What do you think?
Rate this book
In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story
As a Marine, Major Stockwell was CIA paramilitary intelligence case officer in the Congo Crisis, Vietnam & the Angolan War of Independence. Beginning a career in '64, he spent six years in Africa, Chief of Base in the Katanga during the Bob Denard invasion in '68, then Chief of Station in Bujumbura, Burundi in '70, before being transferred to oversee Vietnamese Tay Ninh province intelligence operations. He was awarded a CIA Medal of Merit for keeping his post open until Saigon's '75 fall.
In December of 1976, Stockwell resigned from the CIA, opposed to the methods & results of CIA paramilitary operations in the Third World & testified before Congressional committees. Two years later, he wrote the exposé 'In Search of Enemies', about that experience & its implications. He claimed the CIA was counterproductive to national security & that its secret wars afforded no benefit. The CIA made the Angolan MPLA to be an enemy despite the fact the MPLA wanted relations with the USA & hadn't committed aggressive acts.
In 1978, on TV's '60 Minutes', he claimed CIA Director William Colby & National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had systematically lied to Congress about CIA operations. Stockwell was one of the 1st professionals to leave the CIA to go public. The CIA retaliated by suing him in the 4th District Court in Washington DC. Part of the suit intended to eliminate the possibility of selling the story for the purpose of making a movie & required future publications be submitted for CIA review.
Unable to afford contesting the case, Stockwell filed for bankruptcy in Austin, TX. After the litigation was processed thru bankruptcy, the CIA dropped the suit. His book is useful for researchers & journalists interested in uncovering information about the conduct of US foreign policy in Africa & Asia. For example, the book tells of a CIA officer having Patrice Lumumba's body in his car trunk one night in then Elizabethville, Congo. Stockwell mentions in a footnote that at the time he didn't know the CIA was documented as having repeatedly tried to arrange Lumumba's assassination. His concerns were that, although many CIA colleagues had integrity, the organization harmed national security & its secret wars harmed innocents.
In December of 1976, Stockwell resigned from the CIA, opposed to the methods & results of CIA paramilitary operations in the Third World & testified before Congressional committees. Two years later, he wrote the exposé 'In Search of Enemies', about that experience & its implications. He claimed the CIA was counterproductive to national security & that its secret wars afforded no benefit. The CIA made the Angolan MPLA to be an enemy despite the fact the MPLA wanted relations with the USA & hadn't committed aggressive acts.
In 1978, on TV's '60 Minutes', he claimed CIA Director William Colby & National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had systematically lied to Congress about CIA operations. Stockwell was one of the 1st professionals to leave the CIA to go public. The CIA retaliated by suing him in the 4th District Court in Washington DC. Part of the suit intended to eliminate the possibility of selling the story for the purpose of making a movie & required future publications be submitted for CIA review.
Unable to afford contesting the case, Stockwell filed for bankruptcy in Austin, TX. After the litigation was processed thru bankruptcy, the CIA dropped the suit. His book is useful for researchers & journalists interested in uncovering information about the conduct of US foreign policy in Africa & Asia. For example, the book tells of a CIA officer having Patrice Lumumba's body in his car trunk one night in then Elizabethville, Congo. Stockwell mentions in a footnote that at the time he didn't know the CIA was documented as having repeatedly tried to arrange Lumumba's assassination. His concerns were that, although many CIA colleagues had integrity, the organization harmed national security & its secret wars harmed innocents.
285 pages, Hardcover
First published May 17, 1978
28 people are currently reading
1533 people want to read
About the author
John Stockwell
22 books22 followersJohn R. Stockwell is an American former CIA officer who became a critic of United States government policies after serving in the Agency for thirteen years and serving seven overseas tours of duty. After managing U.S. involvement in the Angolan Civil War as Chief of the Angola Task Force during its 1975 covert operations, he resigned and wrote In Search of Enemies, a book which remains the only detailed, insider's account of a major CIA "covert action". He also served as a reserve officer in the United States Marine Corps from 1955 to 1977, retiring as a Major.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 31 reviews
February 20, 2019
Its a great read, a must read for those who want to understand how the CIA operates. When I bought the book, I was expecting a very broad narrative of CIA activities across the globe. So naturally when I began reading the book I was initially disappointed upon discovering that the book covered only CIA activities in only Angola.
But in the end I was glad that it only covered Angola because it did cover it in so much depth. What makes the story all the more interesting is that it is first hand information being covered by a senior member of the CIA who knew exactly what was going on.
It is a must read for all politicians and especially those grounded in the Pan Africanist ideology who want to know how and why America and her allies in the West interfere and meddle in our politics. . It was eye opening.
But in the end I was glad that it only covered Angola because it did cover it in so much depth. What makes the story all the more interesting is that it is first hand information being covered by a senior member of the CIA who knew exactly what was going on.
It is a must read for all politicians and especially those grounded in the Pan Africanist ideology who want to know how and why America and her allies in the West interfere and meddle in our politics. . It was eye opening.
November 7, 2021
A good inside look at the CIA's meddling in Angola's Civil War. Not an expansive expose of the CIA by any means, but a well assembled critique of its operational structures. Unsurprisingly lacks a more systemic critique, tethered as Stockwell is to the broader bourgeois US Imperial project, but still a valuable resource for operational details on how US skullduggery works.
September 24, 2012
Not as scandalous as I was hoping for. Lacked significant intrigue. If you start this book already believing that the CIA lies to congress, lies to the american people, participates in "unauthorized" wars and foreign military activities then there is nothing to be surprised at in this book.
November 20, 2021
One of the best CIA insider stories I have ever read; Recommended
John Stockwell was a middle-grade CIA Case Officer when he was asked to step up and takeover what became known as the Angola Task Force. For those who don't know much about the CIA in the seventies, there are numerous books and internet sources on the various Congressional investigative committees and journalistic coups that exposed CIA illegal operations and corruption during the brutal era of US National Security reflection that took place at the end of the Vietnam War. John Stockwell watched these forums from the perspective of a case officer who knew he was running a pointless CIA misadventure in Angola. And became determined to bring it to light at the cost of his own career. For those who don't know the history of Angolan independence, Angola became an independent nation on November 11, 1975. Three political movements, divided roughly along tribal lines, vied to takeover. The Portuguese essentially said that whomever controlled the capital city of Luanda would be recognized. And the civil war was on.
The CIA had decided, at the end of the Vietnam War, to find another hotspot in the world where they could enact their revenge on the Soviet Union for their having aided the North Vietnamese in the American debacle in Vietnam. John Stockwell, a Marine Veteran who grew up in Africa and was freshly home from Vietnam (where he had become disillusioned with the way the CIA had handled the withdrawal from Saigon) was asked to lead a task force to muddle up the Soviet effort in Angola. The Soviets and their Cuban allies had gotten into Angola early. They ascertained that the MPLA was the national faction to back and they aggressively aided them. The CIA, determined to make the Soviets look bad, backed the other two groups, the FNLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. Stockwell, still reeling from his experiences in Vietnam, took the assignment against his better judgement. It became the straw that broke the back of his career and in 1977 he would resign to write this memoir.
In Search of Enemies is a fantastic memoir. It's a little known book about a little known Cold War operation that went awry. While many histories of Angola, UNITA and Jonas Savimbi focus on the late 80s, when Savimbi and UNITA were darlings of the next generation of right-wing, anti-communist cowboys, few are aware of the roughly 1974-76 period when the CIA was doing it's best to "slow the Soviet advance" on a shoe-string budget with no strategic objectives and no intention of winning. It was an exercise in cynical "operations for the sake of operations." John Stockwell, was the son of missionaries and grew up in the Congo. He knew many of the key players in the region firsthand from both his childhood and his previous African assignments. He was also a fluent speaker of several dialects of regional languages. He was the right man for the job (except he wanted to win not just muddle around) and the right man to write this book. Having read several books by CIA case officers, I find many of them to be exceptional masters of prose. John Stockwell is one of them. This book was hard for me to put down. Each completed chapter had me wanting to know more. Having worked in the intelligence field myself and studied 20th Century African history, I found the material absorbing. If you've read other exposes of the CIA written by insiders, there might not be much of a surprise in some of the capers Stockwell chronicles here. But it's the details and the personalities involved that fascinated me. The book ends on a sad note with Stockwell's resignation and somewhat cautious hope that President Jimmy Carter and CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner would address some of Stockwell's revelations and reform the agency. Alas, hindsight being 20-20, modern readers will know this was not to be. The recent debacle in Afghanistan only reveals how little has changed in America's intelligence apparatus.
I highly recommend this book... if you can find a copy. It helps if you read up a little on African and CIA history in the 1970s so you can appreciate all that was happening around Mr. Stockwell as he struggled to make the Angola Task Force a viable capability to keep Angola out of the Soviet-Cuban orbit. Enjoy!
John Stockwell was a middle-grade CIA Case Officer when he was asked to step up and takeover what became known as the Angola Task Force. For those who don't know much about the CIA in the seventies, there are numerous books and internet sources on the various Congressional investigative committees and journalistic coups that exposed CIA illegal operations and corruption during the brutal era of US National Security reflection that took place at the end of the Vietnam War. John Stockwell watched these forums from the perspective of a case officer who knew he was running a pointless CIA misadventure in Angola. And became determined to bring it to light at the cost of his own career. For those who don't know the history of Angolan independence, Angola became an independent nation on November 11, 1975. Three political movements, divided roughly along tribal lines, vied to takeover. The Portuguese essentially said that whomever controlled the capital city of Luanda would be recognized. And the civil war was on.
The CIA had decided, at the end of the Vietnam War, to find another hotspot in the world where they could enact their revenge on the Soviet Union for their having aided the North Vietnamese in the American debacle in Vietnam. John Stockwell, a Marine Veteran who grew up in Africa and was freshly home from Vietnam (where he had become disillusioned with the way the CIA had handled the withdrawal from Saigon) was asked to lead a task force to muddle up the Soviet effort in Angola. The Soviets and their Cuban allies had gotten into Angola early. They ascertained that the MPLA was the national faction to back and they aggressively aided them. The CIA, determined to make the Soviets look bad, backed the other two groups, the FNLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. Stockwell, still reeling from his experiences in Vietnam, took the assignment against his better judgement. It became the straw that broke the back of his career and in 1977 he would resign to write this memoir.
In Search of Enemies is a fantastic memoir. It's a little known book about a little known Cold War operation that went awry. While many histories of Angola, UNITA and Jonas Savimbi focus on the late 80s, when Savimbi and UNITA were darlings of the next generation of right-wing, anti-communist cowboys, few are aware of the roughly 1974-76 period when the CIA was doing it's best to "slow the Soviet advance" on a shoe-string budget with no strategic objectives and no intention of winning. It was an exercise in cynical "operations for the sake of operations." John Stockwell, was the son of missionaries and grew up in the Congo. He knew many of the key players in the region firsthand from both his childhood and his previous African assignments. He was also a fluent speaker of several dialects of regional languages. He was the right man for the job (except he wanted to win not just muddle around) and the right man to write this book. Having read several books by CIA case officers, I find many of them to be exceptional masters of prose. John Stockwell is one of them. This book was hard for me to put down. Each completed chapter had me wanting to know more. Having worked in the intelligence field myself and studied 20th Century African history, I found the material absorbing. If you've read other exposes of the CIA written by insiders, there might not be much of a surprise in some of the capers Stockwell chronicles here. But it's the details and the personalities involved that fascinated me. The book ends on a sad note with Stockwell's resignation and somewhat cautious hope that President Jimmy Carter and CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner would address some of Stockwell's revelations and reform the agency. Alas, hindsight being 20-20, modern readers will know this was not to be. The recent debacle in Afghanistan only reveals how little has changed in America's intelligence apparatus.
I highly recommend this book... if you can find a copy. It helps if you read up a little on African and CIA history in the 1970s so you can appreciate all that was happening around Mr. Stockwell as he struggled to make the Angola Task Force a viable capability to keep Angola out of the Soviet-Cuban orbit. Enjoy!
February 19, 2014
What a great read.
Granted, what Stockwell writes about in '78 has been well-documented ever since and the practices of the CIA are nowadays common knowledge, so shock factor is low.
However, the actual details of the Angolan intervention make up for a thrilling book that could easily be turned into a major political movie in the Syriana vein.
What's more, so many things happened in and around Angola that each reference Stockwell makes can easily prompt research into other issues largely forgotten.
An important, and great, book.
Granted, what Stockwell writes about in '78 has been well-documented ever since and the practices of the CIA are nowadays common knowledge, so shock factor is low.
However, the actual details of the Angolan intervention make up for a thrilling book that could easily be turned into a major political movie in the Syriana vein.
What's more, so many things happened in and around Angola that each reference Stockwell makes can easily prompt research into other issues largely forgotten.
An important, and great, book.
October 10, 2010
I brought a copy of this memoir along with me to California, finishing it on the plane and leaving it as a gift for my hosts. It's the memoir of a former CIA officer which concentrates primarily on the covert war the United States conducted in Angola. The author was so appalled at this and other activities conducted by our government surreptitiously and often illegally through the CIA that he left the agency.
Want to Read
June 15, 2025"In my twelve years of case officering I never saw or heard of a situation in which the KGB attacked or obstructed a CIA operation." - New York, 1978 edition, p.101
"If a CIA case officer has a flat tire in the dark of night on a lonely road, he will not hesitate to accept a ride from a KGB officer - likely the two would detour to some bar for a drink together. In fact CIA and KGB officers entertain each other frequently in their homes. The CIA's files are full of mention of such relationships in almost every African station." - Ibid, p.238
"If a CIA case officer has a flat tire in the dark of night on a lonely road, he will not hesitate to accept a ride from a KGB officer - likely the two would detour to some bar for a drink together. In fact CIA and KGB officers entertain each other frequently in their homes. The CIA's files are full of mention of such relationships in almost every African station." - Ibid, p.238
April 26, 2026
I think if you already know the US military and the CIA are the most corrupt, fucked up, racist, and monstrous entities in the entire world— you can skip this book.
If you don’t understand that— this book is a great starting point!
Regardless, this book does a good job of outlining all the fucked up shit the CIA did in Angola in the 70s, and this gave a good foundation to build off of as to why the CIA simply needs to be abolished.
If you want chapter summaries with notable excerpts—see below!
—
John Stockwell joined CIA in 1964, and resigned in 1977.
Author’s Note
“It is the American people’s unequivocal right to know what their leaders are doing in America’s name and with our tax dollars.”
“We actively propagandized the American public, with cruel results—Americans misguided by our agent’s propaganda went to fight in Angola on suicidal circumstances.”
Prologue
November 11th, 1975. Angola declares independence from Portugal.
1975. Civil war in Angola, with the US-backed side going poorly.
Senate 40 committee asks CIA to outline a program which could win the Angolan war.
Chapter 1
Summer 1975. Stockwell begins working with deputy directorate of operations at the CIA. He expressed interest on working for the Angola Task Force, and was appointed the Chief.
“Current [CIA] director, William Colby, had admitted to a twenty-year CIA practice of opening American citizens’ mail.”
Began working with deputy directorate of operations
Chapter 2
“Theoretically the senate has controlled the agency budget since 1947, but CIA funds were buried in the Department of Defense budget, and without detailed knowledge of CIA activities, the Senate could make little practical use of power.”
Angola was a Portuguese colony, and Portugal was freeing its last African possessions. Angolan people were resisting colonial rule, and the US believed it was from communist agitation. Stockwell continues to discuss Portuguese colonialism in Angola, some of the most extreme and one of the worst colonial presences in the world. (Note: in 1961, President Kennedy joined the UN in a call for reform in Angola and to cut sale of arms to Portugal).
From the late 1960s until 1975, there was no official CIA station inside Angola (usually they would use embassies or consulates).
“The Congo covert action cost American taxpayers a million dollars a day for a sustained period.”
The US proceeded to sell arms to the Zairian army, prompting the civil war in Angola. “From the outset, the program was being kept secret from the American people more than anyone else.”
Chapter 3
“Often, the CIA will deliver obsolete American weapons, arguing that World War ll left so many scattered around the world they are no longer attributable to the U.S. In the Angola program, we obtained such obsolete weapons from the National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve stores.”
This chapter outlines the beginning of shipping military equipment and weaponry to the Luanda station in Angola. He details how CIA members working in embassy’s have unlimited money for their salaries, bribes, gifts, recreation, etc.
In Angola, Marxists organized a nationalist political movement which they eventually called the “Popular Movement” or the MPLA. The US and China were first to interfere, not the Soviets (even though the CIA cited Soviet involvement as a reason for operations in Angola).
Chapter 4
Stockwell outlines his task force, including but not limited to “two paramilitary officers ti plan the arms shipments and supervise the war; covert action specialist who would run the propaganda campaign…”
Chapter 5
August, 1975. “The situation in Angola was deteriorating rapidly.” The director of CIA briefs the senate 40 committee. A historic, key event for US-involvement in Angola.
Chapter 6
Stockwell provides an overview of CIA case officers and the organizational structure. He highlights the “clubbishness” and fraternity-like nature of the CIA.
Stockwell recounts his arrival in Angola, and walks through some of the political structure present in Angola at the time of his arrival.
Chapter 7
They go to Ambriz, where he meets with a leader, Santos Castro.
“I was intrigued that the opposing forces in northern Angola, the MPLA, were poorly armed, poorly led, and disorganized, offering us the opportunity for a quick coup.”
Chapters 8 and 9
“The 40 Committee/National Security Council mechanism traditionally directs covert wars, assassination attempts, and coups in other countries.”
August, 1975, Stockwell debriefs with Washington and the 40 Committee. He outline Cuba’s increased involvement and their urge to stand in solidarity with the MPLA.
“Moreover, the Cuban policy in Angola was consistent with Cuba’s ideology and its international stance. Our Angola program, like the previous Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose was against Castro, was a direct contradiction of our public policies, making it essential that we keep the American public from knowing the truth”
Chapter 10
Stockwell reviews the poor handling of Angola task force, and some notable failures of the CIA generally.
“The committee’s final report, January 19, 1976 (suppressed by the House, but published illegally by the Village Voice, February 1976), analyzes six illustrative CIA intelligence failures: the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968, the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia (in which the CIA lost track of the Soviet army for two weeks); the 1973 Mideast war (in which the CIA relied on distorted Israeli reporting, causing the United States to misunderstand the situation and skirt the brink of global confrontation with the Soviet Union); the 1974 Coup in Portugal (which the CIA failed to predict or analyze correctly, leaving the United States without prepared options for dealing with Portuguese colonies in Africa); the first nuclear explosion in the Third World, in India in 1974; and the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus (an intelligence failure which precipitated a diplomatic failure, which seriously undermined NATO’s southern flank, led to a deterioration of our relations with Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and got our ambassador, Roger David, killed).
He also mentions how they worked, illegally and without Congressional approval, with South Africa. South Africa had pressures from Black nationalist movements in Mozambique, Angola, and more, so, they ran their own covert missions and would “run its program..like the CIA, concealing it from its own people.”
Chapter 11
“More than any European power France has remained active in the affairs of newly independent African countries.”
Outlines France’s interest in Angolan oil and Zairian minerals. French intelligence directors met with the CIA.
He further outlines the propaganda campaigns occurring in Europe and the U.S. during this time. By September, the CIA begins to struggle to maintain public appearance of efforts in Angola.
“The United States launched a major political effort to embroil and entrap as many counties as it could into opposition of the MPLA.”
“The only atrocities we were able to document had Cubans as victims rather than criminals.”
“Each delegation opened a bank account in Europe to which European-based CIA finance officers could make regular deposits. Thereafter the CIA could plausibly deny that it had funded anyone’s propagandists in the United States. It would be extremely difficult for any investigators to prove differently.”
Chapter 12
One of the more capitalist-centered chapter, Stockwell outlined the role international business plays in operations like Cuba, Congo, Vietnam, Angola and more. For example, Boeing, Mobil, Gulf oil, and more.
The MPLA had taken control of Angola’s oil reserves, but “there was no threat of nationalization, as the MPLA needed Gulf’s assistance indefinitely to keep the vital revenues coming in.”
By November, President Ford approved the sale of tens of millions of dollars of arms sales and Boeing aircrafts.
This chapter closes out with Stockwell discussing the complete mismanagement and intentional deception to the U.S. government over costs and finances in Angola.
Chapter 13
Cuba and the Soviets bombard U.S./European-backed forces in Angola. With little support from the secretary of defense and congress, they begin recruiting French and Portuguese mercenaries. Ultimately, it ended in what were essentially suicide missions for both mercenaries and U.S. soldiers.
Chapter 14
Stockwell walks through more of the relationships between CIA and congress at the time. Several congresspersons (mainly Senators) were mad the CIA was illegally working with South Africa, sending arms to Angola, and that American soldiers were involved in the conflict—but did not have power to do much. Regardless, the CIA lied to Congress and eventually won over their support for escalating events in Angola.
Meanwhile, oversees, the Angolan program fell apart with Cuban forces accelerating their presence. January 1976, South Africa withdraws as they realize the U.S. would soon forced to also abandon their efforts. February 9th, 1976, “the CIA acknowledged defeat and begin to withdrawal.
Stockwell also mentions how CIA agents never get killed because “terrorists aren’t going to waste suicide missions on U.S. embassy second secretaries, even if they are CIA.” He also outlines how CIA and KGB officers have close relationships.
In April of 1976, the House establishes an overdose committee to keep the CIA in line
“The CIA intensified its propaganda efforts, its agents focusing on New York and Washington. Our United Nations ambassador, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, noisily accused the Soviets of attempting to colonize Africa.”
“In 1974 and 1975, the CIA, under orders from Kissinger, had mounted a program to arm and encourage the Kurdish people to revolt against the Iraqi government.”
Chapter 15
Following defeat in Angola, “the CIA began making generous payoffs to anyone who had been associated with our side of the Angolan war.”
Postscript
“A succession of presidents and Henry Kissinger have been lured into questionable adventures for which, they are promised by the CIA, they will never be held accountable.”
“The CIA’s function is to provide aggressive option in foreign affairs.”
“Our attachment to the CIA’s clandestine services nevertheless seems to be unshaken. We still argue that, no matter what it does, the CIA is essential to our national security. Where is the ancient American skepticism, the “show me” attitude for which our pioneer forefathers were famous?”
“Because of the CIA the world is a more dangerous place. Americans have reduced credibility. Worst of all, by retaining the CIA, we are accepting ourselves as a harsh and ruthless people. It’s the wrong game for a great nation, and the players we’ve got are losers.”
If you don’t understand that— this book is a great starting point!
Regardless, this book does a good job of outlining all the fucked up shit the CIA did in Angola in the 70s, and this gave a good foundation to build off of as to why the CIA simply needs to be abolished.
If you want chapter summaries with notable excerpts—see below!
—
John Stockwell joined CIA in 1964, and resigned in 1977.
Author’s Note
“It is the American people’s unequivocal right to know what their leaders are doing in America’s name and with our tax dollars.”
“We actively propagandized the American public, with cruel results—Americans misguided by our agent’s propaganda went to fight in Angola on suicidal circumstances.”
Prologue
November 11th, 1975. Angola declares independence from Portugal.
1975. Civil war in Angola, with the US-backed side going poorly.
Senate 40 committee asks CIA to outline a program which could win the Angolan war.
Chapter 1
Summer 1975. Stockwell begins working with deputy directorate of operations at the CIA. He expressed interest on working for the Angola Task Force, and was appointed the Chief.
“Current [CIA] director, William Colby, had admitted to a twenty-year CIA practice of opening American citizens’ mail.”
Began working with deputy directorate of operations
Chapter 2
“Theoretically the senate has controlled the agency budget since 1947, but CIA funds were buried in the Department of Defense budget, and without detailed knowledge of CIA activities, the Senate could make little practical use of power.”
Angola was a Portuguese colony, and Portugal was freeing its last African possessions. Angolan people were resisting colonial rule, and the US believed it was from communist agitation. Stockwell continues to discuss Portuguese colonialism in Angola, some of the most extreme and one of the worst colonial presences in the world. (Note: in 1961, President Kennedy joined the UN in a call for reform in Angola and to cut sale of arms to Portugal).
From the late 1960s until 1975, there was no official CIA station inside Angola (usually they would use embassies or consulates).
“The Congo covert action cost American taxpayers a million dollars a day for a sustained period.”
The US proceeded to sell arms to the Zairian army, prompting the civil war in Angola. “From the outset, the program was being kept secret from the American people more than anyone else.”
Chapter 3
“Often, the CIA will deliver obsolete American weapons, arguing that World War ll left so many scattered around the world they are no longer attributable to the U.S. In the Angola program, we obtained such obsolete weapons from the National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve stores.”
This chapter outlines the beginning of shipping military equipment and weaponry to the Luanda station in Angola. He details how CIA members working in embassy’s have unlimited money for their salaries, bribes, gifts, recreation, etc.
In Angola, Marxists organized a nationalist political movement which they eventually called the “Popular Movement” or the MPLA. The US and China were first to interfere, not the Soviets (even though the CIA cited Soviet involvement as a reason for operations in Angola).
Chapter 4
Stockwell outlines his task force, including but not limited to “two paramilitary officers ti plan the arms shipments and supervise the war; covert action specialist who would run the propaganda campaign…”
Chapter 5
August, 1975. “The situation in Angola was deteriorating rapidly.” The director of CIA briefs the senate 40 committee. A historic, key event for US-involvement in Angola.
Chapter 6
Stockwell provides an overview of CIA case officers and the organizational structure. He highlights the “clubbishness” and fraternity-like nature of the CIA.
Stockwell recounts his arrival in Angola, and walks through some of the political structure present in Angola at the time of his arrival.
Chapter 7
They go to Ambriz, where he meets with a leader, Santos Castro.
“I was intrigued that the opposing forces in northern Angola, the MPLA, were poorly armed, poorly led, and disorganized, offering us the opportunity for a quick coup.”
Chapters 8 and 9
“The 40 Committee/National Security Council mechanism traditionally directs covert wars, assassination attempts, and coups in other countries.”
August, 1975, Stockwell debriefs with Washington and the 40 Committee. He outline Cuba’s increased involvement and their urge to stand in solidarity with the MPLA.
“Moreover, the Cuban policy in Angola was consistent with Cuba’s ideology and its international stance. Our Angola program, like the previous Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose was against Castro, was a direct contradiction of our public policies, making it essential that we keep the American public from knowing the truth”
Chapter 10
Stockwell reviews the poor handling of Angola task force, and some notable failures of the CIA generally.
“The committee’s final report, January 19, 1976 (suppressed by the House, but published illegally by the Village Voice, February 1976), analyzes six illustrative CIA intelligence failures: the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968, the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia (in which the CIA lost track of the Soviet army for two weeks); the 1973 Mideast war (in which the CIA relied on distorted Israeli reporting, causing the United States to misunderstand the situation and skirt the brink of global confrontation with the Soviet Union); the 1974 Coup in Portugal (which the CIA failed to predict or analyze correctly, leaving the United States without prepared options for dealing with Portuguese colonies in Africa); the first nuclear explosion in the Third World, in India in 1974; and the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus (an intelligence failure which precipitated a diplomatic failure, which seriously undermined NATO’s southern flank, led to a deterioration of our relations with Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and got our ambassador, Roger David, killed).
He also mentions how they worked, illegally and without Congressional approval, with South Africa. South Africa had pressures from Black nationalist movements in Mozambique, Angola, and more, so, they ran their own covert missions and would “run its program..like the CIA, concealing it from its own people.”
Chapter 11
“More than any European power France has remained active in the affairs of newly independent African countries.”
Outlines France’s interest in Angolan oil and Zairian minerals. French intelligence directors met with the CIA.
He further outlines the propaganda campaigns occurring in Europe and the U.S. during this time. By September, the CIA begins to struggle to maintain public appearance of efforts in Angola.
“The United States launched a major political effort to embroil and entrap as many counties as it could into opposition of the MPLA.”
“The only atrocities we were able to document had Cubans as victims rather than criminals.”
“Each delegation opened a bank account in Europe to which European-based CIA finance officers could make regular deposits. Thereafter the CIA could plausibly deny that it had funded anyone’s propagandists in the United States. It would be extremely difficult for any investigators to prove differently.”
Chapter 12
One of the more capitalist-centered chapter, Stockwell outlined the role international business plays in operations like Cuba, Congo, Vietnam, Angola and more. For example, Boeing, Mobil, Gulf oil, and more.
The MPLA had taken control of Angola’s oil reserves, but “there was no threat of nationalization, as the MPLA needed Gulf’s assistance indefinitely to keep the vital revenues coming in.”
By November, President Ford approved the sale of tens of millions of dollars of arms sales and Boeing aircrafts.
This chapter closes out with Stockwell discussing the complete mismanagement and intentional deception to the U.S. government over costs and finances in Angola.
Chapter 13
Cuba and the Soviets bombard U.S./European-backed forces in Angola. With little support from the secretary of defense and congress, they begin recruiting French and Portuguese mercenaries. Ultimately, it ended in what were essentially suicide missions for both mercenaries and U.S. soldiers.
Chapter 14
Stockwell walks through more of the relationships between CIA and congress at the time. Several congresspersons (mainly Senators) were mad the CIA was illegally working with South Africa, sending arms to Angola, and that American soldiers were involved in the conflict—but did not have power to do much. Regardless, the CIA lied to Congress and eventually won over their support for escalating events in Angola.
Meanwhile, oversees, the Angolan program fell apart with Cuban forces accelerating their presence. January 1976, South Africa withdraws as they realize the U.S. would soon forced to also abandon their efforts. February 9th, 1976, “the CIA acknowledged defeat and begin to withdrawal.
Stockwell also mentions how CIA agents never get killed because “terrorists aren’t going to waste suicide missions on U.S. embassy second secretaries, even if they are CIA.” He also outlines how CIA and KGB officers have close relationships.
In April of 1976, the House establishes an overdose committee to keep the CIA in line
“The CIA intensified its propaganda efforts, its agents focusing on New York and Washington. Our United Nations ambassador, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, noisily accused the Soviets of attempting to colonize Africa.”
“In 1974 and 1975, the CIA, under orders from Kissinger, had mounted a program to arm and encourage the Kurdish people to revolt against the Iraqi government.”
Chapter 15
Following defeat in Angola, “the CIA began making generous payoffs to anyone who had been associated with our side of the Angolan war.”
Postscript
“A succession of presidents and Henry Kissinger have been lured into questionable adventures for which, they are promised by the CIA, they will never be held accountable.”
“The CIA’s function is to provide aggressive option in foreign affairs.”
“Our attachment to the CIA’s clandestine services nevertheless seems to be unshaken. We still argue that, no matter what it does, the CIA is essential to our national security. Where is the ancient American skepticism, the “show me” attitude for which our pioneer forefathers were famous?”
“Because of the CIA the world is a more dangerous place. Americans have reduced credibility. Worst of all, by retaining the CIA, we are accepting ourselves as a harsh and ruthless people. It’s the wrong game for a great nation, and the players we’ve got are losers.”
April 15, 2016
An interesting deal was struck on this book, out of a U.S. Congressional hearing: The book was allowed to be sold publicly with the condition that the CIA gets the royalties! Probably more than any other book out there, this one documents how the U.S. has contributed, via lies, deceipt, and subterfuge, to geopolitical instability and the birth of wars. That's not to say the U.S. doesn't do a lot of great things too. But let's not flinch from the reality here. If you are a U.S. citizen, read this book.
April 21, 2024
Pretty good book about a conflict that never gets discussed today.
October 8, 2025
[This] led me to reflect at length, on Kissinger and Colby, who had to be, if anyone was, the master chess players of American intelligence. I often told myself there must be some master plan behind our intelligence policies, someone who saw the effect today's operations would have on tomorrow's world.
As a young officer, I had thought of the division chief in those terms, presuming that everything he did, even some insane, drunken instruction that I learn an obscure African dialect, must be part of The Plan, rather the way it worked in Le Carre or Fleming's novels. Now I could see Potts wasn't "M." And Colby clearly wasn't either - he was only a disciplined, amoral bureaucrat, who fawned over the politicians and game-players on the hill. Kissinger was a half-genius perhaps, and half clown; he appeared to be the master-mind but consider his Angolan policy...
[The ambassador to Ghana] pointed out that the Soviets' national sport is chess and their foreign policy reflects an effort at long-range planning of coordinated, integrated moves, although they often play the game badly and are fiven to serious blunders. The Chinese are notorious for planning their foreign policy carefully, with moves designed to reach fruition even years beyond the lifetimes of present leaders. By contrast ... The United States is a poker player. It looks the world over, picks up whatever cards it is dealt, and plays, raising the stakes as more cards are dealt, until the hand is won or lost. Then, after a drag on the cigarette and another sip of whiskey, it looks around for the next hand to be played.
As a young officer, I had thought of the division chief in those terms, presuming that everything he did, even some insane, drunken instruction that I learn an obscure African dialect, must be part of The Plan, rather the way it worked in Le Carre or Fleming's novels. Now I could see Potts wasn't "M." And Colby clearly wasn't either - he was only a disciplined, amoral bureaucrat, who fawned over the politicians and game-players on the hill. Kissinger was a half-genius perhaps, and half clown; he appeared to be the master-mind but consider his Angolan policy...
[The ambassador to Ghana] pointed out that the Soviets' national sport is chess and their foreign policy reflects an effort at long-range planning of coordinated, integrated moves, although they often play the game badly and are fiven to serious blunders. The Chinese are notorious for planning their foreign policy carefully, with moves designed to reach fruition even years beyond the lifetimes of present leaders. By contrast ... The United States is a poker player. It looks the world over, picks up whatever cards it is dealt, and plays, raising the stakes as more cards are dealt, until the hand is won or lost. Then, after a drag on the cigarette and another sip of whiskey, it looks around for the next hand to be played.
June 18, 2025
This is a powerful, unflinching memoir from a former CIA officer that delivers far more than just a blow-by-blow of a failed Cold War operation. In Search of Enemies is part confession, part exposé, and—whether Stockwell meant it to be or not—a deeply revealing study in how U.S. foreign policy has long operated in the shadows.
The book focuses heavily on the CIA’s covert war in Angola, but it speaks volumes about broader U.S. strategy. Stockwell pulls no punches in detailing the manipulation of African governments and the use of strongmen as disposable tools. What stands out most, though, is how matter-of-factly he illustrates the deeply embedded racism and moral detachment within the agency—and by extension, the presidency. He does this without preaching, which makes the point land even harder.
Stockwell is clearly angry—at the agency, at the dishonesty, at being passed over—but that emotion fuels clarity. His appendix letter to the new CIA director is especially raw and worth the read on its own. And while he sometimes frames the CIA as operating independently, it’s easy to see through that: Congress and the White House weren’t in the dark—they were deeply complicit. The real secret, as this book shows, has always been hiding in plain sight.
Though not a scholarly work, it’s impressively well-researched and told with real respect for the reader’s intelligence. If you want a ground-level view of how American power really moves—especially in places it rarely bothers to mention in its official histories—this is essential reading.
July 12, 2022
This isn’t the most interesting read and the author uses a lot of professional lingo. The lingo makes it harder to read, but I also think it helps to portray his expertise. The author is clearly knowledgeable about the topic.
There were a lot of fascinating pieces here. First, i found the acknowledgment of moral compromise refreshing. Compare that to Olson’s book, “Fair Play,” which is largely a consequentialist endeavor to justify how he could do Caesar’s job while trying to simultaneously believe he was living out Jesus’s ethic. At least this author wasn’t self-deluded.
I found the acknowledgement of trumped up charges of atrocity to Cuban communists interesting, while he noted that the only atrocity of Cubans he knew of actually happened TO them. Disgusting little known history like our mistreatment of the Kurds to help Iran and the CIA’s drug experiments on citizens is also fascinating. I mean, this stuff is public record and they had hearings on it, yet nobody knows about it.
This isn’t the most interesting book, but it’s valuable because it adds another reference point by someone who was on the inside for a long time.
There were a lot of fascinating pieces here. First, i found the acknowledgment of moral compromise refreshing. Compare that to Olson’s book, “Fair Play,” which is largely a consequentialist endeavor to justify how he could do Caesar’s job while trying to simultaneously believe he was living out Jesus’s ethic. At least this author wasn’t self-deluded.
I found the acknowledgement of trumped up charges of atrocity to Cuban communists interesting, while he noted that the only atrocity of Cubans he knew of actually happened TO them. Disgusting little known history like our mistreatment of the Kurds to help Iran and the CIA’s drug experiments on citizens is also fascinating. I mean, this stuff is public record and they had hearings on it, yet nobody knows about it.
This isn’t the most interesting book, but it’s valuable because it adds another reference point by someone who was on the inside for a long time.
October 17, 2023
Como livro, soa a um relatório insosso de um agente da CIA após uma missão no terreno. É bastante melhor como abre-olhos acerca da escala da ingerência da CIA (e agências equivalentes de outras grandes potências) numa realidade tão próxima, mas sobretudo acerca da minha ignorância sobre o destino das ex-colónias no imediato do 25 de Abril (caído o regime, o ensino da História Portuguesa que eu tive reduz-las a notas de rodapé e, mea culpa, por aí ficaram desde aí).
Li uma vez, não leria outra, porém curiosos por mais perspectivas da época - há certamente muita história na mata angolana entre o 25 de Abril de '74 e o 11 de Novembro '75 (dia da Proclamação da Independência Angolana).
P.S.: Primeiro leitura vinda da Biblioteca do Jardim Literário da Corga da Aldeia da Pontemieiro (aldeia da minha família materna).
Li uma vez, não leria outra, porém curiosos por mais perspectivas da época - há certamente muita história na mata angolana entre o 25 de Abril de '74 e o 11 de Novembro '75 (dia da Proclamação da Independência Angolana).
P.S.: Primeiro leitura vinda da Biblioteca do Jardim Literário da Corga da Aldeia da Pontemieiro (aldeia da minha família materna).
April 21, 2018
Good in-depth on the ground recounting of the situation as it was. Without in-depth knowledge of the run-up to the Angolan civil war it was hard to follow. Most of all it was a bit dry, but informative.
May 31, 2017
Good, but not particularly enlightening compared to some others along the same vein. A bit repetitive and perhaps a bit preachy.
March 29, 2018
One of the fascinating book on the role of the CIA in Angola particularly the historic battle of Cuito Cuanavele which was important even toward the liberation of South Africa and Namibia.
October 29, 2019
Great read about CIA's role after failure of Vietnam. Akin to Orwell in Catalonia.
January 2, 2022
CIA is corrupt.
April 2, 2022
Listened to the audiobook. Highly recommend for anyone who is willing to learn the truth about the US Government and CIA.
February 21, 2024
Unfortunately, not much has changed.
September 5, 2024
An excellent book on how the CIA involves itself in unnecessary conflicts around the world, focusing on an operation the author participated in Angola.
June 3, 2025
The defected cia agent’s main concern with the cia is that they stink at being secret agents. KGB and the Cubans way better at being secret agents
Read
January 28, 2026Honestly a must read if you have any interest in understanding American intelligence and foreign policy. What an absolute shitshow.
November 18, 2016
FOr some reason I've been thinking about my time spent in the South African army, and realised that I knew very little of how, with the perspective of time, the events that played out in Angola and Namibia are seen. I started reading up on this, and almost all accounts of the CIA involvement in the Angolan Civil ware refer to John Stockwell's book. I found it fascinating as an account of how the US position developed, and it gave me a completely different perspective on the role of the CIA in global conflicts. Whilst I've seen people refer to Stockwell as a jerk, I haven't seen any sort of rebuttal of his account. Its readable, although its written in a somewhat amateurish way. Well worth a read for student of modern military history.
January 15, 2014
If you have the stomach for ugly truth, this book is a worthy read. In 1975, Jonas Savimbi was prepared to negotiate with the MPLA. Kissinger wanted to avoid "a cheap Soviet victory." By having the CIA spend $31 million, the US was able to get the Soviets and Cuba to spend well over $200 million. By 1976, when the CIA was no longer funding Savimbi, the MPLA would no longer negotiate. The civil war continued until 2002. This book demonstrates the cynical, amoral efforts to play chess with the lives of millions of people.
October 20, 2014
companion to stormtrooper author's macro-narrative, this micro-narrative details the CIA in angola.
June 11, 2015
War is just business and the foot soldiers don't even know what/who they are fighting for.
March 27, 2019
An essential early whistleblower book to understand American neo-imperialism.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 31 reviews