as a party suffered for Blair’s image as George W. Bush’s “puppy”, particularly in Muslim constituencies, but the Conservatives had no ground to stand on when Howard called Blair a liar during the campaign–they supported the war, after all. Aligning with the government on public finances wasn’t enough to dent the Labour advantage there, and a re-do of Hague’s “core vote” strategy drew media fire. A deeper analysis finds it was the Liberal Democrats who most benefited from a faltering Labour.
The campaign itself was neither the snooze-fest of 2001 nor the captivating, roller coaster ride of 1992. Polls and pundit expectations never wavered from a Labour majority but disagreed on size. (It was 66 in the end, nailed exactly by the BBC exit poll.) Most exciting was the second-half debate over the justifications for the war spawned by the release of the attorney general’s legal advice to the gov’t. Blair lied, cries Howard! An otherwise brisk and at times boring account is improved immeasurably by the detailed analysis of the results in the 2nd appendix. Labour had a lot to fret over under the hood, but so did the Conservatives; a 6% loss in national vote share for a government is normally fatal, but when your chief opposition gains only 0.5% (concentrated mainly in the southeast) over a landslide loss, you may as well count your lucky stars. Lastly, one prescient prediction is notable: the high probability of a hung parliament at the next election. If you really want to know more about the 2005 election, by all means, read this one. Unfortunately I can’t find a greater audience than that for this edition. I’ll settle on a 4/5, but a 3/5 was not out of the question. The chapters on the parties were far too short.
Iraq, Iraq, Iraq. Tony Blair’s decision to fully back the US invasion removed any remaining shine of his ‘97 and ‘01 landslide mandates, and caused him so much personal stress that he nearly resigned the job in 2004. There was frequent lamenting and scorn over Blair’s supposed betrayal of Gordon Brown for not stepping down earlier, and his decision to stick with it likely cost the party seats (despite their best efforts to appear together on the trail). Labour as a party suffered for Blair’s image as George W. Bush’s “puppy”, particularly in Muslim constituencies, but the Conservatives had no ground to stand on when Howard called Blair a liar during the campaign–they supported the war, after all. Aligning with the government on public finances wasn’t enough to dent the Labour advantage there, and a re-do of Hague’s “core vote” strategy drew media fire. A deeper analysis finds it was the Liberal Democrats who most benefited from a faltering Labour.
The campaign itself was neither the snooze-fest of 2001 nor the captivating, roller coaster ride of 1992. Polls and pundit expectations never wavered from a Labour majority but disagreed on size. (It was 66 in the end, nailed exactly by the BBC exit poll.) Most exciting was the second-half debate over the justifications for the war spawned by the release of the attorney general’s legal advice to the gov’t. Blair lied, cries Howard! An otherwise brisk and at times boring account is improved immeasurably by the detailed analysis of the results in the 2nd appendix. Labour had a lot to fret over under the hood, but so did the Conservatives; a 6% loss in national vote share for a government is normally fatal, but when your chief opposition gains only 0.5% (concentrated mainly in the southeast) over a landslide loss, you may as well count your lucky stars. Lastly, one prescient prediction is notable: the high probability of a hung parliament at the next election. If you really want to know more about the 2005 election, by all means, read this one. Unfortunately I can’t find a greater audience than that for this edition. I’ll settle on a 4/5, but a 3/5 was not out of the question. The chapters on the parties were far too short.
Displaying 1 of 1 review