The Limits of Morality

by Shelly Kagan

Most people believe that there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand. Although it would often be meritorious, we are not, in fact, morally required to do all that we can to promote overall good. What's more, most people also believe that certain types of acts are simply forgiven, morally off limits, even when necessary for promoting the overall good. In this provocative analysis Kagan maintains that despite the intuitive appeal of these views, they cannot be adequately defended. In criticizing arguments for limited moral requirements as well as those for unconditionally prohibited acts, Kagan offers a sustained attack on two of the most basic features of ordinary common sense morality.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1989

About the author

Shelly Kagan is Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale. After receiving his B.A. from Wesleyan University in 1976, and his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1982, he taught at the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Illinois at Chicago before coming to Yale in 1995. He is the author of the textbook Normative Ethics, which systematically reviews alternative positions concerning the basic rules of morality and their possible foundations, and The Limits of Morality, which challenges two of the most widely shared beliefs about the requirements of morality. He is currently at work on The Geometry of Desert.

Reviews

[David · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is very classic heavy philosophy with a lot of definitions, counter examples and thought experiments. As said in the description of the book the subject is two perceived limits to morality. The limit to what we are morally allowed to do to bring about a better outcome (kill one to save two) and the limit to what morality can demand of us (common sense morality says we aren't obligated to give to charity or in other ways make the world better). The book is very detailed and the subject is quite narrow, so this book is aimed at professional moral philosophers than the lay public.
I do like the book and agree with much of it, but all the details and intricacies took a toll on me and I simply couldn't give it the focus it needed. So my three star rating is more of a reflection on me as a reader than on the book itself. There are some thought experiments I didn't find convincing though. For example Kagan seemed to say it wouldn't be plausible to say it wasn't the intention to kill an innocent strapped to an enemy tank if you have to shot through him to take out the tank, but it would be plausible to say it if you can shoot at another place on the tank making it explode and thereby killing the person, even though you would know the innocent man would be killed in both situations. I can't see the difference regarding the intention in does to cases.
Anyway, I thought I could end with a small excerpt of from the book which gives should give a pretty good idea on what to expect from the book. In the excerpt, from chapter 4. "Intending harm" sub chapter "Permission", he discusses the suggestion that the moral constraint is that you are not allowed to intend harm.

Consider this classic example. A hand grenade falls in the middle of a group of revolutionaries. In an unusual act of self-sacrifice, Manfred throws himself on the live grenade in order to shield his comrades from the explosion. He is killed, but his fellows escape unharmed.

Now this is a paradigm of the sort of act which ordinary morality believes to be governed by an option. What Manfred does is meritorious—but not morally required. Although he is free to do so, he need not sacrifice his own life to protect the lives of his comrades. This is, presumably, what [moral] moderates want to claim about Manfred's reaction.

Yet it seems that advocates of the constraint against intending harm—far from considering his reaction meritorious—must condemn Manfred's act as morally forbidden, for it apparently violates the constraint. Manfred harms himself as a means of protecting his fellow revolutionaries. But this means that he intends harm—and this is forbidden by the constraint.

If this is correct, then the constraint will clearly be unacceptable to the moderate. Countless saintly, heroic, and altruistic deeds will not be the living examples of moral ideals which they are normally taken to be, but will rather be examples of acts which are morally forbidden. If every self-sacrifice undertaken to help others is condemned by the constraint, then the constraint obviously condemns too much, and will be abandoned by the moderate.

[Yair Atlas · Rating 3 out of 5]

To a casual observer, it would seem strange that so many contemporary moral philosophers spend their time arguing that we need not be all that good. Alas, that's the world we find ourselves in. This book sees its goal as undermining that project.

I agree with the author. Many philosophers direct their anger at moral philosophy for requiring them to do so much good as opposed to being angry at the world for being so unjust. It is the latter which is the problem, not the former.

There are two main claims the book seeks to dismiss: (a) that there are certain actions which are always prohibited and (b) we are not required to sacrifice our interests for the greater good.

The book succeeds, but in doing so it demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary analytic philosophy. The arguments are laid out in excruciating detail, with pages of caveats, making the text boring to get through. While the rigor is clear, being so stuck in this world of logical reasoning makes the reader unable to feel the force of such arguments emotionally. And if people are to really change for the greater good, it is that emotional insight which is needed.

[Kramer Thompson · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kagan presents a quite clear and very thorough argument against common sense (or ordinary) morality. I found much of his argument quite convincing, and found it especially useful how he tackles many different arguments in favour of common sense morality (or at least against purely or largely consequentialist moralities) individually.

[Cullen · Rating 4 out of 5]

5 stars for philosophical content; 3 stars for writing style/quality

[Katkov Iurii · Rating 2 out of 5]

I bought this thing for a lot of money and stopped on the page 50. This is proper philosophy book, not for general public