Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941

by David M. Glantz

From a world expert on Hitler's war in Russia, this book on the operation that changed the course of World War II includes updated information on casualty numbers and opposing forces Here, David Glantz challenges the time-honored explanation that poor weather, bad terrain, and Hitler's faulty strategic judgement produced German defeat, and reveals how the Red Army thwarted the German Army's dramatic and apparently inexorable invasion before it achieved its ambitious goals. On June 22, 1941 Hitler unleashed his forces on the Soviet Union. Spearheaded by four powerful Panzer groups and protected by an impenetrable curtain of air support, the seemingly invincible Wehrmacht advanced from the Soviet Union’s western borders to the immediate outskirts of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov in the shockingly brief period of less than six months. The sudden, deep, relentless German advance virtually destroyed the entire peacetime Red Army and captured almost 40 percent of European Russia before expiring inexplicably at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad. An invasion designed to achieve victory in three to six weeks failed and, four years later, resulted in unprecedented and total German defeat.

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military History, War, Military Fiction, Russia

320 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2001

About the author

David M. Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.

Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.

He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.

After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.

In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.

A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.

Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.

Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.

He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei

Reviews

[Nick · Rating 3 out of 5]

David Glantz re-looks at the German invasion of Soviet Russia in Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941. Utilizing new material available from Russian archives the book provides first hand accounts of the interaction between the Stavka, Directional and Front commanders. Glantz's account also captures details of the Soviet reserve mobilization and transfer of units from the Russian interior and East Coast.

Operation Barbarossa covers the period from the late 1930's thru the Soviet Winter Offensive of '42. As one would expect the book focuses on the military aspects of the offensive, not taking political perspectives into account unless they have a bearing on the military operations. The recently released material from the Russian archives allowed deeper insight into the Soviet strategic thinking and the mobilization and organization of the strategic reserve. Contrasting this strategic reserve information against the German intelligence reports before and during Operation Barbarossa illustrates the lack of OKW / OKH knowledge of Soviet units beyond approximately 300 miles behind the front. This Glantz surmises was the real undoing of the German High Command - not understanding the Soviet ability to mobilize millions of men to replace their enormous losses all while loosing large swaths of land and resources. The Nazi leadership repeatedly believed they had been victorious only to be confounded by the Soviet hordes running in to fill the gap.

A good book and one I would recommend to both those new to studying the Eastern Front as well as those well versed, but maybe not familiar with the newly released Russian material.

[Geevee · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a good book but somewhat like the two armies I was reading about I found myself forging ahead as I consumed vast territory, only then to stop, and in some cases withdraw or even become bogged down as I needed to regroup my thoughts and reflect on the mass of information coming into me so as I could make progress again.

Glantz's book is a tour de force in that at a high command level: army, corps and division, he excels in providing the reader with the strategic background and the order of battles before engagements, and then during the battles or manoeuvres the deployments, reactions and dispositions of the units.

The book is not an easy read because of this it requires the reader's concentration at all times, and by concentration I mean reading and thinking through each sentence and paragraph. If willing to do this then the reward is a full and detailed understanding of the war in the East leading up to Stalingrad.

The author provides the reader with a good but short introduction that leads us to Operation Barbarossa, and he is good on the abilities and shortcomings of the Red Army and the systemic problems it needed to address.

I particulalrly liked the "Reflection" section at the end of each paragraph where the Glantz offers a summary of the past pages and a lead-in to the next chapter. He is also very good at the end with his conclusions chapter.

The book has copious source notes, a selected but still rich biography, and 4 appendices inlcuing a full ORBat for 22nd June 1941.

So why three stars and not higher?

For this reader a work such as Glantz's that provides strategic context, real depth and detail at a high command level requires maps of high quality. Sadly, this was not the case and the maps in my copy were one to a page, small, grey and all at the back of the book (Tempus 2003 Battles and Campaigns Series). Part of this difficulty is, I am sure, because I was reading a paperback, but if the publishers wish the author's labours to be seen at their best then maps must be of a equal quality to the writing.
What is required are maps that fold out and can be read alongside the text so not forcing the reader to flick back and forth. This methodology was used very successfully in official histories (hardback I accept) but seems to be something modern publishers eschew, and yet the reader's experience is more rewarding and the author's work is respected even more; and surely that would drive more 5 star reviews and ultimately more sales (not that this review is intended or ever likely to do this latter point).

In conclusion a good book by an authoritative author let down by poor siting of and quality maps.

[Boudewijn · Rating 2 out of 5]

.

[Brian · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book does give an overview of Operation Barbarossa, but I think it too often gets lost in a narrative of corps movements and command changes. There is some analysis sprinkled in, but you have to wade through a fair amount to get through it.
In my view, what's missing is some treatment of the tactical, operational and technological factors that enabled the German army to make dramatic gains, but also how the Soviets worked to neutralize those factors - partly with numbers and leadership, but also with closing the gaps in these areas so the German advantage was not so pronounced.
The kindle version is hindered by limited maps all the way at the end of the book.

[Sean Chick · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is my first Glantz book and it was much of what I expected. Maps were subpar, but there were plenty of photos, but mostly of Soviets. Glantz is a man more interested in the USSR, so the book is more detailed about the Russian experience. The prose is not engrossing and exciting but it is crisp. As far as conclusions, Glantz is not conventional, but nor is he "creative" in his assessments. The result is solid, if not exactly balanced, introduction to the largest and most horrific military campaign in human history.

[Samuel Brassard · Rating 4 out of 5]

David Glantz offre une vue d'ensemble assez détaillée de la fameuse Opération Barbarossa lancée en 1941 par l'Allemagne nazie pour l'invasion de l'Union Soviétique. Le lecteur peut suivre avec Glantz la confrontation jour par jour, front par front, avec une analyse assez détaillée des raisons pour lesquelles l'histoire s'est déroulée ainsi. Extrêmement intéressant, parfois dur à suivre à cause du nombre énorme de différentes formations et d'actions simultanées.

[Jur · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is one of the classic operational accounts of Barbarossa in the post-Soviet era. Glantz was one of the first to go into the Russian archives after the fall of communism and retrieved large amounts of new source material that fundamentally altered our view of what happened in those fateful months of 1941.

After a short introduction of the run up to the war, Glantz goes into a blow by blow account of the major phases in the campaign. From the border battles to the Red Army counterattacks around Smolensk, through the battles for Leningrad and Kiev, to the final drive on Moscow and the winter counteroffensive. Each chapter is finished with short reflections on the events. These steps back from the immediate action allow some breath for analysis and are very welcome.

The causes for the weak showing of the Red Army are laid squarely at the foot of the Red Army purges of the late 1930s. These, according to Glantz, robbed the Red Army of its experience and initiative. They led to poor showing in the war against Finland and panicked reorganisation afterwards.

Another factor in the defeats was the Soviet emphasis on offensive doctrine. This caused high levels of casualties for little gains. In fact, the success of the Red Army to stem the German advance in the centre indirectly led to the fall of Kiev as Guderian's Panzergruppe was forced towards the south. But more directly, the Western Front wore itself out in futile attacks so much that it became vulnerable to the German thrust in October.

But Glantz goes against those that argue that the Kiev distraction lost the Nazis the battle for Moscow (and the war). He sees the defeat of the Red Army in the Ukraine as a necessary condition to clear the southern flank for the drive on Moscow. The main failure in the final stages of Barbarossa was Hitler's lack of realism in trying to attain too many objectives at once.

Glantz has good reasons why the Hitler underestimated the Red Army. One of the main findings in the 1990s was the planned increase of the Red Army in the run up to the war. This had gone unnoticed to the Germans, who were therefor surprised again and again by Soviet ability to bounce back and plug holes in the line. He shows that in fact the Red Army was consumed on three occassions: first in the border battles, second in the battles for Leningrad, Kiev and the Viazma-Briansk pockets. In each case Stavka was able to create and direct strategic reserves to the threatened spots.

And given the considerable reserves at hand in early December, even though the Wehrmacht might have reached Moscow, the Soviet Union would have been unlikely to give up, and likely to have driven back the invaders in other places along its overextended front line.

Glantz was never a fluent writer, and despite the pretty dense delivery of information on participating units and commanders, Before Stalingrad is pretty readable by comparison to his other books. My major quip with the book is that the maps rarely show the sites that Glantz mentions in the text, which makes for considerable frustration in trying to place events.

Before Stalingrad is a reworking of When Titans Clashed, published in 1995 and also appeared as Barbarossa, Hitlers Invasion of Russia in 2001. Later books by Overy and Bellamy have added new insights, mostly on the German occupation and resistance and social and economical background to the war, but Glantz remains a very useful and relatively concise introduction to the purely military aspects of the war.

[Creighton · Rating 5 out of 5]

I was recommended to read Mr. Glantz's work by a YouTuber who makes in-depth videos on the Second World War. I wanted (and still wish) to study more in-depth about the eastern front. Specifically battles, the weapons, the tactical, logistical, and operational ins and outs, along with the commanders who were involved in this theatre of the Second World War. In my honest opinion, I feel Mr. Glantz wrote a very concise and well written book on this topic. If you are looking to study Operation Barbarossa or for that matter the Eastern Front in detail, check out his books, because you'll learn the nitty gritty facts.

I bought this book on Kindle, and I read it within a few days because I was extremely fascinated and focused on the details of Barbarossa and I found that this helped reinforce the idea I had known for so long: Hitler and the Wehrmacht underestimated the Soviet Unions strength, military organization, and will to fight.. Hitler did not view Moscow as important to him as he did the Ukraine, or the Caucasus, due to their rich resources, which Germany was lacking. Blitzkrieg, while at first was a success, it eventually was proven it could not withstand the Russian juggernaut. Germany in terms of its army was not entirely mobilized, but still using horses and traveling by foot, which limited chances for panzers to do more damage to the soviets. On top of this, Germany was not economically mobilized for a total war, and Hitler was already focused on other plans and rejected the option to send reinforcements, winter clothing, and/or solve the logistical problem the Wehrmacht was facing in the east.

All of these things and numerous other things Mr. Glantz wrote about, and reinforced throughout his writings.

[Justin · Rating 3 out of 5]

A thorough, concise survey of the opening 6 months of Hitler's war of annihilation against the Soviet Union. Similar in scope and size to (but making use of far better sources than) John Keegan's slim "Barbarossa" volume published by Ballantine.

Because this was published some years before Adam Tooze's "Wages of Destruction," a since-disproven assumption makes an appearance here, namely that the Germans did not go on a "total war" footing until 1944, didn't want to put women in factories, etc.

Tooze shows conclusively that a) the Third Reich had scraped the absolute bottom of its manpower barrel before Barbarossa had even begun, and that this was only possible by b) shifting a great deal of the labor in the agricultural sector (which was still largely unmechanized) to the women who were left behind. Thus, adding women to the factories was an impossibility if the already-insufficient domestic food supply were to avoid disruption. Indeed, augmenting the insufficient food supplies of the Reich was a key war aim for invading the USSR in the first place, a strategic necessity that Hitler saw plainly, but that his generals never did.

Invading the Soviet Union was always the most ludicrous, impractical enterprise with almost no chance of success, but it's hard not to be gripped by the stakes as Zhukov desperately, brilliantly holds Moscow at all costs, waiting for the precise moment to give the Wehrmacht a taste of its own medicine.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another Glantz classic. If you want the clear unvarnished record of what happened during Hitler's WWII assault on Russia, this is that book. Using the latest available records from the Soviet archives, as well as all the other extant resources, Glantz tells the macro version of the story. There are few charming anecdotes, more of the rational discussion of what both sides wanted to achieve, how they went about doing it- and the insanely bloody results. But here we no longer get the myth of the easy race to Moscow and the defeat by "General Winter". In Glantz's telling, a hard fighting, but misguided army is destroyed in the early battles, but it buys time for Incredible rejuvenating mobilization, simplification of its command and control structures, and the rapid maturation of its Top command, Stavka. By the end of the story- the Soviet Winter Offensive of 1941, the seeds of Germany's eventual doom have already been sown. But do be prepared for a torrent of Grand Tactical orders of battle, and combat statistics, as Glantz supports every report with lots of those. This is a great book for the Military Enthusiast/Modeller/Gamer, more on background than for scenario/diorama development, although there are many good snow action pics in the book. Great Maps and diagrams fill out the offering. Junior readers up to the factual blast challenge will be rewarded.

[Terry Tucker · Rating 5 out of 5]

David M. Glantz is majestic and the gold standard on Russian operations and WW II. I read his books over 20 years ago while on active duty and before the wall fell in Nov of 1989. I was on patrol along the wall in the Coburg sectors when the wall fell. With the Ukraine invasion and the number of articles on Soviet New Generation Warfare, I thought I would refresh my memory on Soviet doctrine and operations.
This book has 9 chapters, a conclusion, a section of maps and tables, extensive notes, a bibliography and a number of Appendices. There are a total of 206 reading pages. The author is very detailed and presents both the German and Soviet Operations clearly.
The lessons from Operation Barbarossa are evident in the recent invasion of the Ukraine. I highly recommend this book and I also suggest "Soviet Military Operational Art, In Pursuit of Deep Battle," David M. Glantz; and "The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union, A History," David M. Glantz. In essence the names may change, but the doctrine is still the same. Hybrid Warfare and New Generation Warfare has always existed in Soviet Strategy and Doctrine. They may have applied things messily and haphazardly in seemingly futile events, but they achieved their outcomes - albeit a little messy and not always so evident.

[Philip Kuhn · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's a good one volume history of Barbarossa. Nothing really new here that I didn't already know. I love Glantz for the fact that he writes about the German-Soviet war, a subject no other Westerners seem to want to talk about. But his writing gets bogged down in seemingly endless reports of X unit advanced against Y defender, near such and such town across some river. It's like he's reading a map, not telling a narrative.

If you want a really good book on the German-Soviet War, read Alan Clark's book. I've read it over several times.

Phil Kuhn

[pallav mishra · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very pedantic book, perhaps targeted at military historians and diehard WW2 enthusiasts. It gives some great insights into the war- the decisive factors that ultimately led to the unraveling of Operation Barbarossa. But there is so much information chronicling day-by-day account of the war that it gets tiring.

[Steve Smith · Rating 1 out of 5]

While there were interesting sections in the book based upon first hand accounts of individual experiences I was amazed such an interesting topic could be made to sound so boring. Repeatedly lists of different armies, regiments etc and a never ending list of officers really destroys any sense of continuity.

[William Mills · Rating 1 out of 5]

Impossible to read. Endless minutiae detail with no real plot or explanation to its relevance. The author is trying to prove how other writers are wrong to an audience in a college lecture hall in front of teacher.
The paying reader is regarded with contempt. Get a refund!

[Patricia Roberts-Miller · Rating 4 out of 5]

The reflections are useful; the conclusion is elegant. You'll want to read it either with Glantz's other books nearby, or at a computer that would enable you to check maps.

It's beautifully researched and very persuasive.

[Wayne A. Meyer · Rating 2 out of 5]

Overly detailed.

The author gets bogged down in so many details it’s very difficult to see the overall picture. The number of pages containing footnotes take up almost almost half of the book!

[Stephen Bedard · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very good summary of Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. It covers the tremendous successes of Germany followed by the sudden reversal as the Russians began to push back the Germans at Moscow.

[Boyd · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great History

A good overview of Barbarossa. I got a lot of information from the Russian perspective that I have missed in other books on this subject.

Highly Recommend

[Laurens McDonald · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not a great idea

[Ron Nurmi · Rating 4 out of 5]

The story of Operation Barbarossa as Germany invades the Soviet Union leading to the defeat of the German forces in the battle for Moscow.

[Michael Ross · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good overview of Operation Barbarossa by one of the foremost American experts on the Soviet Military during World War Two. Using declassified Russian archives David Glantz is able to present the operation in a new and better understanding than previous works.

[Diane Henry · Rating 3 out of 5]

A book for the military enthusiast, which I am not. Lots of detailed battles, outlining the movements of Army Group this, or Battalion # that. Luckily, there are nice summaries at the end of each chapter.
I didn't know that Barbarossa only dealt with the latter half of 1941. This book shed light on why the Wehrmacht failed to take Russia quickly (at all, really) and how multiple small errors led ultimately to a war of attrition that Germany could only lose.
I was hoping for a more general book on Russia's role in WWII, so I will need to read more. But this had a lot of interesting material.

[Faith Snyder · Rating 2 out of 5]

I read this book for a college course on World War II. While it's not the most engaging book I've ever read, it was really informative and got the history across. I found the book really boring, but I look forward to re-reading it and maybe I'll change my mind when it's not for an assignment. I would still recommend for people who are doing research because it was incredibly detailed, but if you are looking to this book for a bit of light reading I'd wait until you have more time to do follow up research accompanied with the text. All in all it didn't take very long to read the book, it took longer for me because I had to write a paper with it. It was okay but it didn't stun me.

[Christoph Fischer · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941" by David M. Glantz is a brilliant account of the mad and ill-fated campaign that cost so many lives.
Systematic in its approach and well explained the book gives a clear picture of the various steps of the campaign, explains facts and speculation about the successes and failures on both sides and illustrates and documents everything with maps and tables.
Very well done. An easy and informative read.

[Ray · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book.

Unlike some of David Glantz's other works, this book was easily accessible, illustrating the challenges facing the Germans and Russians during Operation Barbarossa. If you are just beginning to read about the Eastern Front during World War 2, this is an excellent book to start with. It will provide a context and overview of, what was arguably, the most destructive conflict in history.

[Dan · Rating 4 out of 5]

While not quite as dense as some of Glantz's books, this is still chock full of detail and is a rewarding read, especially the conclusions. Maps are sparse (as usual) and of uneven usefulness, but some do help visualize the situation. The notes and orders of battle are also quite detailed and interesting.

[Matt Friedman · Rating 3 out of 5]

Chilling account of the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia. Most of this is dedicated to the kind of information appreciated by military nerds - details of equipment, invasion details, etc. Toward the end, it also briefly discusses Nazi atrocities against the Jewish population by the einsatzgruppen and even sometimes the local population, such as the mass murder at Babi Yar outside of Kiev.

[Les · Rating 4 out of 5]

Perhaps the best popular narrative of the first two summers of the Great Patriotic War. Balanced and gripping, it brings together Glantz's superlative research with, for one of the few times, a really good editor. Glantz is usually work to read, although worth the effort. This book is a joy.

[Drpsychorat · Rating 5 out of 5]

A really in-depth look at the 1st year of Barbarossa. Excellently researched with outstanding notes and appendixes. A must read introduction to the operation that ultimately led to the defeat of Nazi Germany.