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The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman & the Destruction of Hitler's Germany 1941-45
As Allied troops advanced, Franklin Roosevelt &, later, Harry Truman fought in private with Churchill & Stalin over how to ensure Germany could never threaten peace again. Eleven years in the writing, drawing on newly opened American, Soviet & British documents as well as private diaries, letters & audio recordings, this narrative eavesdrops on private conversations between historical giants. It illuminates FDR's concealment of what America knew about Hitler's war against the Jews & his foot-dragging on saving refugees. FDR's actions so shocked his closest Cabinet friend, Treasury Sec. Henry Morgenthau Jr, that Morgenthau risked their friendship by accusing the FDR of acquiescence in the "murder of the Jews." After Normandy, obsessed by what he'd learned about the Nazis & the Holocaust, Morgenthau drew up a secret blueprint for the Allies to crush Germany by destroying German mines & factories after victory. FDR endorsed most of the plan & pressured a reluctant Churchill to concur. Horrified, Sec. of State Cordell Hull & Sec. of War Henry Stimson leaked the plan to the press during the '44 campaign. Propagandist Joseph Goebbels denounced the Roosevelt-Churchill "Jewish murder plan" & claimed it would kill 43,000,000 Germans. Republican presidential candidate Dewey charged that by stiffening German resistance, publicity about the plan had cost lives. "The Conquerors" explores suspicions that Soviet agents manipulated FDR & his officials to do Stalin's bidding on Germany. It reveals new information on FDR's illnesses & how they affected his leadership--& his private talk about quitting his job during his 4th term. It shows FDR's final dinner, in 4/45, in Warm Springs, GA, at which he & Morgenthau were still arguing over postwar Germany. Finally it shows how an unprepared new president managed to pick up the pieces & push Stalin & Churchill to accede to a bargain that would let the Anglo-Americans block Soviet threats against Western Europe & ensure the world wouldn't have to fear another Hitler.
377 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2002
67 people are currently reading
934 people want to read
About the author
Michael R. Beschloss
37 books387 followersMichael Beschloss is the author of nine books on presidential history, including, most recently, the New York Times bestsellers Presidential Courage and The Conquerors, as well as two volumes on Lyndon Johnson’s White House tapes. He was also editor of the number-one global bestseller Jacqueline Kennedy: Historic Conversations on Life with John F. Kennedy. He is the NBC News Presidential Historian and a PBS NewsHour contributor and has received an Emmy and six honorary degrees.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 96 reviews
April 26, 2015
This book is a very informative narrative of a very interesting War and time period. It covers just the years 1941 through 1945. Most of it deals with American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, England’s Prime Minister Winston Church Hill and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin’s handling of the war against Nazi led Germany.
By 1943 it looked like the Allied Powers (U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union) were on the verge of defeating Axis power Germany. So, in January 1943 FDR met with Churchill and demanded that the war be continued until Germany accepts an unconditional surrender. Churchill however disagreed but went along so he would not alienate FDR and American support.
In a somewhat funny episode, the big three (FDR, Churchill and Stalin) met in Tehran, Iran in November 1943. Stalin demanded that the Allies shoot 50,000 Germans after the war is won. FDR seconds his demand. Churchill storms out in protest at the brutality. Stalin grabs him and informs him that he was only kidding.
Much of the book focused on FDR’s Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau who also happened to be FDR’s best friend. Morgenthau after he received reports of Jewish extermination camps pressured FRD into helping to stop them. FDR was very slow to act. He feared that public acknowledgment of those horrific details would have stiffened German resistance. In a token effort FDR accepted around 1000 Jewish refugees housing them in an Army base in Oswego, NY in 1944.
Morgenthau went a step further and took it upon himself to write a plan to govern the defeated Germany. His plan intended for Germany’s great industries to be divvied up among German victim countries. And for Germany to exist on just what food it could produce on its own. At times FDR supported his friends plan at other times he didn’t. The other two of the big three were not thrilled by it. Churchill viewed Germany as a vital potential trading partner and Stalin wanted huge war reparation payments that a pastoral Germany would not be able to pay. It should be noted that FDR was in bad health and was deteriorating. Fortunately he died in April of 1945 and his very capable yet ill -informed vice president succeeded him.
In July of 1945 President Truman scrapped the Morgenthau plan and fired Morgenthau. He met at Potsdam with Churchill and Stalin after the Allied victory to decide Germany’s fate. They decided on dividing defeated Germany into occupation zones which (unknowingly at the time) would define the upcoming Cold War boundaries. Truman appointed Lucius Clay to the tough task of governing Germany. His first job was to round up Nazi war criminals for trial. His second job was to democratize Germany. By all accounts he did a magnificent job.
Then in 1947, new Secretary of State George Marshall unveiled what is known as the Marshall plan. The plan provided financial aid and aid for the reconstruction of the devastated Germany. The success of the Marshall Plan has been enormous. In just 30 years after WWII a democratic Western Germany became the third wealthiest country in the world and a great American friend as well.
October 24, 2020
This is a history of Allied planning for a postwar Germany. Noting that Germany evolved, even after reunification, into a peaceful representative democracy, author Beschloss is interested in what went right and how it came to be so despite the passionate debates between and within the allied governments.
I was particularly interested in the relations between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, noting here as I'd done elsewhere that FDR and Stalin respected and came to trust one another. How different the world may have been had Roosevelt survived his fourth term and gone on, as he hoped, to become a leader of the United Nations Organization. He was only sixty-three at the time of his death.
I was particularly interested in the relations between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, noting here as I'd done elsewhere that FDR and Stalin respected and came to trust one another. How different the world may have been had Roosevelt survived his fourth term and gone on, as he hoped, to become a leader of the United Nations Organization. He was only sixty-three at the time of his death.
November 28, 2025
"Clay warned Byrnes of the Germans' anxiety that U.S. Forces would leave them to confront the Red Army alone. In September 1946, the Secretary of State came to Germany and spoke at Stuttgart Opera House to an audience including dozens of the Germans Clay had appointed in the experiment of self-government. Millions of Germans listened by radio to a simultaneous German translation of the speech. Byrnes declared that as long as there were any occupation solders in Germany, Americans would stay: 'We will not shirk our duty. We are not withdrawing.' As Clay later recalled, there was "...enormous enthusiasm. It was unbelievable to me. Here was an American Secretary of State out there signing autographs for the Germans, a little over one year after the end of the war."
--Michael Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's German 1941-1945
The Conquerors is an exacting, intensely researched narrative with a somewhat misleading subtitle. A more accurate (but less catchy) one might have read "The machinations and plotting of the Roosevelt and Truman cabinets with respect to post-World War II Germany." By volume, Conquerors deals very little with the presidents directly--and certainly not in detail with the destruction of Hitler's Germany. Rather, Conquerors fixates on the rivalries between the U.S. State, War, and Treasury Departments as they competed to shape policy towards post-war Germany - policy visions which could not have been more different and still impact our world today.
In particular, entire sections of Conquerors concentrate on the schemings, communications, and actions of Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, a dogged proponent of draconian measures towards Germany (the fact that Morgenthau was a secular Jew within the presidents' cabinets is a steady narrative presence). In the author's acknowledgements, Beschloss notes the generosity of Morgenthau's son in sharing thousands of family notes, documents, and letters. At times, Conquerors feels almost exclusively like a mini-biography of Morgenthau, and an overly sympathetic one at that. The U.S. State and War Departments undeniably won the policy battle surrounding post-war Germany, and the light of history has only served to make clear how critical that victory was. The Morgenthau Plan, while purportedly born out of concern for German rearmament, would almost certainly have induced social chaos, mass starvation and perhaps even furthered Soviet expansionism.
Still, Beschloss's work is full of insightful historical observations and fascinating anecdotes, even as he keeps the narrative moving forward and (generally) unified. Conquerors does a stellar job of demonstrating the complex, partisan, and often haphazard nature of post-World War II policy formation during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. After reading several works within a two-year span focused on Truman's transition to the presidency, the birth and execution of the Marshall Plan, and World War II's eastern front, several additional observations seem relevant:
1. I've already noted this, but Beschloss's delicate treatment of Morgenthau's deeply flawed plan, as well as his his polite handling of Morgenthau's inter-departmental interactions borders on what I can only term altruistic history. Morgenthau, put simply, was simply wrong in his views - and often wrong about how those views were being perceived by the people around him who mattered. In this respect, Conqueror's narrative feels tamped down out of deference and concern for its sources - and the family members that provided them.
2. Despite Beschloss's incredible access to newly unsealed primary sources, his analysis and conclusions struck me as occasionally missing the mark. To give one example, Beschloss portrayal of FDR's inaction on the Holocaust essentially ignores any examination of FDR's personal attitudes and prejudices towards the Jewish people (something he is more than willing to do for FDR's successor, President Truman). This would seem to be relevant, especially given the historiographical shift that has occurred around FDR's legacy over the past 5 decades. Make no mistake - there are subtle criticisms of FDR and his administration's inaction - but FDR's personal attitudes as possible source of inaction are never truly explored. I found this linked article fascinating as a research companion, in no small part because it extensively mentions Beschloss's history professor, the late James MacGregor Burns, and his role in exculpating FDR from historical blame on this complex front, even while giving Beschloss some (modest) credit for advancing a subtly more nuanced narrative.
3. The critical nexus of FDR's death, Truman's unexpected ascendancy, and key global events all impressed on me one inescapable line of historical thought - Truman's organized, distributed, and direct approach to decision-making and leadership were absolutely vital to the revitalization of post-war Europe. Despite the author's laudatory (and arguably overstated) views on FDR's role in shaping post-war Germany ("Franklin Roosevelt had more influence than any other non-German on what Hitler's nation has now become"), my view is that FDR's reliance on personal charisma, deferred decisions, and a (deliberately) divisive approach to leadership had after twelve years left his best cabinet minds embittered, exhausted, and grasping for something solid. That something, it turned out, was a failed haberdasher from Missouri. History is funny that way.
--Michael Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's German 1941-1945
The Conquerors is an exacting, intensely researched narrative with a somewhat misleading subtitle. A more accurate (but less catchy) one might have read "The machinations and plotting of the Roosevelt and Truman cabinets with respect to post-World War II Germany." By volume, Conquerors deals very little with the presidents directly--and certainly not in detail with the destruction of Hitler's Germany. Rather, Conquerors fixates on the rivalries between the U.S. State, War, and Treasury Departments as they competed to shape policy towards post-war Germany - policy visions which could not have been more different and still impact our world today.
In particular, entire sections of Conquerors concentrate on the schemings, communications, and actions of Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, a dogged proponent of draconian measures towards Germany (the fact that Morgenthau was a secular Jew within the presidents' cabinets is a steady narrative presence). In the author's acknowledgements, Beschloss notes the generosity of Morgenthau's son in sharing thousands of family notes, documents, and letters. At times, Conquerors feels almost exclusively like a mini-biography of Morgenthau, and an overly sympathetic one at that. The U.S. State and War Departments undeniably won the policy battle surrounding post-war Germany, and the light of history has only served to make clear how critical that victory was. The Morgenthau Plan, while purportedly born out of concern for German rearmament, would almost certainly have induced social chaos, mass starvation and perhaps even furthered Soviet expansionism.
Still, Beschloss's work is full of insightful historical observations and fascinating anecdotes, even as he keeps the narrative moving forward and (generally) unified. Conquerors does a stellar job of demonstrating the complex, partisan, and often haphazard nature of post-World War II policy formation during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. After reading several works within a two-year span focused on Truman's transition to the presidency, the birth and execution of the Marshall Plan, and World War II's eastern front, several additional observations seem relevant:
1. I've already noted this, but Beschloss's delicate treatment of Morgenthau's deeply flawed plan, as well as his his polite handling of Morgenthau's inter-departmental interactions borders on what I can only term altruistic history. Morgenthau, put simply, was simply wrong in his views - and often wrong about how those views were being perceived by the people around him who mattered. In this respect, Conqueror's narrative feels tamped down out of deference and concern for its sources - and the family members that provided them.
2. Despite Beschloss's incredible access to newly unsealed primary sources, his analysis and conclusions struck me as occasionally missing the mark. To give one example, Beschloss portrayal of FDR's inaction on the Holocaust essentially ignores any examination of FDR's personal attitudes and prejudices towards the Jewish people (something he is more than willing to do for FDR's successor, President Truman). This would seem to be relevant, especially given the historiographical shift that has occurred around FDR's legacy over the past 5 decades. Make no mistake - there are subtle criticisms of FDR and his administration's inaction - but FDR's personal attitudes as possible source of inaction are never truly explored. I found this linked article fascinating as a research companion, in no small part because it extensively mentions Beschloss's history professor, the late James MacGregor Burns, and his role in exculpating FDR from historical blame on this complex front, even while giving Beschloss some (modest) credit for advancing a subtly more nuanced narrative.
3. The critical nexus of FDR's death, Truman's unexpected ascendancy, and key global events all impressed on me one inescapable line of historical thought - Truman's organized, distributed, and direct approach to decision-making and leadership were absolutely vital to the revitalization of post-war Europe. Despite the author's laudatory (and arguably overstated) views on FDR's role in shaping post-war Germany ("Franklin Roosevelt had more influence than any other non-German on what Hitler's nation has now become"), my view is that FDR's reliance on personal charisma, deferred decisions, and a (deliberately) divisive approach to leadership had after twelve years left his best cabinet minds embittered, exhausted, and grasping for something solid. That something, it turned out, was a failed haberdasher from Missouri. History is funny that way.
March 4, 2019
Michael Beschloss is a great presidential historian. In The Conquerors he takes an in-depth behind the scenes look at decision making by the Roosevelt and Truman administrations regarding treatment of Jewish refugees, the Holocaust, and what to do with post-war Germany. Beschloss relies largely on the records kept by Sec. of Treasury Henry Morgenthau. During the Roosevelt years there was a lot of infighting and back stabbing within his administration involving mainly Hull, Stimson, and Morgenthau. With FDR approaching his last days he was less alert and less able to control actions of his staff let alone he was having to play off Churchill and Stalin during the last months of the war. Truman was inexperienced but determined to take control of things which meant replacing Roosevelt people with his own. Also, Beschloss points out that both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations were anti-Semitic with FDR being less overt due to Eleanor’s influence. Truman on the other hand had typical prejudiced views for many of that time period. I thought the book ended a little quick, there was so much more to tell about our involvement in Germany. Nevertheless a good read.
February 8, 2013
The book is "The Conquerors" by Michael Beschloss and its focus is somewhat different from what you might expect from the title.
I expected the book to be about the strategy and battles of the war against Nazi Germany. To my surprise and minor disappointment, these events were barely mentioned. Instead the book is really focused on the question of what to do with Nazi Germany after the war was won. Key to that decision making were the main characters: Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Yet Beschloss devotes a major part of this book to the influence of Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau. The so-called "Morgenthau Plan" was a highly revengeful plan to destroy Germany's industrial ability and let starvation and poverty exact tribute for the Nazi extermination programs. Initially, Roosevelt and Stalin were in favor of the Morgenthau Plan, although Churchill was appalled by it. Others in Roosevelt's cabinet resisted and fought against it as you will see while reading the book. When Roosevelt died in his fourth term, Truman had to deal with the question as the war in Europe ended and the American Army had no plan to follow.
Let me say a word about the Beschloss image of Roosevelt. He gives Roosevelt credit for great accomplishments, but also discloses his secretive and deceitful way of retaining power all to himself. He constantly played one person off against another and kept his cards close to his vest. His deviousness was not news to me and I have long considered FDR to be a mixed bag of great and not-so-great qualities. I personally abhor the type of leadership which fails to delegate in a clear and open manner to subordinates. To intentionally mislead them is sinful in my value system. Although two-thirds of the book is devoted to FDR's reign, it was a relief to me to see Truman take over when FDR died in office. HST took charge with crisp, clear, and decisive directives. Another of FDR's failings was to keep his vice-president in the dark while knowing his own health was failing and he lacked the concentration and energy to juggle all those national and world problems. Truman inherited a demanding job with almost no knowledge of what was happening or was previously decided. His fast study and wise decisions are a credit to him.
Let me also say a word about antisemitism in the WWII era. It is important to the story told in the book. Both FDR and HST are credited with antisemitic remarks and others in the administration fought against helping the fleeing Jews in Europe. When it was learned that Jews and others were being exterminated by Nazis in large numbers, the news was suppressed from the public and no military assistance was specifically directed to stop the slaughter. Henry Morgenthau was of Jewish descent, but ignored his faith. The severity of his postwar plan was attributed by many to his heritage. I guess we have to say it was another time and the behavior of these players seems absurd to us now. Perhaps, we can rejoice in the progress we have made in the intervening years.
My greatest "Aha" moment in the book was when Truman was negotiating with Stalin in Potsdam. The Russians had conquered most of Eastern Europe and were feeling their oats. They were demanding, not asking for what they wanted. Truman received word of the successful atomic bomb test in New Mexico and realized the USA didn't have to kowtow to anyone anymore. I can just imagine how he must have felt at that moment.
You will find "The Conquerors" fast-paced and easy to read. The author has ruthlessly trimmed away everything which does not contribute to his theme. At times, I thought he did it too ruthlessly but it is his book and he has a right to write it as he pleases. For many readers, this style may be what it takes to get them to learn a little history.
Ralph D. Hermansen, November 22, 2012
I expected the book to be about the strategy and battles of the war against Nazi Germany. To my surprise and minor disappointment, these events were barely mentioned. Instead the book is really focused on the question of what to do with Nazi Germany after the war was won. Key to that decision making were the main characters: Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Yet Beschloss devotes a major part of this book to the influence of Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau. The so-called "Morgenthau Plan" was a highly revengeful plan to destroy Germany's industrial ability and let starvation and poverty exact tribute for the Nazi extermination programs. Initially, Roosevelt and Stalin were in favor of the Morgenthau Plan, although Churchill was appalled by it. Others in Roosevelt's cabinet resisted and fought against it as you will see while reading the book. When Roosevelt died in his fourth term, Truman had to deal with the question as the war in Europe ended and the American Army had no plan to follow.
Let me say a word about the Beschloss image of Roosevelt. He gives Roosevelt credit for great accomplishments, but also discloses his secretive and deceitful way of retaining power all to himself. He constantly played one person off against another and kept his cards close to his vest. His deviousness was not news to me and I have long considered FDR to be a mixed bag of great and not-so-great qualities. I personally abhor the type of leadership which fails to delegate in a clear and open manner to subordinates. To intentionally mislead them is sinful in my value system. Although two-thirds of the book is devoted to FDR's reign, it was a relief to me to see Truman take over when FDR died in office. HST took charge with crisp, clear, and decisive directives. Another of FDR's failings was to keep his vice-president in the dark while knowing his own health was failing and he lacked the concentration and energy to juggle all those national and world problems. Truman inherited a demanding job with almost no knowledge of what was happening or was previously decided. His fast study and wise decisions are a credit to him.
Let me also say a word about antisemitism in the WWII era. It is important to the story told in the book. Both FDR and HST are credited with antisemitic remarks and others in the administration fought against helping the fleeing Jews in Europe. When it was learned that Jews and others were being exterminated by Nazis in large numbers, the news was suppressed from the public and no military assistance was specifically directed to stop the slaughter. Henry Morgenthau was of Jewish descent, but ignored his faith. The severity of his postwar plan was attributed by many to his heritage. I guess we have to say it was another time and the behavior of these players seems absurd to us now. Perhaps, we can rejoice in the progress we have made in the intervening years.
My greatest "Aha" moment in the book was when Truman was negotiating with Stalin in Potsdam. The Russians had conquered most of Eastern Europe and were feeling their oats. They were demanding, not asking for what they wanted. Truman received word of the successful atomic bomb test in New Mexico and realized the USA didn't have to kowtow to anyone anymore. I can just imagine how he must have felt at that moment.
You will find "The Conquerors" fast-paced and easy to read. The author has ruthlessly trimmed away everything which does not contribute to his theme. At times, I thought he did it too ruthlessly but it is his book and he has a right to write it as he pleases. For many readers, this style may be what it takes to get them to learn a little history.
Ralph D. Hermansen, November 22, 2012
September 17, 2007
Michael Beschloss' The Conquerors is a wonderful examination of how Roosevelt, Truman and other Allied leaders planned the destruction of Hitler's war machine as well post-war Germany (remember back when we planned ahead?!). The book focuses heavily on Truman's plans for post-war Germany, and in particular the eventual rejection of the Morgenthau Plan. It was the end of WWII, and the start of the Cold War. Fascinating times.
NC
NC
December 31, 2012
This book is not, as the title might suggest, about the destruction of Hitler’s German war machine but about winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the post war German people. The conflicts Beschloss recreates are much more intellectual than physical in nature. I admit that upon reading this book the first time in early 2003 I thought that the primary thrust of Beschloss’ thesis would be focused on the tactics of the military commanders, the major battles fought and the leadership provided by the two presidents listed in the title. It was not until I completed the book, however, that I clearly realized that the evil that Roosevelt and Truman “conquered” was not Hitler’s military and his unconscionable genocidal death machine, that was only the first part of the struggle. The more important job was to ensure that when the war was over they had in place a plan to remake Germany, not merely to rebuild it. That is; to make sure that Germany would never again have “plunged the world into their wars of expansion and aggression” as Churchill stated after returning from Casablanca in 1943. My second reading has confirmed that this is an important book for those interested in World War II Germany.
Thanks to Beschloss’ non-scholarly, narrative style and his attention to an easy to follow linear timeline this was a thoroughly enjoyable read. It was not, however, a book about Roosevelt and Truman so much as a book about the “Morgenthau Plan” and its impact on the conduct of the war and the post war period. The majority of the book dealt with the transformation of the painfully shy Dutchess County neighbor and long time friend of Roosevelt, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. The author paints a detailed picture of the man who for years attempted to ignore (or hide from) his German-Jewish roots while serving as FDR’s Treasury Secretary and explains how he eventually became a committed Zionist, obsessed with Hitler’s intentions to achieve the “final solution to the Jewish problem”.
Beschloss brackets Morgenthau’s gripping story and his “Carthaginian” plan for post war Germany with good, solid and well researched World War II information. The book begins with the Stauffenberg assassination attempt on July 20, 1944 and closes with Ike’s famous statement from October 1945; “…the success of this occupation can only be judged fifty years from now. If the Germans have a stable, prosperous democracy, then we shall have succeeded.” (283) In between these two events he fleshes out the strengths and the sometimes enormous weaknesses of Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Truman and a host of cabinet members. He brings to the surface the undeniable anti-Semitism which was rampant in our country at the time and the effect it had on FDR’s unwillingness to attach much significance to the intelligence that he was receiving as early as 1939 on Nazi death camps. I use as a corroborating reference to this statement a transcript of his December 29, 1940 fireside chat to the nation where he makes specific reference to “the shootings, chains and concentration camps… that are the very altars of (this) modern dictatorship.” Beschloss explains that the Morgenthau plan would never work for a Truman that could say to Secretary Stimson: “...don’t worry. Neither Morgenthau, Baruch nor any of the Jew boys will be going to Potsdam” (246) You get an even better feel for this when reading comments like those voiced by the Ambassador to England, Joseph Kennedy, who said that dragging this nation into a “Jewish war” would result in “…more blood running in the streets of New York than Berlin.” (41) In his defense, Roosevelt was also forced to spend time dealing with the rabid anti-Semite Father Charles Coughlin who railed against “Jews, the communists and the godless capitalists” as the cause of America’s ills as early as 1936.
As a result the author focuses most of the book on Morgenthau's experiences which primarily consist of bureaucratic infighting among the Treasury, State, War Departments and the new Truman Administration, much of it driven by latent anti-Semitism. While publicly supporting Morgenthau, FDR carried an intense private opposition to his plan to reduce Germany to a group of pastoral city-states. Here the author’s writing style allows you to get a sense of the insecurities some of these cabinet members carried around with them when in the presence of FDR’s larger than life personality and how it sometimes affected the conduct of the war. His portrayal of Secretaries of State Stettinius and Bryne can actually make you wince. Reading this one could wonder how we have survived this long as a nation if we sometimes have these manipulative, backbiting boot lickers as advisors to our presidents.
The Conquerors does tackle some of the rumors that continue to cloud FDR’s time in office to this day. From suspicions about Stalin’s ability to manipulate Roosevelt (which infuriated Churchill) to his less than honest dealings with the public on the amount of Lend-Lease activities occurring in the late 1930s. While telling Americans that they were not going to be involved in another European war he was sending much needed supplies to England and building up our military quietly yet effectively. Beschloss spends a good deal of time on FDR’s Machiavellian management style and how he pitted cabinet members and advisers against one another and then reigning them in only when they are about to go entirely off the reservation. No less a figure than Eisenhower himself when chosen to be the Supreme Commander of Operation Overlord says of Roosevelt that he was “almost an egomaniac in his belief in his own wisdom.” (29) And how his illness, especially in 1944 as he approached his fourth term, affected his ability to lead showing him sometimes so tired as to be unable to read and grasp important documents and overseas cables. Most important for me was the fact that knowing he was so ill, he never included Truman in a single discussion about the war. This left Truman woefully unprepared to assume his role as the 33rd president and to be the man that would push two towering figures of the last century, Churchill and Stalin, to agree to his plan to remake Germany while holding off the growing Soviet threat to Western Europe and at the same time supporting a nearly bankrupt England. And to accomplish that task while wielding the incredible power of the new atomic weapons systems in his arsenal as well.
Many historians point to the success of the transformation of Germany as the result of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift, the rise of NATO and the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe at any cost against the threatening Soviet expansion. Beschloss highlights the foresight of FDR and Truman to keep Germany from ever again becoming a threat while ensuring that the failure of Europe’s largest economy did not drive the continent into a massive depression. In fact, Beschloss believes that the success in Germany outshines even the New Deal programs designed and implemented by our 32nd president. Although Eisenhower supported a very tough stance on treatment of all Germans (Nazi or not, to him all Germans were culpable in the carnage that occurred), like FDR and Truman he drew the line at dismembering the economy and voiced strong concerns about the implementation of JSC 1067, the “Handbook for Military Government” as being overly harsh. It was Eisenhower’s belief that you had to control the Germans without forcing them to look at Communism as a better alternative than
democracy. Truman concurred and the military governor, Lucius Clay, carried those plans out almost flawlessly.
I am drawn to this historical period for good reason – I’m a baby-boomer, born right after this war ended. In 1968, as a 21 year old draftee, I was transferred to West Germany and was stationed in Bavaria. By the time I took my discharge there in early 1969 I spoke passable German and subsequently lived as a civilian in Bad Kissigen and later Paris for another 18 months before retuning to the Woodstock Generation. I found one of the most moving and thought provoking parts of The Conquerors on page 279. Beschloss quotes the historian Thomas Alan Schwartz who noted that surveys made a decade after the German defeat revealed that most Germans still thought that “Germany’s best times in recent history had been during the first years of the Nazis. A large minority was still insisting that Nazism was a good idea badly carried out.” That chilled me and I was drawn back in time to an early morning after a late night of drinking way too much Asbach Uralt and German lagers with some locals at a Gasthaus in Ingolstadt. Around 2 AM a group of four or five grizzled old Germans stood up and sang the banned stanzas from “Deutchland Uber Alles”, a song still treated as a criminal act at that time. It may still be.(“Germany, Germany, above all else! For the last time the storm-call has sounded! We are all prepared for the fight! Soon Hitler-flags will fly over every street. Our servitude will not last much longer now!”) When I questioned my girlfriend (of that time) why they would do such a thing, risking fines and possible jail time 25 years after the war was over, she replied with almost no hesitation and in a clear, straightforward manner: “We are Germans, he made us proud to be Germans. We have never felt that way since.” She was about 25 years old at the time, born immediately after the hostilities had ended. Maybe Morgenthau was right after all. Maybe not. You decide.
Thanks to Beschloss’ non-scholarly, narrative style and his attention to an easy to follow linear timeline this was a thoroughly enjoyable read. It was not, however, a book about Roosevelt and Truman so much as a book about the “Morgenthau Plan” and its impact on the conduct of the war and the post war period. The majority of the book dealt with the transformation of the painfully shy Dutchess County neighbor and long time friend of Roosevelt, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. The author paints a detailed picture of the man who for years attempted to ignore (or hide from) his German-Jewish roots while serving as FDR’s Treasury Secretary and explains how he eventually became a committed Zionist, obsessed with Hitler’s intentions to achieve the “final solution to the Jewish problem”.
Beschloss brackets Morgenthau’s gripping story and his “Carthaginian” plan for post war Germany with good, solid and well researched World War II information. The book begins with the Stauffenberg assassination attempt on July 20, 1944 and closes with Ike’s famous statement from October 1945; “…the success of this occupation can only be judged fifty years from now. If the Germans have a stable, prosperous democracy, then we shall have succeeded.” (283) In between these two events he fleshes out the strengths and the sometimes enormous weaknesses of Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Truman and a host of cabinet members. He brings to the surface the undeniable anti-Semitism which was rampant in our country at the time and the effect it had on FDR’s unwillingness to attach much significance to the intelligence that he was receiving as early as 1939 on Nazi death camps. I use as a corroborating reference to this statement a transcript of his December 29, 1940 fireside chat to the nation where he makes specific reference to “the shootings, chains and concentration camps… that are the very altars of (this) modern dictatorship.” Beschloss explains that the Morgenthau plan would never work for a Truman that could say to Secretary Stimson: “...don’t worry. Neither Morgenthau, Baruch nor any of the Jew boys will be going to Potsdam” (246) You get an even better feel for this when reading comments like those voiced by the Ambassador to England, Joseph Kennedy, who said that dragging this nation into a “Jewish war” would result in “…more blood running in the streets of New York than Berlin.” (41) In his defense, Roosevelt was also forced to spend time dealing with the rabid anti-Semite Father Charles Coughlin who railed against “Jews, the communists and the godless capitalists” as the cause of America’s ills as early as 1936.
As a result the author focuses most of the book on Morgenthau's experiences which primarily consist of bureaucratic infighting among the Treasury, State, War Departments and the new Truman Administration, much of it driven by latent anti-Semitism. While publicly supporting Morgenthau, FDR carried an intense private opposition to his plan to reduce Germany to a group of pastoral city-states. Here the author’s writing style allows you to get a sense of the insecurities some of these cabinet members carried around with them when in the presence of FDR’s larger than life personality and how it sometimes affected the conduct of the war. His portrayal of Secretaries of State Stettinius and Bryne can actually make you wince. Reading this one could wonder how we have survived this long as a nation if we sometimes have these manipulative, backbiting boot lickers as advisors to our presidents.
The Conquerors does tackle some of the rumors that continue to cloud FDR’s time in office to this day. From suspicions about Stalin’s ability to manipulate Roosevelt (which infuriated Churchill) to his less than honest dealings with the public on the amount of Lend-Lease activities occurring in the late 1930s. While telling Americans that they were not going to be involved in another European war he was sending much needed supplies to England and building up our military quietly yet effectively. Beschloss spends a good deal of time on FDR’s Machiavellian management style and how he pitted cabinet members and advisers against one another and then reigning them in only when they are about to go entirely off the reservation. No less a figure than Eisenhower himself when chosen to be the Supreme Commander of Operation Overlord says of Roosevelt that he was “almost an egomaniac in his belief in his own wisdom.” (29) And how his illness, especially in 1944 as he approached his fourth term, affected his ability to lead showing him sometimes so tired as to be unable to read and grasp important documents and overseas cables. Most important for me was the fact that knowing he was so ill, he never included Truman in a single discussion about the war. This left Truman woefully unprepared to assume his role as the 33rd president and to be the man that would push two towering figures of the last century, Churchill and Stalin, to agree to his plan to remake Germany while holding off the growing Soviet threat to Western Europe and at the same time supporting a nearly bankrupt England. And to accomplish that task while wielding the incredible power of the new atomic weapons systems in his arsenal as well.
Many historians point to the success of the transformation of Germany as the result of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift, the rise of NATO and the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe at any cost against the threatening Soviet expansion. Beschloss highlights the foresight of FDR and Truman to keep Germany from ever again becoming a threat while ensuring that the failure of Europe’s largest economy did not drive the continent into a massive depression. In fact, Beschloss believes that the success in Germany outshines even the New Deal programs designed and implemented by our 32nd president. Although Eisenhower supported a very tough stance on treatment of all Germans (Nazi or not, to him all Germans were culpable in the carnage that occurred), like FDR and Truman he drew the line at dismembering the economy and voiced strong concerns about the implementation of JSC 1067, the “Handbook for Military Government” as being overly harsh. It was Eisenhower’s belief that you had to control the Germans without forcing them to look at Communism as a better alternative than
democracy. Truman concurred and the military governor, Lucius Clay, carried those plans out almost flawlessly.
I am drawn to this historical period for good reason – I’m a baby-boomer, born right after this war ended. In 1968, as a 21 year old draftee, I was transferred to West Germany and was stationed in Bavaria. By the time I took my discharge there in early 1969 I spoke passable German and subsequently lived as a civilian in Bad Kissigen and later Paris for another 18 months before retuning to the Woodstock Generation. I found one of the most moving and thought provoking parts of The Conquerors on page 279. Beschloss quotes the historian Thomas Alan Schwartz who noted that surveys made a decade after the German defeat revealed that most Germans still thought that “Germany’s best times in recent history had been during the first years of the Nazis. A large minority was still insisting that Nazism was a good idea badly carried out.” That chilled me and I was drawn back in time to an early morning after a late night of drinking way too much Asbach Uralt and German lagers with some locals at a Gasthaus in Ingolstadt. Around 2 AM a group of four or five grizzled old Germans stood up and sang the banned stanzas from “Deutchland Uber Alles”, a song still treated as a criminal act at that time. It may still be.(“Germany, Germany, above all else! For the last time the storm-call has sounded! We are all prepared for the fight! Soon Hitler-flags will fly over every street. Our servitude will not last much longer now!”) When I questioned my girlfriend (of that time) why they would do such a thing, risking fines and possible jail time 25 years after the war was over, she replied with almost no hesitation and in a clear, straightforward manner: “We are Germans, he made us proud to be Germans. We have never felt that way since.” She was about 25 years old at the time, born immediately after the hostilities had ended. Maybe Morgenthau was right after all. Maybe not. You decide.
April 8, 2022
I really did not know what this book would be about before reading it, as I assumed it was going to be about FDR and Truman as war leaders. It is not. It is about what to do with Germany after victory. This was a difficult problem as there would be so many constituencies to satisfy.
The unconditional surrender promise made by Roosevelt was two fold. First as a promise to the Soviets to not make a separate peace. Secondly to remake Germany so it would not start a war again. Of the two FDR seems to have seen the later as far more important. He knew a Germany in his youth that he did not see in his adulthood. A Germany he wanted it restored and democratized. Although much of Roosevelt's attention was on winning the war, planning for postwar Germany had to take place.
The book centers on Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. Morgenthau was the only Jewish person in the Cabinet. Upon hearing about the concentration camps he was appalled. Morgenthau was never a practicing Jew but the wholesale slaughter of a people woke something up in him. FDR's unwillingness to help the Jews or signal to the Nazis that we knew also enraged him. He decided to help, since treasury was going to be needed, and create a reconstruction plan for Germany. His plan would become infamous in its concept to take Germany back at least 100 years developmentally. FDR could be frustrating as he would signal his approval of an idea then not follow up or agree with another opposite idea. The same holds true here. Although FDR seems to have been wanting a harsher peace with the Allies in firm control of the entire nation and even seemed pleased with the idea of breaking the country up.
A problem with FDR that becomes obvious in Beschloss' book is that he was a dying man. There are numerous episodes in the book where those around him feel like they are looking at a dead man. He was not all there. He had memory lapses. He was having trouble handling people which he never really struggled with before. FDR was in no condition to be President from 1944 onwards. Yet his own ego and belief that he alone was the one to fix the problems kept him from even entertaining a thought of retirement. He would make mention of it but enjoyed being President too much. Truman upon becoming President was a complete personality change from Roosevelt. There were quicker decisions and less story telling. Truman agreed that American troops had to be in Germany. As a matter of fact Eisenhower was on board with this too. All wanted Germany to feel the defeat. Truman was the only political figure up in the administration who actually fought the Germans in World War I. Truman's thoughts about Germany soon ran head on into dealing with the Soviet Union. Politics should be about the future and Truman wisely begins to think of how to help Germany become connected to Western Europe, democratic and as a wall to stop the communist menace. Morgenthau's plan would be shelved due to these concerns. The Soviets probably overplayed their hand in Europe hoping the US would leave and when Truman refused, Germany would not become a place so devastated they would turn to communism. The book briefly touches on the start of the Cold War and American German policy but that is an epilogue to the story Beschloss tells.
This book takes a small part of our history and points out how decision came about. Building or repair takes far longer than the destruction. It also has to be thought out or at least planned. Plans can change due to circumstances but planning gives a clue as to options. While fighting the war it is interesting to see how the administrations were looking ahead and trying to balance the need for justice, with the needs for the future and the idea of compassion. Truman's family history plays a part in his final decision. His mother was still bitter at the Yankees for the American Civil War. Truman took that never dying hatred his mother had and projected it onto the Germans and he did not like what he saw if the Morgenthau plan was implemented. Eisenhower and Germany's occupation commander, Gen. Lucius Clay, both believed the final judgement on their handling of German in this time would be best thought of 50 years later. The general judgement was the policies they did follow through on worked to create a far more peaceful democratic Germany where they are no longer feared for their militarism.
The unconditional surrender promise made by Roosevelt was two fold. First as a promise to the Soviets to not make a separate peace. Secondly to remake Germany so it would not start a war again. Of the two FDR seems to have seen the later as far more important. He knew a Germany in his youth that he did not see in his adulthood. A Germany he wanted it restored and democratized. Although much of Roosevelt's attention was on winning the war, planning for postwar Germany had to take place.
The book centers on Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. Morgenthau was the only Jewish person in the Cabinet. Upon hearing about the concentration camps he was appalled. Morgenthau was never a practicing Jew but the wholesale slaughter of a people woke something up in him. FDR's unwillingness to help the Jews or signal to the Nazis that we knew also enraged him. He decided to help, since treasury was going to be needed, and create a reconstruction plan for Germany. His plan would become infamous in its concept to take Germany back at least 100 years developmentally. FDR could be frustrating as he would signal his approval of an idea then not follow up or agree with another opposite idea. The same holds true here. Although FDR seems to have been wanting a harsher peace with the Allies in firm control of the entire nation and even seemed pleased with the idea of breaking the country up.
A problem with FDR that becomes obvious in Beschloss' book is that he was a dying man. There are numerous episodes in the book where those around him feel like they are looking at a dead man. He was not all there. He had memory lapses. He was having trouble handling people which he never really struggled with before. FDR was in no condition to be President from 1944 onwards. Yet his own ego and belief that he alone was the one to fix the problems kept him from even entertaining a thought of retirement. He would make mention of it but enjoyed being President too much. Truman upon becoming President was a complete personality change from Roosevelt. There were quicker decisions and less story telling. Truman agreed that American troops had to be in Germany. As a matter of fact Eisenhower was on board with this too. All wanted Germany to feel the defeat. Truman was the only political figure up in the administration who actually fought the Germans in World War I. Truman's thoughts about Germany soon ran head on into dealing with the Soviet Union. Politics should be about the future and Truman wisely begins to think of how to help Germany become connected to Western Europe, democratic and as a wall to stop the communist menace. Morgenthau's plan would be shelved due to these concerns. The Soviets probably overplayed their hand in Europe hoping the US would leave and when Truman refused, Germany would not become a place so devastated they would turn to communism. The book briefly touches on the start of the Cold War and American German policy but that is an epilogue to the story Beschloss tells.
This book takes a small part of our history and points out how decision came about. Building or repair takes far longer than the destruction. It also has to be thought out or at least planned. Plans can change due to circumstances but planning gives a clue as to options. While fighting the war it is interesting to see how the administrations were looking ahead and trying to balance the need for justice, with the needs for the future and the idea of compassion. Truman's family history plays a part in his final decision. His mother was still bitter at the Yankees for the American Civil War. Truman took that never dying hatred his mother had and projected it onto the Germans and he did not like what he saw if the Morgenthau plan was implemented. Eisenhower and Germany's occupation commander, Gen. Lucius Clay, both believed the final judgement on their handling of German in this time would be best thought of 50 years later. The general judgement was the policies they did follow through on worked to create a far more peaceful democratic Germany where they are no longer feared for their militarism.
February 15, 2021
A frustrating book that suffers from a misunderstanding about its focus. In this history of the shifting American policy toward postwar Germany after World War II, Beschloss obviously is most fascinated by the Morgenthau Plan. FDR's Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, devised a plan to make the country an agricultural one. This idea deserves this level of attention. Since it did not come to pass, coverage of alternative policies would seem to be necessary. Not to Beschloss; he falls down in looking at them. This neglect spills over to his account of important events. His recounting of the Yalta Conference leaves out all attempts to understand if Stalin conned Roosevelt and is singularly unsatisfying. The only element I can endorse is the depiction of the controlled chaos that marks policymaking in the Roosevelt Administration. The funny thing is that if Beschloss had limited his focus to Morgenthau and his proposal it would have been quite interesting. I could recommend that book but not this one.
February 23, 2025
This has truth in what happened in the past with these people who ruled!!!
I do not like history, even these historic people.
So, I skimmed it. And I saw the pages of the past of some of the things that truly happened.
I do not like history, even these historic people.
So, I skimmed it. And I saw the pages of the past of some of the things that truly happened.
October 8, 2017
This book was a deep disappointment. The subtitle, “Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945,” is a deception. Only in a footnote, two-thirds into the book is the reader actually told “… this book is concerned with Roosevelt’s and Truman’s wartime statecraft on postwar Germany…” The first half of the book covers the years 1943 until Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 – the Roosevelt years. But very little of it is about Roosevelt, but rather about the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau and Morgenthau’s obsession with punishing Germany after the war. Historically this was a trivial issue, carrying no weight after the war, and it defies logic that Beschloss essentially wastes the time of the reader. Roosevelt had little interest in developing a detailed post-surrender policy for Germany, being content to allow facts on the ground to define US policy – and Roosevelt was not about to repeat the mistakes of Versailles. Anyone who saw Roosevelt in the early months of 1945 knew he was dying. Plus, Soviet aggression in Europe after the German surrender dictated US policy to support, rebuild and re-arm Germany in the face of Russian aggression. Dedicating the first half of a history book to the trivial in-fighting s of the administration [in the year before the war ended] over post-surrender Germany policy was simply irritating.
But worse, Beschloss tells absolutely nothing about Roosevelt as war leader and de jur Commander in Chief of the Western Allies. For that incredible story I refer you to Nigel Hamilton’s superb three volume work, FDR at War (as of this writing in October 2017, the third volume is yet to be published).
All judgement and commentary by the author is reserved for the final chapter. The initial 90% is rattled out in a “just the facts, Ma’am” manor.
I do not recommend this book.
10-4-2017
But worse, Beschloss tells absolutely nothing about Roosevelt as war leader and de jur Commander in Chief of the Western Allies. For that incredible story I refer you to Nigel Hamilton’s superb three volume work, FDR at War (as of this writing in October 2017, the third volume is yet to be published).
All judgement and commentary by the author is reserved for the final chapter. The initial 90% is rattled out in a “just the facts, Ma’am” manor.
I do not recommend this book.
10-4-2017
September 20, 2007
"Before the meeting, Roosevelt saw McCloy alone. With a stiff-armed Hitler salute, the President cried, "Heil McCloy, Hochkommissar fur Deutschland!" He said, "I've made up my mind. McCloy, you're going to be the first high commissioner for Germany."
That wacky FDR!
This is an immensely readable account of the post-war planning for Germany. Beschloss paints these massive historical figures in an even-handed, rounded, and relatable way.
That wacky FDR!
This is an immensely readable account of the post-war planning for Germany. Beschloss paints these massive historical figures in an even-handed, rounded, and relatable way.
February 7, 2023
This book should have been called Morgenthau Annoys FDR to Death. 80% of the book talks about what everyone wants to do with Germany after the war and how Morgenthau wants the Germans to starve and rot… The book does not talk about how the Big 3 beat Germany. It just talks about what they want to do after.
October 4, 2009
I love this political history, which focuses much of its attention on Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, who attempted to take a lead role in deciding how Germany would be punished after World War II. Overall a great read and an interesting and tragic piece of history.
October 2, 2019
Beschloss, as an historian, gets deep into the weeds in recounting the day-to-day activities of Roosevelt, Truman, and various other players in the saga. I really wasn't interested in much of the detail, but this book was well worth reading to better understand this period in U.S. history.
August 9, 2010
Interesting angle to look a WWII and the post war years through the eyes of Roosevelt and Truman. The wheels of politics and how they turn...
October 13, 2020
I've read several accounts about the Allied involvement in defeated Germany in the aftermath of the World War II, but I've never read anything as in depth about the events and White House's planning leading up to the spring of 1945. "The Conquerors" is a fascinating narrative of the interactions between the Big Three (Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin) and how they were greatly effected by the policies and recommendations from Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and other cabinet members.
For a little background, Morgenthau was one of Roosevelt's closest and oldest friends, a non-practicing Jew who felt it was very important to be as harsh on the fallen Nazi regime as possible. (He, in fact, had dinner with Roosevelt in Warm Springs the night before the president's death.) While his strict approach was appreciated by many within the administration, there were also those who felt it went too far and, when faced with so much destruction and so little hope, it would ultimately cause the Nazis to fight even harder. While Morgenthau defended his stance during this critical time, those around him fought with him and even changed their minds along the way. Essentially, the administration's goal was to forever deter Germany from ever starting another world war, but their means at preventing such a scenario varied from person to person. Morgenthau wanted to strip Germany of its manufacturing ability, feeling that this would be the simplest way to prevent them from re-arming in the future. He wanted to force them gravitating completely toward becoming an agrarian, self-sustaining economy and if they starved along the way, so be it. Because he felt that, as a country, they deserved punishment on both a micro and macro level, regardless of their individual political beliefs. While Roosevelt had similar sentiments (even half-joking at times about shooting former Nazis without a trial), he also recognized the bigger picture implications of the Morgenthau Plan. Churchill even vocalized that the British populace would never accept it because of its cruelty.
The book also delves into Roosevelt's knowledge of the genocide that was taking place in Europe and examines his stance on what to do about it. Bomb Auschwitz? Bomb the railroad lines? Allow more refugees into the US? For each suggested idea, Roosevelt's simplest counter argument was 'the best thing that we can do is win the war quickly.' He even feared that too much assistance for the Jews could backfire on them, with anti-Semites accusing him of getting into the European civil war simply to protect Jews. In the end, it appears that he didn't do much, but the book does an adequate job explaining the challenges with each plan.
Of course, Roosevelt was dead weeks before the war ended and Truman became the newest part of the Big Three. While Roosevelt never shared any details with Truman about his prior meetings in Yalta or other summits, Truman did a respectable job assessing what needed to be done, particularly in light of Russian deceptions and game-playing. In the end, the Morgentha Plan was not practical and within a year or so the Marshall Plan was adopted. Historians agree that it was probably the Marshall Plan that ultimately helped Germany's rebirth and economic growth. And, likewise, unlike the end of World War I, these prosperous times played a large part in Germany refraining from ever going to war again. (That said, while many Nazis escaped justice, many more were forced to reckon with their nefarious pasts and lost their jobs or positions in society.)
After being fired in his presidency early by Truman, Morgenthau bitterly left DC and became a loud footnote in history. Fortunately, Beschloss's book gives this critical thinker the attention that he deserved from a time long ago when the world was in such great peril and uncertainty.
For a little background, Morgenthau was one of Roosevelt's closest and oldest friends, a non-practicing Jew who felt it was very important to be as harsh on the fallen Nazi regime as possible. (He, in fact, had dinner with Roosevelt in Warm Springs the night before the president's death.) While his strict approach was appreciated by many within the administration, there were also those who felt it went too far and, when faced with so much destruction and so little hope, it would ultimately cause the Nazis to fight even harder. While Morgenthau defended his stance during this critical time, those around him fought with him and even changed their minds along the way. Essentially, the administration's goal was to forever deter Germany from ever starting another world war, but their means at preventing such a scenario varied from person to person. Morgenthau wanted to strip Germany of its manufacturing ability, feeling that this would be the simplest way to prevent them from re-arming in the future. He wanted to force them gravitating completely toward becoming an agrarian, self-sustaining economy and if they starved along the way, so be it. Because he felt that, as a country, they deserved punishment on both a micro and macro level, regardless of their individual political beliefs. While Roosevelt had similar sentiments (even half-joking at times about shooting former Nazis without a trial), he also recognized the bigger picture implications of the Morgenthau Plan. Churchill even vocalized that the British populace would never accept it because of its cruelty.
The book also delves into Roosevelt's knowledge of the genocide that was taking place in Europe and examines his stance on what to do about it. Bomb Auschwitz? Bomb the railroad lines? Allow more refugees into the US? For each suggested idea, Roosevelt's simplest counter argument was 'the best thing that we can do is win the war quickly.' He even feared that too much assistance for the Jews could backfire on them, with anti-Semites accusing him of getting into the European civil war simply to protect Jews. In the end, it appears that he didn't do much, but the book does an adequate job explaining the challenges with each plan.
Of course, Roosevelt was dead weeks before the war ended and Truman became the newest part of the Big Three. While Roosevelt never shared any details with Truman about his prior meetings in Yalta or other summits, Truman did a respectable job assessing what needed to be done, particularly in light of Russian deceptions and game-playing. In the end, the Morgentha Plan was not practical and within a year or so the Marshall Plan was adopted. Historians agree that it was probably the Marshall Plan that ultimately helped Germany's rebirth and economic growth. And, likewise, unlike the end of World War I, these prosperous times played a large part in Germany refraining from ever going to war again. (That said, while many Nazis escaped justice, many more were forced to reckon with their nefarious pasts and lost their jobs or positions in society.)
After being fired in his presidency early by Truman, Morgenthau bitterly left DC and became a loud footnote in history. Fortunately, Beschloss's book gives this critical thinker the attention that he deserved from a time long ago when the world was in such great peril and uncertainty.
July 6, 2020
I picked up this book because I am trying to understand history more thoroughly from World War II to the present thinking that it might help me grasp our (U.S.A) current situation regarding Europe and the former Soviet Union. The book did not disappoint. I agree with other reviews that the title is a little misleading because of the prominence of Henry Morgenthau Jr. as a constant presence around President Roosevelt as a friend and a strong proponent of no-holes-barred punishment of Germany for the destruction of Europe and especially the slaughter of the Jews.
That aside, I came away with a much clearer picture of the painful drama inside the Roosevelt cabinet to exert individual theories on how to treat the Nazis and the Germany as a whole after the war. The diaries and documents that Beschloss draws upon reveal some startling private thoughts that Stimson, Hull, Morgenthau, and Ickes, had toward each other both personally and professionally. They fought like school children to influence Roosevelt's thinking. Meanwhile Roosevelt was threading a needle to balance the talks between him, Churchill, and Stalin, especially Stalin who was suspicious that the Anglo-American leaders would undercut him. Roosevelt was fair and kept Stalin from bolting from the combat itself as well as the post war planning. However, Stalin did have plans to advance further into Germany and gain control of the economy of Germany (and eventually install Communism). President Truman literally had to pick up the pieces and manage a new phase of the post-war which demanded a new set of leaders to help form a new German government. He deftly managed the former Roosevelt cabinet members while dealing with the emerging hostility of Stalin. His no-nonsense approach allowed some key decisions to move far forward with such events as the Berlin Air-Lift and the formation of NATO. The Conquerors is an excellent primer for how the Cold War started. Again, meticulous research brings out many little known details that were unknown until 1990 when the cold war "ended" and new documents were declassified or released for research. I'm not sure if this book was the first popular history to reveal Roosevelt's foot dragging on helping the Jews escape the Nazis, but you will put the book down with a heavy heart knowing the extent of anti-Semitism in the United States during World War II. Despite the surprising behind-the-scenes cliff hangers around the fate of Germany, the next sixty years proved to be a great tribute to the vision, and moral fortitude of the United States leaders to stay the course and guide Germany to a democratic and peaceful future for Germany. Having read this book, I look at the approach of our current administration toward NATO with new eyes lowered in shame.
That aside, I came away with a much clearer picture of the painful drama inside the Roosevelt cabinet to exert individual theories on how to treat the Nazis and the Germany as a whole after the war. The diaries and documents that Beschloss draws upon reveal some startling private thoughts that Stimson, Hull, Morgenthau, and Ickes, had toward each other both personally and professionally. They fought like school children to influence Roosevelt's thinking. Meanwhile Roosevelt was threading a needle to balance the talks between him, Churchill, and Stalin, especially Stalin who was suspicious that the Anglo-American leaders would undercut him. Roosevelt was fair and kept Stalin from bolting from the combat itself as well as the post war planning. However, Stalin did have plans to advance further into Germany and gain control of the economy of Germany (and eventually install Communism). President Truman literally had to pick up the pieces and manage a new phase of the post-war which demanded a new set of leaders to help form a new German government. He deftly managed the former Roosevelt cabinet members while dealing with the emerging hostility of Stalin. His no-nonsense approach allowed some key decisions to move far forward with such events as the Berlin Air-Lift and the formation of NATO. The Conquerors is an excellent primer for how the Cold War started. Again, meticulous research brings out many little known details that were unknown until 1990 when the cold war "ended" and new documents were declassified or released for research. I'm not sure if this book was the first popular history to reveal Roosevelt's foot dragging on helping the Jews escape the Nazis, but you will put the book down with a heavy heart knowing the extent of anti-Semitism in the United States during World War II. Despite the surprising behind-the-scenes cliff hangers around the fate of Germany, the next sixty years proved to be a great tribute to the vision, and moral fortitude of the United States leaders to stay the course and guide Germany to a democratic and peaceful future for Germany. Having read this book, I look at the approach of our current administration toward NATO with new eyes lowered in shame.
December 14, 2020
This also is kind of a niche book, covering a small, little known slice of the history of FDR’s presidency and World War II.
It talks, specifically, about the attempt to plan what the policy of the U.S. and the other allies toward Germany will be once the Nazis are defeated. It describes how Roosevelt managed the members of his cabinet, allowing them to compete for power and attention with each other. The process appeared to be pretty random looking on from outside – and even worse looking on from inside – as one of the cabinet members. For a long time, Roosevelt managed to make this work for him, using it to get what he thought was the best from each cabinet member. But toward the end, the process kind of got away from him and some people got discouraged and quit while outsiders intruded into the conversation, distorting the results somewhat.
The book examines particularly closely the ideas and actions of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau. Morgenthau, a not particularly religious Jew, was not initially that interested in what might happen in post-war Germany, but his attention was drawn to the activities of the Holocaust earlier than most people’s, and he became convinced that Germany must be so thoroughly destroyed that it would never be able to make war again; otherwise, in twenty years or less, their whole push to take over Europe would begin again. Morgenthau did his best to have his ideas made national policy, even though, as Secretary of the Treasury, there was little in his job description that had much to do with this area.
Meanwhile, other members of the cabinet pushed hard for Germany, particularly German manufacturing, not to be destroyed because they were worried that the Russians (our allies at the time) would use such a situation to turn Germany into a communist country.
Roosevelt’s comments at the time seemed to be contradictory, so nobody really knew what he had been thinking before he died. (There is a fairly complete description of his death in the book, something I have never read before).
In the end, what became the Allies policy toward Germany appears to have combined many aspects that had been discussed earlier along with some things that appeared to be completely new.
It talks, specifically, about the attempt to plan what the policy of the U.S. and the other allies toward Germany will be once the Nazis are defeated. It describes how Roosevelt managed the members of his cabinet, allowing them to compete for power and attention with each other. The process appeared to be pretty random looking on from outside – and even worse looking on from inside – as one of the cabinet members. For a long time, Roosevelt managed to make this work for him, using it to get what he thought was the best from each cabinet member. But toward the end, the process kind of got away from him and some people got discouraged and quit while outsiders intruded into the conversation, distorting the results somewhat.
The book examines particularly closely the ideas and actions of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau. Morgenthau, a not particularly religious Jew, was not initially that interested in what might happen in post-war Germany, but his attention was drawn to the activities of the Holocaust earlier than most people’s, and he became convinced that Germany must be so thoroughly destroyed that it would never be able to make war again; otherwise, in twenty years or less, their whole push to take over Europe would begin again. Morgenthau did his best to have his ideas made national policy, even though, as Secretary of the Treasury, there was little in his job description that had much to do with this area.
Meanwhile, other members of the cabinet pushed hard for Germany, particularly German manufacturing, not to be destroyed because they were worried that the Russians (our allies at the time) would use such a situation to turn Germany into a communist country.
Roosevelt’s comments at the time seemed to be contradictory, so nobody really knew what he had been thinking before he died. (There is a fairly complete description of his death in the book, something I have never read before).
In the end, what became the Allies policy toward Germany appears to have combined many aspects that had been discussed earlier along with some things that appeared to be completely new.
June 11, 2021
The Conquerors, written about 20 years ago, was for me a time capsule into the inner workings of the Roosevelt and Truman administration as they grappled with how to deal with Germany after WWII. Beschloss' book is so thoroughly researched that it was a though I was in the room when meetings were taking place , or day-to-day when the "warring" factions were complaining about each other and their President (which went on continuously). What they were dealing with and trying to decide -- how to prevent Germany from dragging the world into future world wars -- was truly a momentous task that consumed the main real life characters, including Churchill and Stalin, while they were meanwhile still conducting a war. The consequences of their decisions and planning, which changed many times as the factions fought it out, continue to this day.
This detail in this book can be tedious at times, but this is balanced out by many riveting moments when literally the future of the world is being decided. Truman's late entry into the fray, and how he goes from a non-entity to world player in a matter of months is fascinating in itself. And how fortunate indeed that he had just the right temperament for the job. Many mistakes were made, but this is one story that we can read about now and realize, by a combination of luck and design, turned out pretty well for future generations.
This detail in this book can be tedious at times, but this is balanced out by many riveting moments when literally the future of the world is being decided. Truman's late entry into the fray, and how he goes from a non-entity to world player in a matter of months is fascinating in itself. And how fortunate indeed that he had just the right temperament for the job. Many mistakes were made, but this is one story that we can read about now and realize, by a combination of luck and design, turned out pretty well for future generations.
October 9, 2018
An account of the senior level/strategic discussions during WWII and during the immediate aftermath concerning the future of Germany (and Europe). Didn't realize that so many points were up for discussion such as partitioning Germany, how to deal with war criminals, etc. Having grown up long after these events, one just assumes that was the plan from the start. Thought the issues were presented well and provided me thoughts on how to deal with similar issues in future conflicts. Key excerpts below:
- Morgenthau's close aide Harry Dexter White replied that the American government's attitude toward the refugees was "worse than that of the British because it is covered by hypocrisy. We don't shoot'em. We let other people do that. We let them starve!"
- It was interesting to find that Army officers have a better respect for the law in those matters than civilians who talk about them and who are anxious to go ahead and chop everybody's head off without trial or hearing.
- The Justice added that "most of these Nazi crimes have not been directed at the American government or at the American Army but at the people and armies of our allies."
- Morgenthau's close aide Harry Dexter White replied that the American government's attitude toward the refugees was "worse than that of the British because it is covered by hypocrisy. We don't shoot'em. We let other people do that. We let them starve!"
- It was interesting to find that Army officers have a better respect for the law in those matters than civilians who talk about them and who are anxious to go ahead and chop everybody's head off without trial or hearing.
- The Justice added that "most of these Nazi crimes have not been directed at the American government or at the American Army but at the people and armies of our allies."
April 11, 2020
Starts out interesting but never goes anywhere. This is really a day by day account of Morgenthau trying to convince Roosevelt to implement his plan for Germany. But it just keeps repeating the same thing over and over, and ultimately, the plan never gets implemented. Then, it rushes through at the very end what actually happened to Germany, which is the interesting part!
There is a darkly comic Roosevelt anecdote: To paraphrase, in a meeting with Stalin and Churchill, Stalin says that he will want the top 20,000 German officers executed. Churchill says the British people will never put up with that kind of barbarity. Roosevelt laughingly intervenes, saying "Don't worry, we'll only execute 10,000 tops."
Interesting to see the dysfunction in the Roosevelt white house. And also interesting to consider that in the fog of war, political considerations dictated what kinds of actions were acceptable, even if that meant keeping the rhetoric easy on Germany to avoid being perceived as controlled by Jews.
There is a darkly comic Roosevelt anecdote: To paraphrase, in a meeting with Stalin and Churchill, Stalin says that he will want the top 20,000 German officers executed. Churchill says the British people will never put up with that kind of barbarity. Roosevelt laughingly intervenes, saying "Don't worry, we'll only execute 10,000 tops."
Interesting to see the dysfunction in the Roosevelt white house. And also interesting to consider that in the fog of war, political considerations dictated what kinds of actions were acceptable, even if that meant keeping the rhetoric easy on Germany to avoid being perceived as controlled by Jews.
August 2, 2017
This book is more about Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr., an ethnic but non-practicing Jew than anyone else. This history details Morgenthau's outrage over the Holocaust and his desire to punish Germany after the war with his Morgenthau Plan. He and his aides at the Treasury Department wanted to permanently inhibit Germany's war making abilities by forcing it to become an agricultural nation. Morgenthau's plan stepped on the toes of the other Departments including Secretary of War Henry Stimson and John McCloy. It obviously was never adopted. This is a good foreign policy book to understand the reasons for the partition of Germany and Berlin between the Allies and the negotiations that took place between Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, and later Truman.
October 3, 2018
Went in a different direction in the later half of the book than the first half of the book appeared to be leading, but fascinating insights and discussions revealed. Interesting historical characters brought to life in the context of this bit of wartime debate that are often relegated to footnotes elsewhere. Strong conclusion, yet strangely without delivering a particular message -- the book leaves you with an impression of history moving and characters acting, and then a balance is formed out of all of it.
August 22, 2020
A very deep book, with a lot of newly released information. Beschloss was able to get into Soviet, British and lately released American information. Many personalities are exposed, and some are vilified. I especially enjoyed the last chapter, Chapter 26-The Conquerors, it sums up the after years of the partitioning of Germany and the good things and the bad things that came of this idea.
All in All, a very good and necessary book for those who are interested in this time in American History.
All in All, a very good and necessary book for those who are interested in this time in American History.
November 26, 2023
This is a very fine work. It's immaculately and exhaustively researched and the judgments that Beschloss makes strike me as judicious and thoroughly reliable. He centres the narrative (which is set out in traditional, chronological fashion) on Roosevelt, Truman and Morgenthau. The source materials include the transcripts of recordings the latter made while in office. For an understanding of the origins of the Cold War and the policy debates about how Germany should be treated, this book is invaluable.
April 24, 2018
Recommended for: anyone interested in the executive politics of WWII.
I almost gave this book three stars because the analysis/conclusion was poorly done (and had little or nothing to do with the content). However, the research was fantastic and the writing was good, so I went with four stars (the conclusion is a small portion of the book anyways).
I almost gave this book three stars because the analysis/conclusion was poorly done (and had little or nothing to do with the content). However, the research was fantastic and the writing was good, so I went with four stars (the conclusion is a small portion of the book anyways).
June 18, 2018
A well written review of how two presidents, along with Churchill and Stalin, sought to prevent Germany from ever threatening the world again. For the American president's it was a question of forgiveness versus punishment and whether a stable, economically strong Germany was desirable. A well referenced excellent read from a great current historian.
June 11, 2020
HISTORY PERSPECTIVE:
A brilliant historical account of the events and moments leading up to the occupation of Germany. Beschloss' narrative shows the mayhem, subterfuge, and bombasticity of international diplomacy in an isolationist USA.
SIMPLE PERSPECTIVE:
A strong narrative but a bit didactic. A reminder to what lack of accountability in our elected officials can lead to.
A brilliant historical account of the events and moments leading up to the occupation of Germany. Beschloss' narrative shows the mayhem, subterfuge, and bombasticity of international diplomacy in an isolationist USA.
SIMPLE PERSPECTIVE:
A strong narrative but a bit didactic. A reminder to what lack of accountability in our elected officials can lead to.
August 19, 2023
A slog. Requires rereading of sentences, paragraphs and pages. Writing is disjointed especially by completely unnecessary quotes that should have gone in endnotes. Lacks context, context, context and that most important thing…context. I do think this historical topic is very important and would like to see a different historian present if.
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