Strategy and Arms Control

by Thomas C. Schelling, Morton H. Halperin

This volume presents an analysis of arms control with particular emphasis on the military policy involved. The basic premise of the book is that cooperative arrangements with potential adversaries could have the same objectives as sensible military policies in reducing the likelihood of war.

Genres: International Relations, Politics

Paperback

First published January 1, 1975

About the author

Thomas Crombie Schelling was an American economist and professor of foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He is also co-faculty at the New England Complex Systems Institute. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics (shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis."

Excerpted from Wikipedia.

Reviews

[Mikhail Farhath-Kupriyanov]

A classic text on arms control and its potential implications an how it can work. Given that it is a foundational text, it's key to read but is ultimately dated and suffers from lack of sophisticated arguments.

[Nathan]

Even though it is 65 years old and written before many of the most notable arms control treaties, this book is remarkably prescient and thorough in its considerations.