Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983

Equinox Classic Indonesia

by David Jenkins

In writing this monograph I have been guided by two separate but interrelated goals. The first has been to provide an historical-descriptive record of the "challenge" posed to President Suharto within the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) during the period 1975-82 and the debate that developed over ABRI's role in society. Although this debate sprawled across the whole canvas of military involvement in society, it can be said to have focused essentially on two key issues. The first, which was debated with considerable vigor during the period 1977-80, involved ABRI's relations with other social-political groups in society, and in particular the political parties. The center of this debate was the "contradiction" between ABRI's claim to be above all groups in society and the reality of its continuing support for Golkar, the political grouping which held a majority of the seats in the DPR (Parliament). Due largely to the intervention of the president, this debate was resolved in favor of the status quo and by 1980 it appeared unlikely that there would be any substantial changes during the remainder of the Suharto presidency. The second issue, which became of increasing importance after 1980, centered on the appointment of military officers to nonmilitary functions. There were in the mid-1970s more than 20,000 military men serving in a kekaryaan (nonmilitary, or "functional") capacity, as ministers, ambassadors, parliamentarians, senior executives in government corporations, bankers, senior civil servants, university rectors, provincial governors, subdistrict heads, and even village headmen. Answerable to the chief of staff for functional affairs (Kaskar), they acted as "reinforcing rods" to ensure that the bureaucracy was responsive to the commands of those at the top-a role that was not unlike that of the Communist Party in many Communist states. In the view of the critics, ABRI's heavy involvement in kekaryaan activities, although understandable in terms of recent Indonesian history, was excessive and needed to be scaled back. On this front, some government concessions seemed possible, if only because the armed forces were short of manpower. Even so, any cutback in the kekaryaan ABRI was likely to be both slow and from the bottom up, with the commanding heights of the system remaining firmly in the hands of the military leaders.

Genres: History, Indonesian Literature

332 pages, Paperback

First published November 1, 1984

Reviews

[Ahmad Kurnia · Rating 5 out of 5]

Buku bagus. Agaknya tidak akan dicetak ulang [semoga salah].

Jenkins menulis ada kontradiksi dalam rezim Order Baru: Perwira sadar tidak akan menang jika Pemilu diadakan luberjurdil. Tetapi, mereka percaya, dengan seluruh hati nuraninya, bahwa kepemimpinan mereka amat penting bagi Indonesia. Kontradiksi ini yang kemudian mengukuhkan pretorianisme di Indonesia, dan bahkan nyaris merangsak ke totaliter. Yang tampaknya kokoh tidak tergoyahkan, nyatanya di dalam sedikit keropos. Sejumlah Perwira 'lain' mencoba menggoyahkannya.

Membaca ini, membawa pada perasaan ambivalen: tentu tidak akan mau jika gaya yang disebut tadi berulang lagi hari ini. Namun, jika hal itu tidak terhindarkan, buku ini memberikan sedikit harapan (disertai kecemasan) akan masih adanya sebagian golongan itu yang sudi menggoyahkannya lagi.

[The Talisman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Walau buku ini ditulis tahun ‘80an, isinya masih sangat relevan dengan kondisi perpolitikan era kini. Jenkins menjelaskan dengan detail mengenai KKN yang merebak di era Pak Harto (akibat paranoia-nya), awal mula penerapan teori Dwifungsi ABRI, hingga perpecahan di antara pejabat militer senior. Mereka semua hanyalah pion, yang dimainkan oleh sang Grand Master yang memiliki kekuasaan penuh terhadap segala hal di Indonesia, baik dari segi ekonomi, politik, maupun sosial.

Jika anda suka sejarah dan ingin tahu lebih dalam mengenai OrBa, buku ini adalah sajian yang pas, karena mengutip banyak sumber langsung di lapangan, tempat peristiwa-peristiwa militer & pemerintahan penting terjadi.

[Anjar Priandoyo · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good book, written in 1984, some idea is not applicable, there were many changes in 1980s. However, it is a good book to understand civil-military relationship in Indonesia. I read this from Cornel ebook library, a good source of Indonesian history book

[Andrea G. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Buku ini menunjukkan kepandaian Pak Harto dalam memanage anak2 buahnya

[Miko · Rating 4 out of 5]

Jaman ketika Pak Harto berhadapan dengan para senior dan kolega sebayanya dalam dialektika politik dan ekonomi.

[Jonah Lo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Using an astounding amount of access to Indonesia's top generals including Nasution, Murdani, and Jasin, David Jenkins has constructed an excellent insider account of military politics in Middle New Order.

Across the late 1970s and early 1980s, prominent figures in the Indonesian military came out against the regime - some publicly and even more privately. This was for several reasons - the military's embarrassingly close affiliation with loyalist party Golkar despite its high principles, increasing corruption, and envy towards the Military Intelligence clique of Murtopo, Murdani, and Sudomo - who were rapidly consolidating power. These disaffected active and retired officers produced papers, letters, and parliamentary speeches decrying the state of the regime, and calling for a purification of the military. Ultimately this prompted a showdown of intellectualism, networks, and resources between dissidents and the pragmatist Intel clique - one ultimately decided by Suharto himself.

The one weakness of the book would be the somewhat light conclusion - the dismantlement of the dissident group is described and analysed with an extremely light touch in comparison to the slow elaboration of its emergence.

[Wirotomo Nofamilyname · Rating 4 out of 5]

Berisi hal-hal yang mungkin dulu sangat ingin kita ketahui pada jaman "ketertutupan informasi" Orba. Saat ini mungkin sudah terlihat usang (out-of-date).
Nampaknya hal yang menarik dari buku ini hanyalah mengenai bagaimana Pak Harto "mengelola" kekuasaannya. Tapi itu sudah cukup bagi saya, untuk memberi bintang 4 untuk buku ini. Entah kenapa.
Harusnya 5, tapi agak merasa sedikit terganggu dengan terjemahannya. Entah kenapa (lagi). :-)

[Kahfi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Sangat setuju dengan perkataan Liddle, bahwa kekuatan buku ini adalah kekayaan wawancara yang sangat komprehensif. Dengan itu pula membedakan buku ini berada di tapal terdepan untuk mengetahui praktik kekuasaan Soeharto.

[Setadipa · Rating 4 out of 5]

dari buku ini menarik utk dicermati, apakah telah timbul hegemoni pemikiran bahwa pemimpin dari militer adalah yg diperlukan di negeri ini

[Abrari Aron · Rating 4 out of 5]

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