In this book, Jim DeFelice looks at General Omar Bradley, as he has never been examined before. He makes a compelling case that the historical stereotype of the cautious, unimaginative and plodding general is simply not accurate. In the process, he calls upon deep research and acute analytical skills to debunk the most prevalent myths about Bradley. For the most part his logic and reasoning are on target as he reveals a combat commander who was a lot more creative, aggressive and effective than history has portrayed him. The author does not hide Bradley's faults and miscalculations nor does he represent him as a genius general. What the author does do effectively, however, is to demonstrate how inaccurate and unfair the prevailing wisdom is regarding Bradley's abilities, contributions, reputation and legacy.
Bradley's performance at the Battle of The Bulge is carefully examined. He is not absolved of any responsibility for being initially surprised and overwhelmed. As a gifted tactician, he could not discern the scope of the attack because it didn't make any sense. It made no sense to the German commanders either and they lobbied Hitler for a less ambitious encirclement and destruction of trapped American forces. Hitler insisted on driving to Antwerp even though he didn't have the forces or supplies to sustain such an objective. When Bradley realized this, he acted aggressively to pinch off the spearheads. Only the appointment of Montgomery to command part of Bradley's Army Group kept him from executing his plan.
The only flaw I could find in the author's reasoning was giving credit to Bradley for the extraordinary success of the 82nd Airborne Division. When Bradley led that division, it was not yet an airborne division. Subsequent to Bradley's tutelage, the division's cadre was spilt in half to seed the 101st Airborne Division and most of its regiments were replaced with airborne qualified units. Bradley deserved no credit for its ultimate success.
The book is diminished somewhat by a lack of proper editing. Fractured sentences, missing quotes, using both Rur and Ruhr to name the river and Merche to describe the city of Marche are annoying distractions. However, describing the bomb load of B-17s and B-24s as "4, 100 lb bombs" is simply careless when those planes had the capacity to haul 4,800 and 8,000 pounds of bombs respectively. And poor General Manton Eddy had is name butchered on a few occasions, once and Monton and again as Manson.
Not to be picky but a work of this magnitude ought not to have its conclusions questioned or its scholarship diminished because of silly errors and substandard editing.
Anyone interested in World War II, particularly in the European theater would enjoy this book. It is well written, heavily sourced and somewhat revealing. It held my interest throughout despite the flawed editing.
John E. Nevola
Author of The Last Jump: A Novel of World War II