Becker uses a multidisciplinary approach to explore questions of human meaning and existence through the lens of culture. Here is an outline of his arguments:
PASS THE PARADOX PLEASE
Becker begins by laying out a psychological theory of man predicated on Existentialist schools of thought (Kierkegaard) and modern psychoanalysis (Freud, Fromm, et al). Alone among the animals, man is saddled with symbols, self-consciousness, and self-esteem. He contemplates his own death and finitude while also trying to maintain his belief that he is a unique individual, imbued with some sort of intrinsic value and meaning in the face of a vast, seemingly indifferent cosmos. Becker terms this foundational psychology problem as the “individuality-within-finitude” paradox, and he believes it is the key to understanding the basic motivations and behaviors of men.
Our mechanisms to cope with this paradoxical existence are myriad. Whether we embed ourselves into higher causes of community and conscious or become obsessively controlling of each aspect of our environment, most of our actions serve as convenient distractions, diverting our eyes from our ultimate impotence against death and dissolution. Only after we have looked this despairing fate squarely in the eye can we achieve some higher level of psychological freedom and self-knowledge. Such a task is beyond most of us though; our daily thought processes are aimed more at avoiding cognitive dissonance than acknowledging the final, bleak truth of our situation.
HELP ME HEROISM
Defining culture is a tricky, nebulous task, but for Becker its function is clear: culture gives us the resources we need to cope with our individuality-within-finitude problem. The most effective vehicle culture uses to this end is structured heroism: the establishment of well-defined, commonly understood heroic roles that afford us the essential meaning and significance we need to get on with the daily chore of living. Each of us has a perpetual “newsreel” running in our heads where we project ourselves carrying out an important role in society. In antiquity, the available roles were narrow and generally clear-cut: warrior, prophet, priest, ruler, matriarch, patriarch, farmer, shepherd. All of these (even the seemingly benign latter two) were tinged with a sense of cosmic significance: nature was enchanted, and the material world’s connection to the spiritual world was palpable, bringing a sense of real import to something as innocuous as raising sheep.
The problem, according to Becker, is that current forms of heroism are becoming increasingly tenuous. For modern Westerners, nature is simply one more thing to be controlled and conquered; the tribe has dissolved into the immediate family (and, beyond that, into an amorphous association of friends and acquaintances); religion is a nonessential preference; and our available modes of work and living are so numerous as to be overwhelming. While many of the old heroic forms are still with us (television seems to have an inexhaustible supply of police, firefighter, doctor, lawyer, and teacher shows), very few of us actually fulfill these roles in daily life. Additionally, our material-technic society is becoming increasingly detached from any sense of a spiritual world and the significance it can confer on the common, seemingly weary happenings of our lives.
Where does the modern data analyst look for his heroic fulfillment? Or the delivery truck driver? Or the dental hygienist? What is heroic about having an average job, living in an average house on an average street in an average neighborhood (on the outskirts of an average city), all while consuming the average cultural entertainment and indulging in the average materialistic comforts? When faced with such a situation, how easy it is for people to either give up their quest for heroic meaning and resign themselves to an acceptance of a bland fate, or, conversely, to fanatically bury themselves in some finite cause which they try to inject with infinite meaning (sports teams, politics, investment portfolios, science).
RELIGIOUS RESILIENCE
Becker concludes his discussion by exploring the one form of heroism that he believes is both universally available and seemingly immune to the material and corporeal vicissitudes of life: the religious. Becker argues that the religious hero derives his value not simply from finite sources; rather, by connecting himself to a source whose power and purpose is conceived as infinite, the religious hero is armed with a resilience not to be found in any other type of self-conception. By finding value and meaning in this higher calling, he frees himself from the foundational self-esteem reliances other men cling to: the approval of friends and family; the size of one’s house and bank accounts; good standing within a professional community; physical beauty and sexual prowess; and countless other edifices – each of which can tumble to the ground in a completely unforeseen and uncontrollable fashion (wherein lies the lesson of Job).
It is important to note that, like William James, Becker is far more interested in the psychological function of religion than its empirical truth claims. James once noted that, from a psychological needs perspective, anything less than an infinite, religious aspiration could be seen as irrational. Yet this is exactly what modern man has mastered – imputing infinite value to finite causes. Militaries, given the dangerous nature of their work, have always been particularly skilled at this. More recently, certain sects of the scientific community have gained religious-like fervor as they increasingly view their work as nothing short of the salvation of mankind. In smaller ways, individuals pull the same conjuring trick, finding meaning and self-worth through cars, clothes, careers, and coupling. We suck these finite sources dry of whatever satisfaction they offer us and then move on to another watering hole, hoping the next might not prove so exhaustible.
What is it that makes these sources seem so finite compared to the religious though? After all, isn’t the meaning we assign to them what really matters? If I believe my military service or my teaching career is infinitely valuable in the same way a priest believes his service to God is infinitely valuable, isn’t that good enough? No says Becker. Only when we have found the resources to truly face the paradox of our existence – individuality-within-finitude, life with knowledge of death – can we hope to escape our endless wondering from one temporary source of meaning to another. Becker believes this ability to support contradiction, interpret death and suffering, and provide meaning that is immune to worldly causality is the great strength of the religious sentiment. Indeed, countless modern ideologies have recognized and tried to misappropriate this strength: transcendental idealism, Hegelian statehood, communism, fascism, scientism. Each desperately tries to provide a religious-like cause whose fulfillment would render the life of its acolyte worthy of existence.
CRITIQUES
1. Becker argues that the “self” is essentially a social construct, but then gives a characterization of man that has a heavily Western, atomistic flavor to it – one in which communities primarily exist to serve individuals and not the other way around. He claims that “the highest possible standard of health for man would be a humanistic-critical one that would help him develop as a free, self-reliant, independent being,” yet this idea of man as some sort of “truly free” individual - unencumbered with the social mores of his disposition - would seem nonsensical in many non-Western societies. Notions of radical individual freedom and self-reliance are modern creations not much older than I am.
Becker also believes democratic society is the best society because it fosters a plurality of individuals that somehow serve as a macro self-correcting mechanism in which extreme and harmful ideologies are eliminated. This is quite the claim that I can’t help but call into question. If Becker’s overarching thesis is correct, two counter possibilities have to be considered: some men simply embed themselves even deeper into finite causes, making them more – not less – radical; other men give up on heroic, fiery causes altogether, and any appearance of tolerance or large scale societal self-correction is really just apathy in disguise.
2. There is a lingering sense of naturalism in the background of Becker’s thought that he never explicitly lays bare. He hints that man is nothing more than a physiological, chemical conglomeration of organic matter accidentally forged over eons in the furnace of evolutionary processes. Whether man is simply this, or whether he is this AND something more (as the religious sentiment suggests) is not a trifling point. In fact, it is exactly this point that lead men with incredibly similar views of human psychology (Pascal and Kierkegaard on one hand, Sartre or Camus on the other) to come to such radically different conclusions on how men should live their lives and where they should look for meaning. The irony here is that Becker seems to share the secular metaphysics of a Sartre or a Camus, yet come to the religious conclusions of Pascal and Kierkegaard! I don’t know whether to fault him for incoherence or applaud him for originality.
3. Similar to his analysis in The Denial of Death, Becker builds part of his argument on the proclamations of a child psychology that I just find hard to swallow at times. As a father of three, when I read Becker’s suggestions of hands-off parenting approaches so that children can escape repression and discover the true and the beautiful for themselves, I wonder whether he ever actually raised any children.
4. Finally, the religious life is not without it’s own problems. Some readers might invoke the horrors of religion fanaticism and then accuse Becker of engineering a sophistic argument in its defense. While Becker does note that “the ideal critique of a faith must always be whether it embodies within itself the fundamental contradictions of the human paradox and yet is able to support them without fanaticism, sadism, and narcissism,” he has little else to add to this cursory defense – an unfortunate omission since the religious sentiment he proffers as the psychological elixir of life has come under increasing suspicion in modern secular culture. Something more needs to be said, lest it become too easy to dismiss Becker’s arguments out of hand.
What I think Becker might have offered had he expounded on the topic is this: violent fanaticism is not an inevitable characteristic of the religious sentiment but rather a result of people’s inability to successfully cope with their innate psychological disposition. Fanaticism has many faces, and if there is one thing the 20th century has taught us, it is that secular ideologies and regimes are just as good at meting out death and destruction as religious ones. If anything, religious violence has probably become a bit of a red herring, distracting us from more fundamental psychological issues at play. Nearly all forms of violence are failed attempts to resolve our individuality-within-finitude problem; we seek security and self-aggrandizement through the lording of physical force over others. To cover such acts with a veneer of divine warrant is perhaps little different from killing in the name of one’s country or to save mother nature. Ideologies are only symptomatic; the real pathogen is our abortive attempts to reconcile our infinite yearnings with our finite existence. So says my hypothetical Becker defense.
To close, this passage is perhaps most emblematic of Becker’s central thesis:
“Modern man is denying his finitude with the same dedication as the ancient Egyptian pharaohs, but now whole masses are playing the game, and with a far richer armamentarium of techniques. The skyscraper buildings, the cloverleaf freeways, the houses with their imposing façades and immaculate lawns—what are these if not the modern equivalent of pyramids: a face to the world that announces: “I am not ephemeral, look what went into me, what represents me, what justifies me.” The hushed hope is that someone who can do this will not die. Life in contemporary society is like an open-air lunatic asylum with people cutting and spraying their grass (to deny untidiness, hence lack of order, hence lack of control, hence their death), beating trails to the bank with little books of figures that worry them around the clock (for the same reason), ogling bulges of flesh, bent over steering wheels and screeching around corners, meticulously polishing their cars, trimming their hedges (and of course spraying them), giving out parking tickets, saluting banners of colored cloth with their hand on their heart, killing enemies, carefully counting the dead, missing, wounded, probable dead, planning production curves that will absolutely bring about the millennium in thirty-seven years (if quotas are met), filling shopping carts, emptying shopping carts, nailing up vines (and spraying them)—and all this dedicated activity takes place within a din of noise that tries to defy eternity: motorized lawn mowers, power saws, electric clipping shears, powered spray guns, huge industrial machines, jack hammers, automobiles and their tires, giant jets, electric shavers, motorized toothbrushes, dishwashers, clothes washers, dryers, vacuum cleaners. This is truly obsessive-compulsiveness on the level of the visible and the audible, so overpowering in its total effect that it seems to make of psychoanalysis a complete theory of reality. I mean that in this kind of normal cultural neurosis man’s natural animal spontaneity is almost wholly stifled: the material-technological character-lie is so ingrained in modern man, for the most part, that his natural spontaneity, his urges toward mystery, awe, and beauty show up only minimally, if at all, or in forms that are so swallowed up in culturally-standardized perceptions that they are hardly recognizable: I have, for example, seen someone in ecstasy over a new Edsel, and looks of beatitude on the faces of people contemplating a vast new stretch of concrete or a box-like new apartment building. Modern man is closed off, tightly, against dimensions of reality and perceptions of the world that would threaten or upset his standardized reactions: he will have it his way if he has to strangle the segment of reality that he has equipped himself to cope with.”