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Plenty of Blame to Go Around
It is June, 1863. The Gettysburg Campaign is in its opening hours. Confederate cavalryman James Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart leads his three brigades of veteran troopers on a ride that triggers one of the Civil War's most bitter and enduring controversies. This book investigates the role Stuart's horsemen played in the disastrous campaign.
456 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 1, 2006
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About the author
Eric J. Wittenberg
37 books23 followersEric J. Wittenberg is an American Civil War historian, author, lecturer, tour guide and battlefield preservationist. He is a practicing attorney in downtown Columbus, Ohio. His published works have focused especially on the Civil War cavalryman and the cavalry battles of the Civil War, with emphasis on the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry Corps
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
January 4, 2023
Detailed examination of Stuart's 1863 Pennsylvania campaign and then discussion of if this was the reason Lee lost at Gettysburg (specifically did Stuart disobey orders and leave Lee blind.)
After the loss at Gettysburg confederates needed a scapegoat (as clearly no confederate would be willing to place blame on General Lee.) Such was the love for Lee that all believed any battle could be won, if only Lee’s orders were followed! Consequently, Stuart’s cavalry absence was an easy target, made easier when he died at Yellow Tavern less than a year later, leaving other likely scapegoats (Longstreet, Heath, Early) alive and well to loudly pass blame and defend themselves. It is a testament to Stuart’s skill as both a scout and commander that blame for the loss at Gettysburg has been laid on his shoulders.
The first 8 chapters are a day by day, (and sometimes hour by hour,) detailed tactical examination of Stuart’s campaign from June 25, when he makes the fateful decision to discard Mosby’s route through Hopewell gap and instead take Glasscock’s gap until his exhausted cavalry arrive on the Gettysburg battlefield in the late afternoon of July 2. Almost immediately Stuart is hopelessly off schedule after waiting for Mosby, stranded by Hancock’s troops on Warrenton road, then continually hampered by skirmishes and battles with Union Cavalry. It details Stuart’s brigades desperate search for food, fresh horses and sleep as their mounts broke down under them and they fell asleep in the saddle, sometimes so soundly they fell off their horses in slumber. It examines both the series of misfortunes (moving at exactly the same time at Hancock, the fighting at Westminster, Hanover, and missing Ewell by about 10 miles ) as well as the incredible good luck (the incompetence of Generals Kilpatrick and Pleasonton.) It also does an amazing job of fleshing out all the participants – not just names, but their backgrounds, strengths, failings, and even the tensions among officers that may have kept them from fulfilling their duties. Excellent writing.
The last four chapters examine Stuart’s Gettysburg Legacy by a thorough review of blame and defense from fellow officers and future historians. The first with critics, the second with supporters, the 3rd with modern historians, and finally the author’s conclusions. They quote verbatim both detractors and defenders at length.
So, let us look at the charges against General Stuart:
1. Did he disobey orders
2. Did he leave Lee “blind”
3. Would he have made an impact if he were at Gettysburg on the first day
1. Did Stuart Disobey Orders – No, but made several questionable decisions (in hindsight) as detailed in first 8 chapters
What exactly were Stuart’s ‘orders’? The dispatches, two from Lee and an additional one from Longstreet, give Stuart wide discretion: he was told to guard the mountain passes, move around Hooker’s army, guard Gen. Ewell’s right flank, keep Ewell informed about Union troop movements and collect supplies for the army. Lee gives 2 different routes to use, 2 different objectives (help Ewell vs get supplies,) and lacks any timeline or urgency. The first point to make is: should Lee have given these orders? According to Alexander [Longstreet acting chief of artillery] the idea of passing behind the Union army was “a very unwise proposition which Lee more unwisely entertained.” More importantly, were the orders sufficiently clear that Stuart knew what Lee’s priorities were? – and that answer must be no. Plus Ewell was never told to look for Stuart, meaning he passed within 5 miles of Stuart, heard the cannons, and never investigated that it could be Stuart. Several historians say Lee’s orders were poorly written – moreover this was not the only time Lee’s lack of clear instructions affect his troops. (Ex unclear orders further impaired his army’s movement during battle of Gettysburg.)
An important point to make is, had Stuart started 2 days earlier and thus missed all federal engagements, his cavalry would have been merely moving along with Early / Ewell and arrived at Gettysburg at the same time as Lee (still without being Lee’s “eyes”) To quote Sturtevant Nye on pg. 370, had Stuart made better time: “he would have been of little use to Lee. He would have been creeping along with Early from York to Wrightville, several days march ahead of the Federal army.” He would still not have known where the largest federal force was.
What is clear from Stuart’s campaign was, while Lee was slowly grouping blindly toward the enemy, Stuart was groping equally blindly trying to find his fellow officer Ewell.
2. Did Stuart leave Lee blind – No, Lee had plenty of cavalry available which he inexplicably did not use.
“The entire argument that Stuart’s ride left Lee and the army blind ignores one critical fact: Stuart only took three of the seven available brigades of cavalry with him on his ride. This means he left four full brigades to screen the Arm of No. Va.” (Pg. 411)
Therefore, in addition to Jenkin’s cavalry brigade (who rode with Gen. Ewell and was at Gettysburg on July 1): “General Lee had available 5,000 horse soldiers capable of scouting the countryside and screening the army’s advance. Many were veterans extremely well-suited for these tasks. Lee, however did not use them in this manner.” (Pg. 418)
Major McClellan (Stuart’s adjutant) states “It seems necessary to emphasize the fact that Stuart carried but a portion of his cavalry with him, and that he left in direct communication with the army a force numerically superiors to that under his own command.” and “It was not the want of cavalry that General Lee bewailed, for he had enough of it had it been properly used. It was the absence of Stuart himself that he felt so keenly; for on him he had learned to rely to such and extend that it seemed as if his cavalry were concentrated in his person and from him alone could information be expected.” (Pg. 339 and 340)
Most importantly the diary entry from John B. Jones of the war office proves that Stuart DID send word of Hooker's movements both to Lee and to the war office. Therefore there is proof that Stuart sent messages (not received by Lee but only the war office) about troop movements, but Robertson, left to do just that, did not.
3. Question of Impact: Toss up - not adequately addressed.
To say that Stuart would not have made an impact on the first day of battle because Jenkins was there and was not used ignores Stuart’s greatly superior abilities as a cavalry soldier. However, what everyone 'wants' is that when Stuart saw Hancock moving, instead of continuing his quest to find Ewell he instead stayed with Hancock giving Lee more information, leading Lee to not bungle into Gettysburg. It is clear that if Lee had better intelligence about federal troop movements the battle would not have happened at Gettysburg – indeed, had Heath obeyed orders it is likely it would have taken place at Cashtown.
My final thoughts:
After reading this work, I believe the blame is laid on Stuart NOT because he deserves it but because, in hindsight, everyone thinks (to quote a 9th Virginia Cavalry officer): “But the point is that Stuart ought not to have exercised the discretion conferred upon him. His hard horse sense ought to have told him to stick to Lee. That was the place where he was wanted. But the criticism of Stuart is really not criticism. It is a lamentation that so great and powerful a man as he was not at Lee’s right hand.” (Pg. 375.) Stuart was a great commander – IN HINDSIGHT one cannot help but think, how could you leave General Lee?
Knowing only a little about Gettysburg it seems that the first instigator is Heath, who attacked at Gettysburg against orders; Lee, who then gave up his prime position at Cashtown to fight on ground not of his choosing; Longstreet’s delay in deploying troops etc. Perhaps the war office who received information about federal troop movements but made no effort to make sure Lee had similar information (given how often couriers were captured this seems like a good thing to be sure of!)
Finally, quoting John W. Thomason on page 359: “And consider another thing: The Gettysburg Campaign failed. No one cause broke it down: Lee was poorly served by all his corps commanders, and full credit must be given to General Meade and the seventy-odd thousand Yankee soldiers. If – as he might well have done, and came breathlessly near doing – Lee had won his battle, Stuart’s conduct of the cavalry force would certainly stand in the annals as a great and daring operations. Success justifies itself. Failure is wrong in the first place.”
Good Quote, as this is what IN HINDSIGHT everyone thinks Stuart should have done, as so we blame him retroactively:
Nye (pg 370) What should Stuart have done? The wisdom of hindsight suggests that he might has stayed where he was, in contact with the Federals. By making vigorous probes, employing more scouts like Mosby, he could have kept Lee supplied with reasonable, complete, and up-to-date information on Federal movements … This was information Lee desperately needed and that he never had. Lee shares the blame for not using the cavalry in its vital role of reconnaissance.
After the loss at Gettysburg confederates needed a scapegoat (as clearly no confederate would be willing to place blame on General Lee.) Such was the love for Lee that all believed any battle could be won, if only Lee’s orders were followed! Consequently, Stuart’s cavalry absence was an easy target, made easier when he died at Yellow Tavern less than a year later, leaving other likely scapegoats (Longstreet, Heath, Early) alive and well to loudly pass blame and defend themselves. It is a testament to Stuart’s skill as both a scout and commander that blame for the loss at Gettysburg has been laid on his shoulders.
The first 8 chapters are a day by day, (and sometimes hour by hour,) detailed tactical examination of Stuart’s campaign from June 25, when he makes the fateful decision to discard Mosby’s route through Hopewell gap and instead take Glasscock’s gap until his exhausted cavalry arrive on the Gettysburg battlefield in the late afternoon of July 2. Almost immediately Stuart is hopelessly off schedule after waiting for Mosby, stranded by Hancock’s troops on Warrenton road, then continually hampered by skirmishes and battles with Union Cavalry. It details Stuart’s brigades desperate search for food, fresh horses and sleep as their mounts broke down under them and they fell asleep in the saddle, sometimes so soundly they fell off their horses in slumber. It examines both the series of misfortunes (moving at exactly the same time at Hancock, the fighting at Westminster, Hanover, and missing Ewell by about 10 miles ) as well as the incredible good luck (the incompetence of Generals Kilpatrick and Pleasonton.) It also does an amazing job of fleshing out all the participants – not just names, but their backgrounds, strengths, failings, and even the tensions among officers that may have kept them from fulfilling their duties. Excellent writing.
The last four chapters examine Stuart’s Gettysburg Legacy by a thorough review of blame and defense from fellow officers and future historians. The first with critics, the second with supporters, the 3rd with modern historians, and finally the author’s conclusions. They quote verbatim both detractors and defenders at length.
So, let us look at the charges against General Stuart:
1. Did he disobey orders
2. Did he leave Lee “blind”
3. Would he have made an impact if he were at Gettysburg on the first day
1. Did Stuart Disobey Orders – No, but made several questionable decisions (in hindsight) as detailed in first 8 chapters
What exactly were Stuart’s ‘orders’? The dispatches, two from Lee and an additional one from Longstreet, give Stuart wide discretion: he was told to guard the mountain passes, move around Hooker’s army, guard Gen. Ewell’s right flank, keep Ewell informed about Union troop movements and collect supplies for the army. Lee gives 2 different routes to use, 2 different objectives (help Ewell vs get supplies,) and lacks any timeline or urgency. The first point to make is: should Lee have given these orders? According to Alexander [Longstreet acting chief of artillery] the idea of passing behind the Union army was “a very unwise proposition which Lee more unwisely entertained.” More importantly, were the orders sufficiently clear that Stuart knew what Lee’s priorities were? – and that answer must be no. Plus Ewell was never told to look for Stuart, meaning he passed within 5 miles of Stuart, heard the cannons, and never investigated that it could be Stuart. Several historians say Lee’s orders were poorly written – moreover this was not the only time Lee’s lack of clear instructions affect his troops. (Ex unclear orders further impaired his army’s movement during battle of Gettysburg.)
An important point to make is, had Stuart started 2 days earlier and thus missed all federal engagements, his cavalry would have been merely moving along with Early / Ewell and arrived at Gettysburg at the same time as Lee (still without being Lee’s “eyes”) To quote Sturtevant Nye on pg. 370, had Stuart made better time: “he would have been of little use to Lee. He would have been creeping along with Early from York to Wrightville, several days march ahead of the Federal army.” He would still not have known where the largest federal force was.
What is clear from Stuart’s campaign was, while Lee was slowly grouping blindly toward the enemy, Stuart was groping equally blindly trying to find his fellow officer Ewell.
2. Did Stuart leave Lee blind – No, Lee had plenty of cavalry available which he inexplicably did not use.
“The entire argument that Stuart’s ride left Lee and the army blind ignores one critical fact: Stuart only took three of the seven available brigades of cavalry with him on his ride. This means he left four full brigades to screen the Arm of No. Va.” (Pg. 411)
Therefore, in addition to Jenkin’s cavalry brigade (who rode with Gen. Ewell and was at Gettysburg on July 1): “General Lee had available 5,000 horse soldiers capable of scouting the countryside and screening the army’s advance. Many were veterans extremely well-suited for these tasks. Lee, however did not use them in this manner.” (Pg. 418)
Major McClellan (Stuart’s adjutant) states “It seems necessary to emphasize the fact that Stuart carried but a portion of his cavalry with him, and that he left in direct communication with the army a force numerically superiors to that under his own command.” and “It was not the want of cavalry that General Lee bewailed, for he had enough of it had it been properly used. It was the absence of Stuart himself that he felt so keenly; for on him he had learned to rely to such and extend that it seemed as if his cavalry were concentrated in his person and from him alone could information be expected.” (Pg. 339 and 340)
Most importantly the diary entry from John B. Jones of the war office proves that Stuart DID send word of Hooker's movements both to Lee and to the war office. Therefore there is proof that Stuart sent messages (not received by Lee but only the war office) about troop movements, but Robertson, left to do just that, did not.
3. Question of Impact: Toss up - not adequately addressed.
To say that Stuart would not have made an impact on the first day of battle because Jenkins was there and was not used ignores Stuart’s greatly superior abilities as a cavalry soldier. However, what everyone 'wants' is that when Stuart saw Hancock moving, instead of continuing his quest to find Ewell he instead stayed with Hancock giving Lee more information, leading Lee to not bungle into Gettysburg. It is clear that if Lee had better intelligence about federal troop movements the battle would not have happened at Gettysburg – indeed, had Heath obeyed orders it is likely it would have taken place at Cashtown.
My final thoughts:
After reading this work, I believe the blame is laid on Stuart NOT because he deserves it but because, in hindsight, everyone thinks (to quote a 9th Virginia Cavalry officer): “But the point is that Stuart ought not to have exercised the discretion conferred upon him. His hard horse sense ought to have told him to stick to Lee. That was the place where he was wanted. But the criticism of Stuart is really not criticism. It is a lamentation that so great and powerful a man as he was not at Lee’s right hand.” (Pg. 375.) Stuart was a great commander – IN HINDSIGHT one cannot help but think, how could you leave General Lee?
Knowing only a little about Gettysburg it seems that the first instigator is Heath, who attacked at Gettysburg against orders; Lee, who then gave up his prime position at Cashtown to fight on ground not of his choosing; Longstreet’s delay in deploying troops etc. Perhaps the war office who received information about federal troop movements but made no effort to make sure Lee had similar information (given how often couriers were captured this seems like a good thing to be sure of!)
Finally, quoting John W. Thomason on page 359: “And consider another thing: The Gettysburg Campaign failed. No one cause broke it down: Lee was poorly served by all his corps commanders, and full credit must be given to General Meade and the seventy-odd thousand Yankee soldiers. If – as he might well have done, and came breathlessly near doing – Lee had won his battle, Stuart’s conduct of the cavalry force would certainly stand in the annals as a great and daring operations. Success justifies itself. Failure is wrong in the first place.”
Good Quote, as this is what IN HINDSIGHT everyone thinks Stuart should have done, as so we blame him retroactively:
Nye (pg 370) What should Stuart have done? The wisdom of hindsight suggests that he might has stayed where he was, in contact with the Federals. By making vigorous probes, employing more scouts like Mosby, he could have kept Lee supplied with reasonable, complete, and up-to-date information on Federal movements … This was information Lee desperately needed and that he never had. Lee shares the blame for not using the cavalry in its vital role of reconnaissance.
October 20, 2013
In this book, the authors detail Jeb Stuart's controversial ride around the Union army in the days before the Battle of Gettysburg. This ride, of course, has been the subject of much scrutiny - as to whether or not Stuart's actions led to the ANV's defeat at Gettysburg. The book probes the defenses and criticisms offered immediately following the war, by civil war veterans in general, and by historians in the years since the famous ride. The authors provide final conclusions as to where they place Stuart in the whole controversy - where he made his mistakes and where he was given false criticism.
Overall, I enjoyed this book. I am a fairly new student to the Civil War, and had read the bare bones accounts of Stuart's ride provided in some of the one-volume Gettysburg resources (Sears, Trudeau, Guelzo). The narrative was well written and easy to follow. The author's did a great job of exploring the details of Stuart's ride without making it overly tedious. Many little details enhances my overall knowledge of the Civil War, Gettysburg and the men who rode through this story. While the authors' viewpoint was obvious from page 1, they provided some objectivity to the chain of events and explore the criticisms fairly.
The greatest joy in this book, is the variety of resources provided in the back of the book. The work is well documented with footnotes (although my Kindle edition of this book did not provide links to the said footnotes), has a complete index and bibliography along with a few extra goodies. A staff roster, order of battle can easily be referred to to help readers with the cast of cavalry that are on the field for the various skirmishes. Stuart's complete and extensive battle report is included in its entirity. The nicest surprise, was detailed driving instructions for a tour of the areas covered in Stuart's ride - including a few pictures of some of the most interesting points along the road.
An interesting read for any fan of the Civil War and the Gettysburg controversy - one more book for the pile.
Overall, I enjoyed this book. I am a fairly new student to the Civil War, and had read the bare bones accounts of Stuart's ride provided in some of the one-volume Gettysburg resources (Sears, Trudeau, Guelzo). The narrative was well written and easy to follow. The author's did a great job of exploring the details of Stuart's ride without making it overly tedious. Many little details enhances my overall knowledge of the Civil War, Gettysburg and the men who rode through this story. While the authors' viewpoint was obvious from page 1, they provided some objectivity to the chain of events and explore the criticisms fairly.
The greatest joy in this book, is the variety of resources provided in the back of the book. The work is well documented with footnotes (although my Kindle edition of this book did not provide links to the said footnotes), has a complete index and bibliography along with a few extra goodies. A staff roster, order of battle can easily be referred to to help readers with the cast of cavalry that are on the field for the various skirmishes. Stuart's complete and extensive battle report is included in its entirity. The nicest surprise, was detailed driving instructions for a tour of the areas covered in Stuart's ride - including a few pictures of some of the most interesting points along the road.
An interesting read for any fan of the Civil War and the Gettysburg controversy - one more book for the pile.
December 11, 2017
This should probably be considered the definitive study of the Jeb Stuart's ride to Gettysburg in 1863, which for most of the last 150 years has been considered an important (for some, the most important) link in the eventual loss of the battle at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863) for Lee's Army of Northern Virgina.
Wittenberg and Petruzzi have done great service with incredible scholarship here. They place great emphasis on how easily horses get "worn out" on long rides such as this raid; besides the need for food and regular rest, they must be re-shod every 100 miles or so. Much of this kind of detailed information is missing from other examinations of this famous and controversial episode. In a final section of the book, the authors also give extensive coverage of the post-war arguments which arose over this incident, not only the contentious debate between ex-confederates, but including more recent historians and the sides they took. In the end, Wittenberg and Petruzzi exonerate Stuart of much, but not all of the blame for this strategic error. This is a must read for anyone interested in this event, one of the most well-known and controversial campaigns of the Civil War.
Wittenberg and Petruzzi have done great service with incredible scholarship here. They place great emphasis on how easily horses get "worn out" on long rides such as this raid; besides the need for food and regular rest, they must be re-shod every 100 miles or so. Much of this kind of detailed information is missing from other examinations of this famous and controversial episode. In a final section of the book, the authors also give extensive coverage of the post-war arguments which arose over this incident, not only the contentious debate between ex-confederates, but including more recent historians and the sides they took. In the end, Wittenberg and Petruzzi exonerate Stuart of much, but not all of the blame for this strategic error. This is a must read for anyone interested in this event, one of the most well-known and controversial campaigns of the Civil War.
August 26, 2025
I don’t like the title! There was nothing controversial about Stuarts’ orders and he followed them to a T.
This book was in an unopened condition sitting in a box at my library, the price was $1.00, how could I possibly go wrong!
What interested me about this book was that I live on Frederick Street in Hanover, Pa. The north and the south clashed at my front door. While Wittenberg traces Stuarts steps and missteps north, I am familiar with the towns he passes through and even the secondary trails he used to evade his enemy; and this was titillating. In addition, I have some background having read a few books on this war and the Gettysburg campaign; i have taken the guided tour of the Gettysburg battlefield twice. This background gave me a familiarity with most of the contents of this book; yet Wittenberg did provide some surprises and clarification. He did a lot of research, and a lot of material was provided by other authors, but those authors were not plagiarized, he gave full credit to their quotes and research.
Wittenberg begins his story at the meeting between Lee, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia and Stuart, his Confederate general and cavalry leader. Lee tells Stuart to follow the Union army as it treks north into Pa. and to go around them to the Unions army’s Eastern side. Once he crosses the Pa. line, he is to hook up with General Jubal Early in or around York, Pa. From this reader’s point of view the orders are perfectly clear, no controversy here!
In a favorite book of mine titled “Mary Chestnut’s Civil War”, I gathered her interesting observation on the battle at Bull Run, as written in her diary. On July 22, 1861, Mrs. Jefferson Davis comes by the house and told Mary that a great battle has been fought at a place called Bull Run (in her diary, Mary refers to it as Bulls Run). Many of the people she knew were involved and Mary is stunned! Dead and dying cover the field. Shermans battery taken, Lynchburg regiment cut to pieces, three hundred of the Legion wounded. These women were in constant fear of losing family and friends, so many tears!
On the 24th, Mr. Chestnut came home, he gave her an account of the battle. I was interested in two points that Mary noted. The first observation was that everyone was claiming credit for the victory, and she saw this as a false euphoria, she understood that “success has many fathers while failure is usually an orphan,” but she saw too much of a "cock of the walk attitude". And she did not like it!
Of more interest to me was what Mary said to Mr. Chestnut, why hadn’t the army followed up on the victory and gone into Washington? Her observation is the key to any discussion of the first battle at Bull Run. Washington was open! It was defenseless and the Confederate army was within a few miles of the city. It is possible that the war could have ended by the South’s entry into the Capital City of the North. Some commentators have stated that the Southern Army could have walked into Washington for a week after the battle of Bull Run, a terrific opportunity lost. Mary, without a military background and just applying common sense, clearly observed this missed opportunity.
The reason I bring this story up in the context of this book is that Stuart faced the same issue. Wittenberg tells us that Stuart captured 128 supply wagons destined for the Northern Army. He captured them soon after taking possession of Rockville, Md. Stuart reported, “a long train of wagons approached from the direction of Washington, apparently but slightly guarded.” In his estimation, the train stretched eight miles long, with its tail end being only three or four miles from Washington. Stuart was within 3 or 4 miles of the totally undermanned Union capital, but he followed his orders, he could have but did not take the Union capital. Just like Bull Run, the Union Capital was there for the taking and he didn’t do it because his orders were to follow the Union Army north, Wow! Both decisions could have ended the war in the confederacy’s favor. I dwell on this small factoid because if Stuart had gone into an undefended Washington there would no longer be controversy and no battle in Gettysburg, Pa. Meade and the Union army would have made an abrupt about face and scurried back to Washington to defend or recapture the Capital. Lee’s army would have been at his back, and this event could have ended the war. I bring this hypothetical up because this book is all about what if and I injected mine!
The Book is about Stuart’s trip north and the controversy surrounding it. During the trip north, he engages in some small battles like Hanover and Carlisle but quickly extracts himself from these engagements with the hope of meeting up with Jubal Early; Stuart is following orders.
The biggest issue for both armies was communication. It is hard to understand from our perch on the couch in 2025; as we sit with a $1000 iPhone always in our hands. If there was controversy it was caused by 1863 war and an inability to know where you are, where your army is and where your adversary is; For example, coming out of Union Mills headed for Hanover. There was Union Calvary all around the area, as he approached Littlestown they were only and mile or so ahead of him and he didn’t know it. The other thing that jumps out of this reading is that it was hard to know your latest orders. Stuart got his order directly from Lee, but after that it becomes chaotic, orders can be sent out by currier, and if the currier doesn’t get through and the order is not followed executed you have chaos, communication in the civil war was next to impossible when armies were changing locations and separated by many miles. This is what Stuart provided lee; Lee had calvary with him at Gettysburg, but he didn't have Stuart.
Wittenberg did a fine job first describing Stuart’s journey and then providing all the pros and cons by participants, historians and coach potatoes like me. I don’t believe there is a more comprehensive narrative on this subject.
To the Southern mind, Robert E. Lee was a God. Yet this book proves that lee was the problem at Gettysburg, a battle he didn’t expect or want. Stuart was not the problem, and this may be the reason for the scapegoating and name calling; to protect Lee.
The Civil War is studied in the most minute details and controversy can be found everywhere. I don’t believe controversy exists here, yet it is great fun to explore the what ifs, as I did with the possibility of attacking Washington, the capital of the Union, it could have been taken at least twice causing dramatic consequences. Wittenberg did a good job, and if you like civil war history, you will enjoy this book.
This book was in an unopened condition sitting in a box at my library, the price was $1.00, how could I possibly go wrong!
What interested me about this book was that I live on Frederick Street in Hanover, Pa. The north and the south clashed at my front door. While Wittenberg traces Stuarts steps and missteps north, I am familiar with the towns he passes through and even the secondary trails he used to evade his enemy; and this was titillating. In addition, I have some background having read a few books on this war and the Gettysburg campaign; i have taken the guided tour of the Gettysburg battlefield twice. This background gave me a familiarity with most of the contents of this book; yet Wittenberg did provide some surprises and clarification. He did a lot of research, and a lot of material was provided by other authors, but those authors were not plagiarized, he gave full credit to their quotes and research.
Wittenberg begins his story at the meeting between Lee, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia and Stuart, his Confederate general and cavalry leader. Lee tells Stuart to follow the Union army as it treks north into Pa. and to go around them to the Unions army’s Eastern side. Once he crosses the Pa. line, he is to hook up with General Jubal Early in or around York, Pa. From this reader’s point of view the orders are perfectly clear, no controversy here!
In a favorite book of mine titled “Mary Chestnut’s Civil War”, I gathered her interesting observation on the battle at Bull Run, as written in her diary. On July 22, 1861, Mrs. Jefferson Davis comes by the house and told Mary that a great battle has been fought at a place called Bull Run (in her diary, Mary refers to it as Bulls Run). Many of the people she knew were involved and Mary is stunned! Dead and dying cover the field. Shermans battery taken, Lynchburg regiment cut to pieces, three hundred of the Legion wounded. These women were in constant fear of losing family and friends, so many tears!
On the 24th, Mr. Chestnut came home, he gave her an account of the battle. I was interested in two points that Mary noted. The first observation was that everyone was claiming credit for the victory, and she saw this as a false euphoria, she understood that “success has many fathers while failure is usually an orphan,” but she saw too much of a "cock of the walk attitude". And she did not like it!
Of more interest to me was what Mary said to Mr. Chestnut, why hadn’t the army followed up on the victory and gone into Washington? Her observation is the key to any discussion of the first battle at Bull Run. Washington was open! It was defenseless and the Confederate army was within a few miles of the city. It is possible that the war could have ended by the South’s entry into the Capital City of the North. Some commentators have stated that the Southern Army could have walked into Washington for a week after the battle of Bull Run, a terrific opportunity lost. Mary, without a military background and just applying common sense, clearly observed this missed opportunity.
The reason I bring this story up in the context of this book is that Stuart faced the same issue. Wittenberg tells us that Stuart captured 128 supply wagons destined for the Northern Army. He captured them soon after taking possession of Rockville, Md. Stuart reported, “a long train of wagons approached from the direction of Washington, apparently but slightly guarded.” In his estimation, the train stretched eight miles long, with its tail end being only three or four miles from Washington. Stuart was within 3 or 4 miles of the totally undermanned Union capital, but he followed his orders, he could have but did not take the Union capital. Just like Bull Run, the Union Capital was there for the taking and he didn’t do it because his orders were to follow the Union Army north, Wow! Both decisions could have ended the war in the confederacy’s favor. I dwell on this small factoid because if Stuart had gone into an undefended Washington there would no longer be controversy and no battle in Gettysburg, Pa. Meade and the Union army would have made an abrupt about face and scurried back to Washington to defend or recapture the Capital. Lee’s army would have been at his back, and this event could have ended the war. I bring this hypothetical up because this book is all about what if and I injected mine!
The Book is about Stuart’s trip north and the controversy surrounding it. During the trip north, he engages in some small battles like Hanover and Carlisle but quickly extracts himself from these engagements with the hope of meeting up with Jubal Early; Stuart is following orders.
The biggest issue for both armies was communication. It is hard to understand from our perch on the couch in 2025; as we sit with a $1000 iPhone always in our hands. If there was controversy it was caused by 1863 war and an inability to know where you are, where your army is and where your adversary is; For example, coming out of Union Mills headed for Hanover. There was Union Calvary all around the area, as he approached Littlestown they were only and mile or so ahead of him and he didn’t know it. The other thing that jumps out of this reading is that it was hard to know your latest orders. Stuart got his order directly from Lee, but after that it becomes chaotic, orders can be sent out by currier, and if the currier doesn’t get through and the order is not followed executed you have chaos, communication in the civil war was next to impossible when armies were changing locations and separated by many miles. This is what Stuart provided lee; Lee had calvary with him at Gettysburg, but he didn't have Stuart.
Wittenberg did a fine job first describing Stuart’s journey and then providing all the pros and cons by participants, historians and coach potatoes like me. I don’t believe there is a more comprehensive narrative on this subject.
To the Southern mind, Robert E. Lee was a God. Yet this book proves that lee was the problem at Gettysburg, a battle he didn’t expect or want. Stuart was not the problem, and this may be the reason for the scapegoating and name calling; to protect Lee.
The Civil War is studied in the most minute details and controversy can be found everywhere. I don’t believe controversy exists here, yet it is great fun to explore the what ifs, as I did with the possibility of attacking Washington, the capital of the Union, it could have been taken at least twice causing dramatic consequences. Wittenberg did a good job, and if you like civil war history, you will enjoy this book.
January 18, 2024
very detailed but lousy transcription to kindle format
Very detailed and somewhat difficult to read. The reading is not made any easier by the extremely poor conversion to ebook format this conversion was obviously not reviewed by anyone. The appendices were good especially Jen Stuart’s report and the guided tour of his ride. Overall what could have been a fine work was ruined by the extremely poor conversion to e format.
Very detailed and somewhat difficult to read. The reading is not made any easier by the extremely poor conversion to ebook format this conversion was obviously not reviewed by anyone. The appendices were good especially Jen Stuart’s report and the guided tour of his ride. Overall what could have been a fine work was ruined by the extremely poor conversion to e format.
January 7, 2020
Absolutely fascinating read on JEB Stuart’s controversial role in the battle of Gettysburg. Well researched and well written. Book includes a driving tour of Stuart’s route making it a wonderful addition to any CW library.
June 21, 2016
Well-written and very informative. Great writers
May 11, 2018
Excellent study on General JEB Stuart’s command during the Gettysburg campaign. A must read for those seeking in-depth knowledge of the Battle of Gettysburg.
July 5, 2024
Stuart left Virginia under acting on General Robert E. Lee’s discretionary orders to advance into Maryland and Pennsylvania, where he was to screen Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell’s marching infantry corps and report on enemy activity. The mission jumped off its tracks from virtually the moment it began when one unexpected event after another unfolded across Stuart's path. For days, neither Lee nor Stuart had any idea where the other was, and the enemy blocked the horseman’s direct route back to the Confederate army, which was advancing nearly blind north into Pennsylvania. By the time Stuart reached Lee on the afternoon of July 2, the armies had unexpectedly collided at Gettysburg, the second day's fighting was underway, and one of the campaign’s greatest controversies was born.
Did the plumed cavalier disobey Lee’s orders by stripping the army of its “eyes and ears?” Was Stuart to blame for the unexpected combat the broke out at Gettysburg on July 1? Authors Wittenberg and Petruzzi, widely recognized for their study and expertise of Civil War cavalry operations, have drawn upon a massive array of primary sources, many heretofore untapped, to fully explore Stuart’s ride, its consequences, and the intense debate among participants shortly after the battle, through early post-war commentators, and among modern scholars.
The result is a richly detailed study jammed with incisive tactical commentary, new perspectives on the strategic role of the Southern cavalry, and fresh insights on every horse engagement, large and small, fought during the campaign.
Did the plumed cavalier disobey Lee’s orders by stripping the army of its “eyes and ears?” Was Stuart to blame for the unexpected combat the broke out at Gettysburg on July 1? Authors Wittenberg and Petruzzi, widely recognized for their study and expertise of Civil War cavalry operations, have drawn upon a massive array of primary sources, many heretofore untapped, to fully explore Stuart’s ride, its consequences, and the intense debate among participants shortly after the battle, through early post-war commentators, and among modern scholars.
The result is a richly detailed study jammed with incisive tactical commentary, new perspectives on the strategic role of the Southern cavalry, and fresh insights on every horse engagement, large and small, fought during the campaign.
September 24, 2021
I enjoy this book , and I formalise my own conclusion , that there were many causes to lee's , defeat at gettysburg , starting with heth's attacking the union troops on the first day of the battle and ending with general lee.
February 4, 2023
A nice study of the events surrounding Gettysburg and the cavalry battles that preceded it. With many personal accounts from the participants, this book still managed to be very reader friendly.
December 1, 2023
Balanced and well researched
I found this book a fair and well supported review of the evens. The authors clearly meet the book title as the lay out their argument.
I found this book a fair and well supported review of the evens. The authors clearly meet the book title as the lay out their argument.
January 11, 2025
Masterful historical review
One of the best treatments of the ride by Stuart. If you are a student of the Civil War read this book!
One of the best treatments of the ride by Stuart. If you are a student of the Civil War read this book!
July 13, 2024
The Section on the Campaign itself is great ! The rest could be done in one chapter
I grew up just outside of Westminster and still spend a lot of time in central Maryland so the story of the campaign itself was great. I had to skip through a lot of the last three chapters. The section on how Staurt’s actions helped lead Lee to defeat at Gettysburg were interesting but very redundant. They could have been covered in one chapter.
I grew up just outside of Westminster and still spend a lot of time in central Maryland so the story of the campaign itself was great. I had to skip through a lot of the last three chapters. The section on how Staurt’s actions helped lead Lee to defeat at Gettysburg were interesting but very redundant. They could have been covered in one chapter.
June 4, 2013
On June 25, 1863, JEB Stuart and three brigades of Confederate cavalry left the Army of Northern Virginia on an 200 mile cavalry raid that would end with their weary and belated arrival at Gettysburg on July 2. Stuart's ride/raid would go down in history as one of the most controversial events in the Gettysburg campaign and the war in general.
This book is in four parts. The first 177 are a narrative of the raid itself, including the numerous skirmishes and battles that occured during it: Fairfax, Westminster, Hanover, Carlisle, Hunterstown. The book is very focused to the point of being a little abrupt: it starts immediately after the Battle of Upperville and ends with Stuart's arrival at Gettysburg. Brandy Station and Upperville are mentioned only in passing (Middleberg and Aldie I think not at all). The July 3 Gettysburg East Cavalry Field fight is only foreshadowed. The former is covered in the author's The Union Cavalry Comes Of Age: Hartwood Church To Brandy Station, 1863 and the latter in the author's Protecting the Flank at Gettysburg: The Battles for Brinkerhoffs Ridge and East Cavalry Field, July 2 -3, 1863, but if you haven't read those books it can be a little jarring. The campaign narrative is generally pretty good, although sometimes a bit repetitive.
The next 80 pages addresses the historiography of the event and how the ride, both contemporaries who either blamed or defended Stuart and how the various 20th century authors writing about Stuart and/or Gettysburg have viewed his actions.
Then in 34 pages the authors offer their concluding appraisal of the raid, its impact on Gettysburg, and who is at fault. In short, as the title suggests, there was plenty of blame to go around. I would call their argument good, but not great. In particular, I think the assertion that Stuart's presence at Gettysburg at July 1 would not have substantially alerted the battle is insufficiently supported.
The last section of 60 pages has appendixes listing: the staff and unit sizes of Stuart's command; orders of battle for Hanover and Hunterstown; Stuart's official report for the Gettysburg campaign; and a driving tour of the locations chronicled in the book.
Overall, this seems to be a fairly balanced look at the subject, although not definitive. The narrow scope of the book, while effective for its intent, may also limit appeal.
This book is in four parts. The first 177 are a narrative of the raid itself, including the numerous skirmishes and battles that occured during it: Fairfax, Westminster, Hanover, Carlisle, Hunterstown. The book is very focused to the point of being a little abrupt: it starts immediately after the Battle of Upperville and ends with Stuart's arrival at Gettysburg. Brandy Station and Upperville are mentioned only in passing (Middleberg and Aldie I think not at all). The July 3 Gettysburg East Cavalry Field fight is only foreshadowed. The former is covered in the author's The Union Cavalry Comes Of Age: Hartwood Church To Brandy Station, 1863 and the latter in the author's Protecting the Flank at Gettysburg: The Battles for Brinkerhoffs Ridge and East Cavalry Field, July 2 -3, 1863, but if you haven't read those books it can be a little jarring. The campaign narrative is generally pretty good, although sometimes a bit repetitive.
The next 80 pages addresses the historiography of the event and how the ride, both contemporaries who either blamed or defended Stuart and how the various 20th century authors writing about Stuart and/or Gettysburg have viewed his actions.
Then in 34 pages the authors offer their concluding appraisal of the raid, its impact on Gettysburg, and who is at fault. In short, as the title suggests, there was plenty of blame to go around. I would call their argument good, but not great. In particular, I think the assertion that Stuart's presence at Gettysburg at July 1 would not have substantially alerted the battle is insufficiently supported.
The last section of 60 pages has appendixes listing: the staff and unit sizes of Stuart's command; orders of battle for Hanover and Hunterstown; Stuart's official report for the Gettysburg campaign; and a driving tour of the locations chronicled in the book.
Overall, this seems to be a fairly balanced look at the subject, although not definitive. The narrow scope of the book, while effective for its intent, may also limit appeal.
November 2, 2020
A very good account of the ride and the controversy that surrounded Stuart for years afterward. However, I find the author's final conclusion inadequate.
August 6, 2014
Outstanding book. I highly recommend it for anyone with an interest in the Gettysburg campaign
April 17, 2016
Very informative and comprehensive
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