Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies: Illuminating Emptiness in a Twentieth-Century Tibetan Buddhist Classic

by Bötrül, Douglas S. Duckworth (Translator)

This is an essential work of Tibetan Buddhist thought written by an influential scholar of the twentieth century. From the same Nyingma school as the great Tibetan philosopher Mipam, Botrul in this text provides a systematic overview of Mipam's teachings on the Middle Way. Presenting the Nyingma tradition within a rich constellation of diverse perspectives, Botrul contrasts Nyingma views point-by-point with positions held by other Tibetan schools. Botrul's work addresses a wide range of complex topics in Buddhist doctrine in a beautifully structured composition in verse and prose. Notably, Botrul sheds light on the elusive meaning of "emptiness" and presents an interpretation that is unique to his Nyingma school.

Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies exemplifies the vigorous tradition of Tibetan Buddhist scholarship and is widely studied in the contemporary monastic colleges of Tibet, India, and Nepal. Douglas Samuel Duckworth's translation will make this work widely available in English for the first time, and his thoughtful commentary will provide insight and context for readers.

Genres: Buddhism, Philosophy

346 pages, Hardcover

First published March 1, 2011

Reviews

[Mesoscope · Rating 5 out of 5]

Bötrül (1898-1959) was a highly-respected contemporary Nyingmapa scholar-monk who nominally wrote this work as a meaning-commentary to Mipham Gyatso Rinpoche's magnificent Beacon of Certainty, though to my eyes, the only real connection between the two works is the subject matter - I don't recall that he cites that work once. What it does provide is something rare, or perhaps even unique, in the available English-language literature on the Nyingma: a systematic and comprehensive overview of their take on Madhyamaka philosophy, along with extensive polemical discussions differentiating it from competing Tibetan positions. It was refreshing to see the author elaborate his views in reference to actual, living traditions, instead of couching his explanation with reference to reconstructed Indian Buddhist positions, many of which being long extinct.

Because of its scope, I found this work to be invaluable, although it is a bit rough in many respects. Bötrül did not particularly emerge for me as a brilliant stylist or creative thinker; rather, as a very competent journeyman, who labored diligently to put Mipham's view into something resembling a comprehensive system. It is not altogether clear to me hat the Nyingma view lends itself readily to such systematizing, but it was enormously helpful to go through it on this level.

The first important argument Bötrül sets forth concerns which teachings of the Buddha should be regarded as definitive or final in their meaning, and which should be understood as merely provisional. He asserts that both the second turning teachings of the Prajnaparamita sutras, which teach the emptiness of inherent existence, and the third turning teachings dealing with buddha nature, also called the sugatagarbha or tathagatagarbha, are of definitive meaning, as are the Uttaratantra and the Abhisamayalamkara. Interestingly, he clearly stipulates that all second turning teachings are definitive, while most of the teachings from the third wheel - that is, all of the mind-only sutras - are provisional.

According to Bötrül, the tathagatagarbha sutras and the Prajnaparamita sutras are, properly understood, actually in accord, and it is a unique feature of the Nyingma approach that they may be properly harmonized. By understanding their union, one comes to understand certain fundamental features of tantra, such as the fact that all appearing phenomena whatsoever are divine in nature, and comprise the sacred appearance of the buddhas and their sacred mandalas.

The bulk of the work focuses on the doctrine of the two truths. Bötrül subdivides the two truths into an additional twofold division, accounting for the two aspects of conventional and ultimate reality that are respectively conveyed in the second and the third turning of the wheels of dharma. According to the second turning, conventional or relative truth refers to the false appearance of phenomena as though they have their own independent basis or mode of subsistence, while ultimate truth refers to their emptiness of such a mode of existence. According to the third turning sources that Bötrül counts as definitive, all phenomena are in their very nature indescribable, luminous, self-arisen, and perfect, indistinguishable from the buddha nature by virtue of which all sentient beings may become buddhas.

Bötrül, then, subdivides ultimate truth into what he calls the categorized ultimate (rnam grants pa’i don dam) and the uncategorized ultimate (rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam), where the former refers to the view of emptiness as the mere negation of true existence, and the latter refers to the primordial union and inseparability of appearance and emptiness, beyond the two extremes. That the latter view is in fact completely in accord with the former is only understood by Prasangikas, according to the author. This position has an odd consequence - Bötrül characterizes the Gelukpa "categorized" view of Madhyamaka as "Svatantrika" repeatedly, as he sees Tsongkhapa as falling to the extreme of reification. Following Mipham closely, he asserts that the Gelukpas do not fully negate the appearing object, only a property of the appearing object, the property of ultimate existence. In this way, as Mipham repeatedly states in his commentary on the Madhyamakavatara, the Gelukpas say "a pot is not empty of pot, it is empty of true existence."

The Nyingmas, on the other hand, fully negate the falsely-appearing object, which in no sense whatsoever may be said to arise, abide, or cease. What, then, remains, after such a negation? Indescribable suchness, the union of appearance and emptiness, beyond the extremes of "is" and "is not".

Since [emptiness and appearances] are not different, it is free from [the extreme of] both–
Emptiness and dependent arising are the great unity.
Since appearance and emptiness are equal, it is free from [the extreme of] neither–
The equality free from extremes, Emaho! (pg. 177)

This brings us to Bötrül's subdivision of conventional truth, which differentiates confined (tshur mthong, literally “seeing this side,” immanent, samsaric perception) conventional appearances from pure (dag gzigs) conventional appearances. Ordinary worldly beings see only inert matter through the lens of the afflictions, while superior beings see phenomena as imbued with the numinous luminosity of ultimate truth, which is described as buddha nature on the level of the sutra, and is described in terms of the buddha mandala in the inner tantras. This is a critical argument that goes back at least to Rongzompa's Establishing Appearances as Divine, which insists that the divine appearance of the buddha mandala in the tantras is not simply an imaginative exercise, but is in fact more true than ordinary, mundane appearances.

Thinking through this latter position and its implications, it has recently become clear to me, the degree to which Nyingmapas insist that ultimate truth is not merely some sort of dry, idealist doctrine, it is the very fact of sacredness itself. An aside, but an important one, I think.

One interesting consequence of this subdivision of the two truths is that Bötrül is obliged to defend the position that while ultimate truth in Prasangika-Madhyamaka is a hidden phenomenon, one that can be deduced with certainty by logical analysis, the uncategorized ultimate is a deeply-hidden phenomenon, which cannot be established by either direct perception or inference. I do not exactly understand how this could be, since Chandrakirti is said to establish the final view by reason, but it is a necessary consequence of the inclusion of the luminous character of phenomena under the aegis of ultimate truth. For this feature of reality only becomes evident by practicing the tantras, and the higher up you go in the hierarchy of tantras, the more completely one apprehends the unity of appearance and emptiness. For a succinct and beautiful argument to this effect, see Rongzompa's "Black Snake Discourse."

I agree that such a conception of ultimate truth is not provable by reason, but I must say, it makes me uncomfortable. On one level, I think what is being argued here strongly aligns with well-known tenets, such as the fact that one must be introduced to the nature of mind by a realized master - we cannot simply figure it out or find it ourselves. This is obviously a core feature of Nyingma, but I admit, until it was spelled out in this context, the full implications of that hadn't really sunk in - that we kind of have to take the Buddha's word for it, until we have some substantial degree of realization, ourselves. It is a very attractive feature of Gelukpa Madhyamaka that this is never necessary - we can establish the view fully, and with certainty, long before we have even an inferential cognition of emptiness.

If this all sounds a bit complicated, it is. It took a lot of work for me to get this all sorted out to the degree that I could lay it out in this review, in part because Bötrül's text is not very easy to read or parse, and in part because I believe it is under-explained in the very brief introduction, and difficult interpretive points frequently are unaddressed in the endnotes. I was forced to refer to other texts in order to understand some of the most important terminology in this book, especially Mipham's preamble to his Madhyamakalamkara commentary Speech of Delight. Also vexing is the lack of a glossary, which I am increasingly coming to regard as a serious fault in works of this kind. Some Tibetan equivalents are provided for index entries, others are not, and I still have no idea what is being rendered, for example, as "mystery".

This is not a lovely book. I have only gone through the heart of its argument, the parts that are of greatest interest to me, and I admit that I didn't have the fortitude to plow carefully through the later sections on grounds and paths, and on the nature of buddhahood, with the same kind of care. I would have benefitted from greater assistance from the translator in motivating and explaining its arguments - I do not believe, for example, that he explains why the ubiquitous terms "categorized" and "uncategorized" are used, and it is hardly self-evident. I believe what it's getting at is that the "categorized ultimate" refutes an object of negation that is qualified (i.e. categorized) by terms such as "inherent" and so forth, while the uncategorized ultimate negates "the pot itself," and not just "the inherent existence of pot."

This is not the best book on Nyingma Madhyamaka that I've read, but for me, it's perhaps the most indispensable. It really lays the whole thing out in a way that you don't normally see. Now, I think in part you don't normally see it because it's not really the center of gravity for Nyingma to make a big, systematic set of arguments - the emphasis is often put on giving up such efforts, with the recognition that any attempt to understand the ultimate necessarily falls back into dualistic thought. How could it not?

Despite arguing that the ultimate is beyond is and isn't and has nothing to do with philosophical theories, Bötrül nonetheless embeds the term as deeply in the thicket of polemics and intellectual history as any author I've ever seen. Honestly, if that is the kind of thing you want, the Gelukpas are rather better at it.

One last thing I would have liked to see is much more of a contextualization of this work and the views it represents within the larger arc of the development of Tibetan thought. Duckworth does mention that the clear Sakyapa influence on this work is suggested by the title, which closely resembles the title of Gorampa's polemical work targeting Tsongkhapa, but this clearly just scratches the surface of the influence of that school. The position that Tsongkhapa is himself an unwitting Svatantrika, for example, appears to come straight from Daktsang. I note that Bötrül also presents the ground, path, and fruit in terms of three unities - of the two truths, of wisdom and method, and of the form and truth bodies, respectively - which is also a scheme that Gorampa uses in his own Distinguishing the Views. There is obviously a lot going on here.

This is clearly too big a topic to treat at length, but it seems probable to me that Bötrül drew nearly as much from Sakyapas - and possibly from the Eighth and Ninth Karmapas - as he did from Mipham, and that could have used a bit of consideration. For a reader looking for more of that backstory, I would recommend the two-volume Knowing Illusions, of which Professor Duckworth was a co-author.

That being said, for understanding the Nyingma view, which is very great, very profound, this work is incredibly helpful.