At the Center of the Storm

by George Tenet, Eric Conger

In the whirlwind of accusations and recriminations that emerged in the wake of 9/11 and the Iraq war, one man's vital testimony has been conspicuously absent. Candid and gripping, At the Center of the Storm recounts George Tenet's time at the Central Intelligence Agency, a revealing look at the inner workings of the most important intelligence organization in the world during the most challenging times in recent history. With unparalleled access to both the highest echelons of government and raw intelligence from the field, Tenet illuminates the CIA's painstaking attempts to prepare the country against new and deadly threats, disentangles the interlocking events that led to 9/11, and offers explosive new information on the deliberations and strategies that culminated in the U.S. invasion of Iraq.





Beginning with his appointment as Director of Central Intelligence in 1997, Tenet unfolds the momentous events that led to 9/11 as he saw and experienced them: his declaration of war on al-Qa'ida; the CIA's covert operations inside Afghanistan; the worldwide operational plan to fight terrorists; his warnings of imminent attacks against American interests to White House officials in the summer of 2001; and the plan for a coordinated and devastating counterattack against al-Qa'ida laid down just six days after the attacks.





Tenet's compelling narrative then turns to the war in Iraq as he provides dramatic insight and background on the run-up to the invasion, including a firsthand account of the fallout from the inclusion of "sixteen words" in the president's 2003 State of the Union address, which claimed that Saddam Hussein had sought to purchase uranium from Africa; the true context of Tenet's own now-famous "slam dunk" comment regarding Saddam's WMD program; and the CIA's critical role in an administration predisposed to take the country to war. In doing so, he sets the record straight about CIA operations and shows readers that the truth is more complex than suggested in other versions of recent history offered thus far.





Through it all, Tenet paints an unflinching self-portrait of a man caught between the warring forces of the administration's decision-making process, the reams of frightening intelligence pouring in from around the world, and his own conscience. In At the Center of the Storm, George Tenet draws on his unmatched experience within the opaque mirrors of intelligence and provides crucial information previously undisclosed to offer a moving, revelatory profile of both a man and a nation in times of crisis.

Genres: Biography, History, Politics, Nonfiction, Espionage, Autobiography, Military Fiction

Audio

First published April 30, 2007

About the author

George John Tenet was the Director of Central Intelligence for the United States Central Intelligence Agency and is Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. Tenet held the position as the DCI from July 1997 to July 2004, making him the second-longest serving director in the agency's history – behind Allen Welsh Dulles – as well as one of the few DCIs to serve under two U.S. presidents of opposing political parties. In February 2008 he became a managing director at the merchant bank Allen & Company.

Tenet was born in Flushing, Queens, New York to a family of Greek origin from Greece and Albania, John and Evangelia Tenet; his father first worked in a coal-mine in France before arriving in the United States. Tenet was raised in Little Neck, Queens where he and his brother Bill worked as busboys in their family's diner (later renamed the Scobee Grill). He attended Public School 94, Louis Pasteur Junior High School 67, and Benjamin N. Cardozo High School (he was a classmate of Ron Jeremy and actor Reginald VelJohnson).

Tenet holds a bachelor's degree (1976) from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a master's degree from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University (1978).

Tenet is married to Stephanie Glakas-Tenet. They have one son.

After he received his M.I.A., Tenet became research director of the American Hellenic Institute from 1978 to 1979.

He then began working for the Senate, first as a legislative assistant and later as Legislative Director to former Senator H. John Heinz III of Pennsylvania (1982-1985). He was a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) from 1985-1988, then Staff Director of the SSCI from 1988-1993. Later, Tenet joined President-elect Bill Clinton's national security transition team. Clinton appointed Tenet Senior Director for Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council (1993-1995).

Reviews

[Justin · Rating 5 out of 5]

I like George Tenet. He has a tough-guy New York accent and there's a picture of him in the book with a leather jacket on looking like he's really giving it to Andrew Card. Personally, I have no special strong feelings for George Bush, either way. But, when it comes down to finger-pointing (which, yes it has for a while now), Tenet wasn't a Bush Man---Clinton appointed him--and I think, in a lot of ways, that gives him a lot of credibility as far as believing what he has to say in this book. He wasn't totally wet behind the ears when 9/11 rolled around like most of the Bushies, and so in a lot of ways (yeah, again), his CYA (Cover Your Ass, which it's sort of undeniable this book is) has a lot more resonance for me. The fact of the matter is that unless Iraq miraculously turns itself around, there's going to be a lot of CYA coming out of the Bush administration as they, like Tenet, move from policy-making to history-writing. In addition to the fact that Tenet wasn't a Bush Man to begin with, his being the head of the CIA lends him more credibility, as the CIA is more of a technocratic, fact-finding organization than a policy-making organization (though that is debatable). The DOD should be a technocratic fact-finding org. too, but the fact is that during Bush Jr., it was staffed with the finest the American Enterprise Institute had to offer (read: the much maligned 'neo-cons'). And if half of what people, including Tenet, have to say about guys like Doug Feith, Richard Perle, and Paul Wolfowitz, along with Cheney and Rummy and their coteries, basically railroading the rest of Bush admin. into the Iraq War, then Tenet's CYA, again, has a lot more traction than whatever will come out of, for example, Rumsfeld's or Wolfowitz's corners (which, to tell you the truth, if they write memoires any time in the next decade, I'll be surprised.).

Anyway, I didn't read this book because I'm "totally interested in knowing what really happened in the weeks in months building up to 9/11," but more because I like political memoires or books by guys who really were at the center of the proverbial storm (check Woodward and Bernstein's book The Final Days for a starting point). Anyway, this book was in many ways, a Real Page Turner for me. I didn't want to put it down. I think the CIA is fascinating. I think that Tenet's book is probably the closest you're going to get to the "real story" behind what went down behind the curtain during Bush. You get a real read on some personalities, etc. Moreover, according to Tenet, a lot of the contretemps and "mistakes" have more to do with the inevitable complications of navigating and maneuvering within huge bureacracies rather than some concerted effort to mislead, which is, for me, totally believable (eg., the whole Niger Delta/Iraq/yellowcake/State of the Union Address gaffe). I'd like to go into to detail but there's really too much to say (though I will say that nothing in here really surprised me.). It is what it is. Check it out for yourself. Until Colin Powell writes his book or (gasp!) maybe Condoleeza Rice or someone else closer to Bush (maybe even Bushy himself!) decides to write their political memoires (or maybe even after), this book is about the best thing you're going to get as far as an insider's account. Morever, as I wrote earlier, I'm more inclined to believe Tenet than I would be Rice, or Rummy or pretty much anyone besides George Tenet. So, this book just might be the best thing you'll get if you want know what went on in the Executive Branch, 2001-2005.

[Anaszaidan · Rating 5 out of 5]

كتاب يعبر اسمه عن واقع الحال والحقبة التي تسنم فيها جورح تينت منصبه في الاستخبارات الأمريكية.

يرتبط اسمه عندي شخصيا بحقبة ما بعد سبتمبر..حين قررت أمريكا أن تكشف عن فاشيتها وصارت علاقاتها مع أي دولة تقوم على مقياس أمني بحت يشبه إلى حد كبير علاقة المواطن العربي بحكومته!. حيث يكون حلم المواطن أن يكون ملفه نظيفا في نظر ضابط التحقيق!.

اشتهر اسم تينت بعد أحداث سبتمبر كمبعوث شخصي للرئيس الأمريكي جورج بوش إلى زعامات الدول العربية. ينتابني شعور بأن تينت يأتي حاملا ملفا ضخما يرغب في استكمال التحقيق فيه بالتعاون مع حكومات تلك الدول..وإلا فما الغاية من قدوم مدير المخابرات وحيدا لزيارة تلك الزعامات؟!

اشتهر اسمه أيضا لما كان طرفا أساسيا في مفاوضات الفلسطينيين مع الصهاينة، حيث كان وجوده ضمانة لتفعيل الملف الأمني الذي يصب في مصلحة إسرائيل أولا وأخيرا.

تلك حقبة عصيبة..شعرت فيها بانهزام نفسي وحضاري من ذاك الغربي الذي صارت فيه سحنتي وهويتي وثقافتي أسبابا كافية للارتياب. حتى الندوات الثقافية تحولت من الإجابة عن تساؤلات (لماذا يكرهوننا) و(دعوة للتعايش)..ليصل الأمر إلى تجديد الخطاب الديني..ليتوج الأمر لاحقا بتقرير مؤسسة راند الشهير الذي يدعو إلى تبني تيارين متناقضين ظاهريا..ولكنهما يخدمان العدو فقط..الصوفية والجامية أو المدخلية.

يمر الكتاب على بداية عمله في الاستخبارات في فترة صعبة لذاك الجهاز الذي كان يعاني في مستوى تأهيل العملاء للعمل الاستخباري، ويعاني من تعاقب أكثر من خمس مدراء عليه في سبع سنوات. هذا التعاقب ينعكس سلبا على أداء الاستخبارات وعلى أداء الموظفين.

يحاول تينيت بإسهاب أن يبرئ جهازه من تزويد البيت الأبيض بمعلومات مغلوطة أو ناقصة دفعت القيادة الأمريكية إلى الافتراء حول أسلحة الدمار الشامل العراقية..وهو ما دفع إلى غزو العراق. طبعا لا يتحدث عن نوايا بوش المبيتة ضد العراق، ولا عن سيطرة المحافظين الجدد على سدة الحكم، وهو مما لا يخفى على مدير جهاز استخباري. وهذا يعني عندي بأنه كتاب يتداخل فيه الجانب الشخصي لسيرة المؤلف مع السياسات التي يراد الترويج لها من قبل جهة ما.

طريقة سرد المعلومات وإيصالك إلى مراد المؤلف خبيث جدا..حيث تشعر بأن صدام حسين بعناده ومكابرته قد جلب الغزو لبلده وهو بريء..هذا ما يحاول تينيت أن يجعلنا نصل إليه. فهو يدفعك إلى استنتاج ذلك من كلامه ولا يقوله مباشرة في بادئ الأمر.

أيضا حاول نفس الشيء في سرده لسير المفاوضات العربية الصهيونية. يحاول دوما أن يجعلنا نتصور أن ياسر عرفات قد أضاع فرصة سلام حقيقية في كامب ديفيد في عام 2000.

من متابعتي للموضوع آنذاك أذكر بأن مجلة نيوزويك قد أجرت لقاء مع رئيس الوزراء الصهيوني إيهود باراك، وكان الذي يجري اللقاء يتساءل بانحياز واضح مع الصهاينة عن سبب إضاعة عرفات لفرصة السلام التاريخية. تلك الفرصة المزعومة هي تخلي الفلسطينيين عن السيادة على القدس الشرقية التي فيها الأقصى..وطبعا القدس الغربية لا تدخل في المفاوضات فهي للصهاينة بلا شك!

طبعا هذا التواطؤ على الفكرة ذاتها بين مجلة يقال بأنها مقربة من اللوبي اليهودي وبين ما يقوله مدير المخابرات الأمريكية جعلني أتساءل عن حجم التناغم والتواطؤ بين الأجهزة السيادية الأمريكية ووسائل الإعلام التي تزعم بأنها حرة في بلد ديموقراطي..إذ أن الخطاب والمزاعم متواطئة على قول واحد.

يعرج تينيت على قصة حربهم للقاعدة وطالبان..هناك إصرار على أن القاعدة وطالبان يتاجرون بالمخدرات!. وهي أيضا من الافتراءات التي ما انفك الإعلام الغربي عن الحديث عنها. مع أن تقرير الأمم المتحدة في عام 1999 يكشف بوضوح بأن حجم الأفيون المهرب من أفغانستان في عهد طالبان هو صفر%. لكن هناك آلة إعلامية تصر على الكذب دوما.

رغم أهمية الكتاب إلا أنك لو أردت أن تبحث عن صورة مجملة لموضوع ما..فلن تجدها في هذا الكتاب. فالكتاب أشبه بسرد تفاصيل دقيقة بهدف إيصال رسالة ما، أو تفنيد إشاعة ضد تينيت. وليس هناك كشف حقيقي لواقع الحال كما في كتاب صائد الجواسيس.

كتاب مهم، ولكن يحتاج القارئ فيه أن يتعمق أكثر في كل حدث جرى من خلال مصادر أخرى حتى تكتمل أجزاء الصورة عنده، ويتخذ بعده موقفا متزنا.

يستحق هذا الكذب خمس نجوم بجدارة!

[Jerome Otte · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a VERY interesting read.
His recap of the true nature of Iraqi al-Qaeda links was insightful and a welcome splash of reality to all the neocon Iraqi-al-Qaeda link allegations I came across in Stephen Hayes' Cheney: The Untold Story of the Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President in American History, which incorrectly uses Tenet as a mouthpiece to promote and defend its neocon agenda.
He gives an excellent account of the CIA's pre-9/11 operations against al-Qaeda, and although Gary Berntsen in Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander severely criticizes Tenet for being a lax, stupid DCI who was hellbent on downsizing the operations directorate, that is not true at all.
One of the reasons I checked this out was because I'm intensely interested in the 2001 portion of the war in Afghanistan, and Tenet's chapter "Into the Sanctuary" doesn't disappoint. The inner workings of the CIA are very interesting. He also does an excellent job of covering his ass.
The CIA has always been an interesting organization to study, and I believe that one of the reasons why it is criticized for intelligence "failures" so much is because few people really know how it works.
Also amusing were Tenet's many awkward cultural interactions with foreign officials.
Occasionally, though, Tenet jumps all over the place, but this doesn't hamper the story that much.
I don't think he does a good job describing the CIA' operations in Iraq, though.
Also, if you've read Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, then Tenet's account of the failings of postwar Iraq, "Mission Not Accomplished" isn't going to be news, you can just skip over that.
*Also, the first chapter, Tenet claims he had a conversation with Richard Perle on September 12, but Perle was in France at the time.
*He characterizes Tina Shelton as a naval reservist, but she was actually a DIA analyst with 20 years' experience.
(The Weekly Standard was a little annoyed by his correct analysis of Iraqi al-Qaeda linkages and fair portrait of Richard Clarke and Bill Clinton, so they pointed this out, apparently to lower Tenet's credibility)
Also, see Steve Coll's book Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 for a good and fair portrait of Tenet.

[Charlie Weiss · Rating 2 out of 5]

Although written pretty well (which is why it gets two stars), this was one long boring politics-as-usual, name dropping, finger pointing slog. Here's the most interesting paragraph so you don't have to read this:

"In one conversation, operations officers in Washington told the field of a major development back home. The Starbucks at CIA headquarters had just switched over to a twenty-four-hour-a-day operation. Agency officers in the field speculated that this move signaled an imminent start to the war, and they were right."

Now go find an interesting book.

[Rod Hilton · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book starts as a simple biography of George Tenet, director of CIA during part of the Clinton and Bush administrations, but it becomes much more.

Detailing operations at CIA in the years prior to, during, and after 9/11, the book provides valuable insight into a world that the average person simply has to access to.

The Good

The book is extremely interesting. George Tenet gives us far more than a tome of facts, he provides an actual narrative where he is the main character. The book talks not only about CIA, but people he knew and worked with, how he felt about events, and conversations he had with members of various presidential administrations.

The book does an excellent job of sucking you in. It starts a bit slow, but after a few chapters Tenet really hits his stride, and the book becomes difficult to put down.

I learned a great deal from this book. In fact, many times fundamental assumptions I had about terrorism and 9/11 were challenged by the book, and I was forced to revise a few of my opinions. One thing that fundamentally changed was my view toward the possibility of preventing 9/11. In light of memos sent to Condoleeza Rice titled "Bin Laden Determined To Strike U.S." I had been of the opinion that the administration could have done more to prevent 9/11. I am no longer convinced that is the case - that warning looked like hundreds of others that wound up going nowhere. I am also now convinced of the intelligence of terrorist organizations, whose actions described in the book paint them as far more clever than the "us vs. them" mentality otherwise affords. Before reading this book, I felt that terrorists are dangerous because they are happy to die. Now I view them as dangerous because they are happy to die and they are very smart.


The Bad

Tenet is often a tad too autobiographical in his writing, getting into personality details that don't seem entirely relevant. He also suffers from what I can only imagine is a common attribute among people in his field: acronym poisoning. Tenet uses acronyms for nearly every organization and person he discusses. As the book goes on, the rate of acronyms per page increases. There is even an appendix in the back of the book, which I found myself having to flip to frequently.

Tenet occasionally jumps all over the place. For the most part, the book is structured as a chronological narrative: first this happened, then this happened, etc. Occasionally though, he will delve into relevant details of events that happened months of even years later, but then go back to the "present time" in the narrative. This can get somewhat annoying.


The Ugly

The worst thing about the book is also one of the best things. There is one chapter in particular that talks about Al Queda's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. If your view is that people in caves do not have the money or ability to acquire a nuclear weapon, this chapter will change your mind (it changed mine). This chapter was extremely difficult to get through, simply because it's so terrifying.

I found myself putting down the book very frequently during this chapter, simply finding it too difficult to stomach.

The chapters about the lead-up to the Iraq war are equally difficult to get through. According to Tenet, the CIA essentially was forced to take the fall for the pre-war intelligence, even though the CIA under his watch was well aware of the realities of Iraq's WMD programs. These chapters were infuriating to read.

But since these feelings are partially the point of the book, it's hard to hold these facts against Tenet. These chapters are difficult to read, and they should be.

Summary

If you're interested in an "inside look" at government and the intelligence community during the middle east peace process negotiations under Clinton, September 11th, and the Iraq war, you'll greatly enjoy the book. It rarely (but occasionally) comes off as Tenet trying to shift blame off himself and his staff, and the book is inherently one-sided, but it's an extremely informative and interesting side.

[Jonathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Having read many books by or about military generals, politicians, and pundits, this was my first book from the intelligence community. The point that strikes me the hardest, which was not a point of the book, is that while politicians usually lie to save face those in the intelligence community lie to preserve a larger truth. In other words, their intentions are more honorable, which was not something I expected to learn from the book.

George Tenet is very candid about his own successes and short comings as Director of Central Intelligence. He gives an inside view of what was going on leading up to 9/11 and the years afterwards. Much of the the blame that was put on him and his agency is undeserved, and merely a result of politicians trying to save face. He confirms my dislike for certain members of the Bush Administration, though he is respectful in his disagreement with them and their motives.

George Tenet is the type of guy you would enjoy getting to know. He is smart and articulate but down to earth and enjoys fries and milkshakes from a hole in the wall place in Idaho. He is the type of guy that would not bump people out of a line for a public pay phone when his cell phone could not get coverage. We owe him a debt of gratitude for his years in the CIA and understanding the importance of fighting terrorism without letting political ideology get in the way. He worked for two Presidents from different political parties. This should speak for itself on his ability to deliver intelligence in a meaningful and clear way.

You will not be disappointed with his review of key historical events. Whether you agree or disagree with the politics at the time, he gives a candid unpolitical perspective as a person who had a front row seat at the table.

[R.f.k · Rating 2 out of 5]

مذكرات جورج تينت رئيس المخابرات الامريكية الاسبق في عهد بوش الابن وقضى فتره
في عهد كلينتون من قبلة..قرات هذا الكتاب ممكن قبل سنتين او 3 سنوات لا أذكر بالضبط.يتحدت الكاتب هنا.. نفية عن دورة في حرب العراق
وان لاتوجد هناك ادله لأمتلاك العراق اسحلة دمار شامل ..وان بوش كان متخذ القرار بالغزو من قبل..خصص فصل من هذا الكتاب للرد على كتاب خطة الهجوم ل بوب وودورد..وان كلمتة فهمت بسياق خاطى
المهم..في فصل أسمة انهم قادومن الينا كانت هناك دلائل على هجوم محتمل ضد امريكاء
لماذا لم يوقفه ولماذا هذا التهاون
لم يجب ..بعدها كانت 11 ستمبر
وضح الكتاب التعاون المخابراتى القوى بين المخابرات الامريكيه ونظرائها الاخرين وخاصة
الباكستانيين والسعوديين والحكومات العربية عموما

طبعا لا أثق باي مسؤول أمريكي وأسلم بكل مايقول
وخاصه اذا كان من حكومة بوش المليئة بالحمقى
ولهذا اعطيته نجمتين

هذا الكتاب أعطيته أستعارة لوحدة من االبنات وهذة البنت تخانقت معها منذ سنه
وصراحه أريد الكتاب يرجعلي
حتى لوكان ماعجبني هذه كتبي
أحمق من يعير كتاباً وأحمق منه من يعيده
:(

[Kathleen Hagen]

At the Center of the Storm: My Years in the CIA, by George Tenet.
The narrator was Eric Conger, with Tenet himself reading the foreword and afterword. Produced by Harper Audio, and downloaded from Audible.

First, I have to say that I am very glad that George Tenet did not read the entire book aloud, which was something like 20 hours long. George read his parts like orations, slowly, with emphasis and intonation, like a speech. Conger, on the other hand, had a nice reading voice and gave good narration to the book.

This book is about Tenet’s years in the CIA, seven of which were as its director. He tells, from his and the CIA’s point of view, the time surrounding 9/11, and the aftermath, including the CIA’s place in analyzing information for, and participating in, the war against Iraq. Tenet supports facts already reported by military and civilian figures alike. From his perspective, the question was never: “Did Iraq participate in the terrorist attacks?” but “we assume they did. Now what’s the best way to take Sadam down.” Tenet felt that information was not totally vetted for its accuracy if it fit the mold of the president’s men. Tenet seems to say that it was more the fault of what his men fed him than of Bush. He also says that the mistakes were compounded when there was no plan in place for how to stabilize Iraq once the war was won, which has resulted in El Qaida now being a major force to deal with in Iraq. He bitterly protests the White House, namely Condi Rice, laying the whole blame at the CIA’s door when he felt the blame should be shared by the White House staff. Very interesting.

[Amy · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book has been sitting on my shelf for almost 2 years, because my cousin talked to me about it at Christmas 2007 and shortly thereafter, lent me his copy. I have no desire to read this book, but feel like at this point, I must read it and return it, because I have had it for so long that it has become rude. Ugh.

Update - I could not get through this book so I gave up. Blah

[Brian · Rating 3 out of 5]

George Tenet in his book At the Center of the Strom takes readers through his time as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). At the time this position included the running of the CIA, being responsible for coordinating information from all intelligence agencies and being the primary supplier of intelligence information to the president. The book is written in a very straight talk manner and is easy to follow. Tenet who served an abnormally long tenure through two presidents as DCI made several contributions to defining the way we approach the war on terror. The start of the war in Afghanistan was primarily a CIA directed effort and much of the thinking on how to fight terrorism had come in the CIA think tanks prior to 9/11. His story conforms with much that has been written in the 9/11 commission and by books from authors such as Richard Clarke so while not a lot of new things are available for the reader we do receive more confirmation on what likely happened in the months leading up to 9/11 and the day of the event.

There are several nuggets in this book that are new to the readers and provide a great look at what was happening about terrorism during Tenet's 7 year tenure. One is the inside look at the peace process under Clinton and what went wrong with Arafat at the end of 2000. This is largely confirmed by other sources but Tenet tells the story the best. The dismantling of the A. Q. Kahn nuclear network is another great covered gem that provides readers access to one of the more chilling events in U. S. Intelligence history. From tracking down the Pakistani network to the surrendering of Libya's nuclear program the story is worth reading about.

Finally the last third of the book is spent on the war in Iraq and trying to have damage control about the CIA's role. Tenet tries to vigorously defend himself from his "Slam Dunk" comment that gave Colin Powell the information needed to go to the UN to justify war. As of now we still don't have enough accounts but it sounds like these words were used and the strenuous defense Tenet makes was hard to swallow especially when we goes on to say that Powell's presentation was very good and credible. While I have no doubt Tenet did explain the lack of intelligence I am left believing he did make the comment. It is fairly easy to infer that Tenet thought the war in Iraq was a mistake and no steps were taken to plan an exit strategy.

Overall this is a great read that while a little long will hold your interest. Tenet talks straight and addresses a wide range of subjects over a pivotal point in our history. He comes off as more honest and less biased compared to some who have written on this time frame. Finally one of the reasons I always like to read political books like this is not only to get the story at the time but to see what a day in the life of that high government position that few Americans will ever have the chance to hold. Tenet does a great job of showing what life as a DCI was like and how it can impact your family. A great book and one I highly encourage to be read.

[Vladimir · Rating 2 out of 5]

I don't care about his family. He knows I don't care about his family. Was writing about his family supposed to make me think the head of the CIA is a nice guy? If so, it failed.

There's a lot of info in this book, and maybe its good. But it is wildly glossed in favor of the CIA. He talks about how he always wanted more resources (duh) but seems to have been unable to manage the resources the CIA actually had. He says how important WMD are and how much the CIA tried to stop proliferation, which is good. But he never says what other forms of terrorism should be a lesser priority.

Loyal to the end to President Bush, but criticizes plenty of other executive officials. Bush wasn't elected to be a figurehead. He bears the ultimate responsibility for a lot of the criticism Tenet has. Especially in terms of managing competing priorities among his subordinates. Tenet claims WMD were a reason everyone could agree on to invade Iraq, although there were competing actual reasons. If true, it is entirely Bush's fault that he took the nation to war without having consensus among his own officials about why.

[Katie · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesting in parts but dry in parts... still was a good reminder of recent events in the intelligence world of the U.S., although I took a lot of it with a grain of salt. It was interesting reading about Tenet complaining about how Bob Woodward portrayed him in his book "Plan of Attack", which I read a long time ago and have on my bookshelf - so I took it down and read about the same events from the different perspectives. I also enjoyed some anecdotes about how at times during interrogations, bad guys found out they had been swindled by other bad guys, due to info provided to them by the CIA during the questioning.

[Ron Wroblewski · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good review of events leading up to 9-11 and the aftermath up to 2005 from the head of the CIA's point of view. Discusses the intelligence received, analyzed and either acted on or not, the decisions made by the administration, some being against advice of the CIA, and who takes blame when something goes wrong. Also talks about some of the bad decisions made in the aftermath of the invasion that contributed to the ongoing fighting that we still see there.

[محمد · Rating 3 out of 5]

كثيرة هي التفاصيل ومزدحمة مما جعل الكتاب يبدو ثقيلا
لا أدري كيف أكملته

[Joseph · Rating 3 out of 5]

Overall a very readable book, but many names to remember. Tenet tells it like it is and isn't afraid of stepping on toes. A good look at the CIA from one of its biggest players.

[Paul Eberhart · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good first person narrative with excellent perspective from a very prominent seat to a very historic time.

[Robert Sparrenberger · Rating 4 out of 5]

A look at George Tenet’s time as director of central intelligence is chronicled in great detail
From the man himself. It’s a political junkies book and follows the typical path of the person in question bragging about all the good deeds they’ve done and blaming others for the many mistakes.
George does take some responsibility for some mistakes and tries not to throw too many people under the bus.
It focuses on 9/11, Iraq and wmds and the role George had in gathering intel on those subjects.

For political junkies.

[Jordison Francisco · Rating 4 out of 5]

Um prisioneiro da história... Um retrato honesto da inteligência americana (1997-2004)

Não é necessária uma leitura muito cuidadosa deste livro para inferir que George Tenet adorava o seu trabalho como Diretor da CIA. Aparentemente, ele também tem grande consideração pelos homens e mulheres que trabalham na CIA. Durante o seu mandato de sete anos na CIA, ele melhorou inquestionavelmente o moral da força de trabalho da CIA. Infelizmente, ao ler este livro, também se deve inferir que ele não era um diretor muito bom daquela agência. Embora tenha lidado com questões de inteligência durante os seus anos como funcionário do Congresso e do Conselho de Segurança Nacional (NSC), ele realmente não tinha experiência nos processos reais envolvidos na recolha de dados e na produção de inteligência. Além disso, ele não tinha experiência em gestão e nunca teve que aprender como transformar decisões em ações ou garantir que os subordinados o fizessem. No entanto, se lermos nas entrelinhas deste livro, poderemos ver que o que realmente fez Tenet como Diretor foi o facto de ter sido extremamente mal servido pela gestão sénior da CIA.

Por exemplo, há a questão em curso do movimento Al Qaeda e de Osama bin Laden ou Osama bin Laden. Na sequência dos ataques inspirados pela Al Qaeda contra as embaixadas dos EUA na África Oriental, Tenet diz ao leitor que estava frustrado com a "qualidade e profundidade da nossa inteligência em relação à Al Qaeda e Bin (sic) Ladin". Aparentemente como resultado desta frustração, o Centro Contra o Terrorismo (CTC) da CIA desenvolveu um chamado “plano operacional” e o temível veterano da CIA Charlie Allen pressionou o resto da Comunidade de Inteligência, nomeadamente a NSA e a NGA, a intensificar seus esforços de coleta e processamento para apoiar esse plano. Tenet foi informado de que, como resultado, a quantidade de dados sobre a Al Qaeda e Bin Laden tinha “explodido” e muitos terroristas foram identificados e as suas ligações a outros terroristas foram documentadas. Segundo o chefe do CTC, o plano “danificou a infra-estrutura da UBL (sic) e criou dúvidas dentro da Al Qaeda...”, embora seja difícil determinar como ele sabia disso. É claro que tudo isso aconteceu antes dos eventos de 11 de setembro. Na verdade, o resultado de todo esse esforço era o que se obteria chutando um formigueiro, e pouca informação substancial resultou de todo o alvoroço. Na verdade, em 2004, a CIA aparentemente ainda não tinha certeza se o movimento Al Qaeda deveria ser tratado como uma questão transnacional ou geográfica. Depois do 11 de Setembro, a resposta da CIA ao interesse da administração Bush em encontrar laços entre a Al Qaeda e o Iraque pré-invasão foi uma obra-prima de opacidade burocrática. O presidente Bush e o diretor Tenet mereciam coisa melhor. O problema é que, como afirmou Tenet noutro contexto, "Somos todos prisioneiros da história", este poderia ser o epitáfio da sua direcção e talvez da própria CIA.

Conforme articulado no `Posfácio' [p. 490-491, 499], Tenet lembra constantemente ao leitor o papel da CIA no governo:

"Muitas vezes, na melhor das hipóteses, apenas 60 por cento dos factos relativos a qualquer questão de segurança nacional são cognoscíveis... A inteligência por si só nunca deve orientar a formulação de políticas. A boa inteligência não substitui o bom senso ou a curiosidade por parte dos decisores políticos ao pensar através das consequências das suas ações... A inteligência não opera no vácuo, mas dentro de um mandato mais amplo de políticas e governança."

Aqui estão alguns outros destaques do livro:

- A CIA disse à Casa Branca que o Iraque provavelmente possuía ADM (Capítulo 17), mas nunca estabeleceu uma ligação entre o Iraque e a Al-Qaeda (p.307).

- “No Afeganistão, começámos do zero, permitindo que os vários grupos políticos se legitimassem, construindo depois um governo central e representativo. No Iraque, o processo não poderia ter sido mais diferente... Estávamos no comando , e por Deus, sabíamos o que era melhor." (pág.439)

- "Embora a CIA tenha aceitado tudo o que ouvimos de [Ahmed] Chalabi com uma boa dose de ceticismo, outros, como o vice-presidente, Paul Wolfowitz, e Doug Feith, acolheram bem as suas opiniões." (pág. 397)

- "Em uma de suas viagens ao Iraque, Wolfowitz disse ao nosso alto funcionário [da CIA] lá: 'Você não entende a política do governo dos EUA, e se você não entende a política, dificilmente estará em posição de coletar a inteligência para ajudar essa política a ter sucesso.'" (p. 430)

- A CIA sugeriu formas pelas quais os Estados Unidos poderiam estabelecer a paz no Iraque, mas estas sugestões foram ignoradas (Capítulo 23 e páginas 441, 446).

- Brent Scowcroft foi o único funcionário da administração que expressou desaprovação pública do plano da Casa Branca de entrar em guerra com o Iraque (p. 315).

- Após o ataque ao USS Cole, os EUA "...Não precisavam de desculpas adicionais para perseguir o UBL ou a sua organização. Mas simplesmente disparar mais mísseis de cruzeiro para o deserto não iria conseguir nada. [Os EUA ] precisava entrar no santuário afegão." (pág. 128-131)

- "Durante anos, foi óbvio que sem a cooperação dos paquistaneses, seria quase impossível erradicar a Al-Qaeda... Os paquistaneses sempre souberam mais do que nos contavam e foram singularmente não cooperativos em nos ajudar a acabar com esses caras." (pág. 139)

- A Al-Qaeda planeou atacar o metro de Nova Iorque no Outono de 2003. O ataque foi cancelado durante as últimas fases de preparação "para algo melhor". (p.260-261)

- "Quando estive com o Rei Hussein, sempre senti que estava na presença da sabedoria e da história... Muitas vezes me perguntei que impacto a sua sabedoria teria tido em ajudar a todos nós a evitar a confusão em que nos encontramos hoje ." (pág.71-72)

Crítica

Tenet enfrentou acusações de hipocrisia de ex-oficiais de espionagem na data de lançamento do livro, por não ter se manifestado antes contra a pressão da Casa Branca para invadir o Iraque.

A ex-secretária de Estado Condoleezza Rice contesta a afirmação de Tenet de que a administração Bush, antes da invasão do Iraque liderada pelos EUA em Março de 2003, nunca teve um debate sério sobre se o Iraque representava uma ameaça iminente ou se deveria reforçar as sanções existentes.

O veterano da CIA, Michael Scheuer, afirma: "Infelizmente, mas apropriadamente, 'No Centro da Tempestade' provavelmente nos lembrará que às vezes o que existe no centro de uma tempestade é um silêncio ensurdecedor."

Robert Baer, autor e ex-oficial de campo da CIA designado para o Oriente Médio, afirma: "Não é que Tenet seja responsável por nos levar ao Iraque. É que ele falhou em não revelar completamente ao Congresso e à Casa Branca que estávamos tomando uma decisão saltar para um abismo negro sem fundo. Ele deveria ter renunciado quando percebeu que Bush usaria informações ruins para enganar o povo americano. Isso é o que obtemos quando temos um diretor da CIA politizado."

Douglas Feith, ex-subsecretário de Defesa para Políticas, a quem Tenet critica em seu livro, afirma: "O problema com George Tenet é que ele não parece se importar em esclarecer os fatos. Ele não é meticuloso. Ele está disposto inventar histórias que atendam aos seus propósitos e suprimir informações que não o façam." Em referência ao erro de Tenet em relação a Richard Perle (veja abaixo), Feith escreveu que "A data, as descrições físicas, as aspas são todas, nas palavras de 'Mikado' de Gilbert e Sullivan, detalhes meramente corroborativos, destinados a dar verossimilhança artística para uma narrativa de outra forma careca e pouco convincente." O livro de memórias, disse Feith, "... oferece uma visão sobre o Sr. Tenet. Ele permite que você ouça a maneira como ele falou - rápido, solto, tempestuoso, emocional, impreciso, desde o 'instinto'". Tenet refere-se com orgulho à orientação de seu 'instinto' várias vezes no livro - uma estranha ostentação de alguém cuja característica principal deveria ser exatidão e precisão."

Errata
Uma conversa importante com o então conselheiro do Pentágono Richard Perle em 12 de setembro de 2001, na qual Tenet afirma que Perle lhe disse que "o Iraque teve que pagar pelo ataque" não poderia ter ocorrido porque Perle ficou preso em Paris e não retornou a Washington, D.C. até três dias depois; no entanto em uma entrevista com Wolf Blitzer da CNN durante um episódio de The Situation Room Perle admitiu que os dois homens de fato se cruzaram uma manhã como afirmado por Tenet mas apenas mais tarde na mesma semana e não em 12 de setembro.

[Nathan · Rating 3 out of 5]

I am usually - healthily - suspect of any book written by a former CIA operative or leader. I've read a dozen or so books by former CIA agents and ordinarily it is difficult to tell with any certainty whether the book is sincere, part of a disinformation campaign, part of an active operation, blatant lies to justify misdeeds or outright fantasy. At the Center of the Storm is a little more balanced, though former DCI Tenet does reveal more than a hint of bitterness at how his time in office turned out. As director, Tenet oversaw the CIA during one of its darkest periods: the post-9/11 US intelligence meltdown. He will probably be forever remembered as the pro-war activist he's painted as in Bob Woodward's Plan of Attack, and the now infamous "slam dunk" case Tenet supposedly made to President Bush regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and our ability to prove they existed. Woodward's description of the event seems to imply that Tenet believed there were WMDs in Iraq. Tenet's explanation of the phrase that will set him in history books is that Woodward took the phrase out of context, and that Tenet was speaking in more political terms about how to convince the American people that Saddam's potential WMDs justified a war. "Slam dunk", in this context, wasn't a reference to proof of WMDs in Iraq but was instead a reference to the case that would need to be made to Americans to support the war. Sadly, though, Tenet's credibility is called into question on the first page of the book. As easy as it would be to believe that a neocon civilian warmonger like Richard Perle would suggest that Iraq "had to pay" for 9/11, Tenet's claim that he met with Richard Perle on September 12 of 2001 is a blatant lie as documented evidence in other sources prove that Pearle was in Paris at the time. For his part, Perle confirms that the two men passed each other in a hallway a week later, but denies this conversation ever took place. This pretty much sets the tone for the rest of Tenet's book, and anyone reading it who read the 9/11 Commission Report, Richard Clarke's book, or any other of the numerous books written about 9/11, will find themselves wondering how much of Tenet's tome is complete and utter BS. Tenet clearly has issues with the Bush administration, and this reinforces the perception picked up on by numerous commentators that there is an internal political war between the CIA and the Bush administration. Admittedly, it is difficult to know whose side take in that one... It's hard pin down the "lesser evil". What is most striking about At the Center of the Storm, however, is the complete lack of ideas about how to reform the CIA into a functional intelligence agency - something it clearly hasn't been for sixty years. Final verdict? An interesting read and good for anyone who wants to hear the side of the Director of Central Intelligence during the worst sneak-attack since Pearl Harbor. Otherwise, though, skip this book and read Legacy of Ashes by Tim Weiner or the 9/11 Commission Report or Richard Clarke's Against All Enemies. If you absolutely have to have a CIA insider's view, then read Burn Before Reading by Jimmy Carter's DCI Stansfield Turner. The fact that I'm fascinated by this stuff is really the only reason the book gets 3 stars from me. If my rating were viewed in terms of whether or not the book rang true, well... there's no negative star rating, unfortunately.

NC

[Tom Schulte · Rating 4 out of 5]

I acquired this during a period of time I was interested in Bush-era foreign policy. Disgust enabled disinterest, then I decided to read this anyway from that place. I find Tenet forthcoming, reflective, humble, and circumspect in describing a tenure over an area of foreign policy that has public failures and necessarily private successes. I am surprised he expresses such continued admiration of both "dubya" and Cheney even when he has to admit the possibility he was offered up as a scapegoat by Bush.

Among the public failures, there is an analysis of the 1999 Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and how the explicit unwillingness of the Dept. of Defense to should any of the blame caused it all to fall onto the CIA. This foreshadows the "Sixteen Words" controversy in 2003 State of the Union where similarly the CIA was out on a limb due to a lack of admission from inside the White House. This twisted tail along with "slam dunk" are some of the issues he makes serious, believable complaint about from the writing of Bob Woodward.

Tenet disparages Israel for single-issue negotiating while he himself refused to budge on releasing Jonathan Pollard who spied for and providing top-secret classified information to Israel. The issue of his imprisonment has sometimes arisen with Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu has been particularly vocal in lobbying for Pollard's release, visiting Pollard in prison in 2002. He raised the issue with President Clinton during the Wye River peace talks in October 1998. In My Life, Clinton wrote that he was inclined to release Pollard, but the objections of U.S. intelligence officials were too strong:

For all the sympathy Pollard generated in Israel, he was a hard case to push in America; he had sold our country's secrets for money, not conviction, and for years had not shown any remorse. When I talked to Sandy Berger and George Tenet, they were adamantly opposed to letting Pollard go, as was Madeleine Albright.

Seems to me if it could really have materially advanced the cause of peace in the Middle East, it would be worth it.

[Jedi Kitty · Rating 2 out of 5]

I feel bad rating memoirs so low. But my main criteria for a high rating is first that I learn new information/get a new perspective and second, enjoy the read! This fell short on both counts... the writing just felt flat. I also really didn't learn much while reading because the whole book is so focused on not just publicly available information- but on very very widely publicized information. Much of the book is a reaction to, or clarification of various scandals, soundbites, and headlines that surrounded the CIA during Tenet's time there. It was good to read the CIA's side of these stories- but nothing really caught my attention as particularly surprising, or that ran totally counter to my previous perceptions.

Tenet's book may be a reflection of the very straightforward, plain style of professional intelligence writing- because it manages to tell very exciting, emotional, important events in a very monotone, not exciting way. The section I felt the emotion of clearly was regarding 9/11. But otherwise, his attempts at humanity, humor and seriousness all felt the same. He often threw in small anecdotes and funny quotes that would probably be amusing if written up in a newspaper article or by an outside observer- but written from the perspective of an insider, they just felt a little off. He's an insider, telling the story as if he were an outsider. He mentions his humble origins often- and I suppose he really does feel like he's still just a "Greek boy from Queens/Brooklyn(I forget which)." Instead of outsiders marveling that the CIA director can goof off a tiny bit at historic Israeli-Palestine peace meetings by riding bikes around, or leaving for a quick sports game with other key players, he's kind of marveling at himself... which is awkward. Anecdotes about getting drunk with Eastern European hosts, surprising Agents by popping into their conversations, or bizarre interactions with foreign leaders would be far more fascinating if told by a better writer I think. (Which, I suppose, is one of Tenet's main points! Newspapers and media grab stories and run with them...stories take on a life of their own when massaged a certain way.)

CIA rendition, detainees and torture are barely mentioned until the Afterword, or are referred to obliquely.

[Casey · Rating 1 out of 5]

Not an enjoyable book.

The book focuses intensely on the CIA's doings before and after 9/11 and the Iraq War and its indispensability to the American public via its work. Minor hope was produced with the inclusion of some valuable insight into the workings of the administration from a high ranking official. Severely lacking in this memoir is a personality and in-depth edification as to what the CIA does. Albeit the nature of intelligence is covert, but I was hoping to walk a way with more in-depth knowledge of the agency, etc.

Superfluous hopes.

The entire time, I was very much aware of the fact that I was reading George Tenet's book. It was all about him, and although I am sure he felt he was doing the reader a service by being personable, the usage of the "I" pronoun was pedantic and left this reader tired and frustrated .What have we have learned from this book? George Tenet likes being a good guy: his hero is his Mom, he's best-buds with Arafat and has strong nostalgia to his immigrant neighborhood in Brooklyn. He is also sure the CIA is crucial to American safety. Great but there is no argument or evidence to back up any of his opinions. Most of this book was narrative fluff. Throughout this book there was no semblance of a worldview, important take aways, etc.. It doesn't make for great reading, and although I felt like I could see the inter-workings of the diplomatic world a bit, this reader was left dissatisfied.

Statements like: "she is the Miss Moneypenny of the CIA" and saying that his mom should replace all of the CIA's lie-detection software, left me with an impression of unprofessionalism and a dissatisfaction that this man was running our nation's formoset agency of national intelligence. Maybe he is a very intelligent man but this book sincerely lacks evidence to that effect.

This is definitely a memoir, if you want a book on covert intelligence today or any specific regional insight, etc. look elsewhere.

[Anna · Rating 3 out of 5]

I wanted to give it 3 and 1/2 stars, but goodreads wouldn't let me.

Well written and readable. The beginning is slow--when he describes his relationship with his father and some other fluff I mainly skimmed over. Also, the info about the disorganization of the CIA--not riveting. Useful to know I suppose, but not meaty, and not why anyone is reading his book.

Once he moves on to 9/11, terrorism, and Iraq war the book gets interesting. It's a terrific read for gaining insight into the way the various departments interacted with each other and how certain personalities heavily influenced policy making (the usual suspects: Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz).

I was thoroughly amused when he described some of his awkward cultural interactions with various world leaders (the Georgian trip being one of my favorites). The most amazing chapter was "Mission Not Accomplished" where he details the failings of post-war planning in Iraq. It's very specific, not just ranting--he was in a position to pick it apart piece by piece. And the Afterword is pretty great too, in terms of his vision for future engagements in the Middle East and elsewhere and America's role in the world. He's a Robert Cooper kind of guy--aka my kind of guy.

He definitely comes off as a little self-congratulatory, but I suppose it's forgivable since he got thrown under the bus, first by Cheney and then by the rest of America. He takes a "see? I'm not as bad as they made me out to be, I like puppies and bunnies just like the next guy" tone. It's annoying, but it's worth overlooking.

Overall, great read, recommended to all.

[Bruce · Rating 3 out of 5]

Having served as Director of Central Intelligence under both Clinton and Bush 43, George Tenet brings a unique perspective to the recent history of U.S. Government policies. The preponderance of his tome deals with the Middle East. Part I covers several incidents regarding the Palestinian/Israeli dispute and some incidents from other parts of the world. The rest of the work provides an interesting background to the activities of the Bush/Cheney/Rove administration in dealing with terrorism and more particularly in conning us into war with Iraq and then destroying whatever chances there were for a ‘peaceful’ restoration of stability in Iraq. Perhaps most telling is a quote to the CIA’s Senior man in Baghdad attributed to Paul Wolfowitz: ‘You don’t understand the policy of the U.S. government, and if you don’t understand the policy, you are hardly in a position to collect the intelligence to help that policy succeed.’ Tenet carries this further by noting that the “Policy makers [Bush, Cheney, Rice, Rumsfield et. al.:] didn’t seem to want us dealing with anyone who wasn’t ‘politically acceptable’ to them on some firm but unannounced scale.” Tenet also speaks of CIA reports giving accurate assessments of the situation being leaked to the press and having the administration essentially shoot the messenger. In his conclusion Tenet states ‘intelligence alone should never drive the formulation of policy.’ He did not follow that with the converse, policy should never drive intelligence collection and analysis. Tenet’s book reveals that under the current administration partisan politicization of everything is the norm.

[K · Rating 2 out of 5]

Read by the author both beginning and end, the actual book by Arthur Morey, it can be a dry at times. In the whirlwind of accusations and recriminations that emerged in the wake of 9/11 and the Iraq war, one man's vital testimony has been conspicuously absent. Candid and gripping, George Tenet's At the Center of the Storm is a revealing look at the man at the helm of the most important intelligence organization during the most challenging times in recent history. Beginning with his appointment as Director in 1997, Tenet unfolds the momentous events that led to 9/11; his declaration of war on al-Qa'ida; the CIA's covert operations inside Afghanistan; the worldwide plan to fight terrorists and his warnings of imminent attacks against American interests in the summer of 2001; and the immediate counterattack against al-Qa'ida. Tenet then turns to the war in Iraq as he provides dramatic insight on the run-up to the invasion, including an account of the fallout from the "sixteen words" in the president's 2003 State of the Union address; the true context of Tenet's own now-famous "slam dunk" comment; and the CIA's critical role in an administration predisposed to take the country to war. Through it all, Tenet paints an unflinching self-portrait of a man caught between the warring forces of the administration's decision-making process, the reams of frightening intelligence pouring in from around the world, and his own conscience

[Megan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was an eye-opener. I didn't have any kind of depth of understanding about the CIA and its role before, during, and after 9/11, or in the lead-up to and actual wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I knew what I was fed by the mainstream media, and that's it. And part of that is how it should be, because the CIA cannot operate with full public transparency. But I had no idea of how things worked behind the scenes.

I think this book is best thought of in 3 parts: before 9/11, during and just after 9/11, and the war in Iraq. And while the book is, in general, an attempt to "set the record straight," that comes through most vividly in the third section. Based on the documentation cited by Tenet, he and his agency were the scapegoats for a White House (principally Vice President Cheney and his sycophants) who latched onto anything possible to strengthen its case to go to war in Iraq. I am disgusted and disappointed with how the last year of his reign at the head of the CIA was handled by the White House.

The rest of the book is extremely interesting as well, and really explains how much the CIA and the government knew about Al Qaida and Bin Laden before 9/11, as well as a few of the plots that CIA operatives and their international counterparts were able to thwart after 9/11. For every bombing that is successful, there are many more that are prevented by the brave men and women in the secret services.

[Will Byrnes · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is Tenet’s attempt to set the record straight. Of course, he uses the work to buff his resume of accomplishment at the CIA and to defend himself against criticism that the agency fell down on the job in several areas, including a lack of foresight into the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, and not preventing 9/11. I believe he has a case, certainly, for the latter. It has been written in many places how he was trying to raise the terrorism alarm for a long time before the big event, both under Clinton and then under the disinterested Bush. He decries the agency’s shortage of funding. He tells very personal accounts of diplomatic attempts with the Israelis and Palestinians, with a particular focus on Arafat and Tenet’s view that Arafat alone kept an agreement from happening. There is certainly disagreement about whether the deal was as good for the Palestinians as many of its proponent claim. Jimmy Carter has a different view. Arafat is shown both as a very human and interesting character and the major obstacle to mid-east peace. Well, maybe and maybe not.

[Jean · Rating 4 out of 5]

A memoir from the guy in charge of the CIA for 7 years, including 2001. I was fascinated to see how much detail he could and did give about the country’s CIA operations. Much of the book is taken up with painstaking “I said/did, the press turned it into…” type recounting of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the later declaration of war in Iraq. The book did give me a good feeling that Tenet was a genuine, bright, principled, straightforward individual and therefore well suited to be director of the CIA. It also gives a bit of a scary feeling about how many credible threats there are against the US’s security. I wish Mr. Tenet had provided much more, or any, information regarding the majority of the 9/11 terrorists being Saudi citizens; and the “airlift” of Osama Bin Laden relatives out of the US when private flights were otherwise barred. But all in all, an interesting – though tediously detail ridden at times – account that sheds some light on the inner workings of one of the US’s most secretive agencies.

[Hamada Mostfa Abdo · Rating 3 out of 5]

يطرح الكتاب الكثير من الاسئله ... بالذات حول احداث 11 سبتمبر حيث اوضح بالذات فى الفصل الثامن المعنون ب( انهم قادمن الى هنا ) فطالما توافرت كل تلك الدلائل القويه على ان تنظيم القاعده يحضر لعمل ارهابى كبير ضد امريكا وفى الأغلب ستسخدم فيه الطائرات . فلماذا لم تقم الأداره الامريكيه بأتخاذ اجراء وقائى قوى فى هذا الوقت ؟

كما يشير الكتاب الى التعاون المخابراتى القوى بين المخابرات الامريكيه ونظرائها الاخرين وبالذات الجهاز السعودى. وايضا يعطى الكتاب معلومات عن اسلوب العمل داخل الأداره الامريكيه عموما وال المخابرات المركزيه الأمريكيه خصوصا .كذلك افرد الكتاب اجزاء كبيره للحديث عن البحث عن اسلحة الدمار الشامل فى العراق بعد الاحتلال الامريكى واتضح فى النهايه عدم وجود ايا من تلك الاسلحه فى الاراضى العراقيه

خصمت نجمتان لأنه من المستحيل ان تثق بنسبة مائه فى المائه فى ما يقوله او يكتبه فرد حالى او سابق فى الأداره الأمريكيه


كتبت هذا التعليق بعد اطلاعى على الطبعه العربيه من الكتاب المسماه (فى قلب العاصفه ) والعنوان الفرعى السنوات التى قضيتها فى السى اى ايه ... وهى من ترجمة عمر الأيوبى والكتاب صادر عن دار الكتاب العربى بيروت - لبنان فى عام 2007 ميلاديه

[Samantha · Rating 3 out of 5]

I thought this book was interesting but not fascinating. I expected a lot more. I always thought that George Tenet would be an engaging personality but it doesn't come through in this book at all. It's not a biography but more of a book about his CIA career. I still thought it would be more about him and his thinking instead it's more about events. Yes, he does play cover his butt in it but what do you expect? I wanted more insight on how he changed the CIA, his interactions with Congress and the President with his cabinet and how he discussed things with his advisors and assistant directors. There wasn't much in there about his thoughts based on the intelligence he received about the Iraqi War. I wanted to hear about their investigations with 9/11. I just expected more from him. I enjoyed the inside view of the events but I wanted to know the thinking. I would recommend getting this book from the library or from bargain books.