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نشأة الفلسفة العلمية
This book represents a new approach to philosophy. It treats philosophy as not a collection of systems, but as a study of problems. It recognizes in traditional philosophical systems the historical function of having asked questions rather than having given solutions. Professor Reichenbach traces the failures of the systems to psychological causes.
Speculative philosophers offered answers at a time when science had not yet provided the means to give true answers. Their search for certainty and for moral directives led them to accept pseudo-solutions. Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and many others are cited to illustrate the rationalist fallacy: reason, unaided by observation, was regarded as a source of knowledge, revealing the physical world and "moral truth." The empiricists could not disprove this thesis, for they could not give a valid account of mathematical knowledge.
Mathematical discoveries in the early nineteenth century cleared the way for modern scientific philosophy. Its advance was furthered by discoveries in modern physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology. These findings have made possible a new conception of the universe and of the atom. The work of scientists thus altered philosophy completely and brought into being a philosopher with a new attitude and training.
Instead of dictating so-called laws of reason to the scientist, this modern philosopher proceeds by analyzing scientific methods and results. He finds answers to the age-old questions of space, time, causality, and life; of the human observer and the external world. He tells us how to find our way through this world without resorting to unjustifiable beliefs or assuming a supernatural origin for moral standards. Philosophy thus is no longer a battleground of contradictory opinions, but a science discovering truth step by step.
Professor Reichenbach, known for his many contributions to logic and the philosophy of science, addresses this book to a wider audience. He writes for those who do not have the leisure or preparation to read in the fields of mathematics, symbolic logic, or physics. Besides showing the principal foundations of the new philosophy, he has been careful to provide the necessary factual background. He has written a philosophical study, not a mere popularization. It contains within its chapters all the necessary scientific material in an understandable form--and, therefore, conveys all the information indispensable to a modern world-view.
The late Hans Reichenbach was Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles. His previous books include
Speculative philosophers offered answers at a time when science had not yet provided the means to give true answers. Their search for certainty and for moral directives led them to accept pseudo-solutions. Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and many others are cited to illustrate the rationalist fallacy: reason, unaided by observation, was regarded as a source of knowledge, revealing the physical world and "moral truth." The empiricists could not disprove this thesis, for they could not give a valid account of mathematical knowledge.
Mathematical discoveries in the early nineteenth century cleared the way for modern scientific philosophy. Its advance was furthered by discoveries in modern physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology. These findings have made possible a new conception of the universe and of the atom. The work of scientists thus altered philosophy completely and brought into being a philosopher with a new attitude and training.
Instead of dictating so-called laws of reason to the scientist, this modern philosopher proceeds by analyzing scientific methods and results. He finds answers to the age-old questions of space, time, causality, and life; of the human observer and the external world. He tells us how to find our way through this world without resorting to unjustifiable beliefs or assuming a supernatural origin for moral standards. Philosophy thus is no longer a battleground of contradictory opinions, but a science discovering truth step by step.
Professor Reichenbach, known for his many contributions to logic and the philosophy of science, addresses this book to a wider audience. He writes for those who do not have the leisure or preparation to read in the fields of mathematics, symbolic logic, or physics. Besides showing the principal foundations of the new philosophy, he has been careful to provide the necessary factual background. He has written a philosophical study, not a mere popularization. It contains within its chapters all the necessary scientific material in an understandable form--and, therefore, conveys all the information indispensable to a modern world-view.
The late Hans Reichenbach was Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles. His previous books include
293 pages, Paperback
First published January 28, 1951
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October 21, 2019
باعنوان "پیدایش فلسفه علمی"، از انتشارات علمی و فرهنگی، ترجمهی موسی اکرمی رو خوندم.
کتاب ادعاش سر اومدن دوران فلسفهی نظری و سیستمی و جایگزینی فلسفهی تجربی و استقراییه. دلیل و باعث این تغییر رو پیشرفت "علم" میدونه که قواعد اصلی فلسفه نظری که مهمترینشون تطابق ریاضیات و فیزیک مبتنی بر اون با عالم واقع باشه رو رد میکنه. به این صورت بنیان فلسفه نظری و سیستمی که شناخت رو (طبق تعریف خودش) امری ذهنی و قطعی میدونه، با ادعای عدم قطعیت و همچنین عدم تطابق ریاضیات با جهان واقع مورد تردید قرار میگیره؛ و از اون طرف هم چیزی که پیشنهاد میکنه فلسفه استقرایی علم پایهایه که قطعیتی رو درش نمیبینه و لفظ "استقرایی خوب" رو براش به کار میبره. رایشنباخ "به دنبال قطعیت بودن" رو در فلسفه امری روانشناختی و زائد میدونه.
نظر خودم هم بخوام بگم اینه که ادعاهای قشنگیه اما فقط قشنگه یا به لفظ خود نویسنده "خوب"ه و چون فقط خوبه دلیلی برای باورش ندارم، حتی موقت، حتی لحظهای.
کتاب ادعاش سر اومدن دوران فلسفهی نظری و سیستمی و جایگزینی فلسفهی تجربی و استقراییه. دلیل و باعث این تغییر رو پیشرفت "علم" میدونه که قواعد اصلی فلسفه نظری که مهمترینشون تطابق ریاضیات و فیزیک مبتنی بر اون با عالم واقع باشه رو رد میکنه. به این صورت بنیان فلسفه نظری و سیستمی که شناخت رو (طبق تعریف خودش) امری ذهنی و قطعی میدونه، با ادعای عدم قطعیت و همچنین عدم تطابق ریاضیات با جهان واقع مورد تردید قرار میگیره؛ و از اون طرف هم چیزی که پیشنهاد میکنه فلسفه استقرایی علم پایهایه که قطعیتی رو درش نمیبینه و لفظ "استقرایی خوب" رو براش به کار میبره. رایشنباخ "به دنبال قطعیت بودن" رو در فلسفه امری روانشناختی و زائد میدونه.
نظر خودم هم بخوام بگم اینه که ادعاهای قشنگیه اما فقط قشنگه یا به لفظ خود نویسنده "خوب"ه و چون فقط خوبه دلیلی برای باورش ندارم، حتی موقت، حتی لحظهای.
September 24, 2021
رغم أن الكتاب قديم نوعا ما، فقد صدر لأول مرة في خمسينيات القرن الماضي، ولكنه قيّم جدا لكل من يهتم بفلسفة العلوم والمنطق التجريبي. يحاول المؤلف أن ينظّر لفلسفة جديدة هي الفلسفة العلمية مقابل الفلسفة القديمة العقلية أو التأملية، ويتناول مواضيع وقضايا متنوعة، مفسرا إياها وفق أسس هذه الفلسفة الجديدة، مثل طبيعة المعرفة والزمان والتطور وواقعية العالم وقوانين الطبيعة والأخلاق. أرى أن المؤلف فعلا برع ونجح إلى حد كبير فيما حاول تأسيسه وتفسيره، ولكن من الأفضل عدم الاكتفاء به، فالعلوم استمرت في التغير، ولم تعد الفيزياء (التي تظهر بشكل كبير في الكتاب) تتربع على عرشها كما كانت سابقا.
May 14, 2018
In The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (1951), logical empiricist Hans Reichenbach tries to tell the general history of philosophical thought; but more specifically, he focuses on the battle between rationalism and empiricism, and the ultimate victory of empiricism with the advent of symbolic logic and the scientific breakthroughs of the twentieth century.
Although I fully agree with Reichenbach that there have always been two types of philosophers, hence two types of philosophy - i.e. speculative and empirical philosophy - the book is highly biased in favor of Reichenbach's own stance, which makes it more of a pamphlet than an objective document. Nevertheless, there are gems of insight in this little book that are very valuable for anyone interested in the history of science and philosophy.
Reichenbach sees Plato as the first great speculative philosopher. Speculative philosophers look, obsessively, for certainty (i.e. certain truths). This is not to be found in nature; hence, they postulate transcendental worlds and ideas. For Plato, the world of ideas was a perfect world, of which the natural world is 'just' an imperfect reflection - literally: the natural world partakes (!) in the ideal world.
After Plato, Kant is the major transcendentalist philosopher Reichenbach mentions. Kant tried to overcome the insurmountable problems that the British empiricists (especially David Hume) discovered, by postulating two worlds: the world as we experience it - to be known through science - and the world as it is in itself - not to be known by us.
Reichenbach's stance on these speculative philosophies is that these philosophers wanted certainty so bad, that they created systems that would ensure their wishes came true. Not really philosophical. The mind yearning for certainty easily falls prey to its own imaginations... Reichenbach sees these speculative philosophers mainly as rationalists and as system builders; purportedly claiming that our reason can know the world, without having any recourse to experience - at all.
Of course, these rationalists tried to build their systems on the only known certain knowledge: mathematics. For millennia the goal for the rationalist philosopher was to model all of science on the principles of Euclid. Start with some defintions, find some axioms, apply logic to deduce theorems - et voila!
This ideal broke down in the nineteenth century, when Euclid's geometry was at once degraded from the ideal of certainty to just one of the many possible geometries. Mathematicians like Bolyai, Lobachevski, Gauss and Riemann showed that there were many systems of non-Euclidean geometry, 'degrading' the most certain, rationalistic science to empirical facts. From then on, we had to do observations and experiments to detect what type of geometry was the 'natural' one.
Shortly after these mathematical inventions came quantum mechanics - which definitively did away with determinism - and general relativity - which showed that any physical description can be true, provided that you apply the correct coordinative definitions.
When Reichenbach wrote his book in 1951, rational/speculative philosophy was effectively buried and it seems the author of The Rise of Scientific Philosophy - himself a die hard empiricist - can't hide his malicious pleasure about this fact.
Still, the personal issues aside, I think Reichenbach is right in claiming that philosophy has been transformed into logical empiricism. Philosophy should not build systems anymore; should not occupy itself anymore with answering scientific questions; and should not try to prove that reason can understand the world without any flight to empirical observations. Gone are Kant's synthetic judgements a priori - those are simply non-existent: logic and mathematics are analytical (i.e. rational); the sciences are synthetical (i.e. empirical). Analytic propositions are tautologies, definitions - they certainly don't add any new knowledge to our existing knowledge. We need our senses to gather new knowledge.
So what should philosophy do, exactly? It should apply logic to judge the context of justification of scientific theories (how are said theories derived from said facts?); it should apply logic to analyse existing problems and come up with interesting questions that the scientist can answer; it should apply logic to interpret scientific results and give meaning to scientific theories. Reichenbach seems to claim that the contemporary philosopher should be a linguistic therapist of some sorts, clearing science from the (all too many) fallacies and invalid parts that it contains. Hence, logical empiricism - applying logic to empirical matters, in order to interpret and clarify.
At least Reichenbach's position seems to be much more humble and realistic than the speculative philosophers of the past. And I think he was definitely on the right track with writing this book.
I can't really recommend the book, though. It is written for the layman, but one needs an awful lot of background knowledge of philosophy and science to understand it though. In general, Reichenbach has a gift of explaining tough subjects in an accessible ways, but the subject matter makes it rather inaccessible for people who aren't familiar with the general history of philosohpy and the recurring themes in this history.
Although I fully agree with Reichenbach that there have always been two types of philosophers, hence two types of philosophy - i.e. speculative and empirical philosophy - the book is highly biased in favor of Reichenbach's own stance, which makes it more of a pamphlet than an objective document. Nevertheless, there are gems of insight in this little book that are very valuable for anyone interested in the history of science and philosophy.
Reichenbach sees Plato as the first great speculative philosopher. Speculative philosophers look, obsessively, for certainty (i.e. certain truths). This is not to be found in nature; hence, they postulate transcendental worlds and ideas. For Plato, the world of ideas was a perfect world, of which the natural world is 'just' an imperfect reflection - literally: the natural world partakes (!) in the ideal world.
After Plato, Kant is the major transcendentalist philosopher Reichenbach mentions. Kant tried to overcome the insurmountable problems that the British empiricists (especially David Hume) discovered, by postulating two worlds: the world as we experience it - to be known through science - and the world as it is in itself - not to be known by us.
Reichenbach's stance on these speculative philosophies is that these philosophers wanted certainty so bad, that they created systems that would ensure their wishes came true. Not really philosophical. The mind yearning for certainty easily falls prey to its own imaginations... Reichenbach sees these speculative philosophers mainly as rationalists and as system builders; purportedly claiming that our reason can know the world, without having any recourse to experience - at all.
Of course, these rationalists tried to build their systems on the only known certain knowledge: mathematics. For millennia the goal for the rationalist philosopher was to model all of science on the principles of Euclid. Start with some defintions, find some axioms, apply logic to deduce theorems - et voila!
This ideal broke down in the nineteenth century, when Euclid's geometry was at once degraded from the ideal of certainty to just one of the many possible geometries. Mathematicians like Bolyai, Lobachevski, Gauss and Riemann showed that there were many systems of non-Euclidean geometry, 'degrading' the most certain, rationalistic science to empirical facts. From then on, we had to do observations and experiments to detect what type of geometry was the 'natural' one.
Shortly after these mathematical inventions came quantum mechanics - which definitively did away with determinism - and general relativity - which showed that any physical description can be true, provided that you apply the correct coordinative definitions.
When Reichenbach wrote his book in 1951, rational/speculative philosophy was effectively buried and it seems the author of The Rise of Scientific Philosophy - himself a die hard empiricist - can't hide his malicious pleasure about this fact.
Still, the personal issues aside, I think Reichenbach is right in claiming that philosophy has been transformed into logical empiricism. Philosophy should not build systems anymore; should not occupy itself anymore with answering scientific questions; and should not try to prove that reason can understand the world without any flight to empirical observations. Gone are Kant's synthetic judgements a priori - those are simply non-existent: logic and mathematics are analytical (i.e. rational); the sciences are synthetical (i.e. empirical). Analytic propositions are tautologies, definitions - they certainly don't add any new knowledge to our existing knowledge. We need our senses to gather new knowledge.
So what should philosophy do, exactly? It should apply logic to judge the context of justification of scientific theories (how are said theories derived from said facts?); it should apply logic to analyse existing problems and come up with interesting questions that the scientist can answer; it should apply logic to interpret scientific results and give meaning to scientific theories. Reichenbach seems to claim that the contemporary philosopher should be a linguistic therapist of some sorts, clearing science from the (all too many) fallacies and invalid parts that it contains. Hence, logical empiricism - applying logic to empirical matters, in order to interpret and clarify.
At least Reichenbach's position seems to be much more humble and realistic than the speculative philosophers of the past. And I think he was definitely on the right track with writing this book.
I can't really recommend the book, though. It is written for the layman, but one needs an awful lot of background knowledge of philosophy and science to understand it though. In general, Reichenbach has a gift of explaining tough subjects in an accessible ways, but the subject matter makes it rather inaccessible for people who aren't familiar with the general history of philosohpy and the recurring themes in this history.
June 27, 2021
يفصل الكتاب تاريخ نشأة الفلسفة العلمية من أفلاطون إلى كانت وحتى هيوم واينشتاين، من نشأة المذهب العقلي (rationalistic) -بمعناه الفلسفي الدقيق لا العام- وحتى التحديات التي واجهها المذهب التجريبي من العقليون والرياضيون على حدٍ سواء بعد ظهوره، وحتى ظهور فيزياء الكم بعد الفيرياء الكلاسيكية، ويناقش في فصول الكتاب نظريات علمية أساسية (النسبية، نظرية الذرة، والتطور) ويقارن بين كافة الفلسفات القديمة والحديثة، ويخصص فصل كامل للحديث عن المنطق الرمزي (الرياضي) كتاب قد يراه القارئ العادي ممل؛ إن لم يملك دافعية لقراءة هذا النوع من الكتب والتوسع في تاريخ العلوم ونشأتها، لكني أرشحه تحديدًا لمحبي العلم وهواته والـnerds أمثالي، الكتاب من ترجمة الدكتور فؤاد زكريا.
October 26, 2017
A magnificent book by Reichenbach.
although some of the arguments were not totally persuasive, the it was a great book to read and think about the subjects Reichenbach argued in this book.
although some of the arguments were not totally persuasive, the it was a great book to read and think about the subjects Reichenbach argued in this book.
October 11, 2014
Only on Chapter 3, but so far so good!
September 22, 2015
Kako ih je sve posloziooo... da me je sramota!
Citati Rajhenbaha.
Citati Rajhenbaha.
May 23, 2019
Reichenbach consistently writes with a degree of clarity that is rarely encountered in philosophical works, and is quite easy to comprehend irrespective of whether you agree with his thesis or not. I read this immediately after finishing Kant's Prolegomena and found this provided tremendous insight into why Reichenbach, who was originally a neo-Kantian and had written his doctoral dissertation in that tradition, was compelled to abandon this program after he attended Einstein's general relativity lectures in Berlin.
This book is a popular account, and is thus composed with very broad strokes, resulting in more of a charicature of the history than a serious treatment. For example, his treatment of Leibniz was particularly reductive, due to his overt effort to classify him as a one-dimensional "Rationalist", whereas writers of the same period, such as Popper, are much more nuanced in pointing out how much Leibniz anticipated, even if he did indulge in metaphysical speculation.
I found that those sections for which I already had familiarity with the primary literature (e.g., non-Euclidean geometry, general relativity, probability theory) were easy to digest and I could follow the logic of his arguments, whereas for those I did not (e.g., quantum theory), I had to take his assertions at face value and was left rather skeptical of some of the conclusions.
The chapter on probability was somewhat frustrating. He seemed to verge on a modern Bayesian interpretation, but asserted a definite siding with frequentist interpretations in name. Since this isn't really a technical exposition, I have to suspend my judgement until I can read "Experience and Prediction".
The discussions of ethics, democracy, and the necessity for debating one's moral posits were perhaps the highlight of the text. His rejection of ethics as an a priori domain of investigation follows naturally from the arguments, and his criticism of the motivations for previous systems in codifying the status quo seems to hit the mark. However, this is certainly not my domain of expertise.
Overall, the book left me with a much better sense of the appeal of the logical positivist movement and how it was as polarizing as it was. I'd highly recommend it to anyone who already has deep exposure to classic philosophical traditions, but otherwise I don't think it would a good place to start because it views those traditions through a rather biased lense.
This book is a popular account, and is thus composed with very broad strokes, resulting in more of a charicature of the history than a serious treatment. For example, his treatment of Leibniz was particularly reductive, due to his overt effort to classify him as a one-dimensional "Rationalist", whereas writers of the same period, such as Popper, are much more nuanced in pointing out how much Leibniz anticipated, even if he did indulge in metaphysical speculation.
I found that those sections for which I already had familiarity with the primary literature (e.g., non-Euclidean geometry, general relativity, probability theory) were easy to digest and I could follow the logic of his arguments, whereas for those I did not (e.g., quantum theory), I had to take his assertions at face value and was left rather skeptical of some of the conclusions.
The chapter on probability was somewhat frustrating. He seemed to verge on a modern Bayesian interpretation, but asserted a definite siding with frequentist interpretations in name. Since this isn't really a technical exposition, I have to suspend my judgement until I can read "Experience and Prediction".
The discussions of ethics, democracy, and the necessity for debating one's moral posits were perhaps the highlight of the text. His rejection of ethics as an a priori domain of investigation follows naturally from the arguments, and his criticism of the motivations for previous systems in codifying the status quo seems to hit the mark. However, this is certainly not my domain of expertise.
Overall, the book left me with a much better sense of the appeal of the logical positivist movement and how it was as polarizing as it was. I'd highly recommend it to anyone who already has deep exposure to classic philosophical traditions, but otherwise I don't think it would a good place to start because it views those traditions through a rather biased lense.
January 2, 2023
Kitabın ilk bölümünde Spekülatif (Olgulardan çok, düşünceye dayalı) felsefeyi inceliyor. Bu felsefede önem verilen değer yargılarının olgusal gerçeklerden çok, belli bir ahlak- etik anlayışının olduğunu gösteriyor. Bu ahlaka dayalı felsefi düşüncenin bilimsel düşünceye olumlu- olumsuz katkıları anlatılıyor.
İkinci bölümde bilimsel felsefeyi ele almış. 19. Ve 20. Yüzyıl biyolojisi ve fiziği temelinde bilimsel düşüncenin önemini işlevini anlatmış. Özellikle Evrim, atom- kuantum fiziği, modern mantık, bilginin işlevsel kullanımı, modern bilimsel etik ele alınmış.
Kitabın sonunda’da eski spekülatif felsefe ve modern olgulara dayalı bilimsel düşünceyi karşılaştırarak insanoğlunun doğruya giden güvenilir tek yolun bilimsel düşünce olduğu vurgulanmış.
Anlaşılır, rahat okunan, akıcı bir dili ve tercümesi var. Tavsiye ederim.
İkinci bölümde bilimsel felsefeyi ele almış. 19. Ve 20. Yüzyıl biyolojisi ve fiziği temelinde bilimsel düşüncenin önemini işlevini anlatmış. Özellikle Evrim, atom- kuantum fiziği, modern mantık, bilginin işlevsel kullanımı, modern bilimsel etik ele alınmış.
Kitabın sonunda’da eski spekülatif felsefe ve modern olgulara dayalı bilimsel düşünceyi karşılaştırarak insanoğlunun doğruya giden güvenilir tek yolun bilimsel düşünce olduğu vurgulanmış.
Anlaşılır, rahat okunan, akıcı bir dili ve tercümesi var. Tavsiye ederim.
June 27, 2025
1) A posit is a statement which we treat as true although we do not know whether it is so.
2) Posits are the instruments of action where truth is unavailable.
3) All knowledge is probable knowledge and can be asserted only in the sense of posits.
4) All our knowledge is posits.
5) Our most general knowledge, that of the physical world and human beings, is a posit.
6) An imperative is a linguistic utterance which we use with the intention of influencing another person.
7) The theory of evolution is based throughout on indirect evidence. Will it ever be possible to construct direct evidence for it by producing human beings in a test tube?
8) Knowledge begins with observation: Our senses tell us what exists outside our bodies.
2) Posits are the instruments of action where truth is unavailable.
3) All knowledge is probable knowledge and can be asserted only in the sense of posits.
4) All our knowledge is posits.
5) Our most general knowledge, that of the physical world and human beings, is a posit.
6) An imperative is a linguistic utterance which we use with the intention of influencing another person.
7) The theory of evolution is based throughout on indirect evidence. Will it ever be possible to construct direct evidence for it by producing human beings in a test tube?
8) Knowledge begins with observation: Our senses tell us what exists outside our bodies.
August 26, 2023
An opinionated comparison between speculative and empiricist philosophy, in the style of "kill your idols", and why the author considers the latter superior. It greatly helped me understand the thoughts of Plato and Kant. The second part, where a probabilistic approach to empiricism is introduced, is interesting but not always easy to follow.
July 23, 2016
A dyed in the wool empiricist offers an attempt to deny SAPs from philosophy. The first half even suggests that we psycho-analyze any poor sap who believe(d)s in SAPs (Reichenbach still loves Kant though). Psycho-analysis and something sociological is the proper task of the historian of philosophy, for it's more error than anything else. For those philosophical problems not solved by 'science,' there's also the old 'pseud-problem' trick or linguistic therapy for some classical problems.
September 6, 2025
كتاب ممتاز، لكن المؤلف تعصب(بطريقة فظة)للمذهب التجريبي، واعتبر المذاهب الأخرى غير علمية وضربٌ من الخيال الفلسفي
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