Why has the PRC been so determined that Taiwan be part of China? Why, since the 1990s, has Beijing been feverishly developing means to prevail in combat with the U.S. over Taiwan's status? Why is Taiwan worth fighting for? To answer, this book focuses on the territorial dimension of the Taiwan issue and highlights arguments made by PRC analysts about the geostrategic significance of Taiwan, rather than emphasizing the political dispute between Beijing and Taipei. It considers Beijing's quest for Taiwan since 1949 against the backdrop of recurring Chinese anxieties about the island's status since the seventeenth century. In recent years, the PRC has become dependent on international maritime commerce and has undertaken to expand considerably its navy to ensure access to the sea. PRC analysts concerned about strategy have articulated rationales for eliminating rival influences over Taiwan, the location of which is deemed as critical to China's projection of naval power. This book traces the evolution, explains the appeal, and suggests implications of the geostrategic calculations that pervade PRC strategic considerations of Taiwan.
A moderately useful overview of Chinese attitudes towards Taiwan in the context of the fluctuating self-definition of the Chinese nation and consistent (and often legitimate) anxiety about Taiwan being used as a bridgehead to restrain the Chinese nation. The level of analysis drops abruptly regarding the 1940s, as Wachman unconvincingly speculates about Taiwan's sudden emergence as a salient issue in the Chinese mind.
I do suspect, contrary to Wachman's attempt to convince his readers of the utility of 'geostrategic' motivations viz. zero-sum Pacific dominance and the outer geographical limits of China's conceptual boundaries, that Taiwan remains so important due to a confluence of factors, each of which would have to be utterly subverted to produce any shift in the PRC position.