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Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Political Thought
Hanna Pitkin argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a revolutionary new conception of language, and hence a new and deeper understanding of ourselves and the world of human institutions and action.
- GenresPhilosophy
360 pages, Paperback
First published June 26, 1973
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
September 20, 2010
I read this years ago, simply because the author was my teacher. She didn't feel that it had anything to do with my study. She was undoubtedly correct, but it did furnish some food for thought as I pondered how I was ever going to come up with a senior thesis. I finally decided on the origins of the concept of justice.
February 28, 2015
I first started reading Wittgenstein and Justice in the early 90’s as I was trying to understand more of Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach to language and its applicability outside of the philosophy of language. Judging from my marginal notations, I had read about half way through the book (up to the “Wittgenstein and” of the title) before setting it down. When I picked it up again in January of this year I did not recall just how great the first half of this book is. Nonetheless, like many philosophical texts that try to conjoin disparate authors or concepts through the conjunction “and” Wittgenstein and Justice feels lopsided.
The Wittgenstein half of the text provides an excellent overview of the enigmatic philosopher’s approach to language, the evolution of his thought and the methodology he uses to test concepts. Indeed as I reread these sections, I was frankly surprised at how much of what I understood about Wittgenstein was derived from Pitkin’s exegesis. She shows both the importance and the limitations of the Tractatus before turning to the philosophy of language developed from the Philosophical Investigations onward. In this process she shows how integral the aphoristic style Wittgenstein employs is to his constant testing of philosophy’s presuppositions regarding language; the development of his own philosophy of language as an activity deployed in a variety of different and contradictory ways (from grammar to language games to forms of life); and the effectiveness of this methodology as a critique for both his own philosophy and for the history of philosophy. This half of the book is an exceptional and accessible read.
The “and” of the title, a chapter on Plato’s Republic, is likewise thought provoking, though perhaps not in ways intended by the author. Here, I think, Pitkin falls back on a more traditional philosophical analysis of The Republic that at times felt completely disconnected from the insights on Wittgenstein that she developed earlier. Yet, the language games of justice in Greek thought, culture and politics are many, contradictory and fertile ground for a Wittgenstienian reading of The Republic. Unfortunately, Pitkin overlooks the grammar, language games and forms of life of justice in ancient Athens: how justice is treated in the context of Greek Tragedy; the rise of the Sophists as teachers of the ruling classes; the conflict between Athens and Sparta; and the excesses of the recently deposed Oligarchy. Her reading, instead, focuses on a constricted analysis of empirical versus analytic philosophical schools of thought which is designed to set up the remaining chapters. Where Pitkin’s analysis failed to draw out these implications, I found great joy in thinking through the problem of Justice, its use as a concept of state administration and its implications and contradictions in the analysis of justice as the use of power that animates The Republic. Still, I think her failure here sets her on a path where the earlier promise of the book starts to fall apart.
As Pitkin turns to Justice, the final chapters have a more hit or miss quality where great insights and arguments are interspersed with long stretches that felt dated or, quite frankly, lost sight of Wittgenstein’s methodology. Perhaps the topic of Justice was too broad and the hermeneutic she set up with the Plato Chapter was too weak for a sustained analysis of justice from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Whether this was the cause for the lesser second half or for some other reason, the final chapters were less forceful even if they at times offered interesting insights. Of special note would be her critique of the fact-value dichotomy prevalent in most ethical and political discourse. Less successful are the final chapters where Pitkin’s attempts to read Wittgenstein in light of Arendt, existentialism and phenomenology. Overall, the book is quite good, but a reader would be well justified in putting it down after the chapter on Judgment.
The Wittgenstein half of the text provides an excellent overview of the enigmatic philosopher’s approach to language, the evolution of his thought and the methodology he uses to test concepts. Indeed as I reread these sections, I was frankly surprised at how much of what I understood about Wittgenstein was derived from Pitkin’s exegesis. She shows both the importance and the limitations of the Tractatus before turning to the philosophy of language developed from the Philosophical Investigations onward. In this process she shows how integral the aphoristic style Wittgenstein employs is to his constant testing of philosophy’s presuppositions regarding language; the development of his own philosophy of language as an activity deployed in a variety of different and contradictory ways (from grammar to language games to forms of life); and the effectiveness of this methodology as a critique for both his own philosophy and for the history of philosophy. This half of the book is an exceptional and accessible read.
The “and” of the title, a chapter on Plato’s Republic, is likewise thought provoking, though perhaps not in ways intended by the author. Here, I think, Pitkin falls back on a more traditional philosophical analysis of The Republic that at times felt completely disconnected from the insights on Wittgenstein that she developed earlier. Yet, the language games of justice in Greek thought, culture and politics are many, contradictory and fertile ground for a Wittgenstienian reading of The Republic. Unfortunately, Pitkin overlooks the grammar, language games and forms of life of justice in ancient Athens: how justice is treated in the context of Greek Tragedy; the rise of the Sophists as teachers of the ruling classes; the conflict between Athens and Sparta; and the excesses of the recently deposed Oligarchy. Her reading, instead, focuses on a constricted analysis of empirical versus analytic philosophical schools of thought which is designed to set up the remaining chapters. Where Pitkin’s analysis failed to draw out these implications, I found great joy in thinking through the problem of Justice, its use as a concept of state administration and its implications and contradictions in the analysis of justice as the use of power that animates The Republic. Still, I think her failure here sets her on a path where the earlier promise of the book starts to fall apart.
As Pitkin turns to Justice, the final chapters have a more hit or miss quality where great insights and arguments are interspersed with long stretches that felt dated or, quite frankly, lost sight of Wittgenstein’s methodology. Perhaps the topic of Justice was too broad and the hermeneutic she set up with the Plato Chapter was too weak for a sustained analysis of justice from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Whether this was the cause for the lesser second half or for some other reason, the final chapters were less forceful even if they at times offered interesting insights. Of special note would be her critique of the fact-value dichotomy prevalent in most ethical and political discourse. Less successful are the final chapters where Pitkin’s attempts to read Wittgenstein in light of Arendt, existentialism and phenomenology. Overall, the book is quite good, but a reader would be well justified in putting it down after the chapter on Judgment.
July 15, 2025
Snooze
September 5, 2011
A very good book. The first half is a really nice explanation of ordinary language philosophy, with an emphasis on Wittgenstein. The second half is more speculative, and while the direction of this part didn't exactly go in the direction I had hoped, it is in itself good.
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June 8, 2007Note to self: check the library.
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September 23, 2010Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Political Thought by Hanna F. Pitkin (1973)
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews