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Cables from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West’s Afghanistan Campaign
A frank and honest memoir by Britain’s former ambassador to Kabul which provides a unique, high-level insight into Western policy in Afghanistan.
The West’s mission in Afghanistan has never been far from the headlines. For Sherard Cowper-Coles, our former Ambassador, Britain’s role in the conflict – the vast amount of money being spent and the huge number of lives being lost – was an everyday reality.
In Cables from Kabul, Cowper-Coles takes the reader on a journey through the backstreets of Afghanistan’s capital to the corridors of power in London and Washington. He pays tribute to the tactical successes of our soldiers but asks whether these will be enough to secure stability. Nobody is better placed to tell this story of embassy life in one of the most dangerous places on earth. Powerful and astonishingly frank, Cables from Kabul explains how we got into the quagmire of Afghanistan, and how we can get out of it.
The West’s mission in Afghanistan has never been far from the headlines. For Sherard Cowper-Coles, our former Ambassador, Britain’s role in the conflict – the vast amount of money being spent and the huge number of lives being lost – was an everyday reality.
In Cables from Kabul, Cowper-Coles takes the reader on a journey through the backstreets of Afghanistan’s capital to the corridors of power in London and Washington. He pays tribute to the tactical successes of our soldiers but asks whether these will be enough to secure stability. Nobody is better placed to tell this story of embassy life in one of the most dangerous places on earth. Powerful and astonishingly frank, Cables from Kabul explains how we got into the quagmire of Afghanistan, and how we can get out of it.
352 pages, Kindle Edition
First published May 23, 2011
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January 1, 2024
Sherard was Afghanistan Ambassador from 2007-2009 and Special Representative from 09-10 (an over glorified role).
1. In the preface, it highlights that journalism to often focuses on the wrong parts of the story. “But precisely because such war stories focus so closely on combat, they sometimes miss the broader perspective of the war”. The military generals seemed to suffer from some serious flaws (military analysts as well), who place a premium on positivity and loyalty to their commanders instead of presenting the truth.
2. Americans insistence that crops were sprayed was rebuffed by Sherard, but was symbolic of Britain’s desire to follow in America’s steps, yet lobby for a political solution that involved not just speaking to the Afghan Government, Taliban, but international partners such as India, and Pakistan and Iran. Nobody had the guts, (including the foreign affairs committee) to say that America’s involvement in Afghan was to defeat Al Qaeda, so had nothing to do with the Taliban! “The western campaign was fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country”.
3. Miliband, Brown, Biden, Clinton, Hauge, Cameron were all hosted in Afghanistan. Private meetings with Kazi were held every week. The workaholic Richard Holbrooke with two mobile phones also gets a thorough analysis.
4. The parallels with history (History repeats itself, alas in different disguises) and how Afghan was America's Vietnam. And the parallels continue. Back in 2003 when the Americans/British had made reasonable gains, political progress was there to be achieved. However, Blair suddenly promised Bush that the British would help with Iraq ("the bad war") and resources were diverted which then unleashed more civil war.
5. In 1830 the British nearly conquered all of Afghan, only to turn attention to the opium wars in China. British then came under increasing pressure, hence the retreat from Kabul 1842 through the mountains where they were ambushed by local tribes, and you have one surviving rider making it to Jalalabad on his horse, Doctor Bryton. How similar the retreat from Kabul in 2021 seems?
1. In the preface, it highlights that journalism to often focuses on the wrong parts of the story. “But precisely because such war stories focus so closely on combat, they sometimes miss the broader perspective of the war”. The military generals seemed to suffer from some serious flaws (military analysts as well), who place a premium on positivity and loyalty to their commanders instead of presenting the truth.
2. Americans insistence that crops were sprayed was rebuffed by Sherard, but was symbolic of Britain’s desire to follow in America’s steps, yet lobby for a political solution that involved not just speaking to the Afghan Government, Taliban, but international partners such as India, and Pakistan and Iran. Nobody had the guts, (including the foreign affairs committee) to say that America’s involvement in Afghan was to defeat Al Qaeda, so had nothing to do with the Taliban! “The western campaign was fighting the wrong enemy in the wrong country”.
3. Miliband, Brown, Biden, Clinton, Hauge, Cameron were all hosted in Afghanistan. Private meetings with Kazi were held every week. The workaholic Richard Holbrooke with two mobile phones also gets a thorough analysis.
4. The parallels with history (History repeats itself, alas in different disguises) and how Afghan was America's Vietnam. And the parallels continue. Back in 2003 when the Americans/British had made reasonable gains, political progress was there to be achieved. However, Blair suddenly promised Bush that the British would help with Iraq ("the bad war") and resources were diverted which then unleashed more civil war.
5. In 1830 the British nearly conquered all of Afghan, only to turn attention to the opium wars in China. British then came under increasing pressure, hence the retreat from Kabul 1842 through the mountains where they were ambushed by local tribes, and you have one surviving rider making it to Jalalabad on his horse, Doctor Bryton. How similar the retreat from Kabul in 2021 seems?
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 16, 2024
“War is the continuation of politics by other means.”
~ von Clausewitz, Prussian general
Sherard Cowper-Coles poses questions about NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan that went unanswered during his tenure as the UK’s most senior representative to Afghanistan from 2007 to 2010, not to mention the decade following its publication, in Cables from Kabul. Civilian and military bureaucracies on all sides confused proximity for understanding, reporting for analysis and activity for productivity in the Sisyphean endeavour to stabilise post-9/11 Afghanistan.
Cowper-Coles captures the frenetic energy of a warzone Embassy, from the constant turnover of staff to the difficulties of managing civil-military relations. Combat environments attract ambitious young diplomats and development specialists of every stripe, but Cowper-Coles goes beyond central casting to introduce a wider range of fascinating personalities: an Afghan fighter pilot who once owned the only desk in the entire Taliban-era defence ministry (a luxury they regarded as heretical), an Estonian diplomat whose previous visit to Afghanistan was with the Soviet Red Army, and a President suspicious of the British, the Pakistanis and half of his own Cabinet, though apparently not always the Taliban.
Cables from Kabul is an unhappy story, even more so in retrospect. Time-poor Ministers, under immense electoral pressure to show progress, agree to costly military solutions to non-military problems because they are culturally unable to question uniformed advice. NATO blood and treasure pours into Afghanistan but the US State Department hides behind the unhelpful fiction that Afghanistan is a sovereign country whenever it could otherwise push for painful, unpopular changes among its elite. Counterinsurgency doctrine, relentlessly refined and reinforced by the might of the US military, wasn’t enough to turn Afghanistan’s leaders into the credible alternative to the Taliban that Afghanistan really needed: the patchy, often predatory attention from Kabul responded only occasionally to the best efforts of international donors.
Cables from Kabul meanders into a cycle of meetings, conferences and endless tete-a-tete talks during the third act, far more than Cowper-Coles needs to make his point, but the book is an important reminder that hindsight is not the sole possessor of 20/20 vision. The world, in Cowper-Coles’ view, missed the opportunity to investigate what wounded pride a post-9/11 America might have had to swallow in exchange for a political settlement that protected women, Shia Muslims and the liberal-minded in Afghanistan. The country’s ancient cultures could surely have provided indigenous mechanisms to validate such a settlement, even if they had to make some concessions to what passes for a uniquely Taliban culture.
One haunting anecdote captures the twilight years of a freer Afghanistan, and Cowper-Coles’ impressive diplomatic career. Seven years after the invasion, 60 per cent of Afghan National Army troops deserted when finding out they would face the Taliban in Helmand. As long ago as 2009, the UK’s former Foreign Secretary asked two serving Afghan Ministers how long the Kabuli authorities would remain in Lashkar Gah after an eventual NATO withdrawal. “Twenty-four hours,” they laughed.
Perhaps there should have been less talking, and more listening.
~ von Clausewitz, Prussian general
Sherard Cowper-Coles poses questions about NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan that went unanswered during his tenure as the UK’s most senior representative to Afghanistan from 2007 to 2010, not to mention the decade following its publication, in Cables from Kabul. Civilian and military bureaucracies on all sides confused proximity for understanding, reporting for analysis and activity for productivity in the Sisyphean endeavour to stabilise post-9/11 Afghanistan.
Cowper-Coles captures the frenetic energy of a warzone Embassy, from the constant turnover of staff to the difficulties of managing civil-military relations. Combat environments attract ambitious young diplomats and development specialists of every stripe, but Cowper-Coles goes beyond central casting to introduce a wider range of fascinating personalities: an Afghan fighter pilot who once owned the only desk in the entire Taliban-era defence ministry (a luxury they regarded as heretical), an Estonian diplomat whose previous visit to Afghanistan was with the Soviet Red Army, and a President suspicious of the British, the Pakistanis and half of his own Cabinet, though apparently not always the Taliban.
Cables from Kabul is an unhappy story, even more so in retrospect. Time-poor Ministers, under immense electoral pressure to show progress, agree to costly military solutions to non-military problems because they are culturally unable to question uniformed advice. NATO blood and treasure pours into Afghanistan but the US State Department hides behind the unhelpful fiction that Afghanistan is a sovereign country whenever it could otherwise push for painful, unpopular changes among its elite. Counterinsurgency doctrine, relentlessly refined and reinforced by the might of the US military, wasn’t enough to turn Afghanistan’s leaders into the credible alternative to the Taliban that Afghanistan really needed: the patchy, often predatory attention from Kabul responded only occasionally to the best efforts of international donors.
Cables from Kabul meanders into a cycle of meetings, conferences and endless tete-a-tete talks during the third act, far more than Cowper-Coles needs to make his point, but the book is an important reminder that hindsight is not the sole possessor of 20/20 vision. The world, in Cowper-Coles’ view, missed the opportunity to investigate what wounded pride a post-9/11 America might have had to swallow in exchange for a political settlement that protected women, Shia Muslims and the liberal-minded in Afghanistan. The country’s ancient cultures could surely have provided indigenous mechanisms to validate such a settlement, even if they had to make some concessions to what passes for a uniquely Taliban culture.
One haunting anecdote captures the twilight years of a freer Afghanistan, and Cowper-Coles’ impressive diplomatic career. Seven years after the invasion, 60 per cent of Afghan National Army troops deserted when finding out they would face the Taliban in Helmand. As long ago as 2009, the UK’s former Foreign Secretary asked two serving Afghan Ministers how long the Kabuli authorities would remain in Lashkar Gah after an eventual NATO withdrawal. “Twenty-four hours,” they laughed.
Perhaps there should have been less talking, and more listening.
August 12, 2023
This is a book about the limits of diplomacy. It's not so much the inside story of the west's campaign as the inside story of the inside of an embassy somewhere on the fringes of the west's (i.e. America's) campaign. And the inside story of an embassy tends to boil down to one thing: parties. There are parties, conferences, dinners, and social gatherings galore here, all underpinned with the constant refrain 'But why is nothing getting done?' At the outset, Coles admits the possibility that keeping the whole social whirl going may indeed be end in itself and one suspects that he might well be having his cake and eating it here - both indulging in the merry-go-round and complaining about its ineffectiveness in actually changing much. Being a good diplomat, Coles tends not to go too far in any direction opinion-wise, and so the whole narrative tends to drag with boredom. It is only in the final chapter that he redeems things somewhat, engaging in a relatively convincing polemic about the need for proper political control in Afghanistan.
March 14, 2019
I read this account primarily as a follow up to Pakistan on the Brink by Ahmed Rashid and have to say to go to AR for a more analytical and reasoned understanding of the issues dealing with the Af-Pak dilemma. What you get in this book is the ambassador's account of his prior and direct after thoughts being in Kabul and the surge in confidence for Helmand's western control after vacating the Taliban. Loads of flying here and there, speaking to military persons and politicians. The accounts means well to translate what was lived through. But does nothing to understand how in SCC's eyes about the Afghan citizens negotiations with the global players assessing and interpreting what's best for them. A high level interference which is muddy, provocative and unstable at best is when those who purports to intervene for the good of the country has less traction when there are so many soup spoons in the mix. Rendering a philosophical solution which doesn't reflect the ground realities.
Read
July 21, 2020I can’t add anything to the official summary. Makes one wonder what our warfighters died for
November 4, 2020
Have read before, it was OK
August 27, 2023
A very interesting and illuminating portrait of the West's Afghan campaign, written by a key insider with a very consummate grasp of the region.
October 23, 2012
I didn’t know British Ambassadors published accounts so soon of their recent posting in hot spots like Kabul. This is a fascinating account of the political events in and about Afghanistan, and the war on the Taliban, 2007-11, when Sherard Cowper-Coles (S.C-C) was Ambassador (twice) and HMG’s roving Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP).
Is he really going to tell us like it is – or give us the ‘diplomatic’ version?
While there is a good deal of ‘old boy’ references, networking and coincidences (so the diplomatic service really is like that) S.C-C gives a fascinating account of the people politics behind the West’s campaign. He pulls no punches in acknowledging oveall the advance of the insurgency and the deterioration of security, despite the huge Western military deployment – basically, how we are losing the war. His analysis is as simple as it is profound: there is no coherent political strategy to accompany or secure the military gains, to achieve a peaceful Afghanistan without foreign troops in the field.
S.C-C recommends (and actually proposed) a strategy similar to the ‘closed door’ policy of Curzon, Viceroy at the turn of the last century; making tribal leaders and elders responsible for security and governance locally, rewarding peace and punishing misbehaviour. Today they would be local ‘community defence volunteers’ who would neither want nor tolerate more extreme Al-quaeda elements coming in from elsewhere. This S.C-C argues would give stability from which to develop governance, services, etc. bottom up, not top down; a strategy of ‘engage, stabilise and develop’ as opposed to the military policy of ‘clear, hold, build’.
And, incidentally, S.C-C gives away that William Dalrymple is writing a history of an earlier horrendous British defeat in the First Afghan War, a further half century before Curzon.
Is he really going to tell us like it is – or give us the ‘diplomatic’ version?
While there is a good deal of ‘old boy’ references, networking and coincidences (so the diplomatic service really is like that) S.C-C gives a fascinating account of the people politics behind the West’s campaign. He pulls no punches in acknowledging oveall the advance of the insurgency and the deterioration of security, despite the huge Western military deployment – basically, how we are losing the war. His analysis is as simple as it is profound: there is no coherent political strategy to accompany or secure the military gains, to achieve a peaceful Afghanistan without foreign troops in the field.
S.C-C recommends (and actually proposed) a strategy similar to the ‘closed door’ policy of Curzon, Viceroy at the turn of the last century; making tribal leaders and elders responsible for security and governance locally, rewarding peace and punishing misbehaviour. Today they would be local ‘community defence volunteers’ who would neither want nor tolerate more extreme Al-quaeda elements coming in from elsewhere. This S.C-C argues would give stability from which to develop governance, services, etc. bottom up, not top down; a strategy of ‘engage, stabilise and develop’ as opposed to the military policy of ‘clear, hold, build’.
And, incidentally, S.C-C gives away that William Dalrymple is writing a history of an earlier horrendous British defeat in the First Afghan War, a further half century before Curzon.
March 27, 2013
A worthwhile book to read for understanding the diplomatic and political aspects about Afghanistan, and why there has been so little progress there. It's also an interesting insight into the world of diplomacy.
The main point he makes is that there needs to be a political settlement in Afghanistan alongside the military campaign, and by that he means there needs a negotiated settlement with the Taliban which includes them in government, and also a negotiated settlement with the regional powers around Afghanistan. He doesn't really go into too much detail beyond that though, and I found that a bit of a frustrating trend in his book - he'd frequently say something, such as he met with Karzai to discuss something, without really giving a "so what". I think that's somewhat a consequence of his self-admitted reliance on his appointments diary to provide material, and no journal, correspondence or Foreign Office records, and so the vagueness at times is a consequence of his fallible memory.
Some interesting insights nonetheless, including:
- The close relationship between Karzai and Prince Charles, and the extent of Charles' charitable work in Afghanistan
- He is very critical of the falsely optimistic briefings given by the military, including the heavy reliance on PowerPoint.
- The chaotic nature of Richard Holbrooke, including his constant reliance on his mobile phones, his frequent security breaches and his regular lack of tact and etiquette. Hard to believe he was considered a successful diplomat.
- The circuit of international conferences and action groups that come across as something of a gravy train, achieving little.
The main point he makes is that there needs to be a political settlement in Afghanistan alongside the military campaign, and by that he means there needs a negotiated settlement with the Taliban which includes them in government, and also a negotiated settlement with the regional powers around Afghanistan. He doesn't really go into too much detail beyond that though, and I found that a bit of a frustrating trend in his book - he'd frequently say something, such as he met with Karzai to discuss something, without really giving a "so what". I think that's somewhat a consequence of his self-admitted reliance on his appointments diary to provide material, and no journal, correspondence or Foreign Office records, and so the vagueness at times is a consequence of his fallible memory.
Some interesting insights nonetheless, including:
- The close relationship between Karzai and Prince Charles, and the extent of Charles' charitable work in Afghanistan
- He is very critical of the falsely optimistic briefings given by the military, including the heavy reliance on PowerPoint.
- The chaotic nature of Richard Holbrooke, including his constant reliance on his mobile phones, his frequent security breaches and his regular lack of tact and etiquette. Hard to believe he was considered a successful diplomat.
- The circuit of international conferences and action groups that come across as something of a gravy train, achieving little.
March 17, 2012
Interesting read. I've read the review saying that it lends an unique insight into the workings of the international diplomacy in the crisis countries. Now, you might not like what you see but it's particularly insightful. I mean, the prose is kind of high-whig mixed with if not ghostwriting, then at least heavy editing and professional research teams.
Still, the fact that the author is a bit too much old-Oxbridge, regimental ties, deference to aristocracy and orientalism (we keep hearing about magnificent headdresses of the Afghan aristocracy) mixed with a very new-Labour feeling of spin, horsetrading and denial of responsibility (it's never really author's fault, it's the others) speaks volume of the actual diplomatic and political apparatus of the UK.
But credit where the credit is due, i do believe that the author's principal thesis of political strategy over military tactics in finding Afghanistan settlement is a very good one. He also hits the nail on the head when he dissects the curious tension between the military and civilian leadership. I do think he is right - thorough de-militarisation of the everyday life in the UK mixed with a populist press means that we idealize the armed forces a bit too much which makes it easy to put military tactics before political strategy. Perhaps one good thing of doing compulsory national service is to demonstrate to people how stupid the military really is...
Still, the fact that the author is a bit too much old-Oxbridge, regimental ties, deference to aristocracy and orientalism (we keep hearing about magnificent headdresses of the Afghan aristocracy) mixed with a very new-Labour feeling of spin, horsetrading and denial of responsibility (it's never really author's fault, it's the others) speaks volume of the actual diplomatic and political apparatus of the UK.
But credit where the credit is due, i do believe that the author's principal thesis of political strategy over military tactics in finding Afghanistan settlement is a very good one. He also hits the nail on the head when he dissects the curious tension between the military and civilian leadership. I do think he is right - thorough de-militarisation of the everyday life in the UK mixed with a populist press means that we idealize the armed forces a bit too much which makes it easy to put military tactics before political strategy. Perhaps one good thing of doing compulsory national service is to demonstrate to people how stupid the military really is...
June 4, 2012
In May 2007, Cowper-Coles arrived in Kabul to take over as the Ambassador of an upgraded British Embassy. These are the memoirs of his experiences over the next three and a half years, as he made a great effort to try and steer the British goverment's effort in Afghanistan. It is not a book of history however but a memoir and, as such, can be a bit of slog. He describes the life of an ambassador, with all the diplomatic demands, week by week. He gives a clear picture of the daily life he had to lead and gives much credit to his staff in assisting him. He also gives a record the international effort that went on, as he flew out of Kabul back to London or to Washington or to some other capital to brief offials, or to participate in meetings that were organized to try and find a solution to Afghanistan. Buried in his memokir we get glimpses of his views on AFghanistan and his criticism of the emphasis on a military solution, not enough on the diplomatic or governance level. These views are informative, but you have to dig them out. It's a valuable book for anone intereseted in this subject but not one that is an easy read for the average reader.
September 6, 2012
I'm not that interested in biographical writing, so please read the following comments in the light of that.
I started this exploration of Afghanistan events filtered through the authors personal career. I might persevere but it combines false modesty with self-importance in a way that's simply off-putting. It also combines significant and trivial personal information in a way that makes you think that the author can't assess the difference between the two. I suppose we're all like that to an extent, but the issues involved with diplomacy and Afghanistan are more important than that. I think there's really useful insights here, but I'm honestly not sure I'll be ploughing through it to find out. I would simply be more interested in a long essay from the author about what he's learned and his thoughts about future direction.
I started this exploration of Afghanistan events filtered through the authors personal career. I might persevere but it combines false modesty with self-importance in a way that's simply off-putting. It also combines significant and trivial personal information in a way that makes you think that the author can't assess the difference between the two. I suppose we're all like that to an extent, but the issues involved with diplomacy and Afghanistan are more important than that. I think there's really useful insights here, but I'm honestly not sure I'll be ploughing through it to find out. I would simply be more interested in a long essay from the author about what he's learned and his thoughts about future direction.
August 14, 2017
Fascinating and rare insight into what goes on behind the compound walls of foreign officials in Kabul. It's basically a book by a smart ambassador who saw the futility of the Afghan war strategies and lobbied the Yanks to stop their nonsense approach, but to no avail. The many long lunches and dinners he engaged in to try and convince the Americans that a political approach was the only answer made me hungry and nauseous at the same time. One of the fundamental problems with the military AND political approach simultaneously is that you end up killing the people you want to negotiate with (or the Pakistanis do). Anyway, it leads one to be ultimately convinced the US has no real desire to end the Afghan war when it's such good business for those with vested interests in a 'forever war'.
January 21, 2013
Early on in the book, Sherard references Thucydides great work on the Peloponessian war. This book is, to a certain extent, a similar work for the Afghan war - the parallel continues as the book finishes before the end of the war, much like Thucydides.
Sherard has an easy engaging style in person and this comes through in the book.
Sherard has an easy engaging style in person and this comes through in the book.
May 23, 2013
While candid in many of his comments particularly in his assessment of the military leadership that mitigates against a strategic solution I was , perhaps cynically , more interested in what his bosses made him leave out. Also while I have no doubt that he did the work he had to do well I am left wondering how much of it was work that actually needs doing ?
October 30, 2011
Interesting analysis of situation in Afghanistan written from the perspective of someone who has served the British government at a senior level in or on Afghanistan in various capacities. Well wrtitten and readable even for someone who knows very little about the place.
October 12, 2012
Little bit too much 'I had porridge for breakfast' and not enough political detail, history and analysis. But a good read and a good guide to Afghanistan 2007-11, and plenty of links to more detailed works.
July 7, 2013
Memories from the British ambassador in Afghanistan. A light, even superficial at times, read, though it manages to make a vital point; without a political reconsiliation, one involving all regional actors as well, there can be no lasting peace in Afghanistan.
January 20, 2016
Presumably he is restricted by Official Secrets Act. Interesting though. Worrying about the limits to success so far
October 17, 2018
An insightful account of the allied campaign in Afghanistan written by a former ambassador to Kabul from Britain.
July 31, 2021
A really interesting look at the war in Afghanistan about 10 years in. Cowper-Coles does a good job of laying out complex policy, diplomatic, and military issues in a readable way.
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