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سرقة التاريخ
يبني جاك جودي على عمله السابق الخاص به ليوسع إلى مدىً أبعد نقدَه المؤثر نتأثيراً شديداً و الموجه إلى ما يرى أنه انحيازاتٍ مركزيةٍ أوروبيةٍ أو غربيةٍ متفشية، تنحازُ إليها كثير جداً من الكتابات التاريخية الغربية، و "السرقة" الناتجة عن ذلك التي قام بها الغرب لإنجازات الثقافات الأخرى في إختراع (وبشكل ملحوظ) الديمقراطية، و الرأسمالية، و الفردية، و الحب.
و هذا الكتاب يناقش عدداً من المُنَظِّرين بالتفصيل، و من جملتهم، ماركس، و ويبر و نوربرت إلياس، و يشتبك بإعجابٍ نقدي مع مؤرخين غربيين من أمثال فيرناند برودل، و مسى فينلي، و بيري أندرسون.
و تُثار أسئلةٌ عديدة عن المناهج المُطَبَّقة في هذه المناقشات، و يقترح المؤلف تطبيق منهجية مقارنة جديدة من أجل تحليل التفاعل بين الثقافات المتعددة، منهجيةٌ تعطي أساساً أكثر حُنكةٍ بكثيرٍ من أجل تقييم النتائج التاريخية المتشعبة، و تحل محل الخلافات البسيطة القديمة العهد بين الشرق و بين الغرب.
و أخيراً، هذا الكتاب مهم لجمهورٍ واسعٍ من المؤرخين و علماء الإنسان و المُنَظِّرين الإجتماعيين.
و هذا الكتاب يناقش عدداً من المُنَظِّرين بالتفصيل، و من جملتهم، ماركس، و ويبر و نوربرت إلياس، و يشتبك بإعجابٍ نقدي مع مؤرخين غربيين من أمثال فيرناند برودل، و مسى فينلي، و بيري أندرسون.
و تُثار أسئلةٌ عديدة عن المناهج المُطَبَّقة في هذه المناقشات، و يقترح المؤلف تطبيق منهجية مقارنة جديدة من أجل تحليل التفاعل بين الثقافات المتعددة، منهجيةٌ تعطي أساساً أكثر حُنكةٍ بكثيرٍ من أجل تقييم النتائج التاريخية المتشعبة، و تحل محل الخلافات البسيطة القديمة العهد بين الشرق و بين الغرب.
و أخيراً، هذا الكتاب مهم لجمهورٍ واسعٍ من المؤرخين و علماء الإنسان و المُنَظِّرين الإجتماعيين.
460 pages, Hardcover
First published December 30, 2002
48 people are currently reading
1384 people want to read
About the author
Jack Goody
94 books65 followersSir John (Jack) Rankine Goody (born 27 July 1919) is a British social anthropologist. He has been a prominent teacher at Cambridge University, he was elected Fellow of the British Academy in 1976,[1] and he is an associate of the US National Academy of Sciences. Among his main publications are Death, property and the ancestors (1962), The myth of the Bagre (1972) and The domestication of the savage mind.
Jack Goody explained social structure and social change primarily in terms of three major factors. The first was the development of intensive forms of agriculture that allowed for the accumulation of surplus – surplus explained many aspects of cultural practice from marriage to funerals as well as the great divide between African and Eurasian societies. Second, he explained social change in terms of urbanization and growth of bureaucratic institutions that modified or overrode traditional forms of social organization, such as family or tribe, identifying civilization as “the culture of cities”. And third, he attached great weight to the technologies of communication as instruments of psychological and social change. He associated the beginnings of writing with the task of managing surplus and, in an important paper with Ian Watt (Goody and Watt, 1963), he advanced the argument that the rise of science and philosophy in classical Greece depended importantly on their invention of an efficient writing system, the alphabet. Because these factors could be applied to either to any contemporary social system or to systematic changes over time, his work is equally relevant to many disciplines.
Jack Goody explained social structure and social change primarily in terms of three major factors. The first was the development of intensive forms of agriculture that allowed for the accumulation of surplus – surplus explained many aspects of cultural practice from marriage to funerals as well as the great divide between African and Eurasian societies. Second, he explained social change in terms of urbanization and growth of bureaucratic institutions that modified or overrode traditional forms of social organization, such as family or tribe, identifying civilization as “the culture of cities”. And third, he attached great weight to the technologies of communication as instruments of psychological and social change. He associated the beginnings of writing with the task of managing surplus and, in an important paper with Ian Watt (Goody and Watt, 1963), he advanced the argument that the rise of science and philosophy in classical Greece depended importantly on their invention of an efficient writing system, the alphabet. Because these factors could be applied to either to any contemporary social system or to systematic changes over time, his work is equally relevant to many disciplines.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 31 reviews
June 3, 2020
Contre-sens historique
L'anthropologue britannique Jack Goody se donne pour but dans cet essai de mettre à mal une certaine vision eurocentriste de l'histoire du monde issue de la Renaissance et de la seconde révolution industrielle en particulier.
Chemin faisant, on reconsidère de nombreux traits psychologiques, institutionnels, économiques et culturels attribués à l'Europe. Souvent à tort.
LES IDÉES-FORCES :
LES FAIBLESSES :
Une tendance poussée à la répétition, et à la démonstration brouillonne
Les guillemets incessants, que ce soit pour citer ou restreindre le sens des mots employés, indifféremment. Arrive un moment où, à défaut de trouver le mot juste, on gagne à faire un compromis qu'on explicite.
Parfois, les idées tranchées sans démonstration.
Exemple : que le roman en Europe date du 18e siècle, alors que le Satiricon en est manifestement un (c'est un détail) ; que l'arc gothique soit d'origine arabe (alors qu'une origine indienne est souvent avancée) ; qu'il existait peu de fictions avant la Renaissance.
Je ne crois pas qu'on puisse taxer l'auteur de relativisme culturel intégral, dans le sens où il pose que les cultures d'Eurasie partagent des valeurs universelles et que de nombreux traits et techniques associés à l'Occident lui viennent d'Asie. Il s'agit au contraire d'une entreprise de rapprochement des différentes trajectoires en prenant pour point de comparaison des sociétés qui n'ont pas connu l'âge du bronze, en Afrique subsaharienne en particulier, au plus loin de l'essentialisme.
LES ANGLES D'ATTAQUE :
1. Critique de Joseph Needham (la singularité scientifique européenne).
2. Critique de Norbert Elias (l'apanage européen de la civilisation)
3. Critique de Fernand Braudel (le vol du capitalisme financier)
4. Le temps et l'espace
5. L'invention de l'Antiquité
6. Le féodalisme, une étape obligée sur la voie du capitalisme ?
7. Le despotisme asiatique : où le chercher ?
8. Le vol des institutions : villes et universités
9. L'appropriation des valeurs : humanisme, démocratie et individualisme
10. L'appropriation des émotions
----------------
LECTURES VOISINES :
Sur la décolonisation :
Histoire de la décolonisation au XXème siècle
Sur l'art islamique :
The Formation of Islamic Art
Sur l'antiquité gréco-romaine :
Empire
Sur le syncrétisme religieux, politique, culturel dans l'Antiquité:
Sagesses Barbares
Sur la vie au moyen-âge :
La civilisation de l'occident médiéval
Sur la fameuse spécificité européenne et son programme idéologique :
La création des identités nationales. Europe, XVIIIe-XXe siècle
Sur la récupération idéologique de l'archéologie et de l'histoire des techniques :
Nos ancêtres les Germains : les archéologues au service du nazisme
Un point de vue sur l'occidentalisation en Turquie :
Istanbul: Souvenirs D'une Ville
Pour une courte introduction à l'histoire politique et institutionnelle de la Chine, de l'Inde, du Brésil et de l'Afrique du Sud :
Capital et idéologie
L'anthropologue britannique Jack Goody se donne pour but dans cet essai de mettre à mal une certaine vision eurocentriste de l'histoire du monde issue de la Renaissance et de la seconde révolution industrielle en particulier.
Chemin faisant, on reconsidère de nombreux traits psychologiques, institutionnels, économiques et culturels attribués à l'Europe. Souvent à tort.
LES IDÉES-FORCES :
LES FAIBLESSES :
Une tendance poussée à la répétition, et à la démonstration brouillonne
Les guillemets incessants, que ce soit pour citer ou restreindre le sens des mots employés, indifféremment. Arrive un moment où, à défaut de trouver le mot juste, on gagne à faire un compromis qu'on explicite.
Parfois, les idées tranchées sans démonstration.
Exemple : que le roman en Europe date du 18e siècle, alors que le Satiricon en est manifestement un (c'est un détail) ; que l'arc gothique soit d'origine arabe (alors qu'une origine indienne est souvent avancée) ; qu'il existait peu de fictions avant la Renaissance.
Je ne crois pas qu'on puisse taxer l'auteur de relativisme culturel intégral, dans le sens où il pose que les cultures d'Eurasie partagent des valeurs universelles et que de nombreux traits et techniques associés à l'Occident lui viennent d'Asie. Il s'agit au contraire d'une entreprise de rapprochement des différentes trajectoires en prenant pour point de comparaison des sociétés qui n'ont pas connu l'âge du bronze, en Afrique subsaharienne en particulier, au plus loin de l'essentialisme.
LES ANGLES D'ATTAQUE :
1. Critique de Joseph Needham (la singularité scientifique européenne).
2. Critique de Norbert Elias (l'apanage européen de la civilisation)
3. Critique de Fernand Braudel (le vol du capitalisme financier)
4. Le temps et l'espace
5. L'invention de l'Antiquité
6. Le féodalisme, une étape obligée sur la voie du capitalisme ?
7. Le despotisme asiatique : où le chercher ?
8. Le vol des institutions : villes et universités
9. L'appropriation des valeurs : humanisme, démocratie et individualisme
10. L'appropriation des émotions
----------------
LECTURES VOISINES :
Sur la décolonisation :
Histoire de la décolonisation au XXème siècle
Sur l'art islamique :
The Formation of Islamic Art
Sur l'antiquité gréco-romaine :
Empire
Sur le syncrétisme religieux, politique, culturel dans l'Antiquité:
Sagesses Barbares
Sur la vie au moyen-âge :
La civilisation de l'occident médiéval
Sur la fameuse spécificité européenne et son programme idéologique :
La création des identités nationales. Europe, XVIIIe-XXe siècle
Sur la récupération idéologique de l'archéologie et de l'histoire des techniques :
Nos ancêtres les Germains : les archéologues au service du nazisme
Un point de vue sur l'occidentalisation en Turquie :
Istanbul: Souvenirs D'une Ville
Pour une courte introduction à l'histoire politique et institutionnelle de la Chine, de l'Inde, du Brésil et de l'Afrique du Sud :
Capital et idéologie
March 28, 2016
This is quite simply astounding, but not perfect (but even so it will get 5/5). It is a rich and complex book with a sophisticated analysis and simple, direct argument. History has been stolen from the 'east' by Europe. Of course Goody does not mean this literally – that Europe has deprivied the east of its past in any actual sense of depriving people of their existences. His point is summed up on the penultimate page – this is not so much a book about world history, he says, as about the way that European authors have perceived it.
He has two principal targets in his case: teleological history, as in histories that attempt to how and why Europe came to be, and Eurocentric history. He argues that our categories for understanding European history (Antiquity, feudalism, capitalism) and so forth have been generalised to the whole world in such a way they are then imposed on the rest of the world at the expense of the evidence, and then used to explain European exceptionalism (which we call, ironically, Asian exceptionalism). That is, the claimed distinctiveness of Europe is used in such a way that the only outcome can be a justification for the distinctiveness of Europe. Along the way, there are respectful but blistering critiques of Elias as stealing civilisation, Braudel (who finishes up getting off most lightly) as stealing capitalism, Needham as the thief of science.
Goody argues for a different view of world history as centred on the post-Bronze Age civilisations of the urban revolution's societies in west Asia (what we, and oddly he, still call the Near or Middle East – in our pervasive Eurocentrism). He demands we take a long view, and recognise the biases in our sources (for instance, our principal source for the claim that the ancient Greek city states invented democracy are the ancient Greek city states and the Romans who modelled their rebublic on Greek democracy – not similarly democratic Carthage, a rival for power in the Mediterranean basin).
Goody's breadth of scholarship is breath-taking, in his ability to discuss medieval Islamic humanism and its accompanying science, the migration of the invention of paper and the water wheel from China to Europe, and the iconoclasm (in its literal meaning) of the Abrahamic religions. It is quite hard going, but bear with it – it is a potent case and a compelling dissection of modern European historiography. Fabulous!
He has two principal targets in his case: teleological history, as in histories that attempt to how and why Europe came to be, and Eurocentric history. He argues that our categories for understanding European history (Antiquity, feudalism, capitalism) and so forth have been generalised to the whole world in such a way they are then imposed on the rest of the world at the expense of the evidence, and then used to explain European exceptionalism (which we call, ironically, Asian exceptionalism). That is, the claimed distinctiveness of Europe is used in such a way that the only outcome can be a justification for the distinctiveness of Europe. Along the way, there are respectful but blistering critiques of Elias as stealing civilisation, Braudel (who finishes up getting off most lightly) as stealing capitalism, Needham as the thief of science.
Goody argues for a different view of world history as centred on the post-Bronze Age civilisations of the urban revolution's societies in west Asia (what we, and oddly he, still call the Near or Middle East – in our pervasive Eurocentrism). He demands we take a long view, and recognise the biases in our sources (for instance, our principal source for the claim that the ancient Greek city states invented democracy are the ancient Greek city states and the Romans who modelled their rebublic on Greek democracy – not similarly democratic Carthage, a rival for power in the Mediterranean basin).
Goody's breadth of scholarship is breath-taking, in his ability to discuss medieval Islamic humanism and its accompanying science, the migration of the invention of paper and the water wheel from China to Europe, and the iconoclasm (in its literal meaning) of the Abrahamic religions. It is quite hard going, but bear with it – it is a potent case and a compelling dissection of modern European historiography. Fabulous!
January 5, 2018
يقع كتاب "سرقة التاريخ" للأنثربولوجي الاجتماعي جاك غودي ضمن الأدبيات الحديثة التي تنتقد "المركزية الاوروبية"، وهي أدبيات انتشرت في شتى حقول الانسانيات في أعقاب الحرب العالمية الثانية. وأضحى نقد المركزية الاوروبية مفهوماً أساسياً في دراسات ما بعد الكولونيالية، وفي النقد الاستشراقي الحديث، وفي تخصصات مقارنة عديدة.في هذا الكتاب يسعى المؤلف لنقد الرؤية الأوروبية والغربية الشائعة عن فرادة أوروبا في التاريخ، ودعواها اختراع سلسلة من المؤسسات والقيم، كالرأسمالية، والديموقراطية، والحرية، والفردية، وحتى اختراع الشعور الجديد المتمثل في الحب الرومانسي، وما إلى ذلك.
يشير في البداية لأسباب شيوع الرؤية المركزية الأوروبية في الدراسات التاريخية والاجتماعية، فيذكر منها:
1- أن هناك ميلاً طبيعياً للبشر عموماً يفترض مركزية صاحب الخبرة، وهكذا كانت عموم الشعوب تنظر للآخرين من مقاييسها الداخلية، وباعتبار أنها المركز، وهو هنا يدافع ويقول أن المركزية العرقية ليست اختراعاً أوروبياً خاصاً.
2- الوقوع في الفخ التاريخي، فعموم المؤرخين وعلماء الاجتماع والانثربولوجيا نظروا للماضي مع استحضار إنجازات أوروبا الحديثة في اعقاب الثورة الصناعية، وشعروا أن عليهم أن يفسروا هذه النهضة الجارفة، وأسباب اختلاف أوروبا عن بقية العالم، فوقعوا في اختزال التاريخ الماضي وتحريفه.
3- أن الحقول والمفاهيم السياسية والاجتماعية (مثل الإقطاع والرأسمالية...الخ) التي سكها المنظرون في أوروبا وشاع تداولها في الدراسات المقارنة هي بالأساس تستند لرصد التاريخ الأوروبي دون غيره، وحين ينتقل الباحثون في الدراسات المقارنة لبحث مناطق أخرى من العالم يحملون معهم تلك الحقول والمفاهيم الأوروبية بالأساس، وهكذا يصلون إلى نتائج تمركز أوروبا قي تاريخ العالم.
4- أشار أيضاً لتأثير الجهل بالآخر، فحتى عندما يهدف المؤرخ وعالم الاجتماع لتجنب المركزية العرقية يفشل في كثير من الأحوال في ذلك لمحدودية اطلاعه على تاريخ الآخرين، فيصل في النهاية إلى نتائج منحازة لهويته الأوروبية.
ينقسم الكتاب لثلاثة أقسام، الأول يتضمن نقاش ظروف تكون المركزية الأوروبية، وصدقية التصور الاوروبي للتاريخ، من مرحلته الكلاسيكية مروراً بالإقطاع ثم الرأسمالية، في مقابل استثنائية الحالية الشرقية واستبداديتها.
وفي القسم الثاني يناقش بصورة مفصلة ثلاثة أطروحات شهيرة: الأولى تعود للمؤرخ جوزيف نيدهام في دراسته حول العلم والحضارة في الصين، والثانية تعود للمؤرخ الكبير فرنان بردول في كتابه"الحضارة والراسمالية في القرون من الخامس عشر إلى الثامن شر الميلادي" وهو أطروحة ضخمة ترجمت في أواسط التسعينات في ثلاثة أجزاء كبيرة من قبل المترجم المصري القدير مصطفى ماهر. والثالثة تعود لعالم الاجتماع الألماني نوربرت الياس في دراسته الهامة عن التمدين والحضارة في أوروبا.
ويخصص القسم الثالث لمناقشة مفاهيم محددة، المفهوم الأول دعوى الفرادة الأوروبية في اختراع المؤسسات السياسية والتعليمية والمدن. الثاني عن دعاوى حيازة أوروبا للقيم الإنسان والفردية والديموقراطية. والثالث عن دعوى اختراع أو ملكية العواطف والحب. كما يعبر غودي.
الكتاب ممتاز للمهتم، ومفيد في مجاله، أما الترجمة فلم أطمئن لها. وهو يقع في 450 صفحة تقريباً. ومتوفر بصيغة الكترونية.
يشير في البداية لأسباب شيوع الرؤية المركزية الأوروبية في الدراسات التاريخية والاجتماعية، فيذكر منها:
1- أن هناك ميلاً طبيعياً للبشر عموماً يفترض مركزية صاحب الخبرة، وهكذا كانت عموم الشعوب تنظر للآخرين من مقاييسها الداخلية، وباعتبار أنها المركز، وهو هنا يدافع ويقول أن المركزية العرقية ليست اختراعاً أوروبياً خاصاً.
2- الوقوع في الفخ التاريخي، فعموم المؤرخين وعلماء الاجتماع والانثربولوجيا نظروا للماضي مع استحضار إنجازات أوروبا الحديثة في اعقاب الثورة الصناعية، وشعروا أن عليهم أن يفسروا هذه النهضة الجارفة، وأسباب اختلاف أوروبا عن بقية العالم، فوقعوا في اختزال التاريخ الماضي وتحريفه.
3- أن الحقول والمفاهيم السياسية والاجتماعية (مثل الإقطاع والرأسمالية...الخ) التي سكها المنظرون في أوروبا وشاع تداولها في الدراسات المقارنة هي بالأساس تستند لرصد التاريخ الأوروبي دون غيره، وحين ينتقل الباحثون في الدراسات المقارنة لبحث مناطق أخرى من العالم يحملون معهم تلك الحقول والمفاهيم الأوروبية بالأساس، وهكذا يصلون إلى نتائج تمركز أوروبا قي تاريخ العالم.
4- أشار أيضاً لتأثير الجهل بالآخر، فحتى عندما يهدف المؤرخ وعالم الاجتماع لتجنب المركزية العرقية يفشل في كثير من الأحوال في ذلك لمحدودية اطلاعه على تاريخ الآخرين، فيصل في النهاية إلى نتائج منحازة لهويته الأوروبية.
ينقسم الكتاب لثلاثة أقسام، الأول يتضمن نقاش ظروف تكون المركزية الأوروبية، وصدقية التصور الاوروبي للتاريخ، من مرحلته الكلاسيكية مروراً بالإقطاع ثم الرأسمالية، في مقابل استثنائية الحالية الشرقية واستبداديتها.
وفي القسم الثاني يناقش بصورة مفصلة ثلاثة أطروحات شهيرة: الأولى تعود للمؤرخ جوزيف نيدهام في دراسته حول العلم والحضارة في الصين، والثانية تعود للمؤرخ الكبير فرنان بردول في كتابه"الحضارة والراسمالية في القرون من الخامس عشر إلى الثامن شر الميلادي" وهو أطروحة ضخمة ترجمت في أواسط التسعينات في ثلاثة أجزاء كبيرة من قبل المترجم المصري القدير مصطفى ماهر. والثالثة تعود لعالم الاجتماع الألماني نوربرت الياس في دراسته الهامة عن التمدين والحضارة في أوروبا.
ويخصص القسم الثالث لمناقشة مفاهيم محددة، المفهوم الأول دعوى الفرادة الأوروبية في اختراع المؤسسات السياسية والتعليمية والمدن. الثاني عن دعاوى حيازة أوروبا للقيم الإنسان والفردية والديموقراطية. والثالث عن دعوى اختراع أو ملكية العواطف والحب. كما يعبر غودي.
الكتاب ممتاز للمهتم، ومفيد في مجاله، أما الترجمة فلم أطمئن لها. وهو يقع في 450 صفحة تقريباً. ومتوفر بصيغة الكترونية.
January 16, 2010
It is difficult to evaluate this book. The narrative is broad, covering history in all regions of the world and on topics ranging from love to politics. The overall thesis, though, that Western historians look at global history through a European lens and periodisation, is somewhat obvious. Chinese historians look at global history or even that of North and Inner Asia through the lens of Chinese history and its concepts. For while Goody is surely right that European historians have a Eurocentric bias in their focus and periodisation, he does not present alternative periodisations. The author is clearly widely read and I found the book fascinating -- but for someone so critical of history for being Eurocentric, almost all the sources are European. For Chinese history there is Elvin (I am not a fan of Elvin's work) and Needham rather than Chinese historians themselves.
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February 8, 2017The author was right under 100 years old when he wrote the book, but you would have never guessed unless I told you. I wish I have such a lucid mind at that age.
It is translated into many languages (I read it in French). If the volume is too thick for you, but you are still interested in how ans why Europeans distort/-ed the history of the world, I suggest you read the last chapter, then the last but one and so on until you got what you wanted.
The main thesis (distortion of history) is correct beyond doubt, but the ideas are too much revolutionary...
Which historian would write such subversive ideas? How can he publish it? How can he be sure there is market for such a book?
All three questions resolve if you are a 100-year old well-established historian. In that case, you do not care about anything but truth.
It is translated into many languages (I read it in French). If the volume is too thick for you, but you are still interested in how ans why Europeans distort/-ed the history of the world, I suggest you read the last chapter, then the last but one and so on until you got what you wanted.
The main thesis (distortion of history) is correct beyond doubt, but the ideas are too much revolutionary...
Which historian would write such subversive ideas? How can he publish it? How can he be sure there is market for such a book?
All three questions resolve if you are a 100-year old well-established historian. In that case, you do not care about anything but truth.
September 25, 2019
Jack Goody, a Cambridge University social anthropologist, had a long and celebrated life. This book represents the culmination of a lifetime of comparative social analysis, written less than 10 years before his death in 2015 at age 95. In it, he challenges the teleological argument that the current economic and cultural hegemony of the West was due to intrinsic, distinctive and long-lasting civilizational traits traceable to remote antiquity. He argues instead that Europe shared much more than Eurocentric historians are willing to concede with the leading civilizations of Eurasia, and that many of cultural-economic-political features considered unique European inventions are actually appropriations from other cultures--hence, the "theft" of history.
The Eurocentrists' arguments for the uniqueness of Europe are centered on pushing the divergence between Europe and the rest of the world all the way back, positing a core European identity that remains distinct from that of other cultures over the long span of history, and assuming a European genesis for things such as democracy, individualism, humanism, science, capitalism, and even romantic love, that most definitely had shared origins. They argue that Europe's unique historical path -- from antiquity to feudalism, followed by the Renaissance and the emergence of market capitalism -- is somehow essential to the emergence of modernism. Goody questions each of these assumptions.
Eurocentrists argue that the European advantage can be traced all the way back to Antiquity--the Greco-Roman period that is considered the fount of European identity. They concede that Eurasia probably had a common Bronze Age culture: based on intensive river-basin agriculture, division of labor, trading networks and the first cities. This period ended in what has been called the Late Bronze Age collapse (ref. Eric Cline's book on 1177 BCE, the year civilization collapsed). What emerged out of the ruins in Europe was, according to the Eurocentrists, quite different from what transpired elsewhere. Critical differences, again according to the Eurocentrists, involved more independent city states in contrast to vast centralized empires in the rest of the world, greater individuality, freedom and rule of law, democracy, and undergirding it all, a new alphabet with both vowels and consonants that made communication easier.
But Goody says that there was a rich exchange of ideas and materiel during the Greco-Roman Antiquity between Europe and the rest of the world, and that there was much more common in social and economic patterns. Even the Greek alphabet, based on an earlier Phoenician script, was not that radical an innovation as the Eurocentrists make it out to be.
Eurocentrists make a virtue out of even the negatives in European history. The fall of Rome ushered in the dark ages. The end of a centralized authority resulted in the emergence of local fiefdoms and a feudal society. Culture, literacy, the arts, architecture, all collapsed. But according to the Eurocentrists, the fall of Rome resulted only in the collapse of the superstructure -- whereas, the infrastructure of economic activity actually improved. The competition between feudal enclaves and the end of slavery led to inventiveness, competition and productivity improvements. Therefore, feudalism was an essential step in the emergence of modern capitalism. Far from an economic and cultural catastrophe resulting from the fall of Rome, feudalism was a necessary step in the ascendancy of Europe.
Goody's questions this from multiple perspectives. First, it is not true that inventiveness was any less in other cultures without an explicit feudal structure (citing Needham's monumental work on science in China). Second, much of Europe's inventions during this period were borrowed from other cultures. Third, feudalism as a social structure was not unknown outside Europe. Fourth, feudal lords had much less freedom of action than supposed. There is not much to choose between Europe and the rest of the world in terms of the authoritarianism of rules -- European rules were just as autocratic as the "Oriental despots" in other parts of the world.
In Part II, Goody analyzes how three famous historians, despite sincere attempts to be objective, fall into the Eurocentrist viewpoint. Needham produced a magisterial, multi-volume history of science in China, which by and large demonstrated that Chinese science was superior to the West up until the 16th century, but in the span of a century or so, science took off in Europe and surpassed that of China. Why did Chinese science lose ground so quickly, or why did "modern science" only emerge in Europe? This is called the Needham paradox. But Goody argues that it is a false paradox. Whereas Needham and others argue that "modern science", based on experimentation and mathematical modeling, is categorically different from what went before, Gowdy sees only an intensification and not a new form of science. He says Arab alchemists too experimented, and mathematical modeling too would have emerged elsewhere with time.
A second historian is Norbert Elias, who investigated the origins of civilization in his The Civilizing Process. he says behavioral norms are based on 'sociogenesis' (control by forces outside the individual) and 'psychogenesis' (self-restraints). Civilization emerges through the replacement of coercive social controls by self-controls. One is based on shame (social), the other is based on guilt (psychological). But Elias's work compares the refinements of European society with the unrestrained hedonism, gluttony and sexuality of naturvolk (people in a state of nature). But Elias's naturvolk is mostly an intellectual construct; he does not do field work, and has little knowledge of non-European cultures. Elias's argument that non-European folks do not have social refinements will be laughable to anyone familiar with the intricacies of the Japanese tea ceremony or the minutely detailed and precise requirements for the daily observances of the Hindu brahmin.
Finally, Goody takes up Fernand Braudel and his study of the emergence of capitalism. He is the most broadminded of the three, and does not hesitate to concede that all parts of Eurasia participated in intensive trade and commerce. But he calls this "market capitalism" -- "true" capitalism is when a vigorous financial market for lending, investing and borrowing (a market for money) emerges in parallel to the market for goods. This he calls "finance capitalism." According to Braudel, finance capital including its various innovations such as the joint stock company, the stock market, and modern credit emerged only in Europe. But here too, Goody argues that this was just a matter of timing, and there is nothing intrinsically different about Europe that restricts finance capitalism to that region. Evidence? In a few short decades, China and the Asian Tigers have learned and implemented pretty much whatever needed to be learned.
The last section discusses the European tendency to take credit for innovations and ideas that have much wider provenance. Examples, the city, the university, humanism, democracy, the rule of law, even romantic love. In all these cases, Eurocentrists argue that only Europe has the authentic form of an institution, while other regions have only inferior versions. For example, in no place else did a university emerge, as a secular, corporate body. Towns similarly elsewhere were not autonomous of national governments and did not guard their rights as jealously as in Europe. Democracy as popular adult franchise did not originate elsewhere. But Goody argues that these institutions are not rendered inauthentic just because they lack some idiosyncratic European feature. Rather, institutions and social formations discharging the functions of universities and urban self-government emerged in many cultures, though they differed in specific organizational features.
But the most outrageous European claim is that they invented 'romantic love' -- specifically, it is claimed that 12th century troubadours (and their female counterparts, the troubaritz) invented romantic love, which in turn led to the emergence of the nuclear family, and from there to thrift and hard work as means of amassing wealth for the next generation, and thus to capitalism. But Goody correctly points out that there is a huge corpus of non-European love poetry and folk tales, in Japan, China, India and the Arab world. Ironically, the 12th century troubadours in southern France might have copied the poetic conventions of the Moorish courts to their south. European love has Arab roots.
The Eurocentrists' arguments for the uniqueness of Europe are centered on pushing the divergence between Europe and the rest of the world all the way back, positing a core European identity that remains distinct from that of other cultures over the long span of history, and assuming a European genesis for things such as democracy, individualism, humanism, science, capitalism, and even romantic love, that most definitely had shared origins. They argue that Europe's unique historical path -- from antiquity to feudalism, followed by the Renaissance and the emergence of market capitalism -- is somehow essential to the emergence of modernism. Goody questions each of these assumptions.
Eurocentrists argue that the European advantage can be traced all the way back to Antiquity--the Greco-Roman period that is considered the fount of European identity. They concede that Eurasia probably had a common Bronze Age culture: based on intensive river-basin agriculture, division of labor, trading networks and the first cities. This period ended in what has been called the Late Bronze Age collapse (ref. Eric Cline's book on 1177 BCE, the year civilization collapsed). What emerged out of the ruins in Europe was, according to the Eurocentrists, quite different from what transpired elsewhere. Critical differences, again according to the Eurocentrists, involved more independent city states in contrast to vast centralized empires in the rest of the world, greater individuality, freedom and rule of law, democracy, and undergirding it all, a new alphabet with both vowels and consonants that made communication easier.
But Goody says that there was a rich exchange of ideas and materiel during the Greco-Roman Antiquity between Europe and the rest of the world, and that there was much more common in social and economic patterns. Even the Greek alphabet, based on an earlier Phoenician script, was not that radical an innovation as the Eurocentrists make it out to be.
Eurocentrists make a virtue out of even the negatives in European history. The fall of Rome ushered in the dark ages. The end of a centralized authority resulted in the emergence of local fiefdoms and a feudal society. Culture, literacy, the arts, architecture, all collapsed. But according to the Eurocentrists, the fall of Rome resulted only in the collapse of the superstructure -- whereas, the infrastructure of economic activity actually improved. The competition between feudal enclaves and the end of slavery led to inventiveness, competition and productivity improvements. Therefore, feudalism was an essential step in the emergence of modern capitalism. Far from an economic and cultural catastrophe resulting from the fall of Rome, feudalism was a necessary step in the ascendancy of Europe.
Goody's questions this from multiple perspectives. First, it is not true that inventiveness was any less in other cultures without an explicit feudal structure (citing Needham's monumental work on science in China). Second, much of Europe's inventions during this period were borrowed from other cultures. Third, feudalism as a social structure was not unknown outside Europe. Fourth, feudal lords had much less freedom of action than supposed. There is not much to choose between Europe and the rest of the world in terms of the authoritarianism of rules -- European rules were just as autocratic as the "Oriental despots" in other parts of the world.
In Part II, Goody analyzes how three famous historians, despite sincere attempts to be objective, fall into the Eurocentrist viewpoint. Needham produced a magisterial, multi-volume history of science in China, which by and large demonstrated that Chinese science was superior to the West up until the 16th century, but in the span of a century or so, science took off in Europe and surpassed that of China. Why did Chinese science lose ground so quickly, or why did "modern science" only emerge in Europe? This is called the Needham paradox. But Goody argues that it is a false paradox. Whereas Needham and others argue that "modern science", based on experimentation and mathematical modeling, is categorically different from what went before, Gowdy sees only an intensification and not a new form of science. He says Arab alchemists too experimented, and mathematical modeling too would have emerged elsewhere with time.
A second historian is Norbert Elias, who investigated the origins of civilization in his The Civilizing Process. he says behavioral norms are based on 'sociogenesis' (control by forces outside the individual) and 'psychogenesis' (self-restraints). Civilization emerges through the replacement of coercive social controls by self-controls. One is based on shame (social), the other is based on guilt (psychological). But Elias's work compares the refinements of European society with the unrestrained hedonism, gluttony and sexuality of naturvolk (people in a state of nature). But Elias's naturvolk is mostly an intellectual construct; he does not do field work, and has little knowledge of non-European cultures. Elias's argument that non-European folks do not have social refinements will be laughable to anyone familiar with the intricacies of the Japanese tea ceremony or the minutely detailed and precise requirements for the daily observances of the Hindu brahmin.
Finally, Goody takes up Fernand Braudel and his study of the emergence of capitalism. He is the most broadminded of the three, and does not hesitate to concede that all parts of Eurasia participated in intensive trade and commerce. But he calls this "market capitalism" -- "true" capitalism is when a vigorous financial market for lending, investing and borrowing (a market for money) emerges in parallel to the market for goods. This he calls "finance capitalism." According to Braudel, finance capital including its various innovations such as the joint stock company, the stock market, and modern credit emerged only in Europe. But here too, Goody argues that this was just a matter of timing, and there is nothing intrinsically different about Europe that restricts finance capitalism to that region. Evidence? In a few short decades, China and the Asian Tigers have learned and implemented pretty much whatever needed to be learned.
The last section discusses the European tendency to take credit for innovations and ideas that have much wider provenance. Examples, the city, the university, humanism, democracy, the rule of law, even romantic love. In all these cases, Eurocentrists argue that only Europe has the authentic form of an institution, while other regions have only inferior versions. For example, in no place else did a university emerge, as a secular, corporate body. Towns similarly elsewhere were not autonomous of national governments and did not guard their rights as jealously as in Europe. Democracy as popular adult franchise did not originate elsewhere. But Goody argues that these institutions are not rendered inauthentic just because they lack some idiosyncratic European feature. Rather, institutions and social formations discharging the functions of universities and urban self-government emerged in many cultures, though they differed in specific organizational features.
But the most outrageous European claim is that they invented 'romantic love' -- specifically, it is claimed that 12th century troubadours (and their female counterparts, the troubaritz) invented romantic love, which in turn led to the emergence of the nuclear family, and from there to thrift and hard work as means of amassing wealth for the next generation, and thus to capitalism. But Goody correctly points out that there is a huge corpus of non-European love poetry and folk tales, in Japan, China, India and the Arab world. Ironically, the 12th century troubadours in southern France might have copied the poetic conventions of the Moorish courts to their south. European love has Arab roots.
September 4, 2017
Tarih yazımının Avrupa-merkezci, hatta üstün Avrupa bakışını irdeleyen ve Batı'nın icat ettiğini iddia ettiği yığınla kavramın , Asya ve Doğu'daki paralel, benzer örnekleri ile bu tarih hırsızlığına meydan okuyan bir kitap. Jack Goody Rönesanslar kitabında da , Avrupa Rönesansı'nın tek olmadığını , Hint,Çin ,Arap, İran örnekleri ile gösteriyordu . Bu kitabında da Weber'den Marx'a genel kabul gören antik çağdan feodalizme ve oradan kapitalizme gelen süreç tanımlamasını, Marx'ın 'ın ortaya koyduğu Asya İstisnacılığı yorumunu , paralel gelişimler ile karşılaştırıp , bunun Avrupa merkezli , amaca yönelik bir görüş olduğunu savunuyor. Grek Roma kültür zincirinin kırılışı sonrası karanlık bir çağa gömülen Avrupa'nın benzer yıkımı yaşamayan Çin ,Hint ve İslam kültürlerinden hızlı intihal ile İtalyan şehirlerinin katıldığı Akdeniz ticareti sayesinde , nasıl bilgi ile tekrar buluştuğunu anlatıyor. Özgürlük, demokrasi , bireycilik, hümanizma, sanat ,üniversite,kent kavramı ve hatta aşkın icadını sahiplenen Avrupa'nın (romantik aşkın 12.yy trubadurları ile çıktığını savunan seçkin ortaçağ tarihçilerinin olduğunu görmek ilginç) , aslında bunların başka yerlerdeki örneklerini görmek yerine , kendini merkeze koymak amacı ile hareket ettiğini söylüyor. Kitabın bir bölümünde bu akademik grubun önde gelenlerinden Needham, Elias ve Braudel'i eleştiriyor. Tarihi , bilim,kültür ve medeniyetin gelişimini klasik öğreti ile okuyanlar için okunması zaruri bir kitap. Özellikle diğer kitabı Rönesanslar ile birlikte ve özellikle kendini bir kültürün ezici baskısı altında hissedip , hamasi savunmalara sığınma ihtiyacı hissedenler için. Bununla ilgili kitabın 'Çalınan Aşk ' bölümündeki kapanış cümlesi güzel. :" Aşk sözcüğün gerçek anlamıyla , işgalci bir ordunun elindeyken herkesi fetheder " Bilgi dağarcığınızı başka fatihlerin değil , kendi fetihlerinizin kontrolüne almanız için okunmalı.
July 9, 2018
A great and intuitive book that confronts a lot of the Eurocentristic ideas that historians tend to go with and completely disregard many other, much more role defining historical circles/non-European civilizations that actually helped to contribute to the development of the very same civilization they research on. Goody has his own problems and I tend to catch up easily with the criticisms he received when writing this book. Some examples would be nondefined or not well explained enough processes that he compares with lack of consistency; also he puts emphasis too much on some really nondefining historical events. But nevertheless, it's an eyeopener worthy of the time to read it.
March 2, 2014
Goody's book provides a solid corrective to some of the more egregious aspects of eurocentric history, largely by focusing on a historiography of different "unique" aspects of European history for which he can present evidence of similar trends existing elsewhere. The book could possibly have been better had the author been more thorough in some places as parts of the work seem a bit rushed.
September 7, 2025
In The Theft of History Jack Goody, anthropologist, who died in 2015, presents a sometimes blistering argument against the view that the West was the font of capitalism, humanism, democracy, romantic love, towns, universities, and still more institutions that have often (but not always) been argued to have arisen in western Europe. Looking at a wide variety of sources, Goody shows quite clearly that, contrary to this notion, they can be found both in non-western cultures and much earlier than they appeared in Europe.
Although Goody's case is sometimes presented a bit too polemically, his argument is sound. Today I suspect there are fewer historians who still avert to the "West is best" view Goody attacks; whether Goody's book had any influence of this change, I don't know. My only complaint is that his prose often feel kind of rushed and so not always easy to follow. But I'd encourage folks to take the time to engage with this complex, dense treatise. Goody has much to say.
Although Goody's case is sometimes presented a bit too polemically, his argument is sound. Today I suspect there are fewer historians who still avert to the "West is best" view Goody attacks; whether Goody's book had any influence of this change, I don't know. My only complaint is that his prose often feel kind of rushed and so not always easy to follow. But I'd encourage folks to take the time to engage with this complex, dense treatise. Goody has much to say.
October 26, 2019
Ill be honest, this was a very tough read.
I understood this as less of a book and more of a literature review. I'm glad that I stick to the principle on not giving up on books, but reads like these really challenge that principle for me.
This book touches upon our understandings on what we view are the foundations of Western Civilisation. What we usually believe and understand to be unique to the Western world, in fact, isnt always accurate. The Author Jack Goody packs a punch with a wealth of historical sources and leaves us with little doubt as to his conclusions.
I honestly thought this book would be about a list of technologies and the like which had been "borrowed" and taken from different Civilisations and then used by others. To be fair this book does have a sense of that, not in terms of technology, but on a much more fundamental level.
Sadly, the book very much felt like a drag to me and while I did benefit from reading it (seldom does a book not benefit), I felt like it really wasn't what I was expecting.
If you're after what feels like an extensive literature review on historical concepts, this might be right up your street.
I understood this as less of a book and more of a literature review. I'm glad that I stick to the principle on not giving up on books, but reads like these really challenge that principle for me.
This book touches upon our understandings on what we view are the foundations of Western Civilisation. What we usually believe and understand to be unique to the Western world, in fact, isnt always accurate. The Author Jack Goody packs a punch with a wealth of historical sources and leaves us with little doubt as to his conclusions.
I honestly thought this book would be about a list of technologies and the like which had been "borrowed" and taken from different Civilisations and then used by others. To be fair this book does have a sense of that, not in terms of technology, but on a much more fundamental level.
Sadly, the book very much felt like a drag to me and while I did benefit from reading it (seldom does a book not benefit), I felt like it really wasn't what I was expecting.
If you're after what feels like an extensive literature review on historical concepts, this might be right up your street.
March 24, 2014
It's taken me about three months to read this book, and even if I found it slow at times, or too difficult to read on a daily basis, I did enjoy it. It could be better, because at times it feels like Goody dwells too much on some stuff and leaves other barely touched when I'd have liked to read more about it. He also assumes the reader knows about topics that he mentions but leaves unexplained, which greatly frustrated me.
However, it was an interesting read and I want to pitch some of these ideas to my students to see how they react or if we can start a discussion in class.
However, it was an interesting read and I want to pitch some of these ideas to my students to see how they react or if we can start a discussion in class.
August 30, 2019
I liked. Really! Very interesting and different.
January 11, 2020
The writing style was easy to read even if there was a tendency towards very long paragraphs.
August 30, 2020
Essential book to understand why some social groups expel other social groups from the right of writing history in order to keep their economic advantages in the present and the future
October 2, 2020
Einerseits ist das Buch interessant, weil der Autor vielfach versucht aufzuzeigen, dass vermeintlich europäische Werte und Charakteristiken unabhängig davon auch anderswo auf der Welt anzufinden sind und waren.
Das gelingt allerdings nicht immer wie beim Thema Individualismus. Den wiederum sieht der Autor ohne es zu hinterfragen als Grund für den Kapitalismus und den wiederum für "Entwicklung" - zumindest wirtschaftliche.
Andererseits befasst sich das Buch vor allem mit drei historischen europäischen Primärquellen, die aus offensichtlichen Gründen einen europäischen Fokus haben. Der Autor versucht den Punkt zu verdeutlichen, dass sich die einflussreichsten weiteren Forscher auf diese Primärquellen beschränken ("das Monopol der westlichen Wissenschaft").
Leider untersucht der Autor eben nicht genau diese Sekundärquellen sondern bleibt im Wesentlichen auf dem gleichen Level wie diejenigen, die er kritisiert.
Er hat also weder inhaltlich einen besonderen Mehrwert geschaffen noch methodisch. Schade eigentlich, denn seine Motivation ist schon ehrlich.
Das gelingt allerdings nicht immer wie beim Thema Individualismus. Den wiederum sieht der Autor ohne es zu hinterfragen als Grund für den Kapitalismus und den wiederum für "Entwicklung" - zumindest wirtschaftliche.
Andererseits befasst sich das Buch vor allem mit drei historischen europäischen Primärquellen, die aus offensichtlichen Gründen einen europäischen Fokus haben. Der Autor versucht den Punkt zu verdeutlichen, dass sich die einflussreichsten weiteren Forscher auf diese Primärquellen beschränken ("das Monopol der westlichen Wissenschaft").
Leider untersucht der Autor eben nicht genau diese Sekundärquellen sondern bleibt im Wesentlichen auf dem gleichen Level wie diejenigen, die er kritisiert.
Er hat also weder inhaltlich einen besonderen Mehrwert geschaffen noch methodisch. Schade eigentlich, denn seine Motivation ist schon ehrlich.
August 14, 2024
For those who are not familiar with social theories (my case), reading this book becomes dense and tiring. I ended up not being able to delve too deeply into Jack Goody's critique, and my understanding of the reading was somewhat superficial, something like - "Ok, the West was not the only one to develop certain cultural, economic and political innovations, many of these innovations occurred simultaneously or previously in other parts of the world, mainly in China. Many of the "innovations" considered Western, such as capitalism, democracy and science, have parallels in other cultures or even appeared earlier in the Orient."
But personally, I found the writing somewhat boring.
But personally, I found the writing somewhat boring.
September 1, 2022
Synthèse très intéressante sur l’historiographie européenne, qui remet en cause l’hégémonie intellectuelle de l’Europe et les catégories de pensées qui en découlent. L’exemple qui m’a marqué est notamment la prédominance de l’antiquité grecque en comparaison avec un Empire perse oublié ; et la remise en cause du capitalisme comme catégorie opérationnelle pour décrire la finalité du système économique européen (donc remise en cause de Braudel)
March 8, 2025
Sans mon prof d'histoire, je n'aurais jamais découvert ce livre. C'est un coup de coeur immédiat. C'est un ouvrage très complet qui traite la façon comment l'Europe a imposé le récit de son passé au reste du monde. L'auteur mobilise énormément de références internationales pour exposer le point de vue de chaque civilisation et la manière dont elle a vécu "l'histoire" d'Europe ; ce "passé" est bien sûr l'appropriation culturelle de milliers de domaines .
September 28, 2025
Batının tarihi Yunan’dan ve Avrupa’dan başlatarak bütün tarihi gelişmeleri kendine mal ettiğini anlatır.
Avrupa dünya tarihini çarpıtarak kendi zafer hikayesi haline getirir.
Tarihin geri kalan kısmı, “Batı’nın yükselişine fon” olarak anlatıldı.
Goody, tarihe yeniden küresel bir bakış gerektiğini söyler.
Avrupa dünya tarihini çarpıtarak kendi zafer hikayesi haline getirir.
Tarihin geri kalan kısmı, “Batı’nın yükselişine fon” olarak anlatıldı.
Goody, tarihe yeniden küresel bir bakış gerektiğini söyler.
December 21, 2025
Ahimè devo ammettere che non sono riuscita a leggerlo nella sua totalità, ma penso di averlo ugualmente analizzato nel minimo dettaglio per dire di averlo letto. Leggere questo libro in francese è stato difficile, ma non tanto per la lingua straniera, quanto per la complessità e la forte elaborazione delle idee portata avanti dallo stesso Goody. I concetti sono ripetuti più e più volte in maniera articolata, talvolta anche esageratamente. Comprendo che il metodo comparativo e i numerosi esempi siano volti unicamente a sostenere la sua tesi e le argomentazioni, ma, forse, 500 pagine sono un po' esagerate ...
August 29, 2024
A very interesting dissection of the teleological basis of ‘world history’ from a victorious European perspective.
Sometimes leaned too heavily into whataboutisms, and doesn’t provide any alternate reasoning for the Great Divergence.
Sometimes leaned too heavily into whataboutisms, and doesn’t provide any alternate reasoning for the Great Divergence.
Want to read
July 1, 2022Recommended in TP
July 14, 2022
li inteiro depois de ter lido vários capítulos separados antes e: não acho perfeito, mas meu deus eles precisavam muito ouvir essas
September 20, 2023
Disappointing.
June 10, 2024
Based if you wanna know why Europeans didn’t invent the world
September 14, 2025
Le titre du livre dit tout sur son contenue. C'est une étude riche est instructive.
December 25, 2025
Yazar 19. yüzyılın başından itibaren Batı Avrupa'nın dünya tarihinin kurgulanmasındaki rolünden bahsetmiş. Bu kurgunun yanlışlıklarını açıklayıcı örneklerle cevaplamış.
January 8, 2017
Amazing.
Want to read
October 14, 2010Displaying 1 - 30 of 31 reviews