What do you think?
Rate this book
The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers
As Ambassador and Special Envoy on Afghanistan from 1989 to 1992, Peter Tomsen has had close relationships with Afghan leaders and has dealt with senior Taliban, warlords, and religious leaders involved in the region’s conflicts over the last two decades. Now Tomsen draws on a rich trove of never-before-published material to shed new light on the American involvement in the long and continuing Afghan war. This book offers a deeply informed perspective on how Afghanistan’s history as a “shatter zone” for foreign invaders and its tribal society have shaped the modern Afghan narrative. It brings to life the appallingly misinformed secret operations by foreign intelligence agencies, including the Soviet NKVD and KGB, the Pakistani ISI, and the CIA.
American policy makers, Tomsen argues, still do not understand Afghanistan; nor do they appreciate how the CIA’s covert operations and the Pentagon’s military strategy have strengthened extremism in the country. At this critical time, he shows how the U.S. and the coalition it leads can assist the region back to peace and stability.
American policy makers, Tomsen argues, still do not understand Afghanistan; nor do they appreciate how the CIA’s covert operations and the Pentagon’s military strategy have strengthened extremism in the country. At this critical time, he shows how the U.S. and the coalition it leads can assist the region back to peace and stability.
912 pages, Hardcover
First published July 1, 2011
47 people are currently reading
1262 people want to read
About the author
Peter Tomsen
7 books5 followersPeter Tomsen is a retired diplomat and educator. A graduate of Wittenberg University in Springfield, Ohio, he earned a master's degree in public and international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Starting his career as a foreign service officer in 1967, he rose to become United States Special Envoy to Afghanistan from 1989 to 1992, and United States Ambassador to Armenia from 1995 until 1998.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 44 reviews
August 22, 2013
This book gives us a geo-political perspective and history of this troubled country. The author is from the U.S., but has spent considerable time in the region over the last thirty years. Mr. Tomsen has met many of the key players, for example Ahmed Shah Masood.
We come to view Pakistan as the major culprit of Afghanistan becoming a failed state. After the Soviet Union pulled out, Pakistan turned from the defensive to the offensive. Through the Taliban, whose main support base was in the FATA areas of Pakistan, Pakistan set up its’ own proxy government in Afghanistan.
During the Soviet-Afghan war the U.S. was really a distant third-party providing funds that were channelled through Pakistan to Afghanistan. It was the ISI (Pakistan’s secret service) who had the say of got these supplies. Mr. Tomsen points out that the U.S. never dealt directly the Mujahideen in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. The author in no way provides this as an excuse for later events – in fact he is strongly critical of U.S. intelligence for their failure to understand the nature of their involvement. The U.S. had little idea of exactly who they were really dealing with and made no attempt to ascertain the reality of these purported allies. The U.S. would have been wise to pay more attention, well to twist an axiom - “the enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend”. By contrast Saudi Arabia – the government and private Saudi donors – knew exactly what they were doing. They not only provided enormous funds, but many fanatical fighters from across the Arab world were inspired to go to Afghanistan by Wahhabi madrassas run by Saudi Arabia. In some ways Mr. Tomsen is not severe enough on Saudi Arabia in his book (at times saying that Saudi Arabia is an ally of Western democracies – page 559 of my book). Saudi Arabia is a direct source of religious totalitarianism, and unlike Pakistan, Saudi Arabia is far more organized and wealthier as a government, albeit with a much smaller population.
It is interesting that the author points out that the U.S. only started providing stinger missiles to Pakistan (for delivery to Afghanistan) in 1986; by that time the Soviet Army was on the retreat in Afghanistan. The Soviets never had a chance there – being isolated in a few urban centers. American aid to Afghanistan (via Pakistan) has been over-emphasized in the demise of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.
The author spends considerable time discussing the period between the Soviet withdrawal and Pakistan’s subsequent invasion of Afghanistan in the early 1990’s. This crucial time period would have been, as Mr. Tomsen suggests, the ideal time for nation building. The U.S. was instead obsessed with ending the Cold War and looked elsewhere; leaving Afghanistan to become a haven for Islamic extremists with continued massive funding from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
There are a great deal of topics covered in this book and I came away with a much greater understanding of the vast complexities of this part of the world – such as the tribal nature of this country and the disconnect between what is going on in Kabul and the mountainous countryside where the majority of the population reside. Does Mr. Tomsen over-emphasize the positive role that Ahmed Shah Masood could have played if he had not been assassinated by al-Qaeda? After all Masood was allied at times with Dostum, who was basically a mercenary warlord. This book is more concerned with political dynamics of which there are plenty – the books of Ahmed Rashid provide a more social view. There is a wonderful parable (on page 251) of trying to balance Afghanistan’s regional competitiveness as akin to putting frogs onto two balancing trays, but having them jumping constantly about – off the trays and onto the other tray!
The author recommends withdrawal of most of the armed forces from Afghanistan. As we can see from news reports they are no longer welcome in the country and have (like Britain, followed by the Soviet Union and now NATO) failed to navigate the web of diverse regional groups. These troops also have no knowledge of the different languages of Afghanistan.
The author acknowledges, however, that if Pakistan is allowed to continue its’ Islamic infiltration of Afghanistan we will continue to have several years of conflict in front of us. Mr. Tomsen does not want an abnegation of interests in Afghanistan – which is what happened after the Soviet pullout in the early 1990’s. The world, along with the U.N. must continue to provide conditional aid to Afghanistan. The U.S. must stop funding Pakistan as it continues its drive into Afghanistan. Perhaps, now that Pakistan is feeling the enmity of “the snake that has come back to bite it”; they may be forced to re-think their militant support of Islamic fundamentalists. As per Mr. Tomsen the next few years are critical. Afghanistan must not be allowed, once again, to descend into a shatter zone.
At over 700 pages this is a long book – and it is distressing to read the hardships, the disarray and the turmoil of Afghanistan that has existed for over thirty years now. Prior to 9/11 we knew little of this country – now it has become decisive to our future.
We come to view Pakistan as the major culprit of Afghanistan becoming a failed state. After the Soviet Union pulled out, Pakistan turned from the defensive to the offensive. Through the Taliban, whose main support base was in the FATA areas of Pakistan, Pakistan set up its’ own proxy government in Afghanistan.
During the Soviet-Afghan war the U.S. was really a distant third-party providing funds that were channelled through Pakistan to Afghanistan. It was the ISI (Pakistan’s secret service) who had the say of got these supplies. Mr. Tomsen points out that the U.S. never dealt directly the Mujahideen in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. The author in no way provides this as an excuse for later events – in fact he is strongly critical of U.S. intelligence for their failure to understand the nature of their involvement. The U.S. had little idea of exactly who they were really dealing with and made no attempt to ascertain the reality of these purported allies. The U.S. would have been wise to pay more attention, well to twist an axiom - “the enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend”. By contrast Saudi Arabia – the government and private Saudi donors – knew exactly what they were doing. They not only provided enormous funds, but many fanatical fighters from across the Arab world were inspired to go to Afghanistan by Wahhabi madrassas run by Saudi Arabia. In some ways Mr. Tomsen is not severe enough on Saudi Arabia in his book (at times saying that Saudi Arabia is an ally of Western democracies – page 559 of my book). Saudi Arabia is a direct source of religious totalitarianism, and unlike Pakistan, Saudi Arabia is far more organized and wealthier as a government, albeit with a much smaller population.
It is interesting that the author points out that the U.S. only started providing stinger missiles to Pakistan (for delivery to Afghanistan) in 1986; by that time the Soviet Army was on the retreat in Afghanistan. The Soviets never had a chance there – being isolated in a few urban centers. American aid to Afghanistan (via Pakistan) has been over-emphasized in the demise of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.
The author spends considerable time discussing the period between the Soviet withdrawal and Pakistan’s subsequent invasion of Afghanistan in the early 1990’s. This crucial time period would have been, as Mr. Tomsen suggests, the ideal time for nation building. The U.S. was instead obsessed with ending the Cold War and looked elsewhere; leaving Afghanistan to become a haven for Islamic extremists with continued massive funding from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
There are a great deal of topics covered in this book and I came away with a much greater understanding of the vast complexities of this part of the world – such as the tribal nature of this country and the disconnect between what is going on in Kabul and the mountainous countryside where the majority of the population reside. Does Mr. Tomsen over-emphasize the positive role that Ahmed Shah Masood could have played if he had not been assassinated by al-Qaeda? After all Masood was allied at times with Dostum, who was basically a mercenary warlord. This book is more concerned with political dynamics of which there are plenty – the books of Ahmed Rashid provide a more social view. There is a wonderful parable (on page 251) of trying to balance Afghanistan’s regional competitiveness as akin to putting frogs onto two balancing trays, but having them jumping constantly about – off the trays and onto the other tray!
The author recommends withdrawal of most of the armed forces from Afghanistan. As we can see from news reports they are no longer welcome in the country and have (like Britain, followed by the Soviet Union and now NATO) failed to navigate the web of diverse regional groups. These troops also have no knowledge of the different languages of Afghanistan.
The author acknowledges, however, that if Pakistan is allowed to continue its’ Islamic infiltration of Afghanistan we will continue to have several years of conflict in front of us. Mr. Tomsen does not want an abnegation of interests in Afghanistan – which is what happened after the Soviet pullout in the early 1990’s. The world, along with the U.N. must continue to provide conditional aid to Afghanistan. The U.S. must stop funding Pakistan as it continues its drive into Afghanistan. Perhaps, now that Pakistan is feeling the enmity of “the snake that has come back to bite it”; they may be forced to re-think their militant support of Islamic fundamentalists. As per Mr. Tomsen the next few years are critical. Afghanistan must not be allowed, once again, to descend into a shatter zone.
At over 700 pages this is a long book – and it is distressing to read the hardships, the disarray and the turmoil of Afghanistan that has existed for over thirty years now. Prior to 9/11 we knew little of this country – now it has become decisive to our future.
October 12, 2024
We never know the full truth behind current events. Most people don't want to be bothered to discover it; there are simply too many things going on in our lives to investigate each issue that passes before us in the news.
Nevertheless, for every issue there are people intimately involved, people who do know the truth and are perfectly placed to disclose to us what should determine our attitudes and actions. They may not be able to speak the truth because of their position. Speaking out can destroy a career or even a life (Chelsea Manning comes to mind).
Time changes circumstances. The truth is no longer held hostage to policy, position or income when it becomes a matter of history. Truth spills out often when it becomes irrelevant, yet as history it offers lessons for those willing to listen and for that reason I find history absorbing, particularly when it deals with issues raised during my lifetime - when I recall the cover story that was held up to the public at the time.
No better person than Peter Tomsen could be found to tell the story of the United States relationship to Afghanistan, because he was the representative of the U.S. government to the mujahidin in that country when they were fighting the Russian army. He knew the people involved on all sides - the fighters in the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan, the Pakistani military, the CIA and State Department officials implementing U.S. policy (or not).
He was not in a position to make policy, only to try his best to implement one that was passed down from above. As such he has no stake in defending that policy, but was in the perfect situation to see whether it was effective or counterproductive. If a tool could speak, it could tell us quite a bit about the methods of the gardener that used it.
What an epic he gives us!
We're introduced to the country by an account of its history and the many peoples who contributed to the faces of Afghanistan today. At first exposure, the names of tribes and races are almost overwhelming, the country being a crossroads for so many cultures. I was surprised at the ancient Greek influence that established Greek cities. Persians came from the west, Mongols from the north, sweeping through to stay for decades or centuries but never maintaining their hold.
Once we come up to the 20th century, it's clear that the motive of empire has not disappeared. Tomsen recounts the disastrous Russian intervention and the common technique of setting up a puppet in Kabul in the hope of extending influence over the entire country. The overarching theme of this book is the failure to learn lessons from the experience of others. Regardless of the reason for intervention, each foreign power repeats the same mistakes and the outcome is predictable: retreat and withdrawal leaving the Afghan people in no better conditions than before.
Eight years in the writing, this book is lengthy, but the intimate personal details underlying geopolitical strategies make it interesting throughout. Attention is kept by the ongoing stories of primary characters such as Ahmed Shah Massood, Abdul Haq, Osama bin-Laden and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, we also get the climb of Hamid Karzai to power (with a big boost from Washington), the machinations of Pakistan's ISI to promote Zia-ul-Haq's dream of a pan-Islamic empire and overarching all from the author's point of view, the great divide between CIA operations and the official policy of the United States.
The conclusion offers policy recommendations particularly in regard to ending the counterproductive no-strings-attached U.S. support of Pakistan even as that country undermines stability in Afghanistan by training and exporting Islamist fighters. Tomsen, by the way, is a supporter of Obama's drone strikes.
Tomsen has provided a service to his country by offering this account and analysis. If only it were possible to have such excellent work for every country in the world - available BEFORE there is an urge to intervene. As the book reveals, those at the top are distracted, concerned with so many issues at once and hardly likely to be able to understand the effects of their broad directives and lofty goals. Just as in the U.S. Senate, so it is in the State Department - it is the staff that has the knowledge while the Senator or President is the face presented to the public. Far too often it is a matter of "don't confuse me with the facts" or a personal friendship that favors one voice over another regardless of the content of what is being said. Bureaucracy rules, great power blunders, common people suffer.
Maps are provided but if you read this on a Kindle as I did, they are tiny and who wants to keep referring back to a page? A printout of a map of the area found online will be a big help as you read.
Nevertheless, for every issue there are people intimately involved, people who do know the truth and are perfectly placed to disclose to us what should determine our attitudes and actions. They may not be able to speak the truth because of their position. Speaking out can destroy a career or even a life (Chelsea Manning comes to mind).
Time changes circumstances. The truth is no longer held hostage to policy, position or income when it becomes a matter of history. Truth spills out often when it becomes irrelevant, yet as history it offers lessons for those willing to listen and for that reason I find history absorbing, particularly when it deals with issues raised during my lifetime - when I recall the cover story that was held up to the public at the time.
No better person than Peter Tomsen could be found to tell the story of the United States relationship to Afghanistan, because he was the representative of the U.S. government to the mujahidin in that country when they were fighting the Russian army. He knew the people involved on all sides - the fighters in the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan, the Pakistani military, the CIA and State Department officials implementing U.S. policy (or not).
He was not in a position to make policy, only to try his best to implement one that was passed down from above. As such he has no stake in defending that policy, but was in the perfect situation to see whether it was effective or counterproductive. If a tool could speak, it could tell us quite a bit about the methods of the gardener that used it.
What an epic he gives us!
We're introduced to the country by an account of its history and the many peoples who contributed to the faces of Afghanistan today. At first exposure, the names of tribes and races are almost overwhelming, the country being a crossroads for so many cultures. I was surprised at the ancient Greek influence that established Greek cities. Persians came from the west, Mongols from the north, sweeping through to stay for decades or centuries but never maintaining their hold.
Once we come up to the 20th century, it's clear that the motive of empire has not disappeared. Tomsen recounts the disastrous Russian intervention and the common technique of setting up a puppet in Kabul in the hope of extending influence over the entire country. The overarching theme of this book is the failure to learn lessons from the experience of others. Regardless of the reason for intervention, each foreign power repeats the same mistakes and the outcome is predictable: retreat and withdrawal leaving the Afghan people in no better conditions than before.
Eight years in the writing, this book is lengthy, but the intimate personal details underlying geopolitical strategies make it interesting throughout. Attention is kept by the ongoing stories of primary characters such as Ahmed Shah Massood, Abdul Haq, Osama bin-Laden and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, we also get the climb of Hamid Karzai to power (with a big boost from Washington), the machinations of Pakistan's ISI to promote Zia-ul-Haq's dream of a pan-Islamic empire and overarching all from the author's point of view, the great divide between CIA operations and the official policy of the United States.
The conclusion offers policy recommendations particularly in regard to ending the counterproductive no-strings-attached U.S. support of Pakistan even as that country undermines stability in Afghanistan by training and exporting Islamist fighters. Tomsen, by the way, is a supporter of Obama's drone strikes.
Tomsen has provided a service to his country by offering this account and analysis. If only it were possible to have such excellent work for every country in the world - available BEFORE there is an urge to intervene. As the book reveals, those at the top are distracted, concerned with so many issues at once and hardly likely to be able to understand the effects of their broad directives and lofty goals. Just as in the U.S. Senate, so it is in the State Department - it is the staff that has the knowledge while the Senator or President is the face presented to the public. Far too often it is a matter of "don't confuse me with the facts" or a personal friendship that favors one voice over another regardless of the content of what is being said. Bureaucracy rules, great power blunders, common people suffer.
Maps are provided but if you read this on a Kindle as I did, they are tiny and who wants to keep referring back to a page? A printout of a map of the area found online will be a big help as you read.
August 28, 2014
Peter Tomsen’s "The Wars of Afghanistan" is an incredibly thorough and insightful work, written by someone with a special expertise on the subject. From 1989 to 1992, Tomsen served as George H.W. Bush’s special envoy to the Afghan resistance, holding the rank of ambassador. Working from Pakistan and Washington, he witnessed a shift in the political landscape following the Soviet withdrawal, culminating in the rise of the Taliban in September 1994, and their eventual ascension to power in 1996. In many ways, the author’s chronicles of different Afghan, Pakistani, and Saudi figures in the 1980s and 90s is reminiscent of reading a book on the Mexican War; a veritable “who’s who” of people who would later become famous. Abdul Haq, Ahmed Shah Masood, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Benazir Bhutto, Abdul Sayyaf, Hamid Karzai, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden…
Tomsen argues quite persuasively that the United States missed its golden moment in Afghanistan in the early 1990s because it was working towards opposing goals. The State Department was supporting moderates within the resistance in the hope that they might return to power and restore the liberal society that had been in place prior to the 1973 coup. The CIA, meanwhile, was supporting the Pakistani ISI, which backed extremists such as Hekmatyar, and funded what would later become the Taliban. This seemingly blind trust in Pakistan on the part of the US government continued into the War on Terror, and was responsible for the missed opportunity of Tora Bora, and much of the struggle to rebuild Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009. Tomsen points to this as a representation of the fundamental misunderstanding foreign powers have of the tribal and cultural nature of fighting in Afghanistan. This misunderstanding has hampered foreign efforts to pacify Afghan resistance movements as far back as the late 19th century, and continues to this day.
Where I take issue with the author’s analysis is in his insistence that air strikes and night raids, which often result in civilian casualties, should be banned because they cause popular sympathy to go against coalition forces. This parrots the positions of Hamid Karzai and Stanley McCrystal, but fails to appreciate the role that counterterrorism plays on a COIN battlefield. Oddly, in the author’s prescriptions for a more stable Afghanistan and Pakistan, he asserts the need to remove high value targets from the fight, ostensibly through some new means not yet discovered. It is interesting to note that the “McCrystal year” of 2009-2010, characterized by the hands off approach, saw an increase in violence across the country, while the “Petraeus year” of 2010-2011, characterized by an “all of the above” approach, saw violence decline. While we may not be able to draw causality from this due to the possible existence of unforeseen variables, it certainly offers a strong rebuttal to Tomsen’s argument.
It is undoubtedly true that civilian casualties cause the government to lose popular support, which is a death sentence in a population-centric fight. It is also true, however, that the inability to keep the peace and apprehend anti-government actors signals to the populace that there are competing authorities. This too, is detrimental to success in a COIN campaign. The McCrystals of the world recognize the first point and move immediately in the opposite direction, to the detriment of all. The Petraeuses, however, find a middle way: fighting a population-focused battle while simultaneously maintaining a robust counter-terror campaign, run by highly-trained special operators who are more adept at minimizing collateral damage than the rest of the conventional military forces.
Perhaps the most cogent point Tomsen makes on COIN is in regards to “ownership”. He talks about the dangerous habit of foreign powers and NGOs to try to do too much, which negates the purpose of building and training the Afghan government. Hundreds of projects have been completed in Afghanistan from 2001 to present, but “since the projects were not carried out by the Afghan government, the Afghan population did not give the government credit for bettering their lives”. He goes on to add, “the average Afghan knew that the projects were conceived, planned, and carried out by foreigners. At best, the Afghan government was in a supporting role. This image of Afghan dependence and American preeminence put more wind in the sails of the insurgency.” The idea that helping Afghans can actually strengthen the insurgency is one that the U.S. government has been slow to recognize, but it is clear to someone like Tomsen, who has spent his life immersed in the culture of Afghanistan.
While The Wars of Afghanistan is certainly not an easy read, it is the best history to date of the forty year long period of warfare that has plagued that country. This book should be required reading for all military officers and civilian officials involved in Afghanistan today. While it may not offer the most conclusive and applicable conclusions, it provides invaluable insight into the context of the situation the Afghan people have faced for two generations.
Tomsen argues quite persuasively that the United States missed its golden moment in Afghanistan in the early 1990s because it was working towards opposing goals. The State Department was supporting moderates within the resistance in the hope that they might return to power and restore the liberal society that had been in place prior to the 1973 coup. The CIA, meanwhile, was supporting the Pakistani ISI, which backed extremists such as Hekmatyar, and funded what would later become the Taliban. This seemingly blind trust in Pakistan on the part of the US government continued into the War on Terror, and was responsible for the missed opportunity of Tora Bora, and much of the struggle to rebuild Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009. Tomsen points to this as a representation of the fundamental misunderstanding foreign powers have of the tribal and cultural nature of fighting in Afghanistan. This misunderstanding has hampered foreign efforts to pacify Afghan resistance movements as far back as the late 19th century, and continues to this day.
Where I take issue with the author’s analysis is in his insistence that air strikes and night raids, which often result in civilian casualties, should be banned because they cause popular sympathy to go against coalition forces. This parrots the positions of Hamid Karzai and Stanley McCrystal, but fails to appreciate the role that counterterrorism plays on a COIN battlefield. Oddly, in the author’s prescriptions for a more stable Afghanistan and Pakistan, he asserts the need to remove high value targets from the fight, ostensibly through some new means not yet discovered. It is interesting to note that the “McCrystal year” of 2009-2010, characterized by the hands off approach, saw an increase in violence across the country, while the “Petraeus year” of 2010-2011, characterized by an “all of the above” approach, saw violence decline. While we may not be able to draw causality from this due to the possible existence of unforeseen variables, it certainly offers a strong rebuttal to Tomsen’s argument.
It is undoubtedly true that civilian casualties cause the government to lose popular support, which is a death sentence in a population-centric fight. It is also true, however, that the inability to keep the peace and apprehend anti-government actors signals to the populace that there are competing authorities. This too, is detrimental to success in a COIN campaign. The McCrystals of the world recognize the first point and move immediately in the opposite direction, to the detriment of all. The Petraeuses, however, find a middle way: fighting a population-focused battle while simultaneously maintaining a robust counter-terror campaign, run by highly-trained special operators who are more adept at minimizing collateral damage than the rest of the conventional military forces.
Perhaps the most cogent point Tomsen makes on COIN is in regards to “ownership”. He talks about the dangerous habit of foreign powers and NGOs to try to do too much, which negates the purpose of building and training the Afghan government. Hundreds of projects have been completed in Afghanistan from 2001 to present, but “since the projects were not carried out by the Afghan government, the Afghan population did not give the government credit for bettering their lives”. He goes on to add, “the average Afghan knew that the projects were conceived, planned, and carried out by foreigners. At best, the Afghan government was in a supporting role. This image of Afghan dependence and American preeminence put more wind in the sails of the insurgency.” The idea that helping Afghans can actually strengthen the insurgency is one that the U.S. government has been slow to recognize, but it is clear to someone like Tomsen, who has spent his life immersed in the culture of Afghanistan.
While The Wars of Afghanistan is certainly not an easy read, it is the best history to date of the forty year long period of warfare that has plagued that country. This book should be required reading for all military officers and civilian officials involved in Afghanistan today. While it may not offer the most conclusive and applicable conclusions, it provides invaluable insight into the context of the situation the Afghan people have faced for two generations.
December 25, 2014
A superb, well-written and dense book on the complex history of Afghanistan, history that has been ignored to the detriment of numerous foreign armies. Afghanistan, as Tomsen shows, is pretty much a line on map with fictitious boundaries and a history of weak, ineffective and even irrelevant government and localized centers of power that naturally produce conflict.
The book is strong on Afghan culture and history, especially the tribal structures that make it so complex to outsiders. At one point the story becomes personal as Tomsen recounts his own experience as a diplomat in the region.
It doesn’t seem that Tomsen covered the rise of the Taliban in as much detail as I might have liked. Still, he exposes the role of Pakistan in fomenting so much instability in the region by supporting radical Islamist factions that usually prove dangerous to Pakistan’s own internal security and national instability. It seems that “nation-building in that area of the world is far too difficult for even the most pragmatic and patient actors.
The book is strong on Afghan culture and history, especially the tribal structures that make it so complex to outsiders. At one point the story becomes personal as Tomsen recounts his own experience as a diplomat in the region.
It doesn’t seem that Tomsen covered the rise of the Taliban in as much detail as I might have liked. Still, he exposes the role of Pakistan in fomenting so much instability in the region by supporting radical Islamist factions that usually prove dangerous to Pakistan’s own internal security and national instability. It seems that “nation-building in that area of the world is far too difficult for even the most pragmatic and patient actors.
September 15, 2012
I have read many books on Afghanistan, probably more than 50. Many of them are good, this is among the best. The excruciating details of three years of diplomacy as the Russians pull out and the author, Peter Tomsen, tries to get the Americans, Pakistanis, and Afghans to work together will discourage any but the most devoted student. I am teaching a class about Afghanistan at the local college so I plugged on until I finished this book.
The greatest shortcoming of this book other than the dense text that fills 700 plus pages with minor details of questionable relevance to today's reader is the almost total lack comments regarding illegal drugs. Opium cultivation and processing into herion, drug smuggling, and the total corruption of the government and legal system in Afghanistan needs more than the 10 or 12 sentences in this book.
The greatest shortcoming of this book other than the dense text that fills 700 plus pages with minor details of questionable relevance to today's reader is the almost total lack comments regarding illegal drugs. Opium cultivation and processing into herion, drug smuggling, and the total corruption of the government and legal system in Afghanistan needs more than the 10 or 12 sentences in this book.
November 20, 2020
The first quarter/third of the book is fascinating — really illuminated the history of Afghanistan, something I knew little about previously!
When the book approaches the time of the author’s tenure working on Afghanistan Affairs, the narrative slows to a crawl. There is *so* much minute detail about individual meetings, troop movements, etc. For me, this level of detail became too much, and led me to put the book aside.
Would still recommend the first part of the book, though!
When the book approaches the time of the author’s tenure working on Afghanistan Affairs, the narrative slows to a crawl. There is *so* much minute detail about individual meetings, troop movements, etc. For me, this level of detail became too much, and led me to put the book aside.
Would still recommend the first part of the book, though!
August 26, 2021
Looking back on Great Britain's shattered forays into Afghanistan in the 1800s, Lord Hartington, the Secretary of State for India, lamented: "as the result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous force, and of the expenditures of large sums of money, all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of [Afghanistan]... and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country." Over one hundred years later, even with the disastrous examples of British and Soviet military campaigns in Afghanistan, the United States finds itself staring into an abyss of a failed war effort and anarchic state every bit as discouraging for US policymakers as it was for British aristocrats and empire-builders.
Peter Tomsen's book is, in 2021, a bit dated, but enormously prescient and fundamentally still correct in its views on Afghanistan. Tomsen's narrative is varied and wide in scope, bouncing from a rendition of Afghan history from the time of Alexander the Great through the 20th Century, focusing upon the Soviet invasion of 1979, the mujahidin wars of the 1980s, and the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. The middle chunk of the book is dedicated to Tomsen's firsthand insights from his time as US ambassador to the mujahidin as it resisted the last gasp of the Soviet Empire. Finally, the book ends with a laundry list of ways for the US to improve its position in Afghanistan and avoid the fates of shattered empires fallen into the grave of Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, the recommendations that Tomsen outlines were not followed through. Afghanistan was unable to develop, on its own, a successful central government buttressed by local, autonomous tribes. More unfortunately, the US was, and remains, naively decieved by the duplicitous stance of Pakistan, at once calling itself a US ally while it funds, encourages, and arms Taliban and Islamic extremists seeking the overthrow of Afghanistan, and sometimes, as with Osama bin Laden, direct threats against American lives far from Central Asia.
Tomsen's history is depressing for its potential of a happier Afghanistan. If the US had listened, supplied and encouraged more openly moderate Afghan nationalists such as Masood and Haq during the 1990s, perhaps the Afghan state could have achieved a marked independence from US oversight and military strength. Instead, Hamid Karzai and Ashrif Ghani were perceived as, and in some respects functioned as, hapless puppets of US policymakers and generals. Unfortunately, in the melee of the fall of the Soviet Union, Tomsen's warnings on Afghanistan were lost in the US bureaucracy, only to become relevant again in the dust and ashes of 9/11.
"The Wars of Afghanistan" is at once fascinating and plodding. Tomsen's re-telling of diplomatic maneuvers in the 1990s veers into the repetitive, a story full of conferences rather than battles. However, Tomsen's observations on Afghan society are keen: the country's history, even as recently as the mid-20th Century, is full of examples of moderate, competent central government in harmony with tribal autonomy. Indeed, Afghanistan, unlike its recent history, has been a harbor for a moderate form of Islam that the US would find common cause with in the 21st Century.
With the fall of Kabul and Afghanistan in 2021, Lord Hartington's words become relevant once more. For all the lives, all the treasure, and all the aid devoted to Afghanistan since 2001, the US is left with a failed state. If history doesn't generally repeat itself, it certainly seems to within the bounds of Afghanistan.
Peter Tomsen's book is, in 2021, a bit dated, but enormously prescient and fundamentally still correct in its views on Afghanistan. Tomsen's narrative is varied and wide in scope, bouncing from a rendition of Afghan history from the time of Alexander the Great through the 20th Century, focusing upon the Soviet invasion of 1979, the mujahidin wars of the 1980s, and the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. The middle chunk of the book is dedicated to Tomsen's firsthand insights from his time as US ambassador to the mujahidin as it resisted the last gasp of the Soviet Empire. Finally, the book ends with a laundry list of ways for the US to improve its position in Afghanistan and avoid the fates of shattered empires fallen into the grave of Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, the recommendations that Tomsen outlines were not followed through. Afghanistan was unable to develop, on its own, a successful central government buttressed by local, autonomous tribes. More unfortunately, the US was, and remains, naively decieved by the duplicitous stance of Pakistan, at once calling itself a US ally while it funds, encourages, and arms Taliban and Islamic extremists seeking the overthrow of Afghanistan, and sometimes, as with Osama bin Laden, direct threats against American lives far from Central Asia.
Tomsen's history is depressing for its potential of a happier Afghanistan. If the US had listened, supplied and encouraged more openly moderate Afghan nationalists such as Masood and Haq during the 1990s, perhaps the Afghan state could have achieved a marked independence from US oversight and military strength. Instead, Hamid Karzai and Ashrif Ghani were perceived as, and in some respects functioned as, hapless puppets of US policymakers and generals. Unfortunately, in the melee of the fall of the Soviet Union, Tomsen's warnings on Afghanistan were lost in the US bureaucracy, only to become relevant again in the dust and ashes of 9/11.
"The Wars of Afghanistan" is at once fascinating and plodding. Tomsen's re-telling of diplomatic maneuvers in the 1990s veers into the repetitive, a story full of conferences rather than battles. However, Tomsen's observations on Afghan society are keen: the country's history, even as recently as the mid-20th Century, is full of examples of moderate, competent central government in harmony with tribal autonomy. Indeed, Afghanistan, unlike its recent history, has been a harbor for a moderate form of Islam that the US would find common cause with in the 21st Century.
With the fall of Kabul and Afghanistan in 2021, Lord Hartington's words become relevant once more. For all the lives, all the treasure, and all the aid devoted to Afghanistan since 2001, the US is left with a failed state. If history doesn't generally repeat itself, it certainly seems to within the bounds of Afghanistan.
May 22, 2025
This 2011 tome is controversial, but then, talking about this part of the world, any position taken is usually controversial. Tomsen was the special envoy to the Afghan resistance from 1989-1992. This was somewhat analogous to the position, Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan (in other words, "See if you can solve Afghanistan"), that Richard Holbrooke (d. 2010) held from 2009-2010. Tomsen was also used on a few other occasions to contact various individuals in the theater and ask what was going on.
This long volume is a kind of review of the Afghan struggle from the late 80s up to 2010, intended to be Thomsen's magnum opus no doubt. Because of the point of termination of the work, it misses the 30 August 2021 denouement, at which time the U.S. pulled out of the country. However, Tomsen covers several decades of struggles in Afghanistan, in some part trying to argue that his various suggestions and positions were the "correct" ones, but at any rate, still providing a kind of history. This long view account is useful.
He includes "messianic terrorism" in his subtitle. I don't think messianic anything played a part in any ideology of the Usama bin Laden elements or Taliban in Afghanistan, but let's leave that. When he says "the failures of great powers"--he mostly means the U.S. of course.
I paid special attention to Tomsen's coverage of the period 1999-2009, when I was in and out of Pakistan at U.S. consulates and the embassy in Islamabad (but I never met this author), and in the book I found a mixed bag of statements, opinion, and narration. First of all, as a kind of sketchbook of events in Afghanistan during this period, Thomsen's work is worth perusing. He was not a maker of policy during this period, but he evaluates it, criticizes it. I consulted with a former superior from this period whose opinion I value (he shall go unnamed, lest anyone say they were misquoted), who characterized Tomsen as a kind of "loose cannon." I daresay, gadflies, critics, and loose cannons are sometimes good to have around. They have a role to play.
Regarding the period where Usama bin Laden was fleeing Afghanistan into Pakistan, mostly December 2001, Tomsen sounds reasonable in pointing out we had few U.S. troops in the Tora Bora area, and the surrogates we used on the Afghan side were less than effective. One conclusion one might make here is that events (and the fugitives) were moving too fast for the allied forces to take effective action. But that doesn't excuse missing the big catch. The role of Pakistan stands out (and not for the first or last time), as their joint services intelligence component (ISI) was as usual saying, "Oh, we'll see what we can do." Turned out, they were not willing to do much.
Tomsen also points out that the various U.S. components--military, intelligence, diplomatic--were not always on the same page, not always acting effectively, or even communicating with each other.
This work will probably be of interest only to those with a special interest in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, such as contemporary area studies students, and those reviewing the history of U.S. diplomacy. Tomsen has done a good job in consulting many sources. Whether the reader will agree with his conclusions, that's another matter.
"Enjoy" seems like too strong a hope to express in recommending this book, but for a certain audience, the work is worth checking out. See what you think.
This long volume is a kind of review of the Afghan struggle from the late 80s up to 2010, intended to be Thomsen's magnum opus no doubt. Because of the point of termination of the work, it misses the 30 August 2021 denouement, at which time the U.S. pulled out of the country. However, Tomsen covers several decades of struggles in Afghanistan, in some part trying to argue that his various suggestions and positions were the "correct" ones, but at any rate, still providing a kind of history. This long view account is useful.
He includes "messianic terrorism" in his subtitle. I don't think messianic anything played a part in any ideology of the Usama bin Laden elements or Taliban in Afghanistan, but let's leave that. When he says "the failures of great powers"--he mostly means the U.S. of course.
I paid special attention to Tomsen's coverage of the period 1999-2009, when I was in and out of Pakistan at U.S. consulates and the embassy in Islamabad (but I never met this author), and in the book I found a mixed bag of statements, opinion, and narration. First of all, as a kind of sketchbook of events in Afghanistan during this period, Thomsen's work is worth perusing. He was not a maker of policy during this period, but he evaluates it, criticizes it. I consulted with a former superior from this period whose opinion I value (he shall go unnamed, lest anyone say they were misquoted), who characterized Tomsen as a kind of "loose cannon." I daresay, gadflies, critics, and loose cannons are sometimes good to have around. They have a role to play.
Regarding the period where Usama bin Laden was fleeing Afghanistan into Pakistan, mostly December 2001, Tomsen sounds reasonable in pointing out we had few U.S. troops in the Tora Bora area, and the surrogates we used on the Afghan side were less than effective. One conclusion one might make here is that events (and the fugitives) were moving too fast for the allied forces to take effective action. But that doesn't excuse missing the big catch. The role of Pakistan stands out (and not for the first or last time), as their joint services intelligence component (ISI) was as usual saying, "Oh, we'll see what we can do." Turned out, they were not willing to do much.
Tomsen also points out that the various U.S. components--military, intelligence, diplomatic--were not always on the same page, not always acting effectively, or even communicating with each other.
This work will probably be of interest only to those with a special interest in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, such as contemporary area studies students, and those reviewing the history of U.S. diplomacy. Tomsen has done a good job in consulting many sources. Whether the reader will agree with his conclusions, that's another matter.
"Enjoy" seems like too strong a hope to express in recommending this book, but for a certain audience, the work is worth checking out. See what you think.
August 27, 2017
What America did after the departure of Soviet Union from Afghanistan is nothing different from terrorism as well. By using the excuse of war on terror, the underlying focus of the American state was also to avail the opportunity while it can to have a strong grip of the state that was already demolished and unstable. Pakistan was nothing better too. All the nations that contributed in the elimination of so called terrorism in Afghanistan just added fuel to fire while only keeping in mind what serves them best, completely ignoring the citizens’ welfare or safety. The Pashtunwali code mentioned is a fact that should have been tackled with the extreme and circumspect intellect for the evolution of that savagery into something that we can call today a civilized or rather a humanly state. Treating women like that, they need to have been subjected to severe punishments. They should have been educated about the importance and honour of women. Maybe Tarzi thought that getting women unveiled in going towards the echelons of modernism instead he should have given the rights to wear what they want. Either they want to get under veil or not should be the personal choice of women or any other man. At least bestow them with the basic choice and right of dressing freely like they want if not anything else. Any leading figure that tries to modify the chronic inequality existent between men and women is perceived as a threat to the Pashtunwali code and the commanding person in return face inevitable hostility or death. The forces moving in action in the Afghanistani regime are utilizing the various factors to retain their dominant valour over the demolished and disrupting society. The various nature of combats between different sections pinpoint to the fact that as long as the ammunition keeps circulating around there is no issue but soon when that halts an enemy is generated to fight against that in turn keeps the ammunition supply rotating. Pakistan in not the sole country who is steering the wheels of Taliban for self-interets and being duplicitous to America by supplying aids to the anti-American bands in Afghanistan. Talibans in Afghan have the infamous and desultory nature of craning their necks and siding with the ones who provide them with arms and ammunition along with any other aid. Just like any other country, inclusive American government, it is doing the same thing of endorsing what suits them best. The factual information about the election struggle between Karzai and Abdullah to come to the apex pinpoints to another reality of US that the US administration does not want anyone who can stand or speak against them to be the governor of Afghanistan indicating to the intervention of America in Afghanistan.
April 14, 2019
Very informative gives a great background on the region and why the U.S. and others have gotten involved there. It's also a very disturbing book because it exposes huge issues with our ability as a nation to implement foreign policy, or for that matter, come up with a good one in a given region we are involved in by listening to people who know. My main take away from this book is that, as a country, there are huge dangers in ambiguous and half-hearted foreign policies (i.e. allowing Pakistan to guide our actions and support for Afghanistan, through which they duped us thoroughly for many years and inflamed the region for their own purposes which were in fact directly opposed to ours). Also that it is very dangerous to enter into an area boldly but impulsively without a carefully considered long term geostrategic plan, relying instead on reactionary, tactical decisions to determine progress and influence larger goals. Afghanistan is an example that there is more to nation building than inserting cash and infrastructure without a plan that considers the socio-economic realities or a region. The author quotes General Stanley McCrystal in 2009 "We could do good things in Afghanistan for the next 100 years and fail. Because we're doing a lot of good things and it just doesn't add up to success." This was written in 2011, and it ends with a pretty comprehensive recommendation for a way forward. I now need to get caught up with what has happened in the last 8 years in the region and determine how far off we are from that path. To me, there doesn't seem like any other person to be listening to on how we should act in the region at this point, this guy has been involved there since the late 80's and seems like he truly cares about the interests of the people of Afghanistan as well as the United States position in the world as an entity that can do good in promoting peace and stability for as many as possible.
August 22, 2017
An all encompassing book that covers nearly all of Afghanistan's modern history up to the later part of President Obama's first term in office. At times a daunting read given the size of the book and the subject material contained within Peter Tomsen provides the reader with an in depth look at Afghanistan. Those looking for a broader understanding of a country that has been at war in one stage or another for almost 40 years need look no further. Tomsen charts the history of Afghanistan (Post World War development, Soviet Invasion, Taliban rule, US Invasion) and the impact the foreign policy of the worlds powers and Afghanistan's neighbours have had on it's history and development. He places a lot of the blame for the struggles inside Afghanistan on Pakistan and this narrative carries many of his arguments for what he see's as what needs to change in the country moving forward in order to avoid mistakes made by previous US governments. Given the continued American troop presence in Afghanistan understanding how the world got there has increased importance.
December 3, 2024
Written by America’s former ambassador to the Mujahideen, this book offers a lot of detailed information about Afghanistan’s history from the perspective of someone who actually understands it. He points out the flaws in the Bush and Obama administrations’ policies towards Afghanistan and especially Pakistan. The book does slow down once the author begins detailing his numerous meetings with individual members of the Mujahideen, but it does end on an interesting chapter that offers advice on how the U.S. could actually improve the region, creating a more stable Afghanistan by 2020. Obviously, no one took that advice, and it’s a little depressing to compare his predictions to actual events, but it was still a fascinating read.
August 18, 2021
Thick book that commands your attention. I really recommend it for the author's work in the first 100-200 pages that really help the reader through early Afghan societal structure, from Alexander the Great through the early 1970's, lending insight to the really turbulent period starting with the Soviet invasion in 1979, the post-Soviet period, the Taliban's first reign and then the US invasion up to about 2010. Well worth your time if you want to start understanding this star-crossed area of the world.
June 7, 2018
A book on history that spans several centuries, cultures, countries and policies is not an easy task. And to make that excruciatingly detailed and yet keep it an interesting read is an impossible task. Though I am still in the early parts of the book, I believe the author has done a fantastic job of keeping this book informative and interesting yet didn't compromise on the details. An imposing book by all accounts (800+ pages) - but it promises to be a rewarding read.
Read
November 30, 2021This is a topic of interest to me and I enjoyed what I read. But I realised that at the moment I have way too many other books awaiting my attention; I’ve read quite a few books on this topic from a Soviet perspective (which is really where my interest lies), and investing the time to read another 700 pages on it at the moment just doesn’t make sense. Maybe in future.
August 7, 2024
This book provides a thorough and insightful analysis of Afghanistan's conflicts over the last few decades. The author's firsthand experience adds depth to the narrative, offering clear explanations of complex events. It is a valuable read for anyone interested in understanding the region's history and the challenges faced by foreign interventions.
October 2, 2021
Very insightful to the conflict. At times repetitive description of an event, however that is what helped me to lock down the names and events involved. Interesting last chapter to see what was predicted/feared versus what actually transpired
Want to read
April 13, 2023Part IV: America and Afghanistan
20 Unholy Alliance 517
21. Between the Lions 559
22 Yankee Meets Tribesman 587
23 From Victory to Stalemate 619
24 Needed: Real Change 653
25 The Way Ahead 685
www.publicaffairsbooks.com
20 Unholy Alliance 517
21. Between the Lions 559
22 Yankee Meets Tribesman 587
23 From Victory to Stalemate 619
24 Needed: Real Change 653
25 The Way Ahead 685
www.publicaffairsbooks.com
February 17, 2025
A very detailed history of Afghanistan and what has led to where it is today. Firsthand accounts of how the US went and continues to go wrong in our involvement in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. A great perspective on why we failed there.
August 2, 2020
Epic work on Afghanistan with a tragic opening.
June 16, 2022
This book should be required reading for anyone who wishes to utter opinions about the current (and future) Afghan debacle(s).
I cannot recommend this book enough.
I cannot recommend this book enough.
August 7, 2022
This is cooler and breathtaking than game of thrones. Truly unbelievable that what kind of events happened Afghanistan
February 22, 2012
It takes time for headlines to settle into history. Peter Tomsen is not interested in waiting that long.
Tomsen once served as US ambassador to Afghan resistance groups from 1989 to 1992. The job required him to dive into the tangled thicket of Afghan tribal politics, little understood by the casual observer but crucial in crafting any political deal that could stick in Afghanistan. Tomsen coupled his practical experience with a good read of Afghan history to place today's conflict within the context of history, showing that the solution to Afghanistan's problems are really easy. It's just too damn hard to get there when outside powers are eager to fill the power vacuum in this hostile corner of central Asia.
Do not give Tomsen the benefit of your doubts. He did not write the single "go to" book explaining Afghanistan. And he does have an ax to grind. He stands in a small but growing minority of policy makers and analysts who see Pakistan as playing the U.S. to further its interests in Afghanistan at the expense of all. While this story has emerged in the past decade through news coverage, Tomsen's indictment goes back to the 1970s, as Pakistan used US aid to support favored resistance groups that could fight the invading Soviets. But the real goal was to install a friendly puppet government in Kabul once the Soviets quit the country, so Tomsen argues. Resistance groups led by in-country leaders in Afghanistan were overlooked by the CIA and State department higher ups. These leaders were more moderate and broad-based, truly expressing Afghan political will as opposed to the Pakistani-based groups that veiled the long-term interests of their hosts and paymasters.
Tomsen writes with a straight prose style that does bog down in names, dates and places, a common error made by journalists who recycle past stories into thick books. He hews to the straight and narrow path of narrative, using no more facts than needed to tell the story consistently from start to finish. His past meetings with the various participants in the Afghan wars color his story, providing insight and background that explains their interests and agendas. The Afghan penchant for infighting also runs rampant, forming many frustrating counter-points to every well-laid plan by friend or foe.
It would be too easy to walk away from the whole mess and let the players of the new Great Game continue their intrigues and proxy wars for control of Afghanistan. For Tomsen, this is not an option. He truly wants to see Afghanistan get its act together and go back to being a neutral buffer state keeping larger players from going at each other. Such an Afghan state once had a weak central government that provided some common good to the disparate tribes and ethnic groups that existed with fierce autonomy, respecting the honor and interests of each. That solution, proven workable by history, remains elusive to those who ignore it.
Tomsen once served as US ambassador to Afghan resistance groups from 1989 to 1992. The job required him to dive into the tangled thicket of Afghan tribal politics, little understood by the casual observer but crucial in crafting any political deal that could stick in Afghanistan. Tomsen coupled his practical experience with a good read of Afghan history to place today's conflict within the context of history, showing that the solution to Afghanistan's problems are really easy. It's just too damn hard to get there when outside powers are eager to fill the power vacuum in this hostile corner of central Asia.
Do not give Tomsen the benefit of your doubts. He did not write the single "go to" book explaining Afghanistan. And he does have an ax to grind. He stands in a small but growing minority of policy makers and analysts who see Pakistan as playing the U.S. to further its interests in Afghanistan at the expense of all. While this story has emerged in the past decade through news coverage, Tomsen's indictment goes back to the 1970s, as Pakistan used US aid to support favored resistance groups that could fight the invading Soviets. But the real goal was to install a friendly puppet government in Kabul once the Soviets quit the country, so Tomsen argues. Resistance groups led by in-country leaders in Afghanistan were overlooked by the CIA and State department higher ups. These leaders were more moderate and broad-based, truly expressing Afghan political will as opposed to the Pakistani-based groups that veiled the long-term interests of their hosts and paymasters.
Tomsen writes with a straight prose style that does bog down in names, dates and places, a common error made by journalists who recycle past stories into thick books. He hews to the straight and narrow path of narrative, using no more facts than needed to tell the story consistently from start to finish. His past meetings with the various participants in the Afghan wars color his story, providing insight and background that explains their interests and agendas. The Afghan penchant for infighting also runs rampant, forming many frustrating counter-points to every well-laid plan by friend or foe.
It would be too easy to walk away from the whole mess and let the players of the new Great Game continue their intrigues and proxy wars for control of Afghanistan. For Tomsen, this is not an option. He truly wants to see Afghanistan get its act together and go back to being a neutral buffer state keeping larger players from going at each other. Such an Afghan state once had a weak central government that provided some common good to the disparate tribes and ethnic groups that existed with fierce autonomy, respecting the honor and interests of each. That solution, proven workable by history, remains elusive to those who ignore it.
February 19, 2017
Incredibly detailed, thorough history and analysis of Afghan politics. The author was a career diplomat who was liason to the Afghan Mujahideen during the war with the USSR so he's definitely coming to this from a certain perspective, but the breadth and depth of knowledge get had of the players was impressive. He had his favorite rebels and so on but the book has a wealth of factual info that makes it a great read even if you don't care about how nice his dinner with george hw bush was.
October 9, 2011
A sweeping history starting with Alexander the Great, up to the present. Recounts 1989-92 period when he was US special ambassador working with rival Afghan factions. Argues that Us State Dept was working to bring factions together in coalition government, along with Pakistan's Foreign Ministry. Pakistans Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI) was working to attain military victory of a radical Islamic faction over all the others, as part of a strategy to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan through a client state ISI could control, and use it to prevail in Kashmir, and to launch Islamic jihad in other countries in region. CIA supported ISI approach, even when opposed to US government position of working to build broadly representative government. Congressional leaders like Charlie Wilson provided financing. ISI created Taliban with leader Omar, and then gave them military and financial support to ensure victory in 90s. Result was a militant victory, and the sorry history that followed. As rival leaders emerged with broad following, they were assassinated, eg Haq and Masud in 2001. Pakistan has played deceitful, two-faced policy throughout to this day, supporting militants while claiming otherwise. Argues that US, Pakistani and Afghan agencies continue to work at cross purposes today, leading to present situation. Recommends US pressure on Pakistan to work for peace, plus greater cooperation of instated regional powers, and unity of US agencies around a common policy framework. The pressure has started, but so far to no avail. How to make the other things happen happen? Pakistan will only work for peace, and agencies and countries will only cooperate, when it's in their interest to do so. Why should they do so now? This is a tragic tale of the Afghan nation whipsawed by the self serving machinations of rival external powers and their Afghan proxies, with more of the same likely to continue.
December 25, 2013
This is an incredibly in-depth look at the nation of Afghanistan and how badly they have been screwed over by outside powers for thew last 100+ years. Most notably the United States, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union/Russia in the past 20-30 of those years.
This book is a must read for anyone and everyone.
Peter Tomsen is absolutely brilliant with his analysis of the events that led to Sept. 11 and the never-ending war in Afghanistan. All taken from firsthand experience of talking face-to-face with tribal leaders, Presidents, Ambassadors, Senators, Generals, and freedom fighters throughout his time as the American Ambassador/Liaison for the Mujaheddin, and then as the American Ambassador to the Afghanistan National Government.
This book is a must read for anyone and everyone.
Peter Tomsen is absolutely brilliant with his analysis of the events that led to Sept. 11 and the never-ending war in Afghanistan. All taken from firsthand experience of talking face-to-face with tribal leaders, Presidents, Ambassadors, Senators, Generals, and freedom fighters throughout his time as the American Ambassador/Liaison for the Mujaheddin, and then as the American Ambassador to the Afghanistan National Government.
July 26, 2012
This is a MUST read book by a former US government official that had dealings with and in Afghanistan from the time of the Soviet occupation. It is very well documented and presents a view of why Afghanistan has failed to coalesce as a modern nation state and why America is failing at nation-building. After reading this, I can't imagine how our government policy can possibly be so flawed. I would say policy makers in Washington need to read this book, but Tomsen sent memos to the concerned parties with the same information and nothing has changed. Afghanistan is a war that can't be won, because we're fighting it the wrong way.
August 13, 2016
This is an 800+ page book that focuses mostly on the years Peter Tomsen was special envoy to Afghanistan from 1989-92. However, this time period was very pivotal, as the Soviets withdrew and there were important geopolitical upturns between India and Pakistan (the most important motivator of Pakistan's stance/influence on Afghanistan). Describes the evolution of the Afghan political/military (almost always implemented by a foreign power) environment leading up to and after this period in great detail, as well. The book was recommended by Chuck Hagel, if you want to understand this element of the current US DOD Afghan policy.
March 2, 2015
Half-history, half political memoir; the former is concise and engaging and extremely useful, while the latter is about as overdetailed and turgid as you'd expect from this sort of thing, and also slanted toward a specific and sometimes dubious point of view. (He sure does love Masood.) On the other hand, the memoirish parts contain a fair amount of interesting nitty-gritty about how U.S. foreign policy sausage gets made, so it's good if you're interested in that sort of thing. Very long, and you feel it -- I'd suggest Steve Coll's "Ghost Wars" for more casual readers looking for a primer on our historical engagement with Afghanistan.
June 2, 2015
Interesting history of Afghanistan, covering the period from earliest times to the present, with an emphasis on the mujahidin wars against the Soviets and the aftermath. The book is well-written, and covers a great deal of territory. It does a good job in filling in the gaps in the reader's knowledge of Afghanistan and its history, particularly highlighting the periods when US interest waned. The author also provides a lot of information about the various mujahidin commanders. The book was a little long, and a little too detailed for the average reader in some places, but still well worth the effort.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 44 reviews