On China

by Henry Kissinger

For more than twenty years after the Communist Revolution in 1949, China and most of the western world had no diplomats in each others' capitals and no direct way to communicate. Then, in July 1971, Henry Kissinger arrived secretly in Beijing on a mission which quickly led to the reopening of relations between China and the West and changed the course of post-war history.For the past forty years, Kissinger has maintained close relations with successive generations of Chinese leaders, and has probably been more intimately connected with China at the highest level than any other western figure. This book distils his unique experience and long study of the 'Middle Kingdom', examining China's history from the classical era to the present day, and explaining why it has taken the extraordinary course that it has.The book concentrates on the decades since 1949, presenting brilliantly drawn portraits of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders, and reproducing verbatim Kissinger's conversations with each of them. But Kissinger's eye rarely leaves the long continuum of Chinese he describes the essence of China's approach to diplomacy, strategy and negotiation, and the remarkable ways in which Communist-era statesmen have drawn on methods honed over millennia. At the end of the book, Kissinger reflects on these attitudes for our own era of economic interdependence and an uncertain future. On China is written with great authority, complete accessibility and with many wider reflections on statecraft and diplomacy distilled from years of experience. At a moment when the rest of the world is thinking about China more than ever before, this timely book offers insights that no other can.

Genres: China, History, Politics, Nonfiction, International Relations, Asia, Political Science

608 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2011

About the author

Henry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.

A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.

During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.

Reviews

[Chan Yee · Rating 1 out of 5]

Kissinger’s Ignorance about China

China is a complicated large country with a long history and civilization entirely different from Western ones. Chinese top leading group is a black box. Its operation is tightly kept confidential. For an autocracy like China, one cannot understand it without understanding its leaders. No wonder Western China watchers are frustrated in understanding China.

However, as a well-experienced diplomat who helped Nixon achieve rapprochement with China, Kissinger must be in a better position to see through Chinese leaders, since he has met all Chinese leaders since Mao many times. I, therefore, read through the book, but am greatly disappointed that Kissinger gives distorted images of and misinformation about China and Chinese leaders, especially Chinese madman Mao.

Having personally experienced Mao’s tyranny, my greatest worry concerning China is the potential emergence of another madman like Mao when China grows into a rival to America. The disaster that he may cause to Chinese and world people will be much more serious than Mao’s great famine and Cultural Revolution.

Kissinger, however, compared China’s rise now with that of Germany before World War I and believes if the state leaders then had known the consequence of the war, they would “have recoiled” from confrontation. So will China and America in the future, he concludes. he forgets World War II, which is much more relevant. Madmen Hitler and Tojo Hideki started the war because they were callous killers and their mad calculation made them believe they would win the war. Tojo was especially mad. He attacked America when compared with the giant of US economy, Japan’s was a dwarf.

Like Hitler, Mao Was a Callous Killer
In a speech in 1959, Mao gave the reasons why there was no Hungarian Revolution in China, saying that since the communist takeover “more than one million counterrevolutionaries have been killed. Hungary has not killed any counterrevolutionary. For the elimination of more than one million of the 600-odd million people, I think we shall shout hurrah for that.” The counterrevolutionaries referred to in his speech were mostly unarmed civilians put to death in peacetime. The terror lies in his pride and joy in the killing.

Mao’s Two Fits of Domestic Madness with Heavy Death Toll
Mao’s mad campaign the Great Leap Forward giving rise to a death toll of 20 to 40 million people is now well-known the world over. Frank Dikötter gives an astonishing, riveting, magnificently detailed account of it in his book Mao’s Great Famine.

Mao’s second fit of domestic madness the Cultural Revolution is even more famous. It was at first hailed in America as a campaign with lofty ideal. There were no statistics of the death toll and the number of victims. People who personally experienced it like me know that the number was enormous. People outside China now know the evils of the campaign when the truth has come out, but Mao’s misunderstood image as an idealist remains in the minds of quite a few people.

Mao’s Fits of International Madness
Mao told Soviet leader Khrushchev that he would fight a nuclear war to eliminate capitalism all over the world even if half of Chinese population–300 million then– died in the war. Taking into account of China’s poor economy and backward weapons then, Mao was much madder than Tojo Hideki. However, when I was studying in a university in Anhui, China in 1958, there was hot enthusiasm for communism among the students there. Some of my close classmates talked about Mao’s words and said in private (not openly to please Party cadres) that they admired Mao that he represented Chinese people in saying that we Chinese were willing to make the greatest national sacrifice for communism. Mao was able to make quite a few Chinese people as mad as him because elements of Maoism are deeply rooted in China’s popular culture for infection of his madness. That is China’s most serious problem.

Kissinger mentions that twice Mao brought the world to the brink of nuclear war in the two Taiwan crises in the 1950s, but he admires Mao’s shelling “diplomacy” and regrets that Mao’s “brilliant achievements” were not “balanced against the global impact of the crisis”. He invented China’s ‘traditional” “empty city stratagem” to gloss over Mao’s repeated fits of madness.

Kissinger Ignores Mao’s Export of Revolution
He quotes Mao's words to Snow in 1965 to prove, "the tangible impact of China on world revolution was largely ideological".

Though a well-informed diplomat, he regards as not “tangible” all the following Mao’s enthusiastic world revolution activities except Item 1:
1. Mao transferred 50,000 experienced troops with weapons to increase Kim Il-sung’s troops to 231,000 for invasion of South Korea and sent troops to fight against America to preserve North Korean communist regime.
2. Mao trained and armed Vietnamese communists, sent lots of military advisers to help drive away France and establish communist North Vietnam, and provided aids worth billions of yuan to help them take over South Vietnam.
3. Mao helped Khmer Rouge rise to power in Cambodia in 1975. Mao’s “ideal” of “purifying the society” inspired Pol Pot, resulting in the Killing Fields.
4. Mao provided substantial aids to communists and guerillas all over the world in spite of China’s own economic difficulties.

Mao, an Idealist?
Throughout his book, Kissinger strives to sell Mao’s image as an idealist. He says that of Mao’s four grand titles, Mao told him Mao only wanted to keep that of “Teacher” as if Mao was a loving teacher. Mao persecuted people but that was the punishment given by Mao the strict teacher for purifying his pupils, he hints.

However, Mao was not a loving but a cruel tyrannous teacher whose teachings you were not to trifle with. Non-acceptance of or doubting any of his teachings or instructions was a crime. One would be severely punished even if one revealed it only in one’s private diary. In 1970, Zhang Yihe, a common clerk then but a well-known writer now, wrote in her diary upon Mao’s promotion of his wife Jiang Qing the Chinese saying “When a man becomes immortal, even his hens and dogs become immortal, too”. She got a sentence of 20-year imprisonment for that. When I was in Shanghai then, persecution and imprisonment for dissent in people’s diaries were common phenomena.

Mao’s Cruel Persecution of Dissidents
In 1970, quite a few young dissidents including some Party members openly said that Mao’s Cultural Revolution deviated from Marxism after they had diligently studied Marxist classics. Mao carried out a nation-wide One Strike-Three Anti Campaign and according to official figure, by November 1970 arrested 280,000 dissidents labeled as “counterrevolutionaries”. Those young dissidents were brave and wanted an open debate with Mao, but Mao “purified the society” by cruel torture, imprisonment and execution.

Zhang Zhixin was a typical case. The tortures and death penalty she suffered and the cruelty of the Campaign can still be found on the Internet. My father was framed-up and arrested as a counterrevolutionary then. He told me that he heard noise of torture everyday when he was detained in a detention center in Shanghai for more than one year.

It is very clear that Mao’s “ideal” was not to “purify the society” but to establish his absolute authority. However, a man cruelly realizing such an “ideal” is normally regarded as a tyrant instead of idealist.

America’s ignorance about China
As a brilliant diplomat, in writing his book, Kissinger certainly consulted lots of American China experts’ writings. The plenty misinformation about China and failure to give information about present-day China and its leaders and people in his book reflect their ignorance too. I have no intention to find faults, but have to point out some to rouse American people’s awareness because the misunderstanding resulting from such ignorance may have catastrophic consequence.

Kissinger says that there were no official records of Chinese emperor holding “summit meeting” with other heads of state but foreign heads coming to present tribute to Chinese emperor as their overlord. On pages 6018–6020 of the official history entitled The Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government, Emperor Taizong of Tang met King Jieli of Tujue (the Turkic Khanate) and concluded a treaty with him in 626. That was quite an interesting event as Emperor Taizong who was quite sure that he could defeat Tujue’s one million invading troops then, gave Jieli gold and silk in order to make Jieli arrogant and unprepared so that he could conquer Tujue later. Three years later, his troops conquered Tujue.

Emperor Taizong was the greatest emperor and his Reign of Zhenguan, most famous in Chinese history. Ignorance of him after reading Chinese history is like ignorance of Napoleon Bonaparte after reading French history.

America Not on Alert
American brilliant scholar Samuel P. Huntington predicted in his well-known book "Clash of Civilizations" possible clash between Islamic and Western civilizations but America was not on alert. It failed to make thorough investigations when traces of Islamic terrorist attack were found months before 9.11. That reminds me of Pearl Harbor.

Will America fail to be on alert a third time when the scenario of the clash between American and Chinese civilizations described by Huntington in his book becomes a reality?

Kissinger mentiones China's sinocentric cosmology but glosses over Mao’s enthusiastic pursuit of leadership in world revolution, which was precisely a development of that cosmology. He mentions two recent books advocating sinocentric cosmology, but despite their being bestsellers, he treats them lightly, saying they are criticized in the Chinese press. If Americans believe him, they will not be on alert.

Deep-rooted Maoism, Rich Soil for the Emergence of another Mao
To prevent Kissinger’s book from giving world people a false sense of security, I have to make people see the possibility of the emergence of another Mao. As a profound understanding of Chinese culture and political system is indispensable for that, I have to give a short description and analysis though they are the topics for a special book.

If future Chinese leaders remain Confucianist-Marxist and pursue harmony in the world, China’s rise will be beneficial instead of troublesome to the world.

In his book, China’s singularity is a major topic, but Kissinger is ignorant about that. China’s singularity first of all lies in its always having a dominant ideology. When Confucianism had entirely lost its dominance and been denounced since 1919 and was criticized along with Lin Biao, ignorant of that, Kissinger mentioned it to Zhou Enlai and got furious response.

During the Cultural Revolution, there was renaissance of Confucianism among a new generation of talented intellectuals with moral integrity. Those in Shanghai joined Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai faction and served Jiang in carrying out a silent peaceful coup d’état they have planned for a long time, to substitute intellectuals’ dominance for uneducated workers’ and peasants’. Jiang’s Three Represents marks the success of the coup and develops Marxism to justify China’s pursuit of capitalism adjusted by Keynesian macroeconomic control.

Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have added Confucianism to Jiang’s new Marxism and stressed harmony in order to overcome the conflict arising from the yawning rich-poor gap resulted from such capitalism. They are also trying to establish Mencius democracy of “putting people first”. However, their Confucianism-Marxism, though dominant at present, has a very short history and takes time to be so well established as to prevent the emergence of another Mao.

Another ideology, Maoism, the dominant ideology in Mao era, has its key elements such as egalitarianism, personality cult, sinocentric cosmology, enmity against intellectuals and cruelty in fighting for its goal deeply rooted in Chinese popular culture. Those elements prevailed in lots of peasants uprisings in Chinese history and in Mao’s mad pursuit of leadership in world revolution and the Cultural Revolution.

According to a survey in 2008, in 40 cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Wuhan, families who had Mao’s statutes or portraits for worship accounted for 11.5% of the total number of families there, exceeding by far those who worshiped Buddha, God of Wealth or local god of the land.

Mao Zedong Thought is in conflict with Confucianism-Marxism, but it remains the Party's guiding ideology and Mao remains China’s great leader in spite of the criticism of his errors.

With such rich soil for Maoism, the emergence of another Mao is quite possible in the future.

China’s Political System and Art for Being an Emperor
China has a long history of autocracy. In China, there have never been any definition, codes or rules whatever about the power of a top leader whether he has the title of emperor or not. In fact, even if there are some codes or rules, there is no institution or mechanism to enforce them. This makes a top leader’s position precarious.

Due to frequent usurp of sovereign power resulting in the demise of some ruling families, Han Fei (281?–233 BC), a Legalist master, wrote his famous classic entitled "Han Fei-tzu" to teach sovereigns the strategy, tactics, tricks and intrigues to maintain their authority. As such strategy, etc. were vital for sovereigns, they were further developed and called the art for being an emperor (diwangshu in Chinese) later. One of the most well-known examples was that of Liu Bei, the founding emperor of Shuhan Dynasty, characterized by establishing close affectionate bondage with talented generals and officials.

Han Fei gives the advice that a sovereign must keep all his officials in awe and maintain such awe by keeping a distance from everyone else including his family members, relatives and officials and trust no one. A sovereign will thus have no friends and lead a lonely life, but Qin Shihuang's application of Han's art proved that it was good in maintaining his iron rule though failed to ensure succession.

Around 134 BC, Confucianism was adopted as the dominant ideology. All the later dynasties exploited Confucian stress on loyalty and filial duty to consolidate emperor’s position and ensure succession. However, as Confucianism had been thoroughly denounced since 1919, when Mao became the sovereign of the CCP’s autocracy, his position was as precarious as Qin Shihuang's without Confucian loyalty to rely on.

Mao adopted Han Fei’s art as with no need for hereditary succession the art was perfect for him. That was why he rehabilitated Qin Shihuang who until then had been condemned for 2,000 years in Chinese history, and openly advocated Legalism in his later years. However, Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin’s personality cult greatly threatened Mao’s authority. Mao faithfully abided by Han Fei’s principles and took preemptive actions to remove his close friends and chosen successors Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao when he suspected that they had grown too powerful and might have usurped his power.

CCP’s Core System Facilitates Emergence of Mad Leaders
When Mao Dynasty ended and Mao’s successor was removed from power, Deng Xiaoping tried to set up a system of collective leadership to prevent the reemergence of Mao’s autocracy that had brought disasters to China, but that system did not work. Zhao Ziyang’s memoirs gives a vivid description that when Deng and other powerful elders had retired from the politburo, their successors in the politburo were top leaders only in name, but had no real power.

Moreover, Deng found the collective leadership ineffective in adopting hard measures to suppress Tiananmen Protests and maintain the Party’s rule. He realized that China’s political system since the communist takeover had been a core system with a core having the absolute authority like the emperor in a feudal dynasty but without hereditary succession and believed that such a system should be maintained. That was why when he had promoted Jiang Zemin to succeed him as the core of the Party leadership, he exhorted Jiang, “When Mao was alive, he had the final say and when I am alive, I have the final say. I will not rest at ease until the time when you have the final say.” Obviously, by “final say” Deng Xiaoping meant that the core should have absolute authority like Mao and Deng.

According to Zhao’s memoirs, in making a major decision, Deng Xiaoping consulted with other elders when Zhao was in office. However, after the Tiananmen Massacre, Deng began to act as the core and heeded no other elders’ views. When all the elders and quite a large majority of officials became conservative after Tiananmen Massacre, Deng Xiaoping conducted his famous Southern Tour to reinvigorate the reform alone. All others had to obey his instruction and Deng Xiaoping typically played his role as the core who has the power above all others and even above law and Party and state constitutions like Mao.

When Jiang Zemin has established his absolute authority as the core, the Party’s core system finally became mature.

In such a core system, in order to become the core and maintain the position as the core, one has to master and apply the art for being an emperor elaborated in "Han Fei-tzu" or Jiang Zemin’s art that is similar to Liu Bei’s, which is even more difficult as there is no special systematic book on it.

A madman interested in Han Fei’s art of tricks and intrigues has a better chance to gain the position of core. Therefore the probability that a future core applies Han Fei’s art must be greater than Jiang’s. With the rich soil for mad leader in China, by application of Han Fei’s art such a madman can easily become an absolute monarch and make China mad.

What is most worrisome is that in China’s core system, when the core is mad like Mao, no one can control or remove him!

Democracy, the Only Way Out
Only when there is real democracy in China can the emergence of another Mao be prevented and can another Mao be timely removed if he does emerge. Therefore, only then can Chinese people have a bright future and China’s neighbors and America rest at ease at China’s rise.

However what can Western countries do? They certainly are unable to impose democracy on China as they are doing now on Libya. First, they have to reinvigorate their economy and improve their people’s living standards. With examples of prosperity in their democracies, they can attract Chinese people to learn from their democracies.

Second, they shall keep on disseminating their ideal of democracy by every possible means among Chinese people. They shall continue to denounce China whenever it violates human rights. It seems not effective, but it indeed works. That was why those who persecuted dissidents recently ordered their victims not to contact foreign journalists.

On the contrary, in his book, Kissinger admonishes US current and future administrations to “substantially” balance “long-term moral convictions with case-to-case adaptations to requirements of national security”, i.e., in disseminating American values of democracy and human rights, they shall avoid offending China or they shall even turn a blind eye to the emergence of another Mao in China in order to prevent confrontation and achieve “co-evolution”. By so doing, America will fail to be on alert again and may suffer a third time perhaps much more severely.

[Hartley · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kissinger is such a good writer it makes you forget he may have committed war crimes

[Dmitri · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book on China-US foreign relations by America's iconic 20th century diplomat Henry Kissinger is as revealing as it is self indulgent. Kiss~ is his own self-proclaimed proponent of realpolitik, the pragmatic approach pioneered in the "Art of War". Steeped in ancient lore and modern myth he seems a sinophile as well. Invested in his own legacy he is drawn by historical gravity towards the inevitable return of the Middle Kingdom. From Three Kingdoms he quotes: "The empire long divided must unite".

In a lighting tour of China's past, Kiss~ touches upon the secular wisdom of Confucius, the military philosophy of Sun Tzu, wei qi board game strategies and Ming methods of barbarian management. 19th century imperial catastrophes such as the Opium Wars and the Boxer Rebellion put an end to the Qing Dynasty's heavenly mandate in 1912. The Chiang nationalist remnants of Republican China, too weak to win in WWII, lose the civil war to the Communists in 1949 and then run away to Taiwan.

Kiss~ turns his reverent and awestruck gaze towards Mao, the "poet and warrior, prophet", and the founder of a new empire. Mao thought the past needed to be eradicated to usher in the future. In dialectical opposition to Confucius, rather than restore a lost order Mao would fulfill a coming destiny by inciting social and political disorder. Haunted by a prior century of humiliation Mao stands up to the world, no longer European or Japanese imperialists, but now American and Soviet empires.

A new three way power play begins as the USA and USSR triangulate with the People's Republic. North Korea's Kim poised on his 38th parallel perch since '45 invites Stalin and Mao be part of his dream. Assured of Taiwan, Mao balks but Stalin assents. In order to drive a wedge between the Chinese and Americans Stalin admonishes Kim: "If you get kicked in the teeth I won't raise a finger. You'll have to ask Mao for help." Three million died and yet the Kim dynasty persists until this day.

So on it goes this cold war game, and where it ends nobody knows. From Kiss~ we learn that LBJ misread Mao and was fooled into fighting the Soviet backed Vietcong. Kiss~ might have saved the day if not for his Vietnamization and carpet bombing Cambodia. In detente and rapprochement we sense the Tao of Kiss~ at work, while Nixon whispers from behind: "the ideas were all mine". Kiss~ advises Deng on how to lead a Chinese reform, and then he doesn't complain about the Tiananmen storm.

Kiss~ invests early in a joint venture with the Communist regime, as Mao rolls over in his crystal coffin. Kiss~ is now honored as an "Old Friend of the Chinese People". This is one of the few recent books that show Mao as he was, a man capable of leading China from ruin to world power and back again (a geopolitical opponent worthy of Kiss~). This is a personally gratifying but lengthy tale told by our venerable emissary to Peking. A word of caution, like Caesar in Gaul, read this missive with care.


[Dave · Rating 3 out of 5]

First of all, the humorous aspects of the book:

1. Take a look at the cover itself! Kissinger's name seems slightly bigger than the actual title.
2. A disproportionate amount of the photos feature the distinguished author. "Here is the author talking with X," "Here is the author talking with 'Y,' and my favorite, "Here is the author playing ping-pong with one of his aides." Well I guess you are a regular guy after all!

So, Kissinger lives up to his reputation as being somewhat self-important.

With that out of the way, the book has a number of strengths:

1. Kissinger is an engaging writer. The book is easy to read.
2. From the mid 60's to today, his personal/professional relationships with many of the Chinese leaders give him unique insight and authority to speak on the issues confronting China and the U.S.
3. For someone like myself (basically ignorant about China) the book is informative and illuminating.
4. I would not call Kissinger an apologist for the Chinese point of view, but he does do a solid job of giving the Chinese perspective on various events and problems.

The Weaknesses:

1. In typical Chinese fashion, the book is very slow to actually get anywhere 'decisive.' He believes in continuing dialogue, negotiations, etc., but who doesn't? He has great explanatory power bur does little to advance his own synthesis.
2. He seems to go very easy on Mao. I don't put Mao on the level of the 20th century's worst autocrats like Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot. But that's not saying much. Kissinger always refers almost indirectly to the turbulence and atrocities of Mao's rule.

This made me wonder what he was doing, and then I had an idea. Perhaps Kissinger conceived of this book not so much as an argument, but as a last diplomatic mission. The book functions like a diplomat should - engaging, careful not offend either side, focus on dialogue, etc.

If true, that would sum up both the book's strengths and weaknesses.

[Negar Afsharmanesh · Rating 4 out of 5]

این کتاب که توسط هنری کیسینجر در سال ٢٠١١ نوشته شده و توسط دکتر حسین راسی به فارسی ترجمه شده است، نقطه نظرات این دیپلمات کهنه‌کار امریکایی از مشاهدات و تفکرات خویش در مورد وضعیت رازآلود منطقه وسیعی از آسیا به نام چین را انعکاس می‌دهد. او در پی یافتن راز تداوم و یکپارچگی این واحد سیاسی در طول زمان است.

او در دهه ١٩٧٠ سفرهای متعدد محرمانه به چین داشت تا آنکه رییس‌جمهور امریکا ریچارد نیکسون در ١٩٧٢ رسما به پکن سفر کرد. پس از آن از ١٩٧٩ دنگ شیائوپنگ معمار درهای باز در چین به قدرت رسید و سپس در ١٩٨٩ اعتراضات شهری در چین برای نخستین بار مشاهده شد. کیسینجر در مورد اشغال میدان صلح آسمانی در پکن می‌گوید: اشغال میدان مرکزی حتی به‌صورت مسالمت‌آمیز هر شهری به معنای آسیب‌پذیری حکومت آن کشور است. کیسینجر معتقد است که خیلی بعید است که چین قدرت اقتصادی خود را به قدرت نظامی تبدیل نکند.

[Lewis Weinstein · Rating 5 out of 5]

May 2022 ... I've read a few more chapters of Kissinger's brilliant book ... covering the next segment of my historical novel in progress

***

Kissinger is brilliant ... his portrayal of China through the lens of his own involvement is utterly fascinating ... I have reached his chapter on Mao; every sentence seems to contain another uniquely illuminating insight

one extract; more to come ...

... in his rebellion against China’s pervasive bureaucracy, Mao kept coming up against the dilemma that the campaign to save his people from themselves generated ever larger bureaucracies. In the end, destroying his own disciples turned into Mao’s vast enterprise.

[Jinsong · Rating 5 out of 5]

Although I don’t completely agree with the author, I thoroughly enjoyed this wonderful book about a country where I came from.

I was immensely impressed by the first-hand materials Kissinger possessed in writing this powerful book. Kissinger chooses wisely the starting point where to begin his account. People, even among the Chinese pay little attention to the literal meaning of the Chinese name of the country. Explaining the meaning of the two Chinese characters helps understand the people’s traditional belief and philosophy in dealing with other nations.

Kissinger cleverly picked some of the well know Chinese fables, historical events, and Chinese games to tell what he wanted to convey. The analysis of the impact of the Opium War in 1840, the Chinese classic the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and the board games Wei-chi was accurate and reliable. I enjoyed his account of Zhuge Liang’s (181–234) Empty Fort strategy and using it to interpret Mao’s handling of the superpowers.

Kissinger and his associates did a marvelous job in putting the Chinese classic writings in English. This is especial true with the subtleties of the language.

"The empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been."

[JJ Khodadadi · Rating 4 out of 5]

خلاصه این کتاب رو از پادکست بی پلاس شنیدم و با اینکه کل کتاب رو نخوندم اما واقعا برام جالب بود، هم کتاب کتابه خوب و جذاب و با اطلاعات آموزنده ای هست و هم اپیزود خوب و قوی بود و بررسی های جالبی درباره مسائل مطرح شده انجام داده بود
امیدوارم در آینده بتونم کل کتاب رو مطالعه کنم

[Brett C · Rating 5 out of 5]

"The future of Asia will be shaped to a significant degree by how China and America envision it, and by the extent to which each nation is able to achieve some congruence with the other's historical regional role. Throughout its history, the United States has often been motivated by visions of universal relevance of its ideals and of a proclaimed duty to spread them. China has acted on the basis of its singularity. It expands by cultural osmosis, not missionary zeal." pg 529

This is a must-read in my opinion. This was an excellent overview of both Chinese history from a cultural perspective as well as a diplomatic & political history from the beginning of its inception through recent times. Henry Kissinger wrote a tremendously insightful & transparent book culminated from his tenure as United States Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977 and also serving as the seventh national security advisor from 1969 to 1979 serving under both Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.

Kissinger's narrative completed the overview history of past and classical Chinese principles and how they retained relevance through the centuries: from the various Chinese kingdoms and into the present government of the Peoples' Republic of China. He broke down the inner workings of internal domestic & foreign policy and outward displays of subtlety, patience and indirection, limiting the need of military might.

In his essay "Perpetual Peace," the philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that perpetual peace would eventually come to the world in one of two ways: by human insight or by conflicts and catastrophes of a magnitude that left humanity with no other choice. We are at such a juncture. pg 530

Kissinger examined and explained many key elements of Chinese foreign policies from the classical era and really tooking off during the communist takeover under the Mao regime in 1949. Key events such as The Great Leap Forward, and Cultural Revolution were explained in detail and why they occured.

Kissinger brought forth important information from documented research as well as his personal experiences abroad with key figures such as Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaopeng. Progressive policies through the 1980s through 2000s were dissected to give the reader as much information as possible without overload.

The Chinese diplomacy has learned from millennia of experience that in international issues, each apparent solution is generally an admission ticket to a new set of related problems. Hence, Chinese diplomats consider continuity of relationships as an important task and perhaps more important than formal documents. By comparison, American diplomacy tends to segment issues into self contained units to be dealt with on their own merits. The difference is that Chinese leaders relate to friendship, less to personal qualities, and more to long term cultural, national and historic ties; Americans stress the individual qualities of their counterparts. Chinese protestations of friendship seek durability for long-term relationships through the cultivation of intangibles; American equivalents, attempts to facilitate ongoing activities by emphasis on social contract. (pg 244-5)

This narrative was written clearly and presented for understanding, even with basic understanding of political science knowledge. I would highly recommend this to anyone (especially civil servants or military personnel) for insight and understanding into modern China and Chinese logic. Thanks!

[Mostafa Bushehri · Rating 5 out of 5]

اگر بشود نامی فرعی برای این کتاب در نظر گرفت شاید یکی از بهترین عنوان‌ها، «چین چگونه چین شد؟»، باشد.

هنری کیسینجر، دیپلمات کارکشته و مغز متفکر دیپلماسی، به سراغ چینی رفته است که صدای «خیزش»، «رشد» و «توسعه» آن شاید حالاحالاها در فضای نظام سیاسی بین‌الملل طنین‌انداز باشد. چینی که بود، جا ماند، رسید و اکنون آمده است که بماند و یکه‌تازی کند.

هنری کیسینجر در این کتاب قطور به بررسی تاریخ سیاسیِ چین می‌پردازد. کشوری که تاریخی غنی و سرشار، ملت و فرهنگی منحصر به فرد داشته و اکنون نیز در ردای یک بازیگر تاثیرگذار سیاسی و ابرقدرت جهانی خودنمایی می‌کند.

چین از معدود کشورهایی است که علی‌رغم تمام کاستی‌ها و سختی‌ها و رشد و زوال‌ها تمدنش باقی ماند و به کتیبه‌های تاریخی نپیوست.

این کتاب، تاریخ و سرگذشت یک ملت است که زمانی در اوج اقتدار و امپراتوری خود به سر می‌برد و خود را «مرکز جهان» می‌پنداشت اما همچون تمام امپراتوری‌های تاریخ رو به اضمحلال گرایید. اما این چین با روم و یونان و عثمانی تفاوتی بسیار داشت. کشوری که حتی جنگ‌های داخلی و هرج و مرج هم نتوانست آن را به زیر بکشد.

از مقاومت و خاص بودن این سرزمین این را باید گفت که حتی ایدئولوژی مارکسیست-لنینیستی و کمونیسم نیز حریفش نشد و در نهایت نه فرهنگ و تاریخ چین و کنفوسیوس‌گرایی در کمونیسم، بلکه این کمونیسم بود که در تاریخ و فرهنگ چین و کنفوسیوس‌گرایی استحاله گردید.

حتی باید کمونیسم چینی را، که «مائو» بنیانگذارش بود و مائوئیسم ایدئولوژی‌اش، متفاوت از کمونیسم لنینیستی و شوروی در نظر گرفت.

این چین کمونیستی حتی به زیر چتر «برادر بزرگتر» خود، شوروی، نیز نرفت و در نهایت دشمن دورِ ایدئولوژیک (آمریکا) را بر دشمن نزدیکِ خود (شوروی) ترجیح داد و سمبل عملگراییِ کمونیستی در تاریخ شد. تقابل چین با شوروی و ائتلاف استراتژیک چین و آمریکا را می‌بایست نماد عملگرایی تاریخ جنگ سرد و پیروزی «استراتژی» بر «ایدئولوژی» قلمداد کرد.

علی‌رغم تمام خسران‌ها و فجایعی که مائو در دوران زمامداری‌اش، از «جهش بزرگ به جلو» گرفته تا «انقلاب فرهنگی» و از بین بردن تاریخ و فرهنگ کهن چینی، بر سر چین آورد اما این کشور و تمدن باز هم سرپا ماند.

جانشینان مائو اما فهمیده بودند که این کشور پهناور و پرجمعیت را نمی‌توان با ایدئولوژی و «انقلاب همیشگی» به پیش راند و اینک وقت توسعه و عملگرایی است.

"بیش از ده سال پس از مرگ مائو، «انقلاب همیشگی» او دوباره ظاهر شده بود، اما این گونه‌ی جدیدی از انقلاب همیشگی بود و پوشش تازه بر تن داشت: انقلاب مبتنی بر ابتکار فردی، و نه شور ایدئولوژیکی؛ ارتباط با دنیای خارج، و نه خودکفایی مطلق. این انقلابِ تازه به رهبری «دِنگ شیائوپینگ» (جانشین مائو)، که خود نیز روزی قربانی سیاست‌های مائو شده بود، می‌رفت که چین را از ریشه متحول کند، درست همانطور که خواست «مائو» بود، اما درست در جهت عکس آن."

این کتابِ بسیار آموزنده در کنار بررسی تاریخ سیاستِ خارجه‌ی چین، به رویکرد و سیاست خارجه دولت‌های آمریکا، از پس از جنگ جهانی دوم تا اوایل ریاست‌جمهوری باراک اوباما، در قبال چین نیز می‌پردازد و در آن درس‌های فراوانی از هنر و فنِ دیپلماسی، مفاهیم و جملات معنادار در سیاست خارجه و نیز نحوه تفکر و نگرش به نظام بین‌الملل برای خوانندگان، به ویژه دانشجویان روابط بین‌الملل، نهفته است.

فصل آخر نیز نگارنده به سراغ آینده روابط چین و ایالات متحده و تاثیرات این دو ابر قدرت بر نظام بین‌الملل می‌پردازد و از بایدها و نبایدها و بیم‌ها و امیدها سخن می‌گوید.

*ترجمه این کتاب که توسط حسین راسی صورت گرفته و نشر فرهنگ معاصر آن را منتشر کرده است ترجمه‌ای بسیار دقیق، روان و خوشخوان است.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

On China, by Henry Kissinger, is an examination of Chinese history and diplomacy, coupled with the recent opening up of Chinese society to global forces and China's subsequent engagement with the global community. The book looks at Chinese history, politics, diplomacy and culture, while coupling these topics with China's geopolitical position. Kissinger offers insight into this topic due to first hand negotiations and experience during China's initial foray into diplomatic outreach, during the final few years of Mao Zedong's reign over Communist China.

The book begins with an examination of Chinese culture and how it relates to international diplomacy. China has historically considered itself the centre of the universe, in terms of its position of dominance in Asia. China sought to order itself and the states along its periphery, largely in terms of geopolitics. States in more extreme locale's, such as the Indian Kingdoms, Southeast Asian Kingdoms, and the nations of the Steppe, were often beyond direct military or political control. China, instead, created a radiating centre of states, in increasingly more autonomous systems of vassalage. States like Korea and Tibet would often exist in more permanent states of vassalage, while areas like tribal Kazakhstan and Japan might pay a form of lip service or slight tribute. China, as the sole power in Asia throughout much of history, thus ordered its universe around itself, with complex forms of ritual diplomacy, a strong and professional bureaucratic system, and a deeply rooted sense of historical tradition centered on the principles of Confucianism dominating its cultural narrative.

This all changed with the coming of European forces. China had long been beset by foreign invaders, such as the Mongols, and Manchus, to name a few. However, China often overcame these invaders through a process of Sinicization. New Empires would eventually succumb to Chinese traditions, as the easiest and most efficient way to rule over the often much more populous and sedentary Chinese lands was to adopt their systems of governance. This often led to the eventual incorporation of the ruling elite into the Chinese cultural system. However, European invaders cared only for trade and market access, as well as colonies, and brought there own universal world views based on Christianity, missionary zeal, and perceived cultural superiority. These norms were incompatible with existing Chinese conceptions of the Universe, and a clash was inevitable. China had been through periods of upheaval, collapse and decay before, and had a tradition of overcoming. However, the subsequent invasions of China by the British, French, and Japanese upset China's hegemony in Asia, and challenged its concept of the Universe. China needed to adapt, and in some ways did so.

This came about due to the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 - China's last Imperial dynasty. From that point onward, a Nationalist, and then Communist government controlled China - both quasi dictatorial states either aligned to the West (Nationalist) or the USSR (Communist). The Communist eventually took power in 1949, forming the government that controls China to this day. Even so, the makeup of modern China's government system has gone through many changes since then. Mao Zedong ruled over early Communist China with an iron fist, almost like a new Emperor. He sought to reorder Chinese society away from its traditional Confucius past. This was done through realignment, the disruption and destruction of the Mandarin bureaucracy, and a reorganization of China's traditional agricultural system. These policies were often violently destructive and most often reductive. Millions died in China's subsequent famines, and many leading technical and policy experts were purged from the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution.

However, a change that China did make under Mao was its slow reorientation away from the USSR. China and the USSR had a rocky relationship from the beginning - historical territorial frictions along the shared and porous border, coupled at historical animosity at Russia's traditional colonial claims to Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Port Arthur trumped ideological similarities between the two communist giants. China bid its time, and Mao held Stalin in some regard. Mao sent troops into Korea, for example, after some rocky diplomatic dancing between the two states. However, after Stalin's death, the relationship between China and the USSR began to fray. On paper the two were military allies, however, in practice they were clashing along frontier zones over territorial disputes. China thus sought to hedge its alliances and end its relative isolation in global diplomacy. The US was the natural choice; and the US was interested in courting China as well. A disruption of the Communist bloc would be ideal, and President Nixon was looking to wind down the Vietnam War and sought China's neutrality.

Kissinger details the negotiations in depth including the principle Chinese and American viewpoints, as well as some of the cast of characters involved. Kissinger then goes on to offer a brief analysis of the Deng Xiaoping era, in terms of the opening up of China in terms of its global interactions, the slow recognition of the PRC as the main Chinese government, the development of China and the Tiananmen Square incident. A small section is devoted to the growing rivalry with the US in terms of China's increasingly assertive foreign policy stance in terms of territorial claims, global economic participation, and erosion of US hegemonic practices. Kissinger has written a compelling and interesting book on China, and this is certainly an important viewpoint to read and consider. Recommended for China watchers, those interested in current events, and fans of history and politics.

[Murtaza · Rating 5 out of 5]

I've always been interested in Kissinger's perspective on U.S-China relations since he had a front-row seat to its main events. This book really exceeded my expectations. Instead of just being a blow-by-blow of events (although it has that too) it offers a philosophical examination of China's history and how this shapes the worldview of its contemporary leaders.

Some of the most interesting parts of the book are at the beginning when he discusses the approach that Chinese leaders first took towards Westerners who had sought to come open up their country to trade. The haughty, regal self-assuredness that ended up rankling British emissaries led to their decision to open up China by force. At that time a Sinocentric worldview was the norm, and it was a violent centuries long experience to readjust to a world in which Western powers could challenge "All Under Heaven." Now, China has regained its place but the memory of that period of bullying and humiliation shapes much of China's calculations today.

In addition to being historically informed and full of interesting anecdotes, this is a delicately written and enjoyable book. It also contains thoughtful reflections on the nature of the global order, the respective importance of "values" and public opinion in shaping and constraining policy, and the resilience of Chinese culture in the face of repeated attempts to uproot it. I understand that some of the stuff in here may be viewed as essentializing by those with a more in-depth knowledge of Chinese culture (particularly Chinese themselves), but it made the concepts accessible and can be an introduction to greater study. Kissinger is obviously a troubling figure but he is a far greater intellect than any of our contemporary war criminals. This book is a must-read in my opinion.

[Saadia B. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Through many millennia of Chinese civilization, China was never obliged to deal with other countries or civilizations that were comparable to it in scale and sophistication. Though China and Japan shared a number of core cultural and political institutions, neither was prepared to recognize the other's superiority; their solution was to curtail contact for centuries at a time. China acquired no overseas colonies and shared relatively little interest in the countries beyond its coast. It was for centuries the world's most productive economy and most populous trading area. The methods by which it was unified and periodically overturned and reunified again were occasionally brutal.

Chinese history witnessed its share of sanguinary rebellions and dynastic tyrants. With distinctive traditions and millennial habits of superiority, China entered the modern age a singular kind of empire: a state claiming universal relevance for its culture and institutions but making few efforts to proselytize; the wealthiest country in the world but one that was indifferent to foreign trade and technological innovation; a culture of cosmopolitanism overseen by a political elite oblivious to the onset of the Western age of exploration; and a political unit of unparalleled geographic extent that was unaware of the technological and historical currents that would soon threaten its existence. The results of the interplay between Western overwhelming force and Chinese psychological management were two treaties negotiated, the Treaty of Nanjing and the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue.

It provided the Britain for payment of a $6 million indemnity by China, the cession of Hong Kong and the opening of five coastal 'treaty ports' in which Western residence and trade would be permitted. This effectively dismantled the "Canton System" by which the Chinese court had regulated trade with the West and confined it to licensed merchants. Within the space of a decade, the Middle Kingdom had gone from preeminence to being an object of contending colonial forces. Poised between two eras and two different conceptions of international relations, China strove for a new identity, and above all to reconcile the value that marked its greatness with the technology and commerce on which it would have to base its security.

Mao's approach to preemption differed in the extraordinary attention he paid to psychological elements. His motivating force was less to inflict a decisive military first blow than to change the psychological balance, not so much to defeat the enemy as to alter his calculus of risks. Ideology had brought Beijing and Moscow together and ideology drove them apart again. The Soviet Union regarded the Communist world as a single strategic entity whose leadership was in Moscow. It had established satellite regimes in Eastern Europe that were dependent on Soviet military and to some extent economic support. It seemed natural to the Soviet Politburo that the same pattern of dominance should prevail in Asia. In terms of Chinese history, cultural differences exacerbated latent tensions - especially since the Soviet leaders were generally oblivious of Chinese historic sensitivities.

As the 1960s progressed, even Mao began to recognize the potential perils of China were multiplying. Along its vast borders, China faced a potential enemy in the Soviet Union; a humiliated adversary in India; a massive American deployment and an escalating war in Vietnam; self-proclaimed governments-in-exile in Taipei and the Tibetan enclave of northern India; a historic opponent in Japan; and across the Pacific an American that viewed China as an implacable adversary. Sino-American diplomacy within a year moved from irreconcilable conflict to a visit to Beijing by a presidential emissary to prepare a visit by the President himself. It did so by sidestepping the rhetoric of two decades and staying focused on the fundamental strategic objective of a geopolitical dialogue leading to a recasting of the Cold War international order.

To Nixon, the opening of China was part of an overall strategic design not a shopping list of mutual irritations. Chinese leaders pursued a parallel approach. Invocations of returning to an existing international order were meaningless to them, if only because they did not consider the existing international system, which they had no hand in forming, as relevant to them. They had never conceived their security to reside in the legal arrangement of a community of sovereign states. When Zhou wrote about reestablishing friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, he described an attitude needed to foster a new international equilibrium, not a final state of the relationship between peoples.

What was sought, rather, was a world in which China could find security and progress through a kind of combative coexistence in which readiness to fight was given equal pride of place to the concept of coexistence. One cultural trait regularly invoked by Chinese leaders was their historic perspective - the ability, indeed the necessity, to think of time in categories different from the West's. Whatever an individual Chinese leader achieves is brought about in a timeframe that represents a smaller fraction of his society's total experience than any other leader in the world. The duration and scale of the Chinese past allow Chinese leaders to use the mantle of an almost limitless history to evoke a certain modesty in their opposite numbers. Nixon's visit to China is one of the few occasions where a state visit brought about a seminal change in international affairs.

The reentry of China into the global diplomatic game and the increased strategic options for the United States gave a new vitality and flexibility to the international system. Nixon's visit was followed by comparable visits by the leaders of other Western democracies and Japan. The adoption of the anti-hegemony classes in the Shanghai Communiques signified a de facto shift of alliances. Though at first confined to Asia, the undertaking was expanded a year later to include the rest of the world. Consultation between China and the United States reached a level of intensity rare even among formal allies.

What the opening to China accomplished was an opportunity to increase cooperation where interests were congruent and to mitigate differences where they existed. The reward for Sino-American rapprochement would not be a state of perpetual friendship or a harmony of vales but a rebalancing of the global equilibrium that would require constant tending and perhaps in time produce a greater harmony of values. In that process, each side would be the guardian of its own interests. And each would seek to use the other as a source of leverage in its relations with Moscow. Ideology would be relegated to domestic management; it took a leave from foreign policy. The ideological armistice was of course valid as long as objectives remained compatible. After the opening to China, Moscow started to compete for Washington's favor.

Contacts between the nuclear superpowers multiplied. While the United States clearly signaled that it considered China as essential component of the international order and would support it if threatened, it also had a separate and more strategic option in Moscow. Mao introduced the "Three World": The United States and the Soviet Union belonged to the first world. Countries such as Japan and Europe were part of the second world. All the underdeveloped countries constituted the Third World to which China belonged as well.

Deng Xiaoping abolished the communes and fostered provincial autonomy to introduce what he called 'socialism with Chinese characteristics. The China of today - with the world's second largest economy and largest volume of foreign exchange reserves, and with multiple cities boasting skyscrapers taller than Empire State Building - is a testimonial to Deng's vision, tenacity and common sense. Societies operate by standards of average performance. They sustain themselves by practicing the familiar. But they progress through leaders with a vision of the necessary and the courage to undertake a course where benefits at first reside largely on mutual cooperation.

China had invaded Vietnam to 'teach it a lesson' after Vietnamese troops had occupied Cambodia in response to a series of border clashes with the Khmer Rogue which has taken over Cambodia in 1975 and in ultimate pursuit of Hanoi's goal of creating an Indochinese Federation. China had done so in defiance of a mutual defense treaty between Hanoi and Moscow signed less than a month earlier. The invasion served its fundamental objective: when the Soviet Union failed to respond it demonstrated the limitation of its strategic reach. A principal difference between Chinese and Western diplomatic strategy is the reaction to perceived vulnerability.

The Third Vietnam War may thus be counted as another example in which Chinese statesmen succeeded in achieving long-term, big-picture strategic objectives without the benefit of a military establishment comparable to that of their adversaries. Equanimity in the face of materially superior forces has been deeply imagined in Chinese strategic thinking - as is apparent from the parallels with China's decision to intervene in the Korean War. Both Chinese decisions were directed against what Beijing perceived to be a gathering danger - a hostile power's consolidation of bases at multiple points along the Chinese periphery. In both cases, Beijing believed that if the hostile power were allowed to complete its design, China would be encircled and thus remain in a permanent state of vulnerability.

Seemingly regional issues - in the first case the American rebuff of North Korea, in the second case Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia - was treated as the focus of the struggles in the world. Despite some uncomfortable conservations and bruised egos, the United States, the People's Republic and Taiwan all emerged from the early 1980s with their core interests generally fulfilled. Beijing was disappointed with Washington's flexible interpretation of the communique; but on the whole the People's Republic achieved another decade of American assistance as it built its economic and military power and its capacity to play an independent role in world affairs.

Washington was able to pursue amicable relations with both sides of the Taiwan Strait and to cooperate with China on common anti-Soviet imperatives such as intelligence sharing and support for the Afghan insurgency. Taiwan obtained a bargaining position from which to negotiate with Beijing. Soviet retreats gave Chinese diplomacy a new flexibility to maneuver. Chinese leaders spoke less of military containment and began to explore their scope for a new diplomacy with Moscow. They continued to list three conditions for improving relations with the Soviets: evacuation of Cambodia; ending Soviet troop concentration in Siberia and Mongolia along the northern Chinese borders; and evacuation of Afghanistan.

These demands were in the process of being fulfilled largely by the changes in the balance of power that made Soviet forward positions untenable and the decisions to withdraw inevitable. The United States received reassurances that China was not ready to move toward Moscow - the Chinese proving that two sides could play at triangular diplomacy. The reassurances in any event had a dual purpose: they affirmed continued adherence to the established strategy of preventing Soviet expansion but they also served to bring China's growing options before the United States. As the Reagan years ended, the situation i Asia was the most tranquil it had been in decades.

A half century of war and revolution in China, Japan, Korea, Indochina and maritime Southeast Asia had given way to a system of Asian states on essentially Westphalian lines - following the pattern of sovereign states emerging in Europe at the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648. With the exception of periodic provocations from the impoverished and isolated North Korea and the insurgency against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, Asia was now a world of discrete states with sovereign governments, recognized borders and a nearly universal trait agreement to refrain from involvement in each other's domestic political and ideological alignments.

A new era of Asian economic reform and prosperity was taking root - one that in the 21st century may well turn the region to its historic role as the world's most productive and prosperous continent. Deng's Reform and Opening Up was designed to overcome China's built-in central planning. He and his associates embarked on market economics, decentralized decision making and opening to the outside world - all unprecedented changes. To facilitate the process, China welcomes foreign investment in part through Special Economic Zones on the coast, where enterprises where given wider latitude and investors were granted special conditions.

Systematic decentralization followed. Agricultural communes were abandoned by encouraging the so-called responsibility centers which in practice amounted to family farming. For other enterprises a distinction was elaborated between ownership and management. Ownership world remain in the hands of the state; management would be left largely to managers. Agreements between the authorities and the manages would define the function of each with substantial latitudes for managers.

The student unrest at Tiananmen Square started as a demand for remedies to specific grievances. But the occupation of the main square of a country's capital even when completely peaceful is also a tactic to demonstrate the impotence of the government, to weaken it and to tempt it into rash acts, putting it at a disadvantage. The People's Republic of China had never claimed to function as a Western-style democracy and indeed had consistently rejected the insinuation. Now it emerged in the media of the world as an arbitrary authoritarian state crushing popular aspirations to human rights. In this atmosphere, the entire Sino-US relationships including the established practice of regular consultations between the two countries came under attack from across a wide potential spectrum.

The basic direction of a society is shaped by its values, which define its ultimate goals. At the same time, accepting the limits of one's capacities is one of the test of statesmanship; it implies a judgement of the possible. Statesman are judged by their ability to sustain their concepts over time. The attempt to alter the domestic structure of a country of the magnitude of China from the outside is likely to involve vast unintended consequences. At the beginning of the 1990s the total volume of US trade with mainland China was still only half the volume of American trade with Taiwan. By the end of the decade US-China trade had quadrupled and Chinese to the US had increased sevenfold. China was using its increasing cash reserves to invest in US Treasury bonds (and in 2008 became the largest foreign holder of American debt).

In all this China was surging toward a new world role, with interests in every corner of the globe and integrated to an unprecedented degree with broader political and economic trends. China and the United States no longer had a common adversary but neither had they developed a just concept of world order. The United States and China perceived that they needed each other because both were too large to be dominated, too special to be transformed and too necessary to each other to be able to afford isolation.

The crucial competition between the United States and China is more likely to economic and social than military. The United States bears the responsibility to retain its competitiveness and its world role. China, fulfilling its own interpretation of its national destiny, will continue to develop its economy and pursue a board range of interest in Asia and beyond. The appropriate label for the American relationship is less partnership than "co-evolution." It means that both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible and adjust their relations to minimize conflict. Neither side endorses all the aims of the other or presumes a total identity of interests, but both sides seek to identify and develop complimentary interest.

The future of Asia will be shaped to a significant degree by how China and America envision it, and by the extent to which each nation is able to achieve some congruence with the other's historic regional role. Throughout its history, the United States has often been motivated by visions of the universal relevance of its ideals and of a proclaimed duty to spread them. China has acted on the basis of its singularity; it expanded by cultural osmosis, not missionary zeal. For these two societies representing different versions of exceptionalism, the road to cooperation is inherently complex. Both sides should be open to conceiving to each other's activities as a normal part of international life and not in itself as a cause for alarm.

China and the United States need not agree on their respective political evolutions to recognize that a strategic contest for dominance will prove draining and will ultimately drive most of the Asian states, especially in South and Southeast Asia into domestic crisis or a kind of combative neutralism. A strategy based on confrontation makes both the United States and China hostage to worst-case scenarios, some of which may not be in the control of either sides. In the end, history lauds not conflicts of societies but their reconciliations which are important for a peaceful world.

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[Babak Vandad · Rating 4 out of 5]

کتاب از زبان و دیدگاه یک سیاست‌مدار عالی‌رتبه و باسابقه نوشته شده و این مهمترین ویژگی کتاب است: در این کتاب درمی‌یابیم که یک دیپلمات چطور حرف می‌زند، چطور حرف‌های دیگران را می‌شنود و خلاصه اینکه، آنچه که در رسانه‌ها می‌شنوید از دید یک دیپلمات چه معنی و مفهومی دارد.

کتاب سرگذشت چین معاصر را از جنگ تریاک در قرن نوزده تا زمان ریاست جمهوری باراک اوباما، پوشش می‌دهد. با این حال، همه حوادث مهم را برنمی‌رسد؛ برای نمونه، الحاق هنگ‌کنگ به سرزمین اصلی.

کیسینجر از میان همه مسائلی که یک کشور دارد فقط به دیپلماسی آن می‌پردازد و آن هم بیشتر در ارتباط با آمریکا و روسیه تا کشورهای دیگر و از این میان هم باز تنها به روش تصمیم‌گیری‌های چین می‌پردازد (یعنی روند تصمیم‌گیری‌ها را در آمریکا توضیح نمی‌دهد یا سیاست‌های کلی آمریکا را راجع به منطقه آن قدرها که انتظار می‌رود روشن نمی‌کند.) با این وجود، در مقایسه با سایر کتاب‌هایی که راجع به چین نوشته شده، که عمومن یا رویکرد تاریخی دارند و در نتیجه در پیوند تاریخ معاصر به عصر باستان در می‌مانند یا رویکرد اقتصادی دارند، نگاهی متفاوت دارد؛ برای کیسینجر رشد اقتصادی چین یک واقعیت بیرونی‌ست که به هر ترتیب اتفاق افتاده. دلایلش را واکاوی نمی‌کند و از منظر او دلایل این رشد اقتصادی اهمیتی هم ندارند؛ مهم تأثیری‌ست که روی دیپلماسی دو طرف می‌گذارد. در نتیجه رشد اقتصادی چین را در «بازار آزاد و سرمایه‌گذاری خارجی» خلاصه می‌کند، در حالی که دیپلماسی‌ای که بر این رشد اتکا می‌کند و حوادث میدان تیان‌آن‌من را رقم می‌زند، در چند صد صفحه می‌شکافد.

مسئله دیگر این است که، ایالات متحده همیشه متهم بوده که در عین اینکه شعار دموکراسی و حقوق بشر می‌دهد، ولی از رژیم‌هایی سرکوب‌گری هم حمایت می‌کند. یک نمونه این سیاست دوگانه را در سال ۱۹۸۹ و حوادث میدان تیان‌آن‌من می‌توان دید. کیسینجر در فصل مربوط به این واقعه بحثی را پیرامون همین سیاست دوگانه مطرح می‌کند که خواندنی‌ست و به طور کلی این دوگانگی را توجیه می‌کند.

خواننده فارسی‌زبان، انگیزه دیگری هم برای خواندن این کتاب دارد: چینِ مائو یک نظام ایدئولوژیک و درگیر ضعف اقتصادی است که رابطه خود را با جهان خارج و به خصوص آمریکا قطع کرده و بعد از حدود ۲۰ سال می‌خواهد این رابطه را احیا کند. این اتفاق دقیقن در مورد ایران هم صادق است؛ یک نظام ایدئولوژیک که انقلاب آن شعار ضدیت با امپریالیسم غرب را فریاد می‌کرد و حالا بعد از سی و چند سال نشانه‌هایی از گشایش در روابط دیپلماتیک دیده می‌شود. جالب اینکه این نشانه‌ها و سرگذشت چین بسیار شبیه به هم‌اند و حتی در این میان شخصیت‌های چینی را می‌توانیم نام ببریم که معادلی در ایران دارند.

ترجمه شیوا و روان است ولی با این حال بعضی کلمات مانند «پروسه» و «پرنسیپ» به شکلی استفاده شده که با فارسی امروز فاصله دارد.

[Jen · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am amazed by how deep an American could understand about China. This understanding was based on history and culture in addition to the current leaders that he was talking to, i.e., Mao, Deng, Jiang, and Hu. The book started with an impressive comparison between American and Chinese culture in two metaphors:

1. American exceptionalism is missionary. It holds that the United States has an obligation to spread its values to every part of the world. China’s exceptionalism is cultural. China does not proselytize; it does not claim that its contemporary institutions are relevant outside China. But it is the heir of the Middle Kingdom tradition, which formally graded all other states as various levels of tributaries based on their approximation to Chinese cultural and political forms; in other words, a kind of cultural universality. The Chinese never generated a myth of cosmic creation. Their universe was created by the Chinese themselves, whose values, even when declared of universal applicability, were conceived of as Chinese in origin. In the Chinese version of exceptionalism, China did not export its ideas but let others come to seek them. Neighboring peoples, the Chinese believed, benefited from contact with China and civilization so long as they acknowledged the suzerainty of the Chinese government.
2. If chess is about the decisive battle, Chinese chess (wei qi) is about the protracted campaign. The chess player aims for total victory. The wei qi player seeks relative advantage. In chess, the player always has the capability of the adversary in front of him; all the pieces are always fully deployed. The wei qi player needs to assess not only the pieces on the board but the reinforcements the adversary is in a position to deploy. Chess teaches the Clausewitzian concepts of “center of gravity” and the “decisive point”—the game usually beginning as a struggle for the center of the board. Wei qi teaches the art of strategic encirclement. Where the skillful chess player aims to eliminate his opponent’s pieces in a series of head-on clashes, a talented wei qi player moves into “empty” spaces on the board, gradually mitigating the strategic potential of his opponent’s pieces. Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.

As a Chinese that have spent the past ten years in the United States, I could not draw a better comparison.

Then, the book unfolds the historical moments of using China Cards to combat the Soviet Union, understanding the relationship between China and the Soviet Union during Korean war and Vietnam war, helping Nixon to get in touch with Mao, talking with Zhou, negotiating about Taiwan, etc. The Sino-China relationship was established and the rest is history.

Kissinger concluded that the relationship between China and United States would be coevoltuion rather than the ordinary operation of great-power rivalry or of ideology disagreement. However, such an effort may not necessarily be a success. In that case, the United States will defend its interests by traditional precepts. But the advocates of confrontation will not be vindicated by such an outcome. Those who inherit the ensuing conflict will still be obliged to produce a new and better world order when the crisis abates. In the end, history lauds not conflicts of societies but their reconciliations. What a visionary!

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

On China records the half century effort of Henry Kissinger and successive American governments to establish normal relations with the government of China. This vigorous and highly readable book lays out in detail every aspect of the diplomacy that brought the once hostile and renegade government of China to join the world economic order.

Kissinger spends the first three chapters in an extensive analysis of the political history of China. Key to understanding China's history is the most fundamental strategy of Chinese history, managing the barbarians. As an ancient political culture advanced far beyond its neighbors, China's basic stance was one of absolute superiority. Non-Chinese, that is, "barbarians", were merely to be managed, and could only approach China in an attitude of abject subservience. When faced with military threats beyond its immediate ability to control, China employed a number of strategies to neutralize and control its adversaries, with the eventual goal of reestablishing equilibrium. Unlike the Britain and the United States, China had never been an expansionist state: since Chinese culture was unique and non-transferable, there was no need to spread their own culture via political dominance. Relations with other nations thus became an exercise in management, with the primary goal being to minimize the presence and influence of any who came in contact with China.

Throughout the book, Kissinger traces the ways that the traditional structure of Chinese foreign relations has continued more or less unchanged through the millenia, up to and including the Mao and post-Mao era. Kissinger notes the continuity in China's managing the Soviet Union and the United States much as it had managed other "barbarians" in earlier eras. As always, the goal has been to maintain China's internal equilibrium by playing the barbarians off against each other. Every move in the twentieth century was geared to establish China's primacy in the region, without overstepping the boundaries of its own sphere of influence. China could therefore provide limited assistance to Viet Nam to keep the United States from achieving another beach head in Asia, but then turn around and attack Viet Nam a few years later to keep Hanoi from becoming a center of power in South East Asia.

Kissinger of course describes the historic opening of China to the United States in great detail, and provides a thorough analysis of his own role in process. More interesting, though, is Kissinger's discussions of his continued diplomatic efforts in the many years succeeding his positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations. Kissinger describes the Chinese approach to international diplomacy as being focussed around personal relationships. Because of the relationships he forged with Chinese leaders as China opened up to the United States, the Chinese government continues to use Kissinger as a liason, despite the fact that he has not had a position in the American government for decades.

Most interesting, therefore, is Kissinger's communications with the Chinese government in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square disaster. Kissinger had the unenviable task of explaining to the Chinese how American public opinion was driven by the core values of personal liberty and human rights. China, of course, viewed the incident as a purely internal matter, of no concern whatsoever beyond its borders. Kissinger worked with Deng Xiaoping to arrive at a mutually acceptable series of steps to ease tensions and keep the US and China on the same course of positive engagement. Kissinger's work here was surely of the same import as his initial work to open up China: his efforts insured that the US and China would remain engaged rather than backslide into hostility.

Those who are uncomfortable with Kissinger's brand of realpolitik point to this effort as evidence of his unconcern for human rights. Kissinger is very clear, however, on the need to balance American values with the realities of foreign policy:

"I respect those who are prepared to battle for their views of the imperatives of spreading American values. but foreign policy must define means as well as objectives, and if the means employed grow beyond the tolerance of the international framework or of a relationship considered essential for national security, a choice must be made. What we must not do is to minimize the nature of the choice. The best outcome in the American debate would be to combine the two approaches: for the idealists to recognize that priniciples need to be implememted over time and hence must be occasionally adjusted to circumstance; and for the "realists" to accept that values have their own reality and must be built into operational policies. Such an approach would recognize that many gradations exist in each camp, which an effort should be made to shade into each other. In practice this goal has often been overwhelmed by the passions of controversy."

Kissinger continues by quoting a 1992 statement from Premier Li Peng: "With regard to the three ares you mentioned, we can talk about human rights. But because of major differences between us, I doubt major progress is possible. The concept of human rights involves traditions and moral and philosophical values. These are different in China than in the West. We believe that the Chinese people should have more democratic rights and play a more important role in domestic politics. But this should be done in a way acceptable to the Chinese people."

To wrap up, Kissinger discusses an analogy that sees the US and China playing in the 21st century roles similar to Great Britain and Germany a century ago. Fortunately, though, Kissinger doesn't believe that history has to be repeated. Instead, he believes

"The appropriate label for the Sino-American relationship is less partnership than "co-evolution." It means that both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict. Neither side endorses all the aims of the other or presumes a total identity of interests, but both sides see to identify and develop complimentary interests."

To achieve this, Kissinger envisions the creation of a Pacific Community, to which the US, China, and other Pacific nations belong and in which they all have a vested interest.

This is a brilliant book, full of detail, but highly readable. Henry Kissinger's work to open up, develop, and maintain ties to the Chinese government over the last century will stand as one of the greatest acts of diplomacy in human history. Readers and historians are fortunate that he has been able to lay out for posterity the details of his role, philosophy, and accomplishments.

[Bob Gustafson · Rating 3 out of 5]

"On China" is authoritative, scholarly and dull.

Kissinger puts us on the Chinese History Interstate Highway beginning more than two millennia ago. We travel in fifth gear from the time of Confucius, the purpose of which is to give us China's position in the world from a Chinese person's point of view, and get off at the beginning of the nineteenth century. We then travel through that century, in stop-and-go traffic, as Great Britain attempts to take China over in somewhat the same fashion as it took over India. That last dynasty is on its last legs when we enter a black hole.

We come out of the black hole in the late 1940's. Sun Yat Sen? Japanese occupation? The People's Liberation Army has driven Chiang Kai-shek off the mainland and Mao Zedong is in charge and we travel through the next part of the story in a comfortable second gear.

From that point on, the book is about China's leaders rather than about China and that's why it is so dull. It could have been entitled "On Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping" It is all about how those three managed relationships with countries on their borders -- the Soviet Union, Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, with honorable mention to India and Japan -- and took advantage of the Cold War to enlist the help of the United States.

We then travel in third gear from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Deng's retirement to the present. That's it.

So, if that's what you care to read about, go ahead.

[Jess · Rating 3 out of 5]

First of all, I should probably say that I didn't finish the last hundred pages or so of this book. To be honest, I got bored. I loved that this book started out with a healthy dose of Chinese history, but I wasn't too keen on Kissinger's analysis of...well, anything. Don't get me wrong, I love the Analects as much as the next girl, but Kissinger's attempts to explain modern China using the game of "wei qi" and a handful of Confucuis' teachings did not have me convinced that Kissinger was doing anything but grasping at straws.

And once the book moved into post-1940s China, Kissinger started to wave the apologist flag, and I started to roll my eyes. Yes, Chinese culture is vastly different than our own. But I have no tolerance for the type of beefed-up cultural relativism that says the global community has to stay silent in the face of egregious human rights abuses just because conceptions of good governance differ across states.

Bottom Line: This book is extremely long, especially for being so thoroughly unentertaining. If you want to learn about Chinese history, read something by Jonathan Spence. If you want a feel for the social and political issues affecting modern China, read Out of Mao's Shadow by Philip Pan.

[Chris · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wow. I had always known the name Henry Kissinger but wasn't intimately familiar with his work in the State department or what the general view of his legacy was until started doing some research ahead of reading 'On China', with him clearly being a controversial figure for his embodiment of 'realpolitik'. I will also caveat that I haven't studied Chinese history in too much depth so don't have many other perspectives to compare this against.

All that said, this book is incredible. Kissinger's command of the material, the history of China going back to the first formation of the Chinese state two millenia ago up through the Obama administration, is unbelievable. This book reads like a novel - it is a total page turner and is narrated so seamlessly that it sounds like someone simply recalling personal anecdotes throughout the whole book (which, incredibly, for a lot of the foundational events of China - U.S. relations covered in this book, largely are for Kissinger). Regardless of anyone's personal view on Kissinger, he clearly has a brilliant mind and conveys the incredible depth and complexity of the questions he and other statesman struggled with in the post-World War II world and how to best navigate that world. Kissinger clearly was a central player in the initiation and development of U.S. - China relations and his personal perspective of the meetings and conversations that helped open these relations for the first time are incredibly insightful.

And what a rich history for China. Again, I knew high level Chinese history from high school but this is an incredible overview not only of the facts of history but the common themes and what ties everything together. The evolution of two millenia of a closed, Confucian society first meeting the European / developed world in the 1800's and then the two centuries that followed - fighting colonial powers, tearing their society forward with the Cultural Revolution and an attempt to reject traditional Confucian values seen as driving China's weakness and vulnerability to colonial powers, wrestling with Communist ideology, and finally emerging as a power in the modern world, is absolutely fascinating.

I did not previously fully understand China's historical world view as the center of civilization (as the 'Middle Kingdom') and the implications that had on their interactions with foreigners. They also have the longest continuous social history on the planet, with a language that dates back thousands of years, which frames their long-term view and approach to current events, with current / recent behavior reflecting long-term history and trends much more so than we typically think of in the U.S. I didn't realize the extent to which China's historical perspective over centuries has been to be very self-reliant and that this largely shapes their perspective as they have entered the modern world over the last 60 years. China has never really pursued any form of territorial advancement (beyond their massive historical reaches), which helps frame their view of the Europeans when they showed up to 'break down the doors' to enter China in the 1800's and their interactions with foreign states since.

All in all, I would say this is a must read for anyone trying to understand China's 'rise' and how China will likely impact the modern world. Kissinger very articulately frames the key questions that will impact China's development, which in turn will have an outsized impact on the U.S.'s continued development and on their role in the world.

[Omar Ali · Rating 3 out of 5]

“On China” is a curious mixture of history, geopolitical analysis and self-serving memoir (concentrating mostly on the last two elements). Kissinger reviews some of the highlights of Chinese history; ancient and medieval China is covered quickly and superficially and the material is pretty much standard issue, but the level of detail increases after greatly from the opium war onwards and the book becomes much more interesting at that point. Kissinger makes the case that the Qing bureaucrats, in dire straits thanks to internal revolts, financial crisis and administrative decay, were not completely clueless or apathetic. Faced with determined, ruthless and far more technologically advanced European powers who had already overcome or overawed other great non-Western empires, Qing diplomats did their best to play European powers against one another and try to use (very limited) breathing space to try some fitful reforms, but the court was too far gone and the situation could not be salvaged, which led to 100 years of defeat, disorder, revolutions, famines and other disasters.

Kissinger, having worked with Zhou and Mao and their successors as partners in a world-altering initiative (US-Chinese rapprochement) keeps all criticisms of the CCP rather muted, while constantly highlighting their achievements and what he (enviously) regards as their diplomatic guile, patience and their special oriental “insight”. Given that any other posture would raise questions about how close Kissinger himself became to them and how much he tried to help them, this is not surprising, but it does make his assessments a bit suspect.
Anyhow, the second half of the book is really an account of “China and I”, with Henry popping in to save Mao from the Soviets (a threat that he, and the CCP as a whole) took very, very seriously), help Deng along as he starts China’s transition to capitalism and economic success and smooth over things when something mildly unpleasant like Tienanmen happens. In all, he made more than 50 trips to China, mostly as private citizen and/or unofficial emissary. This is certainly the most interesting part of the book and is full of insider quotes and anecdotes, including one where the Chairman is generously giving Taiwan a 100 years to come back to the motherland and a fawning Kissinger is telling him “it won’t take that long”. The complete amorality of the calculations of the PRC and Henry Kissinger is most obvious in the support both provided to the Khmer Rouge as they carried out their genocide in Kampuchea; Henry spends many pages explaining why this (and the Chinese “chastisement” of Vietnam in a limited punitive invasion) was necessary to prevent Vietnamese domination of South East Asia. Why that would be a core Chinese aims is easy to understand, but why the US should partner with them in this effort is not obvious, though Henry tries to present it as such. After the war, Deng tells K “if we had driven deeper into Vietnam in our punitive action, it would have been even better”. Kissinger: “it could be”!

The book is worth reading for the anecdotes and historical information. The geopolitical explanations are enlightening in that they show how these minds operate, but whether they operate for our benefit or not is an open question.

[Ady ZYN · Rating 5 out of 5]

Despre China apare în 2011 și este scrisă în același stil cu Diplomația, din 1994; ar putea fi considerată chiar o continuare. Astfel că autorul pornește să descrie China prin prisma istoriei sale multimilenare, a imperiului în jurul căruia vecinii gravitau acceptându-i forța, iar inamicii se transformau la rândul lor conform tradițiilor chinezești. Imperiul și împăratul au devenit mult prea centrați pe sine și au neglijat restul lumii; tot universul era centrat în jurul împaratului, el „este o figură de importanță universală, care domneste peste Toate Câte Sunt Sub Cer”, și „China era civilizația însăși”.

Îmbătați de propriile tradiții, chinezii n-au luat parte la progresul care se petrecea în paralel în celelalte părți ale lumii, și când, spre sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea, civilizația europeană a ajuns ferm în imperiu, acesta a suferit de-a lungul secolului următor un șoc urmat de-o implozie a sistemului ierarhic tradițional mai ales când alte civilizații ale orientului au intrat în contact cu occidentul dezvoltat și au început să micșoreze decalajul tehnologic.

Următoarea etapă pe care Kissinger o dezvoltă este China post-revoluționară. China lui Mao Zedong este o țară plină de contradicții, chiar mai accentuate decât fusese Rusia bolșevică după revoluție. Mao este distrugătorul tradițiilor și totodată urmașul lor direct. Pe plan intern, programul lui Mao, de transformare fundamentală a civilizației chineze, conduce la momente de anarhie sângeroasă; pe plan internațional situația nu este mai pașnică. Noul imperiu comunist, devenit așa în 1949 după războiul civil purtat de comuniști împotriva naționaliștilor lui Chiang Kai-shek, se găsește în strânsoarea a altor două imperii cu tradiții bogate de forță: fratele ideologic de la nord-est, URSS și inamicul tradițional la vest, Statele Unite ale Americii.

Între cele două forțe, Mao va încerca să-și păstreze independența deplină refuzând o înfrățire deplină cu prietenul ideologic. Antitradiționalistul Mao va folosi din plin tradiția străveche chineză de a rămâne centrat pe identitatea străveche chineză și chiar și-n cele mai tulburi momente, va păstra o distanță ostilă și față de prietenul ideologic erijându-se chiar în liderul ideologic al lumii comuniste considerând că Rusia după Stalin intrase într-o epocă a revizionismului.

Conflictele repetate cu America (războiul Coreean și apoi cele două crize din Strâmtoarea Taiwan) și cu un stat asiatic prezentat ca o alternativă asiatică la comunism, India (conflictul sino-indian din 1962), a marcat și-o distanțare a Chinei față de Uniunea Sovietică; animozitatea istorică cauzată de pretențiile teritoriale ale rușilor asupra unor zone din nordul țării și a unor porturi i se mai adăuga și respingerea de către Mao a politicii sovieticii de conviețuire pașnică dintre sistemul comunist și cel capitalist. Dar China a reușit să se îndepărteze de toată lumea, singura țară cu care mai avea relații amiabile fiind Albania.

În anii 60, Mao ajunsese să înțeleagă că politica de sfidare și izolare a țării deveneau pericole reale pentru ea însăși — Marele Salt Înainte și Revoluția Culturală secătuiseră societatea chineză, o adusese în pragul colapsului — : „De-a lungul granițelor sale întinse, China avea de-a face cu: Uniunea Sovietică ca posibil adversar; India umilită; o prezență americană masivă în Vietnam și escaladarea războiului de acolo; guverne autoproclamate din exil — cel de la Taipei și cel stabilit în enclava tibetană din nordul Indiei; Japonia — un oponent istoric; în fine, de cealaltă parte a Pacificului, o Americă ce privea China ca pe un adversar inflexibil”. China rămânea protejată doar de seria de rivalități dintre aceste țări care le împiedicau să se ralieze împotriva ei.

Mao devenise conștient de pericolul dușmanilor din apropiere și a pus în practică un vechi îndemn negociind cu dușmanul din depărtare: „să negociezi cu țările aflate la mare distanță și să te lupți cu cele aflate în apropiere”. A profitat discret de demersul președintelui american Nixon, din ianuarie 1969, pentru a schimba publicului vechea paradigmă belicoasă la adresa Americii. Din 1967 Nixon manifesta un interes față de China astfel încât ea să nu rămână izolată de familia națiunilor. Chinezii s-au raportat tot timpul la sovietici; un atac sovietic împotriva țării n-a fost exclus niciodată. Trupele sovietice masate la graniță erau destul de convingătoare. Animozitățile dintre cele două state au înclinat în cele din urmă balanța spre o cooperare cu Statele Unite — America ar fi protejat China în cazul unui atac sovietic pentru că s-ar fi temut ca în urma unei victorii sovietice, imperiul comunist nou format ar fi fost copleșitor militar și economic blocului occidental. Nixon a înaintat teza, în 1969 că „Uniunea Sovietică reprezenta tăbăra cea mai periculoasă și ar fi împotriva intereselor americane dacă China ar fi zdrobită într-un război sino-sovietic”. În cazul unui război între cele două țări, America adopta neutralitatea însă înclina cât de mult posibil spre China.

Aici, Kissinger intervine cu experiența sa directă, fiind consilier pentru securitatea națională și devenind secretar de stat în administrația Nixon. Expunerea devine pe alocuri captivantă asemeni unui film politic despre conspirații globale. În vara lui 1969 forțele rusești se confruntă cu cele chineze pe răul Ussuri; ambasadorul Rusiei se plânge lui Kissinger că rușii ar fi fost atacați. Raportul ulterior consideră că rusia ar fi fost agresoarea. În realitate chinezii au stârnit lupta aprigă.

Începutul relațiilor dintre China și Statele Unite, marcat de anul 1971, este expus de Kissinger cu o atenție remarcabilă față de detaliile subtile ale diplomației celor două țări. În capitolul "Reluarea relațiilor: primele întâlniri cu Mao și Zhou" avem prezentat stilul diplomatic chinezesc în contact cu trimișii Casei Albe. Kissinger și echipa lui pregătesc în secret întâlnirea la nivel înalt dintre Mao și Nixon.

După douăzeci de ani de animozități, americanii iau contact cu o cultură diplomatică distinctă de cea obișnuită, a altor țări comuniste; aceasta datorită amenințării sovietice de la granița de nord a Chinei. Rezultatul amenințării a conturat începutul unei cooperări sporite șino-americane "acolo unde interesele se întâlneau" diminuând totodată diferențele inerente celor două sisteme. Cu toate acestea nu se întrevedea o pace permanentă, ci doar o reconfigurare a echilibrului global având ca urmare o posibilă armonizare a valorilor; ambele tabere își urmăreau interesele proprii și se foloseau una de cealaltă vis a vis de Moscova.

Față de monografia precedentă, Diplomația, cartea de față expune mai bine o strategie diplomatică; aici reiese mai ușor stilul diplomației, percepția mai bună asupra agenților aflați în negocieri. În Diplomația, Kissinger acoperă o perioadă mai mare de timp și o serie lungă de agenți istorici aflați într-o dinamică complexă. În cartea de față, China este actorul din prim plan și perioada temporală e mai scurtă. Prin urmare, atenția focalizată în direcția acesta prezintă mai multe detalii, multe trecute prin filtrul experienței proprii.

Un alt aspect deosebit de interesant al lucrării este că prezintă optica americană de echilibru de putere în plin război rece. Apropierea dintre americani și chinezi nu a rezolvat fobiile chinezilor. Scopul lor ancestral era de a stârni pe barbari unii împotriva celorlalți ca să fie dominați în cele din urmă. Dacă America se folosea de China pentru a doborî Uniunea Sovietică? Astfel că Mao a mers dincolo de strategia americană. Dacă scopul americanilor era de fapt scoaterea tăciunilor încinși rusești cu mână chinezească? Kissinger și administrația Nixon nu se gândeau la așa ceva.

Dar Kissinger nu consideră frica lui Mao neîntemeiată. "Era o strategie pe care Statele Unite puteau, teoretic, s-o adopte. Tot ce lipsea era un lider care să o elaboreze sau un public care s-o sprijine. Manipulările abstracte pe care le-ar fi presupus nu erau posibile în Statele Unite, și nici dezirabile; politica externă americană nu se poate baza niciodată doar pe politica de putere". Dar ideea de bază, a securității proprii, nu ar fi exclus o astfel de tactică. "Dar Washington nu putea ceda unei țări — oricât de importantă — dreptul de a hotărî tactica prin care înțelegea să-și garanteze securitatea".

Dar provocările dinamicii globale au făcut ca cele două tabere să sufere tensiuni între momente de cooperare. Odată cu căderea Uniunii Sovietice și, mai înainte, cu evenimentele din piața Tienanmen, din 1989, relațiile sino-americane au suferit schimbări. Reformele inițiate de Deng Xiaoping au dat aripi economiei chineze. Următorii conducători ai Chinei au amplificat progresul. China, după aproape două sute de ani, a redevenit o forță în regiune.

În finalul cărții, Kissinger întreprinde o analiză a situației în care, în ciuda asigurărilor chinezilor de a-și păstra nivelul de evoluție economică în parametrii pașnici, fără pretenții de dominare globală, ar putea, la un moment dat, să facă pași violenți spre eliminarea Americii din regiunea Pacificului și să înceapă să controleze regiunea din postura de hegemon.

[Smiley · Rating 3 out of 5]

It is a bit difficult to begin my review with 'I thought ...' for this aptly recently-released non-fiction published in 2012. Instead, I would think this highly informative book on historical, cultural and political China, one of the large countries in Asia in terms of its size and population, written by one of the great American diplomats in the 20th century should be a must for those interested in this amazingly magnificent country in the Pacific Rim; its history itself has dated back since some 3,000 years ago as evidenced by some ancient Chinese characters on the turtoise shell excavated and discovered some years ago. As far as I recall, in 1970's China was the most populous country in the world later confirmed by its 1982 population census exceeding 1 billion people (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_po...) while India followed with its 400 million; however, since some few years ago India has become the second populous country with its 1 billion.

Written brilliantly and scholarly with intensive analyses and innumerable references, this paperback would be worth reading presently as well as in the years to come since the author, Dr Henry Kissinger, was an international key man who famously worked with President Richard M. Nixon and his staff to surprise the world by arranging the unthinkable meeting between Chairman Mao and President Nixon in 1972 amidst the stifling Cold War and has long since been a formidable authority on Sino-American relations; moreover, he "is currently chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm". (p. iii)

As for those unfamiliar with this book, I would like to present its panoramic view by listing all 18 chapter titles preceded by a number denoting its chapter as follows: 1: The Singularity of China 2: The Kowtow Question and the Opium War 3: From Preeminence to Decline 4: Mao's Continuous Revolution 5: Triangular Diplomacy and the Korean War 6: China Confronts Both Superpowers 7: A Decade of Crises 8: The Road to Reconciliation 9: Resumption of Relations: First Encounters with Mao and Zhou 10: The Quasi-Alliance: Conversations with Mao 11: The End of the Mao Era 12: The Indestructible Deng 13: "Touching the Tiger's Buttocks": The Third Vietnam War 14: Reagan and the Advent of Normalcy 15: Tiananmen 16: What Kind of Reform? Deng's Southern Power 17: A Roller Coaster Ride Toward Another Reconciliation: The Jiang Zemin Era 18: The New Millennium

[Taha Rabbani · Rating 3 out of 5]

خیلی از کیسینجر خوشم نیومد، بااین‌حال، فکر می‌کنم ربطی به شخصیتش نداره. به‌قول ترجمه‌ی آقای رأسی، احتمالاً «پرنسیب» آدمی دانشگاهی و سیاسی این‌طوریه.
کتاب از جنگ تریاک شروع می‌شه و تا زمان اوباما ادامه پیدا می‌کنه. بیش از اونکه جزئیات اتفاقات برای نویسنده مهم باشه، روح حاکم بر اتفاقات مهمه. به‌همین‌خاطر، من، که اساساً برای آشنایی مقدماتی با چین این کتاب را خریده بودم، شاید در بعضی از جاها چندان متوجه عمق حرف‌های کیسینجر نمی‌شدم. بااین‌حال، برای همین آشنایی مقدماتی برای اتفاقات دوران معاصر چین خیلی خوب بود، به‌خصوص از این جهت که برخلاف بسیاری از این نوع کتاب‌ها که از دوران آدم بنی‌بشر شروع می‌کنند و خیلی طول می‌کشه تا به وقایع معاصر برسند، فقط به همین دویست سال اخیر و مشخصاً به بعد از انقلاب فرهنگی پرداخته است.
این کتاب خواننده را با روح چین آشنا می‌کنه. خواننده متوجه می‌شه که چرا چین، علی‌رغم ابرقدرت بودنش، از نقش‌آفرینی سیاسی در مسائل بین‌المللی سر باز می‌زنه. با روح حاکم بر چین در دوران پیش از استعمار آشنا می‌شه، که چندان هم با روح حاکم بر ایران متفاوت نیست. روحیه‌ای که موقع مواجهه با غرب مشخصه‌هاش بیشتر آشکار می‌شه.
این روزها که چین و هند درگیری مرزی جدیدی داشتند، این روزها که مساله‌ی میانمار هم به‌وجود آمده، جالبه که از دیدگاه چینی‌ها نسبت به منطقه‌ی هندوچین و دیگر مناطق مرزی باخبر بشیم و هنری کیسینجر ما را در این زمینه یاری می‌کنه.
و از این جور حرف‌ها.
ترجمه‌اش بدک نیست. شاهکار حتماً نیست. ولی وقتی کتاب دیگه‌ی هنری کیسینجر، به نام «نظم جهانی» را سعی کرده باشید بخونید و از ترجمه‌ی افتضاحش تعجب کرده باشید، قدر این ترجمه‌ی خوب را خواهید دونست. آدم چطور می‌تونه در ترجمه به مرتبه‌ی عزت‌الله فولادوند برسه؟

[Muhammad Zain · Rating 4 out of 5]

A brilliant book if read with its intended meaning. It is not a recounting of China’s history but an exploration of how it conducted its foreign policy across different eras. It began by seeing itself as a benevolent kingdom that needed nothing from the outside world, while others were free to learn whatever they wished from it. Then came the transition when China embraced communist ideology, yet managed to distance itself from the expansionist ideas of the Soviet Union, maintained its own view of governance, and eventually opened up to learn from the West. Kissinger does not lose track of his intention throughout the book.

Kissinger highlights the key difference between American and Chinese thinking by contrasting their conceptions of exceptionalism. The United States views itself as a nation with a mission — a moral responsibility to promote democracy and freedom globally. China, on the other hand, sees itself as a civilizational state whose stability and harmony serve as a model for others to emulate. These differing perceptions of national purpose also shape their respective strategies. America wants clear outcomes and total domination while China values psychological influence, long-term positioning, and victory without confrontation. Hence, the difference in their psychology leads to mutual misinterpretation and scepticism between the two states.

The writer helps readers understand how China’s worldview evolved from that of an empire to a modern state. In its imperial phase, China saw itself as a moral and cultural centre, the Middle Kingdom, that guided others through benevolence rather than coercion—a philosophy grounded in the strategic thinking of wei chi. Moreover, it resorted to putting the colonial powers against each other by developing opposing interests of each power within itself. It did so to avoid these powers getting together against China and present a unified front against it. Kissinger praises the effectiveness of this approach in maintaining harmony but also highlights its weaknesses and the circumstances that led China to abandon it.

In my view, the best part of the book starts from the post–World War II era, when Mao emerged as a formidable leader—ousting the government of Chiang Kai-shek, regaining control of territories lost to various colonial powers, and forcing the nation to depart from its old, ritualistic style of conduct while maintaining the pride for which the Chinese nation is known. Kissinger, however, does not fail to note the problems China faced due to Mao’s revolutionary style of governance, but he lauds the resistance and resilience of the Chinese people who not only withstood the upheavals brought by their “teacher” but also produced leaders capable of steering the country in a new direction after Mao.

Kissinger also schools readers at times by inserting principles of diplomacy at appropriate places to put the decisions being made in context. For example, through the statement “Statesmanship is about manoeuvring through ambiguities rather than certainties,” he explains how China and the United States approached their interactions. The parts where he contrasts the way the Chinese conduct their foreign policy with how the Americans conduct theirs offer insights from someone who was part of the game for a long time. Moreover, the comparisons he draws between different leaders help readers understand the evolution of the People’s Republic of China and its disposition toward both adversaries and friends.

His own experience as Secretary of State for President Nixon offers a rich account of the road to rapprochement between the two countries that once fought a war over Korea, clashed over Taiwan, and differed deeply in cultural and economic philosophy. Moreover, he thoroughly explores the events and issues delicately handled by successive governments to keep the ties intact and avoid causing irreversible harm to the relationship.

Dr. Kissinger’s reverence for the culture, people, and visionary leaders of China is evident in every chapter of the book—especially in his admiration for Premier Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. He closes the book with suggestions for improving relations between two countries that may appear to be poles apart, yet cannot ignore each other.

Reading On China today offers valuable context for understanding Beijing’s current foreign policy—its emphasis on patience, control, and long-term positioning rather than impulsive confrontation. The fact that the United States termed China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) a “String of Pearls” also shows that Washington continues to interpret Chinese intentions through lessons drawn from past experience. However, China still maintains the notion of “peaceful development” regarding the BRI, as it has tried to portray since Hu Jintao’s time. Kissinger’s book also notes that China never yields under pressure—as seen in its response to the human rights criticism following the Tiananmen Square incident. The same resilience is evident in the recent trade war between China and the United States, where instead of appeasing Washington under tariff pressure, China engaged in a tit-for-tat policy. Ultimately, it is the United States that has begun to seek compromise once again.

In conclusion, the book is not just a study of China’s diplomatic evolution but also a masterclass in strategic thinking. What stands out most is how Kissinger makes the reader appreciate the depth of Chinese patience and foresight—a mindset that weighs every move like a wei chi player rather than a chess strategist. For me, the greatest takeaway is how understanding history through the lens of diplomacy broadens one’s own perspective on leadership, decision-making, and endurance. On China is not merely about a nation’s past, but it may be treated as a manuscript on how understanding between nations can help manage even ideological, political, and social differences.

[Knigoqdec · Rating 4 out of 5]

Аз тепърва ще продължа да се занимавам с тази книга, но във всеки случай - по-приятна ми е от "Дипломацията", както и по-интересна, може би задето "За Китай" се отнася до места, които пряко ме интересуват в момента.

[Preetam Chatterjee · Rating 2 out of 5]

Very myopic and Yankee-centric thinking. The greatest pickle with IR books is that, apart from the situation-specific context in which they were penned, they lose their lustre with the shift in the ever changing dynamics of world politics.

[Krishna · Rating 4 out of 5]

Henry Kissinger's On China benefits from his half century of experience in international diplomacy, much of that time spent engaged with China and its multiple generations of leaders. It is a fascinating ring-side view of history in the making, as well as of the art of diplomacy as practiced at the highest levels. However, the presentation is partial -- first, it is primarily an exposition of China's foreign relations, with domestic developments covered only to the extent they impinge on international relations. For example, there is little in the book about dynastic changes and the ebbs and flows of Chinese culture, unless there was an external dimension to them. Second, it is an exposition of China's foreign relations primarily with the United States. Relations with other states such as Russia (and later the Soviet Union), Japan, Korea, Vietnam and India are covered, but the main focus is on US-China relations, and within it, on the historic American opening to China during the Nixon administration in which Kissinger himself played a major role.

Divided into 18 chapters, an epilogue and an afterword in the paperback edition, On China devotes the maximum space to 20th century developments. The first three chapters are on the historical antecedents of the Chinese state. Confucianism, with its emphasis on civic duties, order, filial responsibility, hierarchy, and scholarly authority comes in for extensive discussion. So does Sun Tzu's Art of War: its emphasis on psychological factors, concealment of capabilities until the moment of surprise, patience and the long time horizon, and alliances is also discussed. The classic game embodying Sun Tzu's principles is 'go' -- the strategy game where the goal is to encircle the opponent. This is wei qi -- of gradually moving strategic assets into place so that the enemy is overwhelmed and sees no option but the surrender, rather than fight. Kissinger portrays how the Chinese state, often confronting barbarians at its borders who are collectively militarily stronger, succeeded by using one barbarian against the other and using the pomp and ceremony of the Emperor to overawe the outsider. China never insisted on outright conquest, but on the establishment of tributary relationships. But the Chinese state was also periodically overrun -- for example, but the Mongols and the Manchus. In those cases, the Han-dominated bureaucracy turned over the state apparatus to the conquerors while continuing to operate it. Eventually, the conquerors themselves adopted Chinese values, and merged their territories into the Chinese state -- a process Kissinger calls growth by osmosis.

Chapters 2 and 3 deal with China's period of decline -- the hundred years of humiliation. McCartney's mission and the disdain it provoked from the Qing emperor, and later embassies by Amherst and Napier are covered. By the time of Napier's mission, the Western powers had gathered enough strength that they were maintaining armed militias in the treaty ports, and often confronting local law enforcement in pitched battles. Then comes the 1840 Opium War, in which the British insisted on their right to import opium into China on grounds of free trade, and the 1866 expedition to Beijing and the burning of the summer palace. As it became evident that the Qing dynasty had lost the mandate of heaven, revolts broke out across China -- the Nian uprising in central China, the Taiping rebellion in the south and in the late 19th century the Boxer rebellion that was eventually suppressed by an eight-state Western alliance. The Chinese state, on life support, desperately sought to buy time -- appeasing the barbarians (Qiying's diplomacy), or advocating for urgent modernization. But to no avail, since by 1912 the last emperor had been deposed and Sun Yat Sen's nationalist government was established.

A far greater threat than the Western powers was also emerging at this time -- Japan. Resurgent after the Meiji restoration, Japan was bent on acquiring the trappings of the modern state, including colonies. Shadowboxing for control of Korea led to a Japanese victory, followed by territorial claims in China's northwest. An expansionist Russia was also encroaching into outer Mongolia and further into northeastern China seeking mineral rights and warm-water ports. Eventually, these great power rivalries resulted in the second word war.

Meanwhile a Communist Party had been created in 1921, and an uneasy alliance with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists turned into warfare. Russia concluded a treaty with the Nationalists ceding them territory in China as well as access to ports. After the Communists succeeded in the civil war in 1949, the Nationalists withdrew to Taiwan and Mao became unquestioned leader on the mainland. Mao was an elemental force, an advocate of "continuous revolution" and sharply broke with traditional Chinese values. As Kissinger writes, "where the Confucian tradition prized universal harmony, Mao idealized upheaval and the clash of opposing forces .... The Confucian tradition prized the mean and the cultivation of balance and moderation; when reform occurred, it was put forward as the 'restoration' of previously held values. Mao, by contrast, sought radical and instant transformation, and a total break with the past." Another difference Kissinger mentions is the attitude towards militarism: traditional Confucianism disdained the military, while Mao exalted it. But though Mao disdained Confucianism, he was widely read in the Chinese classics and quoted liberally from them.

The immediate post-war years saw incipient cold war rivalries spill over into the division of Korea and the Korean war. Kim Il Sung appealed to both the Soviet Union and China (then in a comradely alliance) for help, but Stalin wanted China to bear the burden of supporting the Koreans. His calculation was that the Chinese will be able to succeed only with Soviet assistance, pulling them tighter into their orbit. But Mao the prickly nationalist was not willing to concede primacy to the Soviets in the alliance; and additional sticking point was that the Soviets insisted on China adhering to the treaty previously negotiated with the Nationalists, in which the Soviet Union was granted rights in northeast China. Nevertheless, Mao alarmed by the prospect of American forces on the Yalu river (and the ever-present fear of wei qi encirclement), decisively intervened in the Korean war and the war ground to a stalemate around the 38th parallel.

Though united by communist ideology, the Soviet Union and China were inherently conflict-prone geopolitically. Mao could not forget that the Soviet Union had territorial designs in China's northeast, as well as pretensions to ideological leadership of the world communist movement, which Mao could never concede. Rifts opened up between the two -- but simultaneously with the US over the latter's support for Taiwan. The first and second Taiwan straits crisis saw China intermittently shelling two Taiwan-controlled islands close to the mainland. Mao was bold enough to take on both superpowers at the same time, though China militarily was very weak. Mao's expectation was that neither superpower will want a total collapse of China, which would mean when conflict would break out with one, the other will reluctantly step in to help.

Domestically, the Great Leap Forward was launched aiming to make China an industrial power in a short period of time, but it was a disaster. Famine conditions prevailed in parts of the country and there were absurd scenes of workers melting down home and farm implements to meet steel production quotas.

In 1962, war with India broke out over India's northeast frontier, where China had territorial claims. The boundary had been negotiated between the British colonial administration and the government of Tibet, with China present but not signing the document. China claimed that the treaty was negotiated at a time of Chinese weakness, when Tibet was nominally independent. In a well-thought out strategy, China in a lightning move advanced dozens of miles deep into Indian territory, and then voluntarily withdrew to the international border. Kissinger says this was a strategy straight out of Sun Tzu -- to demonstrate to an opponent China's offensive potential, to gain the psychological advantage, but not undertake a costly occupation involving expensive supply lines across the Himalayas that might have exposed Chinese weaknesses.

In 1968 the cultural revolution was launched. Mao's idea of continuous revolution meant that cadres would need to be motivated by constant ideological fervor since any period of quiescence will lead to stagnation and the creeping advance of reactionary tendencies. The Cultural Revolution was meant smash the remnants of traditional authority in China -- the Confucian priesthood, local elites, intellectuals, even the party leadership. In effect, it just meant chaos and cruelty in which roving bands of ideologically-crazed young men attacked any and all authority figures that attracted their ire. For 4 years, all of China was in turmoil as the country essentially fell to mob rule. A shocking detail -- Deng Xiao Ping was exiled and his son was pushed off the roof of a Beijing university, and broke his back -- but was refused admission to hospital. He was a paraplegic the rest of his life. Imagine Deng's anger -- and his self-control that allowed him to cooperate with the perpetrators and enablers of the Cultural Revolution (including Premier Zhou En-Lai).

1969 -- clashes break out along the Ussuri river between Soviet and Chinese troops and the US senses a historic opportunity to peel away China. Kissinger masterfully deconstructs each party's geopolitical calculus: for China, the worry is whether it is a US feint and would China be sacrificed to possible superpower detente? The path forward was thorny -- including the question of who shall reach out to who. We get a view of the careful pas de deux of two supposed antagonists seeking to initiate a dialog and the tedious process of placing messages in diplomatic bags so that it makes its way up the chain of communication. But eventually, Kissinger visited Beijing, followed by the historic presidential visit and the Shanghai Communique.

The Shanghai Communique was a masterful document that did not make any effort to merge the positions of the two sides. Both sides presented their positions in its entirety and a separate section listed the items they agreed on, including a pointed reference to excluding outside powers (the Soviet Union) that sought to establish their hegemony in Asia. One effect of the summit was that China -- formerly averse to any sort of alliance or coalition of states on the grounds that it will curb their freedom of action -- began to talk about encirclement of the Soviet Union (the "horizontal line" of states including China, Iran, Turkey and the NATO allies that would hem in the Soviets).

The two leaders at the China-US summit were not destined to be around for too much longer after it. Watergate claimed Nixon and Mao died in 1976. Kissinger has some fascinating insights into the dangers of being the number-two man in a dictatorship. They should be close enough to the leader not to permit a competitor to come in between, but no so close that they overshadow the leader or seem to be overreaching. Lin Biao, an early follower of Mao fell after he was deemed too ambitious, Zhou En-Lai was on the way out well before Mao's death. The unlikely successor to Mao was Hua Guofeng; his brief tenure was distinguished only for doing away with the Gang of Four -- extreme ideologues including Mao's wife Jiang Qing. Deng Xiao Ping, rehabilitated after being imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution, succeeded Hua.

Modern China's economic rise should be attributed to Deng. A pragmatist who encouraged China to learn from the West, Deng and his technocrat allies unleashed the entrepreneurial spirits of the Chinese people. A dramatic episode in Deng's early years was the Third Vietnam War. After expelling the Americans, a resurgent and reunified Vietnam had extended its influence into Laos and invaded Cambodia in 1978 to expel the Khmer Rouge. This raised fears of a revived Indochinese Empire, a solid bloc of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which might also bring Thailand into its orbit. Coupled with Vietnam's alliance with the Soviets, this raised the old Chinese fears of encirclement -- Soviet divisions were still stationed on China's northern borders. So Deng initiated the Third Vietnam War, a hugely expensive invasion of three northern provinces of Vietnam. In a repeat of their India performance of 1962, the PLA laid waste to the three provincial capitals and withdrew. The Soviets, despite their treaty with Vietnam, did not lift a finger, leading Deng to crow that "China had touched the tiger's buttocks." Thereafter, Deng initiated a series of confrontations in proxy wars with the Soviet Union all over the world, in Africa, in Asia, vowing to "cut off their fingers, wherever they poked them."

Kissinger defends China mostly, in its handling of Tiananmen. Deng's reforms had the effect also of raising expectations among urbanites, as well as fears among party members that their profits from licensing and permitting were about to dry up. Kissinger takes at face value Deng's reformist credentials, pointing out that the Party hesitated for 7 weeks before acting to clear the square. Nevertheless, Tiananmen provoked a public outcry in the US, and led to the imposition of sanctions on China.

in 1997, Deng retired from public life. Before leaving he left instructions for his successors, in the form of a 24-character epigram. It is worth reading in full: "Observe carefully. Secure our position. Cope with affairs calmly. Hide our capacities and bide our time. Be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership."

Deng's successor was Jiang Zemin, a convivial, approachable, avuncular type who nevertheless concealed a sharp mind. He and his successor Hu Jintao, benefited from Deng's reforms and saw China transform into an economic powerhouse.

The most interesting part of the book is the Epilogue, in which Kissinger offers the all-important prognosis: will China peacefully rise (or peacefully develop, since 'rise' has connotations of displacing others), or will there be a violent hegemonic transfer? Key to the conundrum is whether intentions or capabilities matter. If we go by intentions, both the US and China are on record stating their preference for peaceful co-existence. But there is another school of thought that says that it is capabilities that matter, since intentions may change any time or may be concealed until the decisive moment. Kissinger cites an analysis of the situation in Europe in the run-up to World War I. Eyre Crowe, a British military strategist, produced a memorandum analyzing the causes of WWI. According to him, the decisive point was the deployment by Germany of a powerful navy. Britain knew that though Germany professed to be uninterested in empire, the navy gave them the capability to threaten British shipping at any time. And with the capability in hand, Germany could change intentions at any time, and Britain could not afford to be complacent. And any move by Britain would further Germany's threat perceptions and responses. Kissinger acknowledges that China's emerging economic and military capabilities might unleash a similar cycle today -- but eventually dismisses it saying that we know too much about the consequences of war and the lethality of modern weapons to be led down that path.

Some blind spots are evident -- for example, repeated assertions of the US preference for democratic regimes, whereas the historical record shows that the US prefers pliable dictatorships by a far margin -- but the book on the whole is well-balanced and fair. Kissinger of course plays a central role in the story -- but that is no exaggeration, because he did have a seat at the diplomatic high table for most of the last half-century.

Kissinger's book is backed up by records of interviews and other primary documents from his personal archives. It is excellently documented, with close to a 100 pages of scholarly apparatus at the end.

[Jacob Seely · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not quite memoir, not quite geopolitical treatise. I've struggled a bit to figure out why I liked this approach in, say, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich and not here. I think in part it may be that even when he is narrating Kissinger feels impersonal, almost as if he were speaking of a third person.

The beginning picks up where World Order left off, going deeper into the Chinese geopolitical view. Later chapters zoom in on Mao, then almost grind to a standstill during the years Kissinger experienced. I can't help but think this would be more digestible if Kissenger at least told us how it felt to be him (or stuck to high-level points)...

That said, the Kissenger POV is interesting, especially his view that with China particularly, the Western quest for a perfect democratic state may actually undermine real progress of reform from within, and that too much pessimism towards China may worsen outcomes rather than improve them. "...the advocates of confrontation will not be vindicated by such an outcome. Those who inherit the ensuing conflict will still be obliged to produce a new and better world order when the crisis abates. In the end, history lauds not the conflicts of societies but their reconciliations."

[J.R. · Rating 4 out of 5]

My readings on China have continously referenced or recommended Henry Kissinger's book "On China" and I finally caved. Let me start by stating that Dr. Kissinger was brilliant. Period. No qualifiers needed. Despite any agreement or disagree in policy or philosophy, his intellectual capacity and equally deep amd broad understanding of world events shines through his book.

His understanding of Chinese history, the cultural and poltical contexts, and the personalities surrounding China in the 1960s-1990s is unrivaled in any western book I've read to-date. It was so fascinating to hear from a man who was in the room during these negotiations, a confidant of multiple presidents spanning parties and decades, on why certain policies were approached the way they were. He captures the nuances, the fears, the competing and aligned interests alike when he retells how figures like Nixon, Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Carter navigated the geopolitical issues. The book covers the Soviet Union's expansion, the second and third Vietnam war, nuclear weapons, international trade and much more.

If you want to better understand Sino-American foreign policy, you simply cannot afford not to read this book.

[Masatoshi Nishimura · Rating 4 out of 5]

The atrocity committed by Mao and his proceeding communist party is well-covered topics by journalists and historians. Henry Kissinger adds valuable insight. It was really interesting to go through the dialog of Kissinger had with top Chinese politicians. He shows us a glimpse of the human side behind those Chinese leaders.

Kissinger has lots of historical insights and well-read. And as someone who has experienced the horror of Nazi Germany, I can see his passion behind his job as a diplomat. As much as it's criticized today, he sincerely believes the US leadership can bring world peace. Whether that is true or not, someone with such passion working side by side with a global leader feels to me much comforting. I appreciate such a person in power writes a first hand biography for us.

My general takeaway is how important the historical value of nations (China as the only cultural sovereignty and US as the ambassador of global democracy and freedom) in assessing the decision making of policymakers. That sounds far apart but idealists and pragmatists operate only in a different time horizon and they are both equally relevant. National interests involved go beyond immediate rational calculation.

PS: I sincerely hope China and US won't get into a conflict too in the 21st century.