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Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
Lowenthal (a professor at Columbia U. and a former U.S. intelligence official) presents an academic introduction to the history and current role of intelligence agencies in the foreign policy of the United States. He surveys the growth of the intelligence agencies, examines their place in the general structure of government, reviews policy debates about the scope and nature of intelligence activities, and discusses intelligence reforms. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
334 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 1999
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 33 reviews
February 16, 2019
It is hard to find a book on intelligence that is not lurid-and-wrong, or purely historical, or focused on some specific event. Perhaps Robert M. Clark's books, but you'd have to read several of them to cover the range of Lowenthal's book.
Mark Lowenthal's book has become the primary academic textbook on intelligence (imagine the very idea of that in any country but the U.S.A.). It considers how intelligence is organized, how it is done in practice, and how it relates to policymaking. He does an amazingly good job without using anything but materials in the public domain (informed, of course, by his own career in intelligence).
Just one warning. It is a structured, referenced, academic book. It is not a quick read, and I had to take it in lumps like a textbook. Worth the time, though.
I had long said that I wanted to read this book, and put it off in part because Lowenthal keeps updating it to cover changes (primarily in the policy framework; intelligence work doesn't change nearly as much). My wife bought me this copy, and that made it more of a "okay, read it this time." I'm glad I did, even if I still put it off for a couple of years.
I particularly enjoyed the chapter on the intelligence services of other countries, emphasizing how intelligence services are designed in large measure to reflect the history and culture of the specific country. And, as you'd expect, there is a wonderful bibliography of things that explore or explain still more than Lowenthal has room to cover. I'll use it as a reference.
Mark Lowenthal's book has become the primary academic textbook on intelligence (imagine the very idea of that in any country but the U.S.A.). It considers how intelligence is organized, how it is done in practice, and how it relates to policymaking. He does an amazingly good job without using anything but materials in the public domain (informed, of course, by his own career in intelligence).
Just one warning. It is a structured, referenced, academic book. It is not a quick read, and I had to take it in lumps like a textbook. Worth the time, though.
I had long said that I wanted to read this book, and put it off in part because Lowenthal keeps updating it to cover changes (primarily in the policy framework; intelligence work doesn't change nearly as much). My wife bought me this copy, and that made it more of a "okay, read it this time." I'm glad I did, even if I still put it off for a couple of years.
I particularly enjoyed the chapter on the intelligence services of other countries, emphasizing how intelligence services are designed in large measure to reflect the history and culture of the specific country. And, as you'd expect, there is a wonderful bibliography of things that explore or explain still more than Lowenthal has room to cover. I'll use it as a reference.
May 26, 2020
This makes a good textbook introduction to the concept of intelligence and intelligence agencies. It's a bit dry, but comprehensive, so it's the kind of book to keep around as a reference.
Review first published on my blog: https://agencyofbooksandspies.blogspo...
Review first published on my blog: https://agencyofbooksandspies.blogspo...
March 4, 2019
This was very interesting for me. I am giving it full stars because I had not learned a lot about the structure of intelligence agencies or the particularities of how intelligence is done before. So essentially all of the information presented in the book was new to me, and while it is not impossible to put down prose, it kept my interest. This methodically goes through the structure of intelligence agencies, how agencies think about collecting and processing intelligence/data. It is quite thorough. The chapters are fairly independent which can be bad for reading straight through as you get a good amount of repetition. On the other hand, it will make it easier to remember all of the acronyms that come up again and again. The book ends with a look at foreign intelligence services. This is kind of a fun ending, as it delves a bit into how intelligence agencies are sort of peculiar to each nation.
I would say if you are interested in learning how intelligence in the US is conceptualized, this is a great and exhaustive book. It has a textbook tone, so if that bothers you, then reader be warned. The prose is not especially hard to read, but it still reads like a textbook. I give it all the stars mostly because I read this on a whim from seeing it on another person's shelf and I did not really know that much about the subject area. I feel like I have a fairly good grasp of intelligence structure now.
I would say if you are interested in learning how intelligence in the US is conceptualized, this is a great and exhaustive book. It has a textbook tone, so if that bothers you, then reader be warned. The prose is not especially hard to read, but it still reads like a textbook. I give it all the stars mostly because I read this on a whim from seeing it on another person's shelf and I did not really know that much about the subject area. I feel like I have a fairly good grasp of intelligence structure now.
October 13, 2012
no comment.
:) This was a really informative read. It read like a textbook/academic introduction to the US Intelligence Community (and hey! that's what it is supposed to be..). Full of acronyms and government-ese, but really good. I think it would be fun to co-teach a class based on this book.
:) This was a really informative read. It read like a textbook/academic introduction to the US Intelligence Community (and hey! that's what it is supposed to be..). Full of acronyms and government-ese, but really good. I think it would be fun to co-teach a class based on this book.
January 10, 2010
Mark M. Lowenthal wrote this book to fill a gap he had identified in instruction on the intelligence community. He found that many texts dealt in specifics, without first addressing the general background information Lowenthal's college students seemed to need most. He wrote this text as a starting point for his course material, to provide students the necessary foundation for further inquiry.
This book is full of facts -- fact after fact after fact to get the student of intelligence up to snuff. Eventually, all the declarative sentences start to wear on one's patience. Also, redundancy abounds: I'm surprised to find myself reading and re-reading the same material. Perhaps this repetition is intended as an instructive tool for students who may not read the book cover to cover... or maybe it's just a sign of a lazy editor. Either way, it adds an unfortunate degree of tedium to an otherwise interesting read.
The material itself is fascinating, and the prose is accessible for any reader, even those with no prior acquaintance with the subject. But the book is an instruction text more than it is a narrative, and as such, it's probably better suited for scholastic readers, rather than those with a casual interest in the subject. It may be an easy read, but it's not exactly light reading.
July 1, 2008
A book that helps get at the inner working of the intelligence community and how it becomes policy. A concise book that navigates through the complicated world of intel.
Want to read
December 3, 2008There is a 4th edition to this book p. 10/2008
September 28, 2011
Another classic for the old dissertation.
February 13, 2023
Another book on intelligence to expand my knowledge of this subject. Overall, it is a very good read but covers the subject much like a college textbook (by design). The book is very well organized with a deep breadth of information that will certainly provide a reader with more than enough information for the average individual. As someone who has read and utilized intelligence products over my career, the book did keep my interest even though I was already familiar with this topic. Key excerpts are below.
- Intelligence is different from other government functions for at least two reasons. First much of what goes on is secret…. The second reason... is that the US intelligence community is a relatively recent government phenomenon…. Some Americans are uncomfortable with the concept that intelligence is a secret entity within an ostensibly open government based on checks and balances. P1. PJK. While transparency is in most cases good, citizens must understand that a certain amount of secrecy is essential or else your country will lose; not all business can be conducted out in the open.
- Strategic surprise should not be confused with tactical surprise… Tactical surprise, when it happens, is not of sufficient magnitude and importance to threaten national existence. P2. PJK. In reality, 9-11 was a tactical surprise in my assessment. The country was shaken deeply, but ultimately its existence was never truly threatened. Some of our normal life had to change, but the “surprise” attack had a short shelf life for most.
- Compared with the permanent bureaucracy, all senior policymakers are transients. P2. PJK. Elected officials tend to fear this, but it’s the truth. Unfortunately it does lead to some mistrust of the bureaucracy which is unfortunate.
- But policymakers and intelligence officers cannot restrict themselves to thinking only about enemies. They must also keep track of powers that are rivals, even though they may be neutrals, friends, or even allies. P5.
- Mirror imaging, or assuming that other states or individuals will act just the way we do, can undermine analysis… The other problem with mirror imaging is that it assumes a certain level of shared rationality... It leaves no room for the “irrational” actor…. P8. PJK. This is a huge issue in our intelligence analysis and planning. How does one truly know how another nation will behave?
- The goal of the US intelligence community is to produce all-source intelligence, or fusion intelligence, that is, intelligence based on as many collection sources as possible in order to compensate for the shortcomings of each and to profit from their combined strength. P55. PJK. I’ve used fusion cell intelligence on numerous occasions over the years, but this is perhaps the best definition of such products that I’ve ever seen.
- The classic rationale behind covert action is that policymakers need a third option. P124.
- Policymakers and intelligence officials examine at least two levels of risk before approving a covert action. The first is the risk of exposure. A director should always assume that an operation will become known at some point. The second risk to be weighed is failure of the operation. Failure may be costly at several levels: in human lives and there's a political crisis… p126-7.
- Every political leadership - democratic or totalitarian - worries about the state of its economy because this has the greatest daily effect on the population: the availability of food and commodities, the stability of prices, the relative ease or difficulty with which basic needs can be met. Economic unrest often leads to political unrest. P129.
- The NSC staff is primarily interested in the execution of policy as defined by the president and senior presidential appointees. P140.
- But policymakers also tend to assume, incorrectly, that “everything” is being covered, at least at some minimal level. P144. PJK. Priorities matter; not everything is covered by a satellite, HUMINT, etc.
- There is nothing in the constitution about “the public's right to know.” The Constitution safeguards freedom of speech and of the press, but these are not the same as a right to information. In the case of intelligence, the principle of openness does not apply. P163.
- Intelligence is different from other government functions for at least two reasons. First much of what goes on is secret…. The second reason... is that the US intelligence community is a relatively recent government phenomenon…. Some Americans are uncomfortable with the concept that intelligence is a secret entity within an ostensibly open government based on checks and balances. P1. PJK. While transparency is in most cases good, citizens must understand that a certain amount of secrecy is essential or else your country will lose; not all business can be conducted out in the open.
- Strategic surprise should not be confused with tactical surprise… Tactical surprise, when it happens, is not of sufficient magnitude and importance to threaten national existence. P2. PJK. In reality, 9-11 was a tactical surprise in my assessment. The country was shaken deeply, but ultimately its existence was never truly threatened. Some of our normal life had to change, but the “surprise” attack had a short shelf life for most.
- Compared with the permanent bureaucracy, all senior policymakers are transients. P2. PJK. Elected officials tend to fear this, but it’s the truth. Unfortunately it does lead to some mistrust of the bureaucracy which is unfortunate.
- But policymakers and intelligence officers cannot restrict themselves to thinking only about enemies. They must also keep track of powers that are rivals, even though they may be neutrals, friends, or even allies. P5.
- Mirror imaging, or assuming that other states or individuals will act just the way we do, can undermine analysis… The other problem with mirror imaging is that it assumes a certain level of shared rationality... It leaves no room for the “irrational” actor…. P8. PJK. This is a huge issue in our intelligence analysis and planning. How does one truly know how another nation will behave?
- The goal of the US intelligence community is to produce all-source intelligence, or fusion intelligence, that is, intelligence based on as many collection sources as possible in order to compensate for the shortcomings of each and to profit from their combined strength. P55. PJK. I’ve used fusion cell intelligence on numerous occasions over the years, but this is perhaps the best definition of such products that I’ve ever seen.
- The classic rationale behind covert action is that policymakers need a third option. P124.
- Policymakers and intelligence officials examine at least two levels of risk before approving a covert action. The first is the risk of exposure. A director should always assume that an operation will become known at some point. The second risk to be weighed is failure of the operation. Failure may be costly at several levels: in human lives and there's a political crisis… p126-7.
- Every political leadership - democratic or totalitarian - worries about the state of its economy because this has the greatest daily effect on the population: the availability of food and commodities, the stability of prices, the relative ease or difficulty with which basic needs can be met. Economic unrest often leads to political unrest. P129.
- The NSC staff is primarily interested in the execution of policy as defined by the president and senior presidential appointees. P140.
- But policymakers also tend to assume, incorrectly, that “everything” is being covered, at least at some minimal level. P144. PJK. Priorities matter; not everything is covered by a satellite, HUMINT, etc.
- There is nothing in the constitution about “the public's right to know.” The Constitution safeguards freedom of speech and of the press, but these are not the same as a right to information. In the case of intelligence, the principle of openness does not apply. P163.
December 8, 2021
This is a great reference for the concept and lifecycle of intelligence, and how intelligence interfaces with policy. Lowenthal also broke down the IC and how it is funded as well as the somewhat ambiguous nature of responsibility and authority. It seemed that Lowenthal made an effort to reel back his bias at times, but it bled right through. Overall, a great reference and starting point for understanding how intelligence broadly, and the US IC specifically, works.
September 6, 2017
I thought it was good because tells us about a person that surveys the government and the policy.
September 25, 2019
Undoubtedly the best textbook I have ever seen on intelligence. It is very informative and easy to follow. It is very hard to put down.
July 22, 2020
Best Intelligence book I've studied so far
August 9, 2021
Good intro/reference text if quite dry and dense.
February 7, 2022
very good introduction to government agencies/intelligence community!
Read
March 13, 2022 A reasonably-easy read on the relationship between military and civilian intelligence, and the origins of each.
March 28, 2023
Class textbook with so much information. Thumbs up
March 31, 2024
It's about introduction and problems of US military intelligence.
November 25, 2024
good stuff prof
June 21, 2025
cant even be a casual enjoyer of spy movies anymore
October 5, 2025
A textbook on the history of intelligence in the United States.
August 25, 2025
This book has to be not one of the longest but most definitely one of the heaviest on my shelf.
Fabulous overview of what intelligence is, how it was developed in the States, the U.S. Intelligence Community, what the intelligence cycle looks like, how counterintelligence and covert action work, nation-states, transnational issues, as well as ethical and moral issues in intelligence. Maybe most important for me of a chapter at the time was the understanding of the role of the policy maker and the very important and cyclical relationship between intelligence analysts and policymakers.
Keeps the many possible acronyms to a minimum and provides a breezy read covering many intelligence topics, key terms, their history, and where they stand for the future. Can see why more editions have this been published since even I read it last as its a fundamental work for anyone studying or working in this field
Fabulous overview of what intelligence is, how it was developed in the States, the U.S. Intelligence Community, what the intelligence cycle looks like, how counterintelligence and covert action work, nation-states, transnational issues, as well as ethical and moral issues in intelligence. Maybe most important for me of a chapter at the time was the understanding of the role of the policy maker and the very important and cyclical relationship between intelligence analysts and policymakers.
Keeps the many possible acronyms to a minimum and provides a breezy read covering many intelligence topics, key terms, their history, and where they stand for the future. Can see why more editions have this been published since even I read it last as its a fundamental work for anyone studying or working in this field
November 6, 2007
This is the best unclassified book on US intelligence, or so says all of my intelligence and security professors, and I believe it! It is a clear and detailed look at all aspects of the US intelligence institutions and the way intelligence works. Very interesting and enlightening.
March 22, 2021
Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, authored by Mark M. Lowenthal.
This book is not classified as a textbook, but that is exactly what it is.
Mark Lowenthal provides a thorough explanation of the inner and outer workings of intelligence agencies.
This book is not classified as a textbook, but that is exactly what it is.
Mark Lowenthal provides a thorough explanation of the inner and outer workings of intelligence agencies.
December 8, 2008
great primer on US intelligence community functions, organization, capabilities, culture, and issues.
Read
November 21, 2009None
February 5, 2013
Good overview for beginners.
April 8, 2014
Seemed pretty biased, but informative enough
May 19, 2014
Extremely informative book about the inner workings of intelligence agencies
April 22, 2015
Class. Dry and shitty.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 33 reviews