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Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America
By Richard H. Kohn. A monumental study in American military history. This book brilliantly chronicles the creation of the U.S. military establishment and its effects on the democratic ideals of the young republic. An engrossing story of political infighting and intrigue.Richard H. Kohn is Chief of Air Force History, Washington, D.C. A recipient of the Organization of American Historian's Binkley-Stephenson Award.
- GenresHistoryMilitary History
443 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1975
60 people want to read
About the author
Richard H. Kohn
19 books1 followerA specialist in military history, Richard Kohn is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of North Carolina.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
April 29, 2025
Dense, challenging, but rewarding and brilliant study of the formation of the US military establishment. Kohn follows the decisive years between the Revolutionary War and Jefferson's election in which the US formed a bona fide (if rather small) military establishment under the leadership of the Federalists.
This was a significant break from colonial political tradition, rooted in Republican and Whig ideology, that saw standing armies as an inherent menace to liberty. The 1780s demonstrated the weakness of the Articles of Confederation government, which could deal neither with internal revolt nor with external threats. A major objective of the Constitution was to empower the state to construct a military establishment, while of course dividing those powers between executive and legislative branches.
One great point in this book is just how fundamental military affairs were to the formation of early American politics and identity. There were competing visions of the country and of politics in the pro and anti-establishment camps. Pro-establishment Federalists believed that the military would bring about modernization, nationalization, and authoritative central government. They also believed that a federal state's legitimacy ultimately depended on its ability to coerce the individual states' into obeying the law. Establishment skeptics among the Republicans, however, believed with good reason that the Federalists wanted to use the military establishment for internal political control and to crush dissent. They wanted to rely more on the militia and build up a military with volunteers when absolutely necessary. They also believed that a government that relied mainly on force was not legitimate at all.
And yet, the formation of the military establishment did not emerge from some master plan but from the messy politics and contingent events of the 1790s. Weirdly, events and political debates reconciled Republicans to a minimal military establishment. The St. Clair expedition's failure in 1792 showed the weakness of poorly trained volunteer armies and the need for real military planning/organization. The US then formed a legionary army under Wayne, which defeated the Iroquois Confederacy and solidified control of the Northwest Territory. With each of these steps, the Federalists advanced the idea that regulars were superior troops and that the US needed an infrastructure of military production, training, bases, ships, etc to defend itself.
Then, major debate erupted in the mid-late 1790s over preparing for war with France. The Republicans were enamored of France and detested England, while the Federalists were the opposite. The Federalists wanted to expand the military establishment to prepare for war, but they also thought that Republicans might betray the country and ally with France to undermine the republic. Republicans, meanwhile, feared budding tyranny within the executive branch's pursuit of a military establishment. I never realized quite how heated this debate was, nor how central the military was in the Federalist-Republican split in the 1790s.
This book was also useful for understanding the divisions among the Federalists themselves, especially the High Federalists like Hamilton, against the mainstream folks like Adams. Hamilton's reputation, I think, has benefitted immensely from his early death. He comes across as arrogant and more than a little scary in this book. He championed the creation of the Provisional and New Armies, with himself at the head, of course. He was a nationalizer and modernizer way ahead of his time, but he was also politically maladroit and a bit dangerous. For example, he simply wanted to crush the Whisky Rebellion with force, whereas Washington wisely sent peace envoys to take the temperature down and show his reasonableness before moving against the rebels in a restrained way.
Hamilton ultimately got much of what he wanted re: the military, but it came at the cost of the destruction of the Federalists as a viable party. Adams greatly distrusted Hamilton, who was almost trying to run a shadow government at the time. Adams understood that the High Federalists were using the threats of war with France and related domestic subversion to justify the expansion of the military. While he wanted a basic military establishment, he thought it was more important to pursue peace with France and keep an unprepared US out of the war. He ultimately achieved this but at the cost of a major split with the High Federalists.
Political orders are said to be entrenched or legitimized when parties change hands but a basic set of structures and principles are accepted/consolidated. This happened under Jefferson and Madison, who, despite their Whiggish fears of the military, accepted and even expanded the Federalist military establishment. The US developed a system that would last over 100 years: maintain a skeletal regular military and defense infrastructure that can be expanded with volunteers during war and then limited again. This was a necessary adaptation to geopolitical realities that was compatible with American traditions and values regarding the military.
This is a difficult book; you have to focus and read it in small bites. I wouldn't recommend it if you don't have a working knowledge of the political history of the time, as Kohn assumes a baseline of understanding among the readers. However, if you are interested in US military history, war and society issues, civ-mil relations, and similar fields, this is a rewarding and classic study.
This was a significant break from colonial political tradition, rooted in Republican and Whig ideology, that saw standing armies as an inherent menace to liberty. The 1780s demonstrated the weakness of the Articles of Confederation government, which could deal neither with internal revolt nor with external threats. A major objective of the Constitution was to empower the state to construct a military establishment, while of course dividing those powers between executive and legislative branches.
One great point in this book is just how fundamental military affairs were to the formation of early American politics and identity. There were competing visions of the country and of politics in the pro and anti-establishment camps. Pro-establishment Federalists believed that the military would bring about modernization, nationalization, and authoritative central government. They also believed that a federal state's legitimacy ultimately depended on its ability to coerce the individual states' into obeying the law. Establishment skeptics among the Republicans, however, believed with good reason that the Federalists wanted to use the military establishment for internal political control and to crush dissent. They wanted to rely more on the militia and build up a military with volunteers when absolutely necessary. They also believed that a government that relied mainly on force was not legitimate at all.
And yet, the formation of the military establishment did not emerge from some master plan but from the messy politics and contingent events of the 1790s. Weirdly, events and political debates reconciled Republicans to a minimal military establishment. The St. Clair expedition's failure in 1792 showed the weakness of poorly trained volunteer armies and the need for real military planning/organization. The US then formed a legionary army under Wayne, which defeated the Iroquois Confederacy and solidified control of the Northwest Territory. With each of these steps, the Federalists advanced the idea that regulars were superior troops and that the US needed an infrastructure of military production, training, bases, ships, etc to defend itself.
Then, major debate erupted in the mid-late 1790s over preparing for war with France. The Republicans were enamored of France and detested England, while the Federalists were the opposite. The Federalists wanted to expand the military establishment to prepare for war, but they also thought that Republicans might betray the country and ally with France to undermine the republic. Republicans, meanwhile, feared budding tyranny within the executive branch's pursuit of a military establishment. I never realized quite how heated this debate was, nor how central the military was in the Federalist-Republican split in the 1790s.
This book was also useful for understanding the divisions among the Federalists themselves, especially the High Federalists like Hamilton, against the mainstream folks like Adams. Hamilton's reputation, I think, has benefitted immensely from his early death. He comes across as arrogant and more than a little scary in this book. He championed the creation of the Provisional and New Armies, with himself at the head, of course. He was a nationalizer and modernizer way ahead of his time, but he was also politically maladroit and a bit dangerous. For example, he simply wanted to crush the Whisky Rebellion with force, whereas Washington wisely sent peace envoys to take the temperature down and show his reasonableness before moving against the rebels in a restrained way.
Hamilton ultimately got much of what he wanted re: the military, but it came at the cost of the destruction of the Federalists as a viable party. Adams greatly distrusted Hamilton, who was almost trying to run a shadow government at the time. Adams understood that the High Federalists were using the threats of war with France and related domestic subversion to justify the expansion of the military. While he wanted a basic military establishment, he thought it was more important to pursue peace with France and keep an unprepared US out of the war. He ultimately achieved this but at the cost of a major split with the High Federalists.
Political orders are said to be entrenched or legitimized when parties change hands but a basic set of structures and principles are accepted/consolidated. This happened under Jefferson and Madison, who, despite their Whiggish fears of the military, accepted and even expanded the Federalist military establishment. The US developed a system that would last over 100 years: maintain a skeletal regular military and defense infrastructure that can be expanded with volunteers during war and then limited again. This was a necessary adaptation to geopolitical realities that was compatible with American traditions and values regarding the military.
This is a difficult book; you have to focus and read it in small bites. I wouldn't recommend it if you don't have a working knowledge of the political history of the time, as Kohn assumes a baseline of understanding among the readers. However, if you are interested in US military history, war and society issues, civ-mil relations, and similar fields, this is a rewarding and classic study.
August 12, 2011
Brisk and fair treatment of the Federalists and their militarism. Kohn avoids cliches, hysterical accusations, and most importantly remains fair in his analysis.
August 11, 2023
One of the best books I've read in 2023
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews