" Throughout most of American history, U.S. military forces proved unready for the wars that were thrust upon them and suffered costly reverses in early battles. During the Cold War, for the first time, U.S. defense policy tried to maintain high readiness in peacetime. But now, with the Cold War over and defense budgets falling, what will happen to U.S. military forces? Will they revert to a state of unpreparedness or find a new balance? Politicians and military planners alike have found this crucial issue especially difficult to deal with because they have often misunderstood what readiness really means. In this book, security expert Richard Betts surveys problems in developing and measuring combat readiness before, during, and after the Cold War. He analyzes why attempts to maximize it often have counterproductive effects, and how confusions in technical concepts cause political controversy. The book explores conflicts between two objectives that are both vital but work against each other because they compete for operational readiness to fight immediately, and structural readiness—the number of organized units that increase military power, but require time during a crisis to gear up for combat. Betts also discusses the problem brought on by the Cold War and plunging defense mobilization readiness—the plans and arrangements needed to shorten the time for recreating a large military if it once again becomes necessary. Betts offers new ideas for understanding the dilemmas and tradeoffs that underlie debates on how readiness should be maintained in peacetime, and he explores the strategic consequences of different choices. "
This book was terrific, an absolute must read for anyone who wants to understand what "readiness" means. Betts describes how readiness, like anything else in DoD or the services is about choices. Betts describes the differences between Operational Readiness and Structural Readiness, and how investment in one leads to risk in another. Leaders should move beyond promoting "readiness" as a broad concept and look to answer three questions: 1. Readiness for When? 2. Readiness For What? 3. Readiness Of what?
An excellent theory on and critical analysis of military readiness as it evolved from the two World Wars through the Cold War. It provides essential insight into the single most critical axis of defense policy and appropriations. While providing the fundamentals, it falls short of a direct basis for analyzing the current situation with the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan, mostly because it was writtin in 1995. The lessons he draws from the first Persian Gulf War, however, are quite different from the consensus and incredibly prescient!
Betts was born and raised in Eaton, Pennsylvania graduating from Newton High School in 1965. He went on to attend and graduate from Harvard University earning a bachelor's, master's, and eventually doctorate in government in 1965, 1971 and 1975 respectively.
His dissertation, under the direction of Samuel P. Huntington was on the role of military advice in decisions to resort to force, which later became his first book, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
His dissertation was awarded the Sumner Prize, for best dissertation in international relations. While a student at Harvard, Betts served as a teaching fellow from 1971 to 1975 and a lecturer for the 1975–1976 academic year. He served as a professional staff member on the Church Committee.
In 1976 Betts joined the Brookings Institution where he served as a research associate and later in 1981 a senior fellow until 1990. While at Brookings, Betts was a professional lecture at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Harvard, and Columbia University.
Additionally, he was a staff member on the National Security Council in 1977 and on the foreign policy staff of Walter Mondale presidential campaign in 1984.
In 1990, Betts joined the faculty at Columbia University. There, he led the international security policy program at the School of International and Public Affairs, became the director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.
A staple of the faculty, Betts taught the introductory course war, peace, and strategy for over 25 years, a requirement for all international relations students at the university.
Betts has been an occasional consultant to the National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency.