When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France was forced to cope with a varied and adaptable Algerian strategy. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command at the height of the rebellion. This groundbreaking work, with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman, remains relevant to present-day counterinsurgency operations.
One of the classic and definitive works in contemporary counterinsurgency theory. David Galula is regarded by many as the father of modern counterinsurgency, as is evident by his grasp of counterinsurgency theory, strategy, and tactics, which he successfully applied while serving with the French Army in Algeria. Must read for any practitioner or scholar of modern warfare.
Very good book. Galula had extensive experience in Indochina prior to his assignment in Algeria. One of his criticisms was that there was no overarching doctrine for success in Algeria. The high command and French government were out of touch on what was going on in sector. He had some very practical suggestions: commanders and staff should personally visit the AO and he favored using the carrot/stick approach to the population. This work was a major contributor to the new FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. He had a good eye for what worked and what didn't.
An French army captain writing his observations of analysis of the war in Algeria. He died in 1967, a decade after he wrote this, but his ideas would be rediscovered and reapplied in the counterinsurgencies of this century.