Following the Rules: Practical Reasoning and Deontic Constraint

by Joseph Heath

For centuries, philosophers have been puzzled by the fact that people often respect moral obligations as a matter of principle, setting aside considerations of self-interest. In more recent years, social scientists have been puzzled by the more general phenomenon of rule-following, the fact that people often abide by social norms even when doing so produces undesirable consequences. Experimental game theorists have demonstrated conclusively that the old-fashioned picture of "economic man," constantly reoptimizing in order to maximize utility in all circumstances, cannot provide adequate foundations for a general theory of rational action. The dominant response, however, has been a slide toward irrationalism. If people are ignoring the consequences of their actions, it is claimed, it must be because they are making some sort of a mistake.

In Following the Rules , Joseph Heath attempts to reverse this trend, by showing how rule-following can be understood as an essential element of rational action. The first step involves showing how rational choice theory can be modified to incorporate deontic constraint as a feature of rational deliberation. The second involves disarming the suspicion that there is something mysterious or irrational about the psychological states underlying rule-following. According to Heath, human rationality is a by-product of the so-called "language upgrade" that we receive as a consequence of the development of specific social practices. As a result, certain constitutive features of our social environment-such as the rule-governed structure of social life-migrate inwards, and become constitutive features of our psychological faculties. This in turn explains why there is an indissoluble bond between practical rationality and deontic constraint.

In the end, what Heath offers is a naturalistic, evolutionary argument in favor of the traditional Kantian view that there is an internal connection between being a rational agent and feeling the force of one's moral obligations.

Genres: Philosophy

354 pages, Paperback

First published September 1, 2008

About the author

Joseph Heath (born 1967) is a professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto. He also teaches at the School of Public Policy and Governance. He received his bachelor of arts from McGill University, where his teachers included Charles Taylor, and his master of arts and doctor of philosophy degrees are from Northwestern University, where he studied under Thomas A. McCarthy and Jürgen Habermas. He has published both academic and popular writings, including the bestselling The Rebel Sell. His philosophical work includes papers and books in political philosophy, business ethics, rational choice theory, action theory, and critical theory.

Reviews

[Adam Gurri · Rating 5 out of 5]

Should be a standard read for anyone in the social sciences. Provides a much more sophisticated model of practical reasoning than the standard, filling in many of the blindspots of the typical instrumental model.

[saml · Rating 4 out of 5]

so so so cool. the starting point is the inadequacy of decision theory, as traditionally construed, in accommodating morally regulated behaviour, and this is then underwritten by a hypothesis of the biological regularities which must underpin this regulation. this constitutes something of a sceptical solution to moral doubts, reminding us we won't do without rules, to which heath adds a little about the transcendental necessity of our not doing so. the book is hardcore applied brandomism, which in this case was preaching to the choir, though i doubt it would, or should, convince the unconverted. it's all well-meted and clearly directed iconoclasm, and a lick of real enough science, culminating in that great feeling you get when someone convinces you that you need not worry so much, though you go on worrying. crazy that he's a habermas guy