The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission

by Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, Joji Watanuki

The Crisis of Democracy: On the Governability of Democracies was initially a 1975 report written by Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki for the Trilateral Commission and later published as a book.

The report observed the political state of the United States, Europe and Japan and says that in the United States the problems of governance "stem from an excess of democracy" and thus advocates "to restore the prestige and authority of central government institutions."

Genres: Politics, History, Nonfiction, American History, Business, Philosophy

212 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1975

Reviews

[Tim Mode · Rating 5 out of 5]

Everyone interested in understanding the origins of neo-liberalist ideology and the reemergence of authoritarian rule in the US today, MUST read this seminal analysis of what ruling-elites saw as a time of crisis that challenged the viability of their rule.

In the early 1970's ruling class elites, centered around David Rockerfeller's Tri-lateral Commission, tasked three academics with analyzing what was perceived as the "crisis" of democracy--in the context of the seismic political shift contained in a worldwide cultural revolutionary tendencies among youth in the 1960's, which derailed their imperialist war in SE Asia, and threatened to topple the US government. A "crisis" (for them) indeed!

The resulting analysis, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies..., presented three possible alternatives for the ruling elites to select from. The core "governability" problem with "democracies" was framed as an excess of democracy; the people had too much to say about the decisions of the ruling-elites, including a much too free media, and were increasingly critical of ruling-elite agendas, thus democracies were becoming out of control and un-governable, as far as the ruling-elites were concerned.

The alternatives defined by the academics were:
1. Do nothing, in which case the days of ruling-elite-control were numbered;
2. Liberalize, with ruling-elites standing aside to give the people more freedom and more political-economic control, ultimately allowing transfers of wealth from the haves to the have-nots (as the people were demanding), rather than increasing the concentration of wealth, which of course also threatened the prevailing political-economic control of the ruling elites (ie "the governability of democracies"); or
3. Clamp down on democratic institutions, beginning with the media, ultimately dissolving "democracies" in a gradual turn to outright corporate-state (fascist) control by the ruling-elite oligolopy, today know as the 0.001%.

The analysis actually recommends the 3rd option as the best alternative for ruling-elite power, although, as a sort of head-fake, the academics recommended that a toned-down version of the 2nd option be implemented as a short term fix, appearing to yield to SOME of the people's demands (Remember Jimmy Carter?) as a strategic way to stave off the incipient people's revolution.

Notably, this was a plan that Zbigniew Brzezinski (also a co-founder of the Trilateral Commission who became Carter's most influential national security adviser...) loved, explaining in 1974 that "...it is very easy to love humanity and hate your neighbor, but it does seem to me that much of our universal idealism is really a hedonistic escape from our real problems" referring to the un-governability of democracies... perhaps foreshadowing his role in creating the Pakistani-trained mujahideen network to counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, a network that post 9/11 became the Taliban which in 1997 allied with Osama bin Laden's al Qadea, just prior to 9/11.

This book offers key insights to the ruling-elite agenda faced today in the US and should be on the reading list of anyone interested in building a united front movement for revolutionary social change.

[Public Scott · Rating 1 out of 5]

"In the United States, the strength of democracy poses a problem for the governability of democracy in a way which is not the case elsewhere." P. 115

The reason this book is still remembered today is because it says that democracy is fine as long as citizens don't actually use it. By actually employing democracy to wield the levers of power citizens somehow undermine the viability of democracy. Ideally, according to this book, democracy is really only supposed to be a veneer that allows the wealthy and powerful to run things the way they always have. This notion is vile. This book is vile.

But, considering the source, this thesis should come as no surprise. The Trilateral Commission is made up of wealthy and powerful people. In the mid-70's they were wringing their hands because they saw their power eroding as angry citizens made progress in the anti-war and civil rights movements.

If you want to see for yourself what helped inspire the last 40 years of class warfare by the rich against the poor look no further. It's right here in this book.

[Eren Buğlalılar · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting, historically significant report by the organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie, among them the notorious Mr. Huntington. It is drafted in 1974 and published in 1975, namely at the height of the oil crisis, post-Vietnam war sentiments.

The authors ask, "Why are the democracies of US, Japan and Europe in crisis?" and give a cold-blooded answer: "Because there is too much democracy." Their account focuses on how the increasing politicisation of the masses and their rising expectations paralysed the bourgeois democracies. It's chilling to see the fragile facade of western democracy is quickly exposed, system becomes unstable and the population ungovernable, when there is a "sharp increase in political consciousness, political participation and commitment to egalitarian and democratic values" (p. 106) and when "differences in wealth and power are viewed with scepticism" (62).

I liked how they admitted that when the masses become politically consistent and critical, their political regimes begin to show signs of crisis. So much so that they advise, "a program is necessary to lower the job expectations of those who receive a college education." (s. 184)

Think of this report as a prelude to neoliberalism. They made the diagnosis here in 1975 and began the shock therapy in 1980s with Reagan and Thatcher. And the ruling classes solved almost all the "problems" this report analysed. Pacification and less democracy were the cure for the ills of "excessive democracy".

[J.p. De · Rating 3 out of 5]

You should read this. It is one of the seminal documents in the recreation of the American Plutocracy, which began in the late 60s/early 70s after the GOP wrested control of the racist south from the (no longer quite so racist) Democrats.

Basically, its US section explains that we have been suffering from too much democracy. In other words, during the 60s the rabble ceased to respect and obey its betters.

This paper presents the middle of the road, Center Right and Corporate Liberal views about how that rabble might be put back in its rightful, worshipful and obedient place.

Check it out. And remember, these are the opinions of the mild, centrist wing of the oligarchs. (David Rockefeller founded the Tri-Lateral Commission.)

[noblethumos · Rating 5 out of 5]

Published in 1975 under the auspices of the Trilateral Commission, The Crisis of Democracy is a seminal text in the study of late twentieth-century political order and democratic theory. Co-authored by Samuel P. Huntington, Michel Crozier, and Joji Watanuki, the report examines the perceived decline in governability among the advanced industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. It represents both a diagnosis of the political and institutional stresses of the post-1960s era and a normative reflection on the limits and sustainability of democratic governance. The work’s influence extends beyond its immediate policy context, marking a pivotal moment in the intellectual and ideological trajectory of Western liberalism during the Cold War.


The central thesis of The Crisis of Democracy is that the democratic upsurge of the 1960s and early 1970s—manifested in social movements, student protests, and the expansion of political participation—had produced a paradoxical weakening of democratic authority. Huntington and his co-authors argue that democratic societies had become “overloaded” with demands that exceeded the capacity of their institutions to respond effectively. The proliferation of interest groups, the erosion of traditional authority structures, and the rise of adversarial politics created what they describe as a “crisis of governability.” The democratic process, they contend, had become too responsive—threatening the very stability and efficacy of governance.


Huntington’s American chapter is the most frequently cited and controversial portion of the report. He attributes the crisis to a decline in governmental discipline and public confidence, a “delegitimation of authority,” and an “excess of democracy.” By this, Huntington did not advocate authoritarianism, but rather a rebalancing between participation and authority—a restoration of the institutional restraints and deference necessary for effective governance. He warns that when all social groups insist on maximal rights and immediate responsiveness, democratic governments risk paralysis. His call for a “greater degree of moderation in democracy” thus reflects a conservative turn in political thought—a defense of order and governability against the destabilizing effects of participatory excess.


Crozier’s analysis of Western Europe and Watanuki’s study of Japan complement Huntington’s argument with region-specific insights. Crozier emphasizes the bureaucratic rigidity and corporatist stagnation of Western European democracies, which he sees as unable to reconcile modernization with adaptability. Watanuki highlights Japan’s unique combination of economic dynamism and political apathy, suggesting that social cohesion had been maintained at the expense of participatory vitality. Together, the three case studies present a comparative portrait of democracies under strain, beset by social mobilization, declining trust, and administrative inefficiency.


The report’s intellectual framework reflects the broader concerns of the Trilateral Commission, an elite transatlantic forum founded in 1973 by David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski to foster policy coordination among industrial democracies. Within this context, The Crisis of Democracy functions not merely as a scholarly analysis but as a political document—a call to restore confidence in democratic institutions and elite stewardship amid the turbulence of the 1970s. Its subtext reveals anxieties about the erosion of consensus, the politicization of previously apolitical domains, and the challenges posed by the democratization of knowledge and media. In this sense, the report can be read as an early articulation of what later theorists would describe as the “governance dilemma” of modern liberal democracies.


Scholars have interpreted The Crisis of Democracy in diverse ways. Some view it as a prescient analysis of the structural challenges that would confront late modern democracies: bureaucratic overload, political polarization, and public cynicism. Others see it as emblematic of an elite reaction to the democratizing movements of the 1960s—a defense of technocratic control and institutional insulation against popular pressure. From a critical perspective, the report’s notion of an “excess of democracy” has been read as symptomatic of a neoliberal turn in governance thinking, privileging stability and market order over democratic participation and social justice.


Yet, beyond its ideological implications, the report’s analytical contribution lies in its conceptualization of legitimacy and capacity as interdependent dimensions of democratic governance. Huntington and his co-authors anticipated key debates in political science about institutional performance, political trust, and the limits of state intervention in pluralist societies. Their insistence that democracy’s survival depends not only on participation but also on authority remains a provocative and enduring insight, particularly in light of contemporary crises of populism, polarization, and technocratic disillusionment.


The Crisis of Democracy can be seen as both a product and a critique of its historical moment—a reaction to the upheavals of the postwar order and a prelude to the managerial liberalism of the late twentieth century. Its warnings about political overload and declining legitimacy resonate with current debates about democratic resilience, though its prescriptions often appear elitist or paternalistic to modern readers. Nevertheless, the report remains a key document in understanding the evolution of democratic thought in the latter half of the twentieth century, bridging the intellectual worlds of political science, policy analysis, and international governance.

GPT

[Andrew Price]

This is one heck of an insightful book.

The authors, from the Trilateral Commission, examine the state of democracy in the mid-1970s. Their conclusion was that Western liberal democracy is at risk due to an "excess of democracy," caused by the political movements of the 1960s. This had made government "less powerful and more active." They prescribed a return to the strengthening of traditional institutions.

It is interesting to note this isn't some grand conspiracy. The authors were genuinely concerned that liberal democracy could be shattered if too much democratic power is given to the people, and taken away from the clever men who run the society. It was easier, as Huntington declares on pg. 98, when "Truman had been able to govern the country with the cooperation of a relatively small number of Wall Street lawyers and bankers."

They also blame the press for playing a role in this weakening of central institutions. Interestingly, in the appendix, they recommend a return to re-instating libel law as "a necessary check upon the abuses of power by the press." They also recommend journalists create mechanisms such as press councils to police themselves, or face regulation by the government. The appendix also has recommendations in regards to higher education which would be interesting to any college student.

Overall, it was a very interesting and eye-opening report, which you have to imagine wasn't really meant to be widely read, and so it's flown largely under the radar.

[Peyman HAGH · Rating 2 out of 5]

Book Report:

The number of pages: 221 pages
Publisher: New York University Press
Date of Copyright: 1975 by The Trilateral Commission
Author/s: Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki

On pages 6 to 7, the book says:

Currently, a significant challenge arises from intellectuals and related groups who express their discontent with the corruption, materialism, and inefficiency of Democracy and the subservience of democratic governments to "monopoly capitalism." The emergence of an "adversary culture" among intellectuals has influenced students, scholars, and the media. As Schumpeter noted, intellectuals are "people who wield the power of the spoken and the written word," one of the key differences that sets them apart from others who do the same is their lack of direct responsibility for practical affairs.

In advanced industrial societies, this has given rise to a class of value-oriented intellectuals who often criticize leadership, challenge authority, and expose and delegitimize established institutions. Their behaviour contrasts with the increasing number of technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals. In an era marked by widespread secondary and higher education, the prevalence of mass media, and the transition from manual labour to clerical and professional jobs, this development poses a challenge to democratic governance that could be as serious as the threats previously posed by aristocratic cliques, fascist movements, and communist parties.

Michael Crozier, on page 12, says:

Each country, of course, is substantially different. The main characteristic of Western Europe is its diversity. But across the widely different practices and rationalizations, two essential characteristics hold about the fundamental problem of governability:

• The European political systems are overloaded with participants and demands, and they have increasing difficulty in mastering the complexity that is the natural result of their economic growth and political development.

• The bureaucratic cohesiveness they have to sustain to maintain their capacity to decide and implement tends to foster irresponsibility and the breakdown of consensus, which increases, in turn, the difficulty of their task.

How information shape politics:

From page 13

There are several interrelated reasons for this situation. First, social and economic developments have united many more groups and interests. Second, the explosion of information has made it difficult, if not impossible, for traditional governance to maintain the necessary distance. Third, the democratic ethos complicates efforts to prevent access to and restrict information. In contrast, the persistence of bureaucratic processes associated with traditional governing systems makes managing these issues at a lower level challenging. Due to the model of instant information and the absence of self-regulating subsystems, even minor conflicts have become governmental problems.

These convergences and contradictions have led to an increasing paradox. While it has traditionally been believed that a state's power relies on the number of decisions it can make, the reality is that the more decisions the modern state needs to handle, the more helpless it becomes. Decisions not only confer power; they also introduce vulnerability. The fundamental weakness of contemporary European states lies in their susceptibility to blackmailing tactics.

The world is shrinking, and fewer consequences are being accepted as externalities. European societies are affected by this general trend and struggle to respond with the necessary improvements in governance. Politicians and administrators often find it easier and more convenient to avoid dealing with complexity. Instead, they accommodate it and use it as a convenient distraction.

From page 14:

Britain and France take pride in having a highly qualified elite corps of professional decision-makers often considered better trained or at least better selected than their American counterparts. This seemingly paradoxical situation can be understood by recognizing that decision-making is not solely the responsibility of top civil servants and politicians. Instead, it results from bureaucratic processes within complex organizations and systems.

One factor for inflation:

From page 37:

Inflation can be considered a direct result of Western democracies' ungovernability. It is an easy answer to the tensions of growth.

Unsurprisingly, countries with a weak social fabric—those reliant on hierarchical, fragmented, and distant models of social control—are much more vulnerable to inflation. In the 1960s, however, a reasonable equilibrium was achieved where growth expectations aligned with actual growth, and Keynesian policies helped stabilize the economy. This golden age of economics was relatively short-lived, particularly in Europe and Germany, except for North America.

Today, no country can escape the immense pressures of the new global turbulence. Large-scale inflation has been well tolerated for some time. However, it has significantly distorted individuals' and groups' economic and social positions. Its impersonal nature complicates direct complaints about it. Moreover, the groups that typically voice their concerns often stand to benefit from the inflationary process. The interplay between public sentiment, union pressure, and government intervention is crucial in shaping the economic landscape during these times.

The problem of modern Western Societies:

Page 39:

The challenges faced by modern Western societies stem from some fundamental issues related to values. Key questions to consider include participation, people's consent, equality, the right of the community to intervene in personal matters, and the potential acceptance of authority. Addressing these issues is essential before providing an accurate diagnosis and suggesting viable solutions.

From Page 44:

While the community's feelings may seem more important to young people than the actual content of any specific goals, the fundamental principles of democratic and Christian ideals remain vibrant and influence both revolutionary and conservative movements. In this context, four clusters of values appear to be as prominent now as they have been for a long time.

First, the individual's freedom stands out as the primary value, widely shared and rediscovered by various movements, whether extremely radical or conservatively religious. It is often argued that these movements hold vastly different interpretations of freedom. However, this distinction may not be as clear-cut when considering values and core political beliefs. At this level, the only significant difference lies in the contrast between the European conception of freedom—characterized as "freedom from," which emphasizes the inalienable right of the individual not to be interfered with—and the American interpretation, which focuses on "freedom to," highlighting the inalienable right to take initiative and lead others if desired.

European freedom-from predates the advent of political Democracy and has deep Christian roots. While it varies in form across different European countries—some Protestant nations lean toward the freedom-to concept—there is generally more convergence than expected across countries, class barriers, and political groups.

Second, equality remains a dominant value orientation throughout Western Europe despite its ambiguities and potential challenges. However, European egalitarianism differs from its American counterpart in various ways.

From Page 45:

Due process is not the most crucial element of this belief system. Additionally, efficiency can be seen as significant, as it carries a legitimating connotation. In this context, order is the means through which efficiency is achieved, and efficiency is essential for a well-functioning society. West Europeans prioritize a good, "efficient" system over tangible results.

Order is often associated with the white man's responsibilities, while efficiency demonstrates that order in a modern rationalized society. Lastly, I want to highlight dualism as a fourth key belief. Unlike Eastern countries, Western Europeans have never embraced a unified idea of legitimacy. The opposition between Church and State predates the modern left-right political conflicts.

While there may be aspirations for group cooperation to create a harmonious consensus, such collaboration has never been realized without the safeguards provided by dualism. Free choice can only be maintained if opposition exists, which ensures the independence of individuals who might otherwise become overly dependent on the dominant power, hindering their ability to assert their rights.
Recently, I finished reading The Crisis of Democracy. This book offers a thought-provoking perspective on how Western countries have grappled with reform rejection, resistance to an egalitarian society, and preservation of traditional values.


Samuel P. Huntington, on page 113, says:

Deficiency of Democracy:

Al Smith once remarked that "the only cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy." However, our analysis suggests that applying this remedy in the current context only exacerbates existing problems. Some issues of governance in the United States today stem from an "excess of democracy"—a phrase that echoes David Donald's observations regarding the consequences of the Jacksonian revolution, which contributed to the Civil War.

What is needed now is a greater degree of moderation in democratic practices. This moderation can be applied in two significant ways. First, Democracy is just one means of establishing authority and is not always the most appropriate. In many instances, the claims of expertise, seniority, experience, and specialized skills may take precedence over democratic principles when deciding how to constitute authority.

The effective operation of a democratic political system often requires a certain level of apathy and noninvolvement from some individuals and groups. Historically, every democratic society has had a marginal population—varying in size—that has not actively engaged in politics. While this lack of participation may seem undemocratic, it has also contributed to the effective functioning of Democracy. Now, marginalized social groups, such as Black communities, are increasingly becoming active participants in the political system. However, there remains a risk of overwhelming the political system with demands that could extend its functions and undermine its authority.

Political authority is generally weak in the United States, and it becomes incredibly fragile during periods of intense commitment to democratic and egalitarian ideals, known as creedal passion periods. In the U.S., the strength of Democracy creates challenges for its effective governance, unlike in other countries. The risks to democratic government in the United States primarily stem not from external threats—though those are real—or from internal subversion from either the left or the right, although both scenarios are possible. Instead, the vulnerabilities arise from the internal dynamics of Democracy itself within a highly educated, engaged, and participatory society. As John Adams noted, "Democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide." This self-destruction is more likely to result from overindulgence than any other cause.

Joji Watanuki Page 119:

The People's Democratic Republic of Korea presents one potential conflict, while another concern is the possibility of military confrontation between China and the Soviet Union. If either of these conflicts were to escalate significantly, they could have worldwide repercussions, and the United States would likely become involved. However, if the escalation remains below certain thresholds and can be viewed as a localized issue, it may not necessitate broader international involvement.

Page 120:

Japan's dependency on overseas resources is significant, with nearly 100 percent reliance on oil and 85 percent on total energy supply. In terms of specific materials, the country depends entirely on imports for aluminum and has a 95 percent dependency on iron ore, based on 1970 levels. Additionally, 23 percent of Japan's total food supply comes from abroad. Among essential food items, 92 percent of the wheat and 96 percent of the soybeans consumed in Japan in 1971 were imported. Compared to figures for the United States, these statistics highlight Japan's considerable reliance on international sources for resource acquisition.

Page 135:

**Education**: The expansion of higher education in Japan over the past decade has been remarkable. The percentage of individuals enrolling in universities and colleges among the eligible age group has doubled, reaching 30 percent in 1974. Furthermore, this trend is expected to continue, and enrollment may reach 40 percent by 1980. While several issues within the Japanese university system need to be addressed, this discussion will focus solely on the political implications of the expansion of higher education.

Page 136:

One notable trend in higher education has been the increase in university social science specialists, some of whom have started to engage more closely with governmental policy-making than previous Japanese university professors. In areas such as econometrics, social engineering, and regional planning, several specialists provide advice and maintain close contact with the government.

However, expanding higher education has also led to a growing number of intellectual oppositionists. In Japan, this tradition of intellectual dissent is longstanding. What is new, though, is the emergence of policy-oriented fields within social science and the rise of intellectuals willing to advise the government on these matters.

A crucial question remains: Can the Japanese economy continue creating suitable job opportunities for university graduates, who comprise over 30% to 40% of their age cohort? Another key concern is the cost and quality of higher education. The government has been increasing funding for private universities, but as budget constraints loom, it remains uncertain whether further assistance is feasible or advisable.

Page 137:

Present-day democracy relies heavily on the recognition and support of labour unions. In Japan, the significance of labour unions, particularly the two major national federations, cannot be understated as they have acted as key defenders of postwar Democracy, albeit in different ways. Sohyo has closely collaborated with the Socialists, has had a somewhat favourable stance toward the Communists, and has taken a firm stance against the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In contrast, Domei has supported more moderate Democratic Socialists. While it opposes the Communists, Domei is willing to work with the LDP and its government under specific conditions.

Conclusion:

Page 161:

The Problems of Democracy:

(1) The pursuit of democratic values such as equality and individualism has resulted in the loss of legitimacy for authority and a deterioration of trust in leadership.

(2) The expansion of political participation in Democracy has led to an "overload" on government and an imbalanced increase in governmental activities, worsening economic inflationary pressures.

(3) The essential political competition in a democracy has intensified, causing a fragmentation of interests and a decline in the cohesion of political parties.

(4) Democratic governments' responsiveness to the electorate and societal pressures fosters a nationalistic parochialism that affects how democratic societies conduct their foreign relations.

Page 163:

Leadership is currently viewed with skepticism in democratic societies. Without confidence in their leaders, groups struggle to function effectively. When leadership weakens within various segments of society, this decline also extends to the highest levels of government. A society's ability to be governed effectively at the national level relies on how well it is governed at subnational, regional, local, functional, and industrial levels. For example, influential trade union leaders are often perceived as threatening state authority in the modern state. However, responsible union leaders with effective control over their members pose less of a challenge to national political leaders' authority than they do as a necessary foundation for exercising that authority.

Page 164:

The democratic principle that government should respond to the people's needs leads to the expectation that it must address the issues and injustices faced by specific groups in society. Given the requirement for competitive elections every few years, political leaders find it difficult to do anything but meet these expectations.

[DoctorM · Rating 4 out of 5]

A largely-forgotten book that appeared in the mid-1970s, during that grey grim period when it seemed that the economies and societies of the West were failing, when Britain seemed to be on the edge of economic collapse and America was entering into a post-Sixties, Oil Crisis funk. Still--- this isn't a period piece. Crozier and Huntington ask a question that's haunted democratic thought since...well...Athens: how much democracy is compatible with governance? Does active citizenship at some level actually undermine the ability of a state and a society to function? You may or may not approve of the answers in this report, and the book was attacked by many reviewers as a piece of propaganda for corporate and authoritarian interests. But for anyone interested in the deadlock in the present (2010) American political system, or interested in what democracy's limits might be, or in the viability of popular politics--- it is well worth reading for the ideas here, even if the issues that prompted its writing are forty years gone.

[Stephen Masri · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book is seen as something of a watershed for succeeding public policy and a hint at the purportedly nefarious workings of the Trilateral Commission. Would that it were the latter, as that could make intriguing reading. It does reflect a the arrogance particular to those who rotate between corporate leadership, university and think tank roles. Arrogant and credentialed though they are, their views are mundane and predictable.

The first third of the book focuses on 1960s-70s public policy paralysis in Europe and Britain. The contributing author of that portion attributes it to several causes, but seems wholly to ignore the most important factor of all: in systems of proportional representation lies the risk of potential policy stalemates and expedient compromises leading to weak leadership That is a pretty glaring omission. The first part of the book looks like a naive and cranky complaint about unions and protesting students. However, it is written in such anodyne terms (business-speak) that it misses even being a good rant about what were the truly bad effects of runaway unions, petulant teenagers, and doctrinaire leftists.

The book is redeemed by Samuel Huntington's portion. It examines trends in US public policy, election processes and representation, and evolution in the interactions between branches of government. Unlike the other sections, his is supported by a wealth of hard data and a broad array of sources.

The section on Japan is somewhat helpful, but is light on data and detailed example. Emerging Asia was already on the horizon, but is given scant notice. That makes the section on that part of the world short sighted.

The members of the Trilateral commission might be venally cosmopolitan, work too hard to exert corporate influence on government policy, or be socially irresponsible, but they are not Bismarcks, nor Richelieus, nor even good imitations of Machiavelli's prince.

[Nick]

If anyone is interested in learning of the origins of neoliberalism, specifically some of the first intellectual responses (here, the liberal internationalists), this book is for you.

The authors focus on political and social impacts of the end of the New Deal/Fordist era and how the seeds of neoliberalism, then in the early 1970s, were even then in bloom.

This book should be compared and contrasted with the Powell Memorandum, which talked at that time of the same subjects, only from a more right wing perspective.

[Tom Twigt · Rating 3 out of 5]

Wat een boek. Geschreven door grootkapitaal van de drie grote economische regio's , VS, West-Europa en Japan. Ze schrijven heel duidelijk op hoe ze de opkomst van democratie als bedreiging zien die hun autoriteit doet afnemen. Walgelijk om te lezen, maar wel een hele interessante kijk op de wereld.

[Patricia Roberts-Miller · Rating 1 out of 5]

Historically interesting, but it mostly turned out to be wrong.

[Marco · Rating 3 out of 5]

Book is almost technical. Some parts worth reading just to understand how the think back then.
I like most of the analysis, I wish if they were this accurate even to these days.
Unfortunatly not very practical to be honest...