Another volume in Praeger's The Military Profession series, this revised edition of the 1984 Praeger classic tells the story of infantry in the 20th century and its impact on the major conflicts of our time. Its purpose is to provide the reader--whether infantryman or not--with hitherto unavailable insights on the role that infantry plays in the larger battle and how that has helped shape the world that we live in today. Unique aspects of the book include the treatment of technical issues in non-technical language, the extensive use of German and French sources generally unavailable to the English-speaking reader, and the shattering of some long-cherished myths. Combat motivation and combat refusal, the role played by small units (such as the squad and fire team), the role of infantry in the Blitzkrieg, and many other issues often papered over in the literature of infantry are discussed and analyzed in detail in this revised edition.
I've always been interested in how military doctrine is developed, so this seems to be the ticket for me, though it is a little dated, very cold-war oriented. Elglish starts with European infantry after the Franco Prussian war (really the last set piece battle war, if not already on the cusp). The book is best, in my estimation, in the discussion of the second world war. There's a hidden thesis that really starts here (it's not very strongly represented in the opening, thoughly strongly reflected upon at the conclusion), suggesting that, despite the relative weakness of th einfantry squad and the limited effect of its arms in the scheme of armoured maneuver, artillery and strategic air power, the skill and potency of the infantry at the smallest level was a major determinant ofnt he success of the various armies, and that the german army, in particular, was successful as long as it was (holding off both the Soviets and Western Allies) because of superior small unoit cohesion, traiing, agressiveness and leadership. As English was writing for a potential Nuclear battlefield in the Fulda Gap, I can see how this would be a bold statement. He does good work reflecting on the past in a consideration of Central Germany's prospects for the infantry fight in the 1980's. I'd be keen to see what the revised version has (my version deals little with the Vietnam Conflict, so that's what I imagine is added, but who knows?)
Describes the development of the infantry over time. As innovation made the battlefield more lethal, infantry dispersed which required innovative tactics, the adaptation of technology, and changes to the way the infantry addressed morale and the soldier. The conclusion is flawed, however. The author argues the infantry will dominate the future battlefield without the aid of combined arms through the benefit of modern technology. He doesn't address the technological advances occurring throughout the armed forces. This reader believes that first-rate infantry are necessary to succeed in future conflict, they alone are insufficient to guarantee victory by themselves. Well worth the read for any student or practitioner of the tactical element of war.
Warfare has changed greatly even in the last 50 years. The movement from the primarily attrition-driven tactics started in WWII and we arrived at what we could legitimately call maneuver warfare tactics by Korea.
Bit old by now, with everything up to 1973. And the last chapter really made it more of a pamphlet rather than a scholarly tract. Nice details of sub-company developments though.
Perfekt bok för mig, knappast för alla andra. Det är en detaljerad genomgång av infanteri taktik under 1900-talet. Hur de olika stormakterna organiserar sitt infanteri och hur de slåss. Mycket fascinerande om man tänkt på problemet hur krig fungerar allra längst fram, vad sker när folk försöker döda varandra på mycket kort håll? Boken kräver vissa förkunskaper om krig och krigföring under förra seklet men ger en rik belöning till den som söker detaljkunskap. Grundproblemet med infanteristrid är att man samtidigt behöver folk som är smarta, som kan ta egna initiativ och folk som är villiga att strida till döds enligt en övergripande plan. De nationer som löser det best kan besegra mycket bättre utrustade och numerärt överlägsna fiender i alla fall på den taktiska nivån. Exempel är tyskar under världskrigen, kineser i Korea och vietnameser. Misslyckas man kan man kanske ändå vinna krig men till mycket högre kostnad i liv, som Sovjetunionen eller USA. Diskussionen har en relevans för hur vi i Sverige ska ordna vårt försvar. Vad är bäst vapen eller tränade soldater? Boken är mycket klart på den sidan som svara soldater. Kanske inte så många men väldigt väl tränade och väl motiverade.