The complete and definitive history of how Roman generals carved out the greatest and longest-lasting empire the world has ever seen.
The Roman army was one of the most effective fighting forces in history. The legions and their commanders carved out an empire which eventually included the greater part of the known world. This was thanks largely to the generals who led the Roman army to victory after victory, and whose strategic and tactical decisions shaped the course of several centuries of warfare.
This book, by the author of THE PUNIC WARS, concentrates on those Roman generals who displayed exceptional gifts of leadership and who won the greatest victories. With 26 chapters covering the entire span of the Roman Empire, it is a complete history of Roman warfare.
Adrian Goldsworthy, born in 1969, is the author of numerous acclaimed books, including biographies of Julius Caesar and Augustus. He lectures widely and consults on historical documentaries for the History Channel, National Geographic, and the BBC. He lives in the UK.
This book does not look at the broader picture. Instead, it looks at individuals – but not just any individuals. They were all military and, according to the author, all exceptional since They Made Rome. We ought not to forget that Rome was foremost a military power.
Goldsworthy has selected fifteen personalities (sixteen really), ranging from the third century BC until the end of the Empire, but those of the Republican times are more numerous. He does not begin earlier because the Romans did not begin to write history until the end of the 3rd BC, and he jumps over long periods (the third and fifth centuries AD are vacuums). Many of the commanders are well known (Scipio Africanus, Pompey, Julius Cesar, Germanicus, Titus, Vespasian and Belisarius), but several, mostly from the Republic, are less notorious (Fabius Maximus, Claudius Marcellus, Quintus Sertorius). Some very famous figures are completely jumped over, or at least they do not get their own chapter, such as Augustus.
The author makes an explicit defence of his concentration on individuals. And he does so by quoting a very individualistic one, Napoleon. Goldsworthy finds a direct causality between the particular actions of specific human beings and the resulting events. He argues that even if some of these events could have taken place anyway – later or in a different form – since they happened the way they did, it was as a result of a series of identifiable decisions from identifiable men.
And yet, a general picture does emerge; there was an overall development of the Roman military forces. These began as ad hoc armies, formed for a particular battle or war--and therefore impermanent, to an army which, once Rome had considerably extended its lands and borders, required a permanent military body formed by professionals. In many ways this is unsurprising. What to me was more remarkable were the economic implications of the earlier system: the temporary armies and their unsustainability. Only men with some wealth (read with some productive land holdings) could join these temporary bodies; hopes for booty and an increase in their already property clearly outweighed the risks. But as these wars became long campaigns and these ‘occasional’ soldiers stayed too long away from their home productive base, they began running into debts eventually losing their lands to, guess whom? Many of the Senators who stayed back in cosy Rome had been acting as moneylenders. This trend got to the point that great extensions of land consolidated under fewer heads, which in its turn resulted in fewer eligible volunteers for the next war, since there were not enough people with enough wealth to form the required armies. Rome got itself into a pernicious circle.
One way out was the professionalization of soldiers -- their conscription was signed for very long periods and in distant postings. They received a steady salary to which they could add the eventual booty and upon retirement received some sort of pension, often structured in acceptable pieces of arable land.
There had been another initiative to break the vicious circle. Tiberius Gracchus, in his reform programme of 133 BC, proposed “to redistribute publicly owned land to increase the number of yeoman farmers who had traditionally formed the heart of the legions.” During Christmas I watched a TV episode, directed by Mary Beard, on this admirable Gracchus. His impulse for reform is presented on the screen version as resulting from his will ‘to serve the people’ – with a somewhat anachronistic “socialistic” concern. Goldsworthy’s version seemed to me more enlightening. Yes, Gracchus was a Tribune, but he was also a soldier and therefore perfectly aware of the serious threat to the maintenance of the legions--when permanent garrisons were beginning to be posted in key provinces such as Transalpine Gaul, Spain and Macedonia.
Apart from wealth, class was another concern in the way these armies were formed. In the earlier times, soldiers had a ‘pedigree’. It was Marius (157-86 BCE) who began enrolling men who had new wealth but had not belonged to the traditional families. Amongst the leaders, social changes began to take place and the commanders were no longer necessarily patricians. With these ascents new classes were formed. The legions, composed now of professional and permanent soldiers, began acquiring also a strong sense of identity, and often saw themselves directly associated to a particular man, and less to the State – the Roman Senate. That would pose other problems.
Another fascinating aspect that emerges from this book, is Goldsworthy’s portrayal of the Roman character, their spirit. This was their deep and indomitable belief in their own strength. Even when facing defeat, they would bounce back convinced that eventually they would attain victory. This was their “virtus”- their ability to endure whatever never losing faith in the final triumph.
Goldsworthy’s gallery of Men, they all showed this particular quality, sometimes leading them directly to their death, but winning always additional stature to their unequalled Rome.
Tenía ganas de acercarme a este autor, uno de los que están pegando fuerte en Novela Histórica en el ámbito anglosajón. Lo he hecho con este ensayo sobre las campañas y la forma de hacer la guerra de 15 generales romanos: Quinto Fabio Máximo, Marcelo, Escipión Africanus, Emilio Paulo, Escipión Emiliano, Mario, Sertorio, Pompeyo, César, Germánico, Corbulón, Tito, Trajano, Juliano y Belisario. Evidentemente No están todos los que son, sino aquellos sobre los que nos han llegado fuentes históricas más o menos detalladas acerca de sus campañas militares. Donde está Sila, donde está Agrícola, las campañas de Marco Aurelio, de los Severos, no hace referencia a ningún hecho del siglo III (al menos Aureliano o Claudio II), no profundiza en el periodo de la Tetrarquía, ni en el periodo Constantiniano (salvo Juliano). Vamos que ha ido a lo fácil. Aquí está mi pequeña decepción, al final el libro es una mera transcripción de las fuentes históricas, con relatos de campañas, tácticas y batallas que no pueden competir con las grandes recreaciones que, de estos mismos hechos, se han realizado en los buenos libros de novela histórica que, además, beben de las mismas fuentes, pero de una forma mucho más entretenida y disfrutable. Puntos positivos: -Se esfuerza en intentar explicarnos la evolución del ejército romano y del estilo de mando de los generales a lo largo de los siglos, desde el periodo Republicano hasta le época de Justiniano. -Me ha gustado el capítulo sobre Corbulón (el único general de los incluidos del que tenía poca información previa). -El capítulo de Trajano es original, ya que intenta interpretar los relieves de la columna trajana a la vista de los hechos conocidos en las dos campañas Dacias.
Si queréis un pequeño repaso de hechos relevantes históricos y militares de época romana, este es el libro, si queréis divertiros tirad de novela histórica tradicional, de autores contrastados: Posteguillo, Coleen MacCollough, Graves, Haefs, Gallo, Grimal, Yourcenar, etc. Aunque siempre es bueno tener presente lo que dicen las fuentes históricas, para poder valorar adecuadamente el grado de verosimilitud de lo que se nos cuenta en las novelas. Espero que este autor sea un poco menos rígido y más imaginativo en sus novelas. Que va a ser fiel a los hechos, lo tengo claro. A pesar de este pequeño traspiés, le daré una oportunidad a sus libros.
Goldsworthy successfully draws a picture of how Roman generals actually commanded their armies. This book is in similar style to Goldworthy's first book "The Roman Army at War", which covers how the Roman Army actually fought its battles.
Besides the story of individual generals, this book also traces the development of the Roman style of command as it evolved along with changing Roman society. The story starts with Fabius Maximus and Claudius Marcellus who are elected leaders of citizen soldiers in the Second Punic War and ends with Belisarius, a member of the Imperial household, who is general of an army of unruly mercenary cavalry and questionable infantry. A definite "Roman", style of command emerges which Goldsworthy then follows past the end of the Roman world and into modern times through leaders like Gustavus Adolphus, du Picq and especially Napoleon.
The main Roman leaders covered in the book are:
Fabius Maximus (2nd Punic War) Claudius Marcellus (2nd Punic War) Scipio Africanus (2nd Punic War) Aemilius Paullus (Conquest of Macedonia) Scipio Aemilianus (Numantia) Gaius Marius (Jugurthine War / Cimbri & Teutones) Quintus Sertorius (Roman Civil war in Spain) Pompey the Great (Conquest of the East) Julius Caesar (Conquest of Gaul) There is also a chapter on Pompey vs. Caesar in the Civil War. Germanicus Caesar (Reprisal war across the Rhine after defeat of Varus) Domitius Corbulo (Armenian War) Titus Vespasianus (Siege of Jerusalem) Emperor Trajan (Dacian Wars) Emperor Julian (Career on the Rhine and in Parthia) Belisarius (Persian Wars / Battle of Dara)
Goldsworthy also manages to work in many other prominent Roman generals such as Sulla, Lucullus, Agrippa and Paulinus Seutonius.
If you are interested in military leadership, ancient military history or Roman history in general you should read this book.
An excellent analysis of Roman command style, and of the personalities of some of the more prominent commanders. Along the way, you'll learn a lot about ancient warfare and the politics and culture of Rome from the Republic to the end of the Principate. Goldsworthy has an engaging prose style, an excellent command of the sources and a real passion for the subject. His focus - on the leadership qualities of each commander, is original and refreshing, giving new perspective to a well-trod topic.
In the Name of Rome by Adrian Goldsworthy – 4.5 Stars
Another winner from Goldsworthy!
What an outstanding journey through Rome’s military triumphs (and occasional defeats) and the great commanders who led the way. Adrian Goldsworthy is, without question, one of the premiere military historians writing today. Every time I read one of his works, I feel like I’m transported back in time, standing alongside the legions on campaign.
A major takeaway- I learned so much about Roman life from the 4th to 6th centuries and even the Byzantine Empire. Goldsworthy’s strong use of sources shines throughout the book, giving depth and credibility to his narrative. One of the more fascinating takeaways for me was his perspective that Rome’s decline wasn’t a single dramatic collapse, but rather a slow erosion in small increments. The book is written from 4th century BC to around 600ad.
Like many of Goldsworthy’s books, the introduction and conclusion are incredibly strong—his framing and closing insights are where he really excels. The middle sections can get a bit fuzzy at times, but the overall richness of the material more than makes up for it.
And I have to say—Hooray for Scipio Africanus! One of my favorite Roman generals, and Goldsworthy gives him the treatment he deserves.
A must-read for anyone who loves Roman history and military studies.
Adrian Goldsworthy, one of the world's foremost experts on the ancient Roman Empire, wrote this book about the great generals of that civilization. Although the author himself points out that this book is primarily about generals and statesmen and not a complete picture of what Rome was like, he still successfully fills in the gaps as he jumps from one generation of Romans to the next. In effect the reader goes on a journey though the ancient Roman civilization from the Punic Wars to the era of the 'Byzantine Empire'. Goldsworthy has smooth narrative that flows well from the time of Hannibal to the reign of Emperor Justinian.
The book features those who Goldsworthy considers to be the greatest generals in Roman history. Some of the men he studies are very famous already,--such as, Fabius Maximus, Scipio Africnaus, Pompey Magnus, and Julius Caesar--others are barely known,--Aemilius Paullus and the very tragic Sertorius --and some were emperors--Trajan and Julian. Goldsworthy challenges the traditional view that Roman generals--in light of being politicians--were, by default, amateurs who real command fell to subordinates. He argues instead that they were both politicians and military men equally.
"Yet a closer examination of the evidence suggests that most of these assumptions are at best greatly exaggerated and often simply wrong. Far from taking power away from the general, the Roman tactical system concentrated it in his hands. Junior officers such as centurions played a vitally important role, but they fitted into a hierarchy with the army commander at the top and allowed him to have more control over events than less."p.16
Also explored in this book is the culture of the Roman state and how that culture impacted the senators of the Republic in their careers serving it. One of these cultural traditions was that the Romans, even if things were not going their way, would never turn on Rome in favor of a foreign power. Their bond to their homeland was incredibly strong and this is part of what makes the tragic Sertorius's story of exile so particularly sad.
"However important it was for an individual to win fame an add to his own and his family's reputation, this should always be subordinated to the good of the Republic. The same belief in the superiority of Rome that made senators by the second century BC hold themselves the equals of any king ensured that no disappointed Roman politician sought the aid of a foreign power. Senators wanted success, but that success only counted if it was achieved at Rome. No senator defected to Pyrrhus or Hannibal even when their final victory seemed imminent, nor did Scipio Africanus' bitterness at the ingratitude of the State cause him to take service with a foreign king."p.155-6
When the rule of the aristocratic Senate gives way to the emperors the role of the general changed from one of personal achievement and glory to all honor won by one man: the Emperor himself. Imperial Legets won glory only in the Emperor's name giving emperors, such as Augustus, a good deal of bragging rights.
"Augustus brought internal peace to Rome, an achievement which was conspicuously celebrated throughout his principate. His regime relied heavily on the glory derived from continuous and spectacular warfare against foreign opponents. Under its first emperor Rome continued to expand as intensively as it had done in the last decades of the Republic and by AD 14 had brought under its control almost all the territory which would compose the Empire for over four centuries. The Res Gestae, a long inscription set up outside Augustus' mausoleum recounting his achievements, lists a vast array of peoples and kings defeated by the emperor. In style the test is identical to the monuments set up by triumphing generals for many generations, but in sheer numbers of vanquished enemies it dwarfs the victories even of Pomepy and Caesar."p.270
Imperial selfishness on the part of the Emperor seemed like a smart move, especially after it was proven that generals who did earn personnel glory were able to depose an unpopular emperor. However with incidents of emperors being dethoned by popular generals, Goldsworthy points out that this transfer of power to the barracks led to break down in military discipline that sapped the army's strength and with the army went the empire.
I highly recommend this book to anyone. It is an incredible achievement on the part of Goldsworthy and an overly entertaining read. It will greatly increase ones knowledge into the Roman military, its politics, and its leaders though out history.
Man did this book take me a long time to read. That is not to say that it wasn’t a very interesting read focusing on the individual generals/ leaders of the Roman republic/ Empire. It gave me a perspective that I had not yet encountered much in my extensive reading of ancient Roman history especially events post Augustus’s rule of the Roman Empire so that in itself was very interesting in itself
But If I was to pigeonhole this book I would say this is strictly military in its approach with each chapter focusing on military leaders Caesar, Augustus, Pompey etc. and their campaigns abroad away from Rome and the Roman expansion of its territory.
Great for those who enjoy military history or already have a good sense of Ancient Roman history and the events surrounding the topics covered in “In The Name Of Rome”.
Un libro académico sobre los lideres que desde el marco político militar forjaron la República y el Imperio Romano muy agradable de leer. Está organizado en orden cronológico pero la verdad se puede leer en cualquier orden pues cada capítulo trata de un personaje diferente. Yo lo leí en el orden del libro dado que me inicié en la novela historia de la antigua Roma con Escipion Africano con Posteguillo y luego con obras sobre Cesar, Pompeyo y la magnífica saga de Roma de Collen McCullogh que recorre la época de Cesar y sus contemporáneos. Confieso que se poco del periodo de decadencia del Imperio y aunque sabía de Juliano no conocía acerca de Belisario. Jones una obra árida de leer, de hecho deje de leer novelas por terminar esta obra.
Scipio Africanus’s stupendously self-confident—and as it would turn out, accurate—statement that his mother had born a general and not a warrior speaks to more than just Scipio’s pride. It speaks volumes about the political, cultural, and martial status of a commander in ancient Rome. It presents a schism between the physical fighting and the leading of an army. This makes sense when one considers the problems of mobility in essentially any period until the modern age. One man could not be at every place at once, especially in a military system that was built around the foot soldier. To command was not to thrust oneself into battle as Alexander did at the head of his household calvary. To command was to remain separated from the front lines and required spatial and temporal awareness. Indeed, commanders were often chided by their own men if they put themselves in danger. The value of their experience was not in their strength of arms, but in their understanding of topography, timing, and the inherent tug-and-pull of battle. Ability, not numbers, was what forged the Roman world at the point of a sword.
Allow me to take a step back. This book is not fifteen biographies pasted together. Nor is it adulatory of Roman martial virtue. It is not even a defense of the Great Man theory of history. The subtitle is more than a little misleading. ‘In the Name of Rome’ presents the military history of the Roman Republic and Empire through the careers of fifteen commanders. It does this with somewhat uneven efficiency, but excels at making a point. This point is that Rome at every point in her history was an extremely martial state, and one sees the very cultural and societal history of Rome presented in her military history. At times of expansion, stasis, and contraction Rome’s civil governance revolved around military force. This was for both self-serving reasons and for national security. As Rome grew and then boomed, she came into contact with innumerable enemies at every point of the compass. She withstood invasions from states small and large. The Republic’s greatest external enemy, Carthage, fielded both disciplined and expertly controlled armies. The clans and tribes of first Italy, then all of southern and Western Europe, the Near East, and North Africa made up in personal skill and courage what they lacked in expertise. These enemies required different leaders and different armies.
Even more so than external threats, internal dynamics shaped how the Roman army grew into a dominant professional force. For men of senatorial and equestrian rank—essentially the upper and upper-middle classes—the corsus honorum and tres militaire, respectively, made military positions extremely lucrative. Once entered into the Senate, a man took political positions in order to gain military commands, thus providing him with the honor and riches necessary for his next political move. This cycle, and the need to perpetually fuel the machine, is what dashed the Republic onto the rocks of a fatal civil war. Because of this, many supreme commanders were not professionals. They may have possessed an education that gave them theoretical knowledge, and may have held junior and then middle-grade commands, but they were rarely given command of armies after decades of previous service. They relied upon equestrians, who more often did possess many years of climbing a somewhat conventional command ladder, and junior officers from lower classes to provide the professional backbone of their armies. In order to protect political allies and then to deal with declining birth rates, armies moved from militias to professional enlisted organizations made up of first volunteers, then conscripts, then non-Italians. The smaller units within armies and legions changed as well, as they became more autonomous and wieldy on the battlefield. But at no point were armies easy to lead. This is why commanders of true genius—like Scipio, Pompey, Caesar, and Trajan—stand out. To command well required an innate understanding of warfare and of humanity, as a professional education was largely out of the question. At times commanders were more motivational speakers than tacticians, but in a style of warfare that required personal stamina and a willingness to put oneself within a spear’s length of the enemy, a good hectoring was sometimes necessary. Julius Caesar was superb at this.
As emperors replaced consuls and senators, they became more and more afraid of internal threats. Because of this commanders were kept on short leashes with smaller armies. The size of legions shrank from nearly 5000 troops to under 2000. But they remained effective. Though large-scale battles were essentially limited to the old days of the Republic against Hannibal and the Macedonians, against omnipresent powers in Persia and Mesopotamia, and against internal revolts at all stages, the Roman army possessed a keen ability to best enemies great and small. Personal pride and sheer efficiency in logistics and battlefield prowess gave Rome greater than even odds that whichever enemy she faced could be bested. This did not protect her against catastrophic losses like Cannae or Teutoburg Wald. But it did protect her against capitulation following such disasters. A large recruiting base and an innate stubbornness and optimism made Rome an extremely resilient state. But her resilience was born in part through an ever-increasing territory, which effectively kept shifting the front lines further and further away from her political, economic, and agricultural power centers. For this Rome needed armies, and for those armies, leaders.
That last statement obviously raises the classic response: what about the common man, the soldiers, the ones actually putting themselves on the bloody threshold? For this, there is one clear answer: Rome produced millions of such men, and if left to their own devices with whichever commanders luck, fate, or providence provided they would’ve accomplished essentially what Roman armies did accomplish, and in due time Rome would’ve risen and fallen regardless. But that is perhaps 60 or 75 or maybe even 90 percent of the discussion. It is that last 10 percent in which great commanders leave their imprint, in which great commanders actually change the course of history. The legions that Caesar led into Gaul in 58 BC were largely the same men that he led across the Rubicon in 49. They followed Caesar because he inspired them to follow him. He harangued them into ignoring missed payments because they held him in awe. They repeatedly fell into his attempts to guilt them into action because they could not bear to be left behind. This was the essence of military leadership in the Roman era. It was tactical brilliance, which relatively few commanders possess (discipline and cohesion covers up many sins on the battlefield), and psychological awareness that made the good Roman generals great. At most points in Roman history, the military life was a integral part of a larger career. Without a formal military education and clear progression in responsibilities as proficiencies grew, the semi-professional nature of her commanders widens the divide between the good and the mediocre and places the exceptional essentially on different planes of existence. In essence, military leadership in ancient Rome was heavily autodidactic and instinctive. In this we see a theory of the the man on the spot that is not at all incompatible with theories that address cultural, societal, and group dynamics. How Roman armies and commanders conducted themselves may not bear too much on modern military dynamics, but it does reiterate the need to foster greatness, initiative, and occasionally recklessness. Julius Caesar was a gambler, and sometimes who dares, wins.
(2.5) some solid insights on what is actually known about these battles and the author does an effective job of casting light on the great man version of history while always tempering his assertions with valid qualifications…
The trend line he demonstrates about the nature of Roman armies moving from aristocracies to levies and the influence these different men and their motivations was new and I think have value in understanding soldiering today….additionally, his point in that armies became the installer of generals and thus changed the power dynamic says a lot about the difficulties Rome had by the 5th century…
Adrian Goldworthy's In the Name of Rome is something of a mixed bag. It purports itself as being an examination of the Roman style of command by looking at several of its most prominent generals. The selection is constrained to those where there's enough known to be able to say something intelligent, which warps the coverage somewhat. Goldsworthy covers fifteen generals, with Caesar coming in for extra attention (of course!) and two (Fabius and Marcellus) combined into one chapter, and thus feeling a bit more summarized.
Despite the fact that this is centered around individual people, Goldsworthy actually spends a fair amount of time providing extra background and bridging, and the volume can serve as a decent history of Rome from the Second Punic War through the early Empire. After his chapter on Titus and the siege of Jerusalem, the gaps become too big (mostly because of a lack of sources on individual commanders) and the overall narrative of events breaks down for the final two chapters on Julian and Belisarius, making them feel more like the separate essays you would expect from the general format of the book.
The part that surprised me, is that while the book is supposed to be about Roman command, it seemed like it had more to say about the Roman military itself. He points out early on that the Roman Republic army was set up to be a very non-professional force, with it's constant cycle of recruiting a legion, training it, and then disbanding it once the immediate goal/campaign is done. This leads to Roman armies having trouble at the start of the Second Punic War when there's been little training, and doing better as experience is gained. In the years afterward, there's a good number of veterans that cycle into the new legions, and help power Rome's growth in the 2nd Century BC. Then the Marian reforms put the legions on a more permanent basis, with long-term training, making it a professional service, and creating the armies that both conquer large portions of the future Empire, and tear the Republic apart as they fight each other.
On the other hand, the last two chapters show just how completely this had all come apart. While the Empire was still a major state, even after the fall of the Western half by the time of Belisarius, and the total number of men under arms could still be fairly large, the actual armies in use were very small in comparison to previous centuries. Goldworthy's main analysis of Julian is that his successful campaigns against various Germanic tribes would have been handled locally by a provincial governor instead of needing attention from near the very top. His failure against Persia is given as being at least partly due to having to manage a larger army and distances than he had yet had to deal with. Finally, Belisarius' armies are generally puny, and he has to put up with a lack of discipline and mutiny that would never have been allowed in an early legion.
The stated idea of how Roman generals functioned is discussed throughout the book as well, but it felt less prominent than the arc I just summarized. But the book is large enough to support both threads, while talking about the actual people involved, and threading much of the history together. At the large scale, all the history in here can be found in any number of other places, but this particular presentation is a good one, and does develop its own themes well.
This is a great book for any enthusiast of Roman history. As the title suggests, it focuses on the military leaders and the institutions that led to the conquest of the entire Mediterranean by the Romans. Each chapter beings with a summary of the political and institutional background that each man operated: how the army was organized, how politics influenced the decisions of each leader, how the history of the city had developed up to that point. Then it goes on with mini biographies of each leader, with greater focus on their military exploits, providing small insights that likely shaped the decisions and influenced events, such as religious customs, desire to gain prominence through propaganda, material gains, etc.
Goldsworthy relies on a rich mixture of sources, usually basing the narrative on ancient works and inserting different interpretations of some facts by modern scholars. While we can never be entirely sure as to where the truth ends and conjecture begins, it’s fascinating to consider how “history” may be interpreted through different points of view, especially since most of the original sources were, in one form of another, directly affected by the actions of such man. It is also very interesting to see how he positions the Roman army in comparison with contemporary and subsequent armed forces regarding its strengths and weaknesses as well as dispelling some myths that the Romans propagated about themselves.
Some reviewers had issue with the leaders chosen by Goldsworthy. While it is fair to say that he played safe by selecting very famous individuals, the comparatively limited sources we have for other historical figures makes the task more difficult. Nonetheless, I must admit that the chapters I’ve found most interesting dealt with the periods of relatively less information, such as the beginning of the Republic (Fabius Maximus, Marcus Marcellus) and the IV – V century generals (Julian and Belisarius).
well-written as is Goldsworthy's forte, but his selection is 90% predictable who's who of Roman generals, with a heavy slice of the 2nd century BC-AD.
He makes his most interesting point in the intro. Despite the apparent amateurism of the Roman high command, with no academies & little formal on the job training except as a tribune, there was an unofficial streak of imparted wisdom through lost manuals, senior advisors with campaigns under their belt & let's not forget the senior centurions of a Legion with up to thirty years' experience in various theaters of war. Also, the education of Roman nobility, where politics & military glory were inseparately entwined, gave a decent foundation for a young general to command on horseback with sangfroid.
As in any profession since the damn of man, the most important quality was to listen, to learn from mistakes & to delegate. Even if Caesar knew how to time a personal encouragement by appearing at a threatened section of the frontline. The luxury of pre-gunpowder warfare.
-¿Están todos los que son? ¿Son todos los que están?.-
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Repaso de las acciones de algunos (quince en concreto, aunque se hable de otros en algún momento) de los líderes romanos más exitosos, centrado en qué hicieron, cómo lo hicieron, por qué y para qué, con leves pinceladas de sus biografías y caracteres.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
just a thoughtful overview of generalship through Roman history with just enough social background for context. The more abbreviated 3rd-4th century AD coverage was very interesting.
Well written account of the rise and fall of Rome through brief careers of its most famous generals; and a page-turner despite being non-fiction and quite condensed
In the Name of Rome represents the information environment of the early 2000s. Covering a thousand years of Republic and Empire, it’s an encyclopedic overview that Wikipedia has made irrelevant. While the writing is more engaging than its online counterpart, the author’s editorial decisions are the most compelling. He candidly explains the difficulty of sourcing details from those times and how archeology impacts our perception. But his mission to tell us everything about Roman warfare is too ambitious. It’s best seen as a primer, establishing the broad picture for a motivated reader to dig deeper.
On the other hand, because of its focus on Consuls and Legates through the ages, the author highlighted facts that are only apparent from an evolutionary perspective. The resilience of Rome during the Punic Wars was borne of shared struggle and nationalism, something that Marius and Sulla would whittle away at. Caesar’s cult of personality and Octavian’s innovation of Imperium-delegation weakened and strengthened Rome. What I gained from In the Name of Rome was the filling of blind spots. I would be ecstatic if the author produced a sequel focused on the Legion’s adaptations through the ages: the recruitment of legionnaires, its place in the Republic/Empire, and its institutional memory.
However, the author didn’t set out to convince me of the double-edged nature of the Marian reforms, or for all of Octavian’s Empire-building, he failed at its most critical institution. In the Name of Rome achieved this through its scope and comprehensiveness. Yes, the author has too much academic integrity to provide unsubstantiated but entertaining narratives. Yes, an experienced reader will know many of the key moments and players. But its weaknesses are also its strengths, much like Rome herself.
This is my third Goldsworthy book and I am kind of thinking that he can't write a bad or boring history book. His writing style is clear, calm, cool and collected with little emotion. Dry perhaps, but rather like a good Bordeaux. Starting with 'The Shield and Sword of Rome' -- Fabius and Marcellus in the 3rd century BC all the way up to Belisarius of the Byzantine Empire, Goldsworthy details the military careers and to some extent the political life of some 15 Roman generals (a few also went on to be Emperors). At the same time he chronicles how tactics and the army itself changed over the centuries, from Republic to Principate to Late Empire and the Byzantine period. These military trends he details well, but considering such a such time span he can really only sketch each general. More detailed biographies on most of them can be found elsewhere. One minor quibble I have is the desire to see more maps of what Goldsworthy is describing. To be clear, the maps he has included are fine. I just wanted more and found myself looking them up online. Despite that little gripe, this book is highly recommended.
This is a military history of Rome from the 2nd Punic wars to the Byzantine empire. It is told through the story of many key generals. It covers many Generals you may know of like Caeser and some not as well known like Titus. This book tells the story of Rome and how these generals shaped its history. Many campaigns and wars were discussed, and I found it a very informative book. It even goes into detail of the history of the Roman military itself and the changes it went through as it developed into one of the greatest armies in the world. Adrian Goldsworthy does a good job telling this history and keeping it interesting.
I enjoyed the book. A nice overview of some famous and some not so famous Roman generals. Great background work as well. I do think you need to have an interest in Roman History to pick it up. Goldsworthy is an excellent popular historian. In this day and age, perhaps we need to be considering the rise and fall of Empires, including our own, the USA.
Fie că a fost vorba despre trupele republicii, ale principatului sau ale imperiului divizat, legionarii romani au fost timp de aproape cinci secole o prezență pregnantă și de temut pe câmpurile antice de bătălie. Datorită antrenamentului, a folosirii de formații tactice, a echipamentului net superior, dar și a, nu în ultimă instanță, comandanților militari care au făcut carieră (uneori chiar și politică) în fruntea armatelor. Iar despre 15 dintre aceștia e vorba în această carte - unii dintre cei mai faimoși, cunoscuți sau, în lipsă de altceva, indivizi despre care avem suficiente izvoare istorice cât să scriem un referat: nemuritorul Caesar, Scipio învingătorul lui Hannibal, Pompei cel Mare, Germanicus, Titus, Traian, Belisarius etc. Apărută în urmă cu 21 de ani, această operă de popularizare a istoriei se adresează în principal "strategilor de fotoliu" și celor care au înțeles că dacă ageamii vorbesc despre bătălii și tactică, cei mai profunzi vorbesc despre logistică și linii de aprovizionare. Dincolo însă de aceste false pretenții la inteligență, cartea este un compendiu de eseuri atent spicuite, bine pregătite și prezentate cu suficiente detalii încât să alcătuiască o bază solidă pentru orice doctorat. Acoperă o perioadă de 700 de ani, și chiar dacă nu epuizează niciun subiect le prezintă atât de corect și asiduu încât să inducă sațietatea.
It took a while to get through this book, but I have a good excuse, finishing up my history BA final exams, which are now successfully behind me. I deliberately chose a book for these past few weeks, which I would certainly enjoy, but at the same time give me some utility preparing for the exams. Ancient Rome featuring in at least 2 topics made this book an ideal candidate.
I did not regret choosing a Goldsworthy book again, he takes 15 of the most important Roman (Belisarius included) commanders and goes through very descriptively how they led their armies, how they got to that position and what happened with them afterwards. At the same time highlighting how the Roman state, society and army changed over the centuries. Such books are must-reads for anyone interested in ancient warfare and the ancient world in general. The only thing I was missing in the end that I would have welcomed a chapter about Aetius, but he was not included, the long line of commanders ending with Belisarius.
I have not even heard the name of Corbulo during the Principate period so far, so reading about his life and wars was great and also a new thing for me. All-in-all the standard is similarly great to Goldsworthy's other books I have read, he is evidently a foremost scholar of the era who can also write to a larger audience and not just academics. Absolutely recommended!
Well my Roman history obsession continues. After starting the year reading SPRQ and Dynasty, I moved to acclaimed historian Adrian Goldworthy’s account of a unique part of Roman history: namely the generals that won victories for the Republic and then the Empire. In this book, Goldworthy traces the accounts of over 15 different Roman generals and how they won battles in the fight for the good of the Republic/Empire.
Among the most noteworthy is someone I think everyone should at least know the name of: Scipio Africanus. The Punic Wars were a series of wars that the Roman Republic fought against the annoying Carthaginians. After intervening in an uprising during the First Punic War, Carthage came back in full force to threaten the Republic with the brilliant commander Hannibal in the Second Punic War. Scipio was able to repulse the Carthaginians and defeat Hannibal. Livy recounts a story, almost certainly apocryphal, where Scipio asked Hannibal who the greatest general was, Hannibal reportedly said Alexander the Great as the first and Pyrrhus the second. And had he beaten Scipio, he would have put himself before either of them. A nice story, yet Hannibal lost to probably the greatest general in Roman history who never lost a battle: Scipio Africanus.
The second most famous, at least in of the generals in this book, Roman general of note is Pompey (sometimes Pompey the Great). Pompey rose to fame in early battles such as the quelling of the slave revolt of Spartacus and solidifying the agricultural trade in Africa. Later, he rose to power to become of one the triumvirate, consisting of Julius Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey. The power struggle that ensued started a civil war after Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon river. In those days, territories were controlled by what we would call governors. The governors had the right to command troops, and entering into another governor’s land meant you forfeited command. But Julius needed to go to Rome to ascend to the throne and oust Pompey, and so he broke with convention and crossed (after much debate). Pompey and other leaders fled Rome and Julius ascended the throne. Nonetheless, Pompey is still considered one of Rome’s greatest generals.
Julius Caesar had moxie, as the aforementioned Rubicon venture states. When civil war broke out, Julius was able to politically and militarily defeat his enemies thereby leaving the throne at his disposal. Of note in Julius Caesar’s army was Legio X, his most favorite legion and arguable the greatest Roman Legion in history.
I thought a particularly interesting account was that of the general Titus. Titus was the general in charge of quelling the rebellion in Jerusalem. Taking notes from both Roman sources and Hebrew (Josephus in this case) presents a more balanced approach to Roman domination. Titus laid siege to Jerusalem and despite advances from the Hebrews, they were not able to repulse their Roman conquerors and Jerusalem was sacked. This was probably the most interesting account in my opinion.
There is much more as the book looks at many more, but these left impressions on me that I found particularly compelling. What Goldworthy does is interesting in that he views some of the cultural conditions of the time before going into biographical detail on a particular general. Obviously a general in the Republic looked very different from those in the Empire. For one, generals in the Republic were often times statesmen who commanded various legions at their disposal. It would be the equivalent of our statesmen’s, congressman and governors, controlling the local National Guard units (can you imagine?). Further the composition of the army continually changed with technological advances and more advanced doctrine as time progressed.
I felt like the closing comments were particularly poignant. Goldworthy speaks about how the ancient Romans often times fought against rivals who were vastly technologically and organizationally inferior to themselves, much like the unconventional wars we fight today. Further, the influence of Roman armies continue to leave a legacy on armed forces around the world today. The drilling of troops is something Marines learn at boot camp and at times exercise throughout their careers. Often times this is seen as something that is totally unnecessary. Yet, it harkens back to a time where the precision of movements and lack of communication necessitated controlling thousands of troops in an organized way. This carried on into the introduction of the musket. The Romans drilled in 3 lines much like we utilize today. For musketeers however, it was necessary to 1) concentrate firepower, and 2) provide a quicker means of sending bullets downrange. The first rank would fire and begin to reload while the second took their shot, etc. We keep the tradition alive today by drilling and utilizing troop movements from the legacy we received it from. And there are good reasons to do so that I won’t get into right now.
The Marines I know, in particular, have a reading list that is supplied by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. If I could put this on the list, it would be one of the books I’d recommend at the General Officer level. There are incredibly important lessons to be learned that are far, far above my pay grade. So if you know any Generals, give them a copy of this book.
Fabius and Marcellus, Scipio Africanus, Aemilius Paullus, Scipio Aemilianus, Marius, Sertorius, Pompey the Great, Cesar, Germanicus, Corbulo, Titus, Trajan, Julian and Belisarius: this is certainly not a motley collection of Roman generals, and by the way, yes, all were Romans, the last on the list included, for those we call the Byzantines saw themselves and thought of themselves as true Romans. So neither a bitty selection nor a clumsy classification, far from it, Adrian Goldsworthy picked his men with great care in order to talk us through what warfare really was about during the Roman era and how it evolved through time. Because it is obvious, or should be, that the way Cesar led his soldiers to fight Pompey in the midst of civil war couldn't be but different to how Marcellus dealt with military operations in Sicilia in the course of the protracted First Punic War. I say "should be": more often than not unfortunately, I see documentaries online or on TV, all supposedly approved of by vetted pundits and scholars in which legionaries of the third century AD still seem to be sporting the same military gear as their forebears from six centuries before! And in regard to those things, as well as anything relating to ancient tactics, Adrian Goldsworthy has a knack for bringing the remote past back to life with his crafted writing and his eagle-eyed precision, all the while never holding forth. His book is thus a great contribution to understanding how Rome made itself the unsurpassed superpower of its time. Yet I am sad to say something is lacking here. I think it is mostly due to the fact that the author sticks to the battlefield and barely broadens the scope of his study such as to encompass the political and religious spectrum. And it is something of a disappointment because in Rome, religion touched its holy finger to anything human, war included. The Romans were always prone to war, nevertheless they didn't see themselves as warmongers, always praising their qualms when it came to pick up the sword. Waging a war? Yes, but on condition it was fair, meaning not aggressive, but defensive, (or to go help and support an ally under attack), and just, i.e. abiding by the will of the gods. Of course, it happened now and then to prove pure self-ingratiating, if not utter desingenuous rigmarole. Sometimes the construct was overstretched and burst at the seams. That was why for example many outspoken Senators shouted themselves hoarse in their questioning Cesar's allout war in Gaul. Overlooking this tiny flaw, I deem the book a good read. I wish all writers on the matter were as serious and dedicated as Adrian Goldsworthy is.
This was an odd book for me to read. Military history, battles, and generals are amongst my least favorite aspects of ancient history, and ones I’ve managed to avoid for the most part. However, in the past year I’ve had two instructors tell me that if I really want to understand ancient history, and in particular ancient Roman history, I need to learn more about warfare of the time. I’ve liked other books by Goldsworthy, so decided this would be a good one to read,
Goldsworthy focuses on key Roman generals and their leadership style. Along the way we learn about such notable generals as Scipio Africanus, Pompey the Great, Julius Caesar (of course), Titus, Trajan, Julian, and many more. I’m not convinced this would be a good book for someone to read if they knew nothing or very little about Roman history. There are a lot of other names thrown out along the way, as well as information about the times, that might be meaningless if you had not already read some Roman history.
If you are a fan of military history, I suspect this will be a great book for you. I’m clearly not the target audience, but did find it informative and learned a fair amount reading this book. Did I enjoy it? Not really, but that's not due to the author's writing, but to the subject matter.