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Valor of Ignorance
One of the foremost strategists of the American Army in the first decade of the twentieth century warns of the great danger of militarized Japan and forcasts -- 44 years before it actually happened -- the Japanese invasion of the Philippines.
344 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1909
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About the author
Homer Lea
17 books4 followersGeopolitical strategist and close adviser to Sun Yat-sen during the 1911 revolution.
Lea wrote about China and geopolitics. Two of his books prophecy a war between America and Japan. His other book is a historical novel set in China.
1876-1912
Lea wrote about China and geopolitics. Two of his books prophecy a war between America and Japan. His other book is a historical novel set in China.
1876-1912
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
December 25, 2025
This was another in-between out of copyright book that I read in my spare time, but I wish I hadn't.
I was drawn to it because it is said that it was popular reading for American officers in the first half of the twentieth century, allegedly being influential to men like MacArthur.
But this book is tedious and more of an extended philosophical rant than a work on geopolitics. The first half is just a social Darwinist rehash of ideas trendy at the time but long discredited. One particular gripe Lea seems to have is with feminism, mentioning it several times in the context of a degrading society. America is in decline, he says, because good Lord not feminism!
It's hard to take seriously. Apart from feminism he alleges that the American people had any number of other moral and physical failings that would doom them to inevitable defeat at the hands of invincible Japan.
While it's true that the US standing army was small and unprepared for war, what actually happened was far different from what Lea predicted. For one thing, the United States introduced conscription in 1940 and carried out extensive maneuvers in the months before Pearl Harbor. Both the Army and the Marines carried out wargames and simulated operations, and of course the Navy was intensely training in the entire interwar period with the Fleet Problems.
Lea's belief that the United States would be completely unprepared, would have no idea what to do, and have no ability to offer any resistance whatsoever, was obviously wide of the mark. In many ways it was the Japanese who were unprepared and who had not thought through their strategic intentions. Ironically, the US feared that the Japanese would do many things that apparently never occurred to them (e.g. sabotaging the Panama Canal or waging submarine warfare on American shipping).
There is some value in this work, notably in discussing the strategic position of the Philippines. Lea is correct in noting that the American acquisition of the Philippines was a serious strategic concern for Japan, and placed the United States and Japan on a collision course towards war.
This recalled to me articles by e.g. Toshi Yoshihara and Andrew Teo which argued that Japan was not, after all, Mahanian. Japan pursued a strategy of continental expansion into Korea and Manchuria when she would have been much better off expanding south into the Philippines.
As Lea notes, even under American occupation resistance would not have been great. But Spain would have been a very soft target, and one wonders why Japan did not engineer some excuse to seize the Philippines from a long decrepit and declining Spain before the Americans found themselves with the islands almost by accident.
If Lea's contention that the Japanese was so wise and so calculating was true, then this is what would have happened. One can make any number of suggestions for why Japan did not do this. Perhaps she feared the intervention of other European powers in support of Spain, after all the Europeans had intervened to limit Japanese success against China in 1894-1895.
More likely Japan was simply not as wise or as farseeing as Lea believed. He correctly noted that with the Philippines, Japan would dominate the entire coast of China and Indochina, that Japan would have bases within striking distance of Indonesia and perhaps could even threaten Australia.
But Japan did not see this golden opportunity and the Philippines passed under American rule. It was, evidently, at this time that Japan suddenly realized their strategic importance, as well as the strategic importance of Hawaii which was also annexed at this time (a move which Japan protested, as Lea relates).
This made me also think of an article by Paul Schroeder about lost intermediaries in Germany. Spain could be said to have been an intermediary in a similar sense. By occupying the Philippines and Cuba, Spain acted as a sort of buffer keeping Japan and the US separated, and denying the US supremacy in the Caribbean.
With the demise of Spain, the US and Japan were suddenly confronting each other face to face, and the US found itself drawn into the Caribbean leading to the Banana Wars. Interestingly enough, Spain was to fulfill a function of intermediary after 1898 in another part of the world, separating French ambitions in Morocco and the British position in the Straits of Gibraltar, a very necessary and useful purpose.
Lea is correct in stating that the only two powers that could contend for mastery of the Pacific were the US and Japan, and that eventually the sword must decide between them. The version of this book I read was reprinted in 1942 with a preface by Clare Booth.
In the preface Booth provided some insight into the storied career of Lea as a would-be Napoleon in China, and argues that he was not fascist. But he sounds awfully fascist. Booth even says that Lea had an unexpected admirer in Hitler, and one sees a similar writing style between them.
Lea the non-fascist has nothing but contempt for democracy and individual freedom, has nothing but good to say about the militarism and collectivism of Japanese autocracy, and argues that the American idea is stupid and self-defeating. Americans should be more like Japanese, he says. They should sacrifice individual freedom for supposed military efficiency. Thankfully this advice was not taken.
Lea also rants at length against immigration, which is only interesting insofar as it reflects on today's sentiments. Like now, people back then feared that the 'essential Anglo-Saxon element' in the United States was being eroded. These were the years of the 'Yellow Peril' when Americans (and Australians) believed that the large influx of East Asians would transform the character of the country.
Surprise, surprise, it didn't happen. Those who are so violently oppose to immigration today might want to read this section and reflect on their beliefs.
The final section is an extended examination of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast. There is a lot of useful geographic data here, and Lea's description of a stronghold in the peninsulas of San Francisco is interesting and instructive, one could draw parallels with Bataan.
But his belief that the Japanese could land hundreds of thousands of men in a couple of weeks is just wildly unrealistic. He himself notes that Los Angeles is surrounded by desert, so one wonders where the Japanese Army was supposed to derive its fresh water, its food, its ammunition.
The Japanese might possibly have been able to carry this number of men had they crammed their whole fleet full of soldiers. But they wouldn't have been able to carry anything the army needed, and it would have been starved into surrender.
The United States found it very difficult to move and supply such numbers of men to Europe even though the distance was shorter and the shipping resources of the United States by then much greater. The Normandy landings involved about one-hundred and fifty thousand men, but it took a long time to prepare for this operation and even though the landings were made from the close proximity of southern England, with specialized landing ships and landing craft, the United States was still not able to land anywhere near the number of men that Lea thinks that Japan could have sent across the entire Pacific all willy-nilly.
He clearly does not have a strong grasp on seapower or on amphibious operations. This is further demonstrated in his disingenuous dismissal of the importance of seapower. He says navies are not decisive, that if Germany's whole fleet were sunk this would not have been fatal to her.
Sure, we grant that. Germany was not existentially dependent upon her navy. But Great Britain was. Japan was. He does not seem to take into consideration that the conditions between insular and continental states are widely different.
All in all the second half of the book contains some useful insights, though it's far too long and much of it is improbable. It reads more like the play-soldiering of an amateur strategist, the sort of person who conceives of warlike operations based on board games or video games. The first half reads like the gloomy prognoses of German philosophers like Weininger, full of vitriol against women (not the feminists!) and democracy and anything that does not involve war. It's interesting in that it shows what people thought at the time, but there is no need to read this.
I was drawn to it because it is said that it was popular reading for American officers in the first half of the twentieth century, allegedly being influential to men like MacArthur.
But this book is tedious and more of an extended philosophical rant than a work on geopolitics. The first half is just a social Darwinist rehash of ideas trendy at the time but long discredited. One particular gripe Lea seems to have is with feminism, mentioning it several times in the context of a degrading society. America is in decline, he says, because good Lord not feminism!
It's hard to take seriously. Apart from feminism he alleges that the American people had any number of other moral and physical failings that would doom them to inevitable defeat at the hands of invincible Japan.
While it's true that the US standing army was small and unprepared for war, what actually happened was far different from what Lea predicted. For one thing, the United States introduced conscription in 1940 and carried out extensive maneuvers in the months before Pearl Harbor. Both the Army and the Marines carried out wargames and simulated operations, and of course the Navy was intensely training in the entire interwar period with the Fleet Problems.
Lea's belief that the United States would be completely unprepared, would have no idea what to do, and have no ability to offer any resistance whatsoever, was obviously wide of the mark. In many ways it was the Japanese who were unprepared and who had not thought through their strategic intentions. Ironically, the US feared that the Japanese would do many things that apparently never occurred to them (e.g. sabotaging the Panama Canal or waging submarine warfare on American shipping).
There is some value in this work, notably in discussing the strategic position of the Philippines. Lea is correct in noting that the American acquisition of the Philippines was a serious strategic concern for Japan, and placed the United States and Japan on a collision course towards war.
This recalled to me articles by e.g. Toshi Yoshihara and Andrew Teo which argued that Japan was not, after all, Mahanian. Japan pursued a strategy of continental expansion into Korea and Manchuria when she would have been much better off expanding south into the Philippines.
As Lea notes, even under American occupation resistance would not have been great. But Spain would have been a very soft target, and one wonders why Japan did not engineer some excuse to seize the Philippines from a long decrepit and declining Spain before the Americans found themselves with the islands almost by accident.
If Lea's contention that the Japanese was so wise and so calculating was true, then this is what would have happened. One can make any number of suggestions for why Japan did not do this. Perhaps she feared the intervention of other European powers in support of Spain, after all the Europeans had intervened to limit Japanese success against China in 1894-1895.
More likely Japan was simply not as wise or as farseeing as Lea believed. He correctly noted that with the Philippines, Japan would dominate the entire coast of China and Indochina, that Japan would have bases within striking distance of Indonesia and perhaps could even threaten Australia.
But Japan did not see this golden opportunity and the Philippines passed under American rule. It was, evidently, at this time that Japan suddenly realized their strategic importance, as well as the strategic importance of Hawaii which was also annexed at this time (a move which Japan protested, as Lea relates).
This made me also think of an article by Paul Schroeder about lost intermediaries in Germany. Spain could be said to have been an intermediary in a similar sense. By occupying the Philippines and Cuba, Spain acted as a sort of buffer keeping Japan and the US separated, and denying the US supremacy in the Caribbean.
With the demise of Spain, the US and Japan were suddenly confronting each other face to face, and the US found itself drawn into the Caribbean leading to the Banana Wars. Interestingly enough, Spain was to fulfill a function of intermediary after 1898 in another part of the world, separating French ambitions in Morocco and the British position in the Straits of Gibraltar, a very necessary and useful purpose.
Lea is correct in stating that the only two powers that could contend for mastery of the Pacific were the US and Japan, and that eventually the sword must decide between them. The version of this book I read was reprinted in 1942 with a preface by Clare Booth.
In the preface Booth provided some insight into the storied career of Lea as a would-be Napoleon in China, and argues that he was not fascist. But he sounds awfully fascist. Booth even says that Lea had an unexpected admirer in Hitler, and one sees a similar writing style between them.
Lea the non-fascist has nothing but contempt for democracy and individual freedom, has nothing but good to say about the militarism and collectivism of Japanese autocracy, and argues that the American idea is stupid and self-defeating. Americans should be more like Japanese, he says. They should sacrifice individual freedom for supposed military efficiency. Thankfully this advice was not taken.
Lea also rants at length against immigration, which is only interesting insofar as it reflects on today's sentiments. Like now, people back then feared that the 'essential Anglo-Saxon element' in the United States was being eroded. These were the years of the 'Yellow Peril' when Americans (and Australians) believed that the large influx of East Asians would transform the character of the country.
Surprise, surprise, it didn't happen. Those who are so violently oppose to immigration today might want to read this section and reflect on their beliefs.
The final section is an extended examination of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast. There is a lot of useful geographic data here, and Lea's description of a stronghold in the peninsulas of San Francisco is interesting and instructive, one could draw parallels with Bataan.
But his belief that the Japanese could land hundreds of thousands of men in a couple of weeks is just wildly unrealistic. He himself notes that Los Angeles is surrounded by desert, so one wonders where the Japanese Army was supposed to derive its fresh water, its food, its ammunition.
The Japanese might possibly have been able to carry this number of men had they crammed their whole fleet full of soldiers. But they wouldn't have been able to carry anything the army needed, and it would have been starved into surrender.
The United States found it very difficult to move and supply such numbers of men to Europe even though the distance was shorter and the shipping resources of the United States by then much greater. The Normandy landings involved about one-hundred and fifty thousand men, but it took a long time to prepare for this operation and even though the landings were made from the close proximity of southern England, with specialized landing ships and landing craft, the United States was still not able to land anywhere near the number of men that Lea thinks that Japan could have sent across the entire Pacific all willy-nilly.
He clearly does not have a strong grasp on seapower or on amphibious operations. This is further demonstrated in his disingenuous dismissal of the importance of seapower. He says navies are not decisive, that if Germany's whole fleet were sunk this would not have been fatal to her.
Sure, we grant that. Germany was not existentially dependent upon her navy. But Great Britain was. Japan was. He does not seem to take into consideration that the conditions between insular and continental states are widely different.
All in all the second half of the book contains some useful insights, though it's far too long and much of it is improbable. It reads more like the play-soldiering of an amateur strategist, the sort of person who conceives of warlike operations based on board games or video games. The first half reads like the gloomy prognoses of German philosophers like Weininger, full of vitriol against women (not the feminists!) and democracy and anything that does not involve war. It's interesting in that it shows what people thought at the time, but there is no need to read this.
May 22, 2008
Five stars because of its importance and the acute insight of the author. He foresaw Pearl Harbor decades beforehand. Stylistically, it rates three, or at most four, stars.
March 17, 2023
Over 100 years old – 1909 – my interest in this book was directly to related to its reputation as a precursor to Bywater’s “Great Pacific War.” It is not Bywater’s work, not even close. The military analysis is flawed to a crippling degree, the assumptions half-baked, and do not bear up under cursory examination. Where Bywater provides prescient insights into the coming war in the Pacific, Lea does not.
The first half of “Valor of Ignorance” is a political science treatise which betrays a the worldview of a career military officer with little actual interaction with civilian populations in a peaceful manner. It tells more about its author than its subject. The author is an authority lover whose philosophy seems based on a mix of fascism and social Darwinism. The main ills in America after immigrants of any non-Anglo Saxon flavor are, in order, according to the author: Feminism, Commercialism, Unionism, with a nod towards Communism, too. You do not have to take my word for it the author belabors this throughout the text.
The writing is florid and overwrought. References to classical literature are rife, and sometimes difficult to follow. It is unnecessarily obtuse throughout. There is an odd geometric analysis of what the author presents as the military science of naval strategy, complete with circles, triangles, obtuse or acute angles and hypotenuse length, none of it makes sense nor have I heard of it elsewhere in my reading of history. I think he pulled it out of his a**.
Rife with flawed analysis based on stereotypes, the social science presented in the first half of the book rails against diversity, basing the greatness of nations – western nations exclusively, absent the author’s love affair with China (he advised Sun Yat-Sen) – on the homogeneity of its peoples and governments. He also propagates the theory that not only are non-Anglo Saxon peoples the main danger to the United States, but that they are in general incapable of democratic self-government based on his flawed cultural assumptions.
His writing provides insight into the way current America Firsters, white supremacists and the like think. He lays it out clearly in the last full paragraph of pg 125. His America is not the America of the US Constitution, a document he swore to uphold and defend as a military officer, the same oath in effect that I swore. Instead he sees America as a white Anglo-Saxon majority being submerged in foreign – his words – influences and peoples. This was a popular analysis back then and survives into today. He correctly sees the coming divide between urban and rural populations, although the development of suburbs is beyond his prescience. He betrays a lack of understanding of the electoral college, predicting the loss of political power of rural peoples – Anglo Saxon, who are by his analysis morally and intellectually superior to other peoples - who will eventually lose their hold on power. He fails to anticipate the role of the electoral college in continuing denying democratic majority rule in America a century later. It is in any case an interesting exercise in the thought processes of prejudiced folks.
His logistical analysis is similarly flawed. While he correctly sees the shrinking of the world due to technologies of communications and transports, he fails gloriously in accounting for the difficulty of transoceanic logistics, predicting the arrival on American shores of European/Asian invaders whose only hurdle is transport time, disregarding the need to lift and supply hundreds of thousands of troops and their impedimenta. Logistics was not the strong suit of the American army in these times, a small organization incapable of projecting or maintaining global presence. He argues for a larger military, but given the lessons of the Civil War which was less than 50 years removed from his writing exhibits a large deficit in the understanding of the logistics of that conflict.
I wanted this book to be worth the time to read it, I really did. It may have value if you want to explore outmoded and disproven ways of thinking, or as a hagiography of racist nonsense, otherwise save your time and read something else.
The first half of “Valor of Ignorance” is a political science treatise which betrays a the worldview of a career military officer with little actual interaction with civilian populations in a peaceful manner. It tells more about its author than its subject. The author is an authority lover whose philosophy seems based on a mix of fascism and social Darwinism. The main ills in America after immigrants of any non-Anglo Saxon flavor are, in order, according to the author: Feminism, Commercialism, Unionism, with a nod towards Communism, too. You do not have to take my word for it the author belabors this throughout the text.
The writing is florid and overwrought. References to classical literature are rife, and sometimes difficult to follow. It is unnecessarily obtuse throughout. There is an odd geometric analysis of what the author presents as the military science of naval strategy, complete with circles, triangles, obtuse or acute angles and hypotenuse length, none of it makes sense nor have I heard of it elsewhere in my reading of history. I think he pulled it out of his a**.
Rife with flawed analysis based on stereotypes, the social science presented in the first half of the book rails against diversity, basing the greatness of nations – western nations exclusively, absent the author’s love affair with China (he advised Sun Yat-Sen) – on the homogeneity of its peoples and governments. He also propagates the theory that not only are non-Anglo Saxon peoples the main danger to the United States, but that they are in general incapable of democratic self-government based on his flawed cultural assumptions.
His writing provides insight into the way current America Firsters, white supremacists and the like think. He lays it out clearly in the last full paragraph of pg 125. His America is not the America of the US Constitution, a document he swore to uphold and defend as a military officer, the same oath in effect that I swore. Instead he sees America as a white Anglo-Saxon majority being submerged in foreign – his words – influences and peoples. This was a popular analysis back then and survives into today. He correctly sees the coming divide between urban and rural populations, although the development of suburbs is beyond his prescience. He betrays a lack of understanding of the electoral college, predicting the loss of political power of rural peoples – Anglo Saxon, who are by his analysis morally and intellectually superior to other peoples - who will eventually lose their hold on power. He fails to anticipate the role of the electoral college in continuing denying democratic majority rule in America a century later. It is in any case an interesting exercise in the thought processes of prejudiced folks.
His logistical analysis is similarly flawed. While he correctly sees the shrinking of the world due to technologies of communications and transports, he fails gloriously in accounting for the difficulty of transoceanic logistics, predicting the arrival on American shores of European/Asian invaders whose only hurdle is transport time, disregarding the need to lift and supply hundreds of thousands of troops and their impedimenta. Logistics was not the strong suit of the American army in these times, a small organization incapable of projecting or maintaining global presence. He argues for a larger military, but given the lessons of the Civil War which was less than 50 years removed from his writing exhibits a large deficit in the understanding of the logistics of that conflict.
I wanted this book to be worth the time to read it, I really did. It may have value if you want to explore outmoded and disproven ways of thinking, or as a hagiography of racist nonsense, otherwise save your time and read something else.
April 25, 2009
This was a pretty fascinating book (maybe because I've been studying Japanese). He dedicates the book (1909) to Elihu Root, and was apparently in with the Republican Progressives. Can anyone recommend a good book about his involvement in China?
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews