The author argues that theories of human origins developed by archaeologists and physical anthropologists from the early nineteenth century to the present day are structurally similar to Western folk theories, and to the speculations of earlier philosophers. Reviewing a remarkable range of thinkers writing in a variety of European languages, he criticizes the lack of development in theories of human origins, but concludes optimistically that the power of the scientific approach will deliver more reliable theories--only if it is conscious of the baggage it carries over from popular discourse.
A fascinating book. Its essential point is that when studying human origins, anthropologists have often told stories that have not relied on scientific details, but instead have relied on "common-sense" and "naive anthropology" that repeat details from Enlightenment and even classical descriptions of human origins. In his research he found that in the drive to craft complete narratives, evolutionary theory was often set aside for Lamarckian and traditional explanations based on environmental determination and usefulness of traits. In doing so anthropologists returned to many older stories about the danger of the prehistoric environment, the travail of searching for food, and the necessity of hunting, bipedalism and gender specific roles (among a long list).
This book does get thick on occasion with technical terminology, but it is never overwhelming and it is a delight to read anthropology that quotes Lucretius, Origen, Rousseau, Darwin, and Durkheim.
The following is a quote from near the end of the book, after the author has answered some questions about theory and science and the place of history and narrative in the making of science.
"Contrary to what is often thought, scientists do not draw their conclusions from empirical data, any more than they rewrite history in terms of prevailing ideology. In fact, they rather try to organise the heterogeneous conceptual materials that society places at their disposal, and these include new facts and recent ideologies just as much as ancient commonplaces. These various materials are the actual data on which the scientists work; the scientists infer nothing from them; they just put them in order.
And there are two ways of putting them in order: first the one in which speculative ideas predominate and empirical data is subordinate to them, and second, the one where the opposite holds true. Researchers are accustomed to give this second procedure the term 'scientific', but frequently they are content to practice the first. The ignorance of the history of sciences in particular, and of the history of Western thought in general, entails the first procedure, because the lack of historical knowledge favors the transformation of the arbitrary and epistemologically fragile conventions of common sense into 'natural facts', and this shelters them from any attempt at empirical evaluation, whereas the ideas slightly removed from the dogmas of common sense are put aside a priori, before their pertinence can be assessed." (198)
Thus he calls science to both acknowledge and use historical knowledge ("It is not a question of some liberation from the past, but rather of learning to make good use of it.") and to a better exploration of the empirical data that recognizes its potentially limited narrative value (especially necessary in dealing with remote human origins). Quite a good read overall.