Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition

by William D. Casebeer

In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is a comprehensive examination of what a plausible moral science would look like. Casebeer begins by discussing the nature of ethics and the possible relationship between science and ethics. He then addresses David Hume's naturalistic fallacy and G. E. Moore's open-question argument, drawing on the work of John Dewey and W. V. O. Quine. He then proposes a functional account of ethics, offering corresponding biological and moral descriptions. Discussing in detail the neural correlates of moral cognition, he argues that neural networks can be used to model ethical function. He then discusses the impact his views of moral epistemology and ontology will have on traditional ethical theory and moral education, concluding that there is room for other moral theories as long as they take into consideration the functional aspect of ethics; the pragmatic neo-Aristotelian virtue theory he proposes thus serves as a moral "big tent." Finally, he addresses objections to ethical naturalism that may arise, and calls for a reconciliation of the sciences and the humanities. "Living well," Casebeer writes, "depends upon reweaving our ethical theories into the warp and woof of our scientific heritage, attending to the myriad consequences such a project will have for the way we live our lives and the manner in which we structure our collective moral institutions."

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Psychology, Neuroscience

227 pages, Paperback

First published August 15, 2003

Reviews

[Blake · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is one of those books I picked up years ago, back when I was in the thick of reading analytic moral philosophy and metaethics. It's a neo-Aristotelian (emphasises proper function and flourishing) attempt at working out moral normativity within a realist framework, and with, importantly, a view to removing the philosophical barriers to what you might call a moral science. That is, a moral theory that is not only informed by the theoretical insights of the sciences, but is affected by those insights even at the level of moral norms.

Is it successful in its project? Well, I don't think so. Philosophy rarely is cleanly successful like that. I think it has some interesting strategies and insights that aren't often aired in this literature, but that it suffers from being too short in length to cope with the undertaking and that perhaps it doesn't face some of these problems and barriers, which it hopes to resolve and overcome, in their strongest forms.

But then, I'm skeptical of what proper function can do in moral philosophy. I've watched it misused in natural law and new natural law, so there are always issues with majoritarian politicisation of minority groups that I want a virtue ethics approach to resolve cleanly before I even begin to take it too seriously. If not, I'll tend to attack it with everything I have.

Sincerely,
A. Gaye Guy.