Do you ever pick up a book thinking it will be about a certain person or topic, but instead the book ends up not quite being about what you had thought it was going to be? That could work both ways of course - a book might end up being even more than you had expected. But more often these situations - at least for me - veer towards being a negative. And unfortunately that is the case with Eric Larrabee's book. I had thought that it was going to primarily be about FDR's management of his top generals and admirals in WWII. Instead, it was much less about FDR, and even less about the several named generals and admirals, than it was about battles tactics and descriptions. I'm not nearly as interested in military history as I am in political history, although I understand that both impact the other. Nonetheless, when Larrabee writes about left flanks being protected, or armies wheeling around to face another direction, my eyes start to glaze over. There was a lot of glazing here.
Larrabee organizes the book into ten chapters, each one titled with the name of a general, admiral, or in the first one, FDR. These long chapters are bookended by a lengthy prologue and an epilogue. In the prologue, Larrabee somewhat sets the scene for the war and for what was going on in Roosevelt's White House leading up to Pearl Harbor, with the President increasingly wanting to rearm but being held back by a highly reluctant Congress and equally reluctant populace. We are introduced to one of his chief assistants, Harry Hopkins, who appears frequently throughout the book.
FDR
This section I was most looking forward to of all since I figured it would be much less on military matters, and more about FDR's management style. Wrong! Much of the space in this part is actually devoted to the Japanese, and the political turmoil going on in their country. Larrabee discusses the political instability there, and the increasing militancy (more like fanaticism) enveloping the Japanese armed forces. FDR is absent for much of this section, despite his name being on it. Larrabee provides almost no focus on his domestic management of the war or his efforts to get the American people mentally ready for the challenge.
MARSHALL
This section overall was a mixed basket for me. Larrabee is quite good and in-depth on General George Marshall's personality, the near-universal respect in which he was held by most everyone, and his dedication to the war. Marshall was an excellent judge of talent (plucking Dwight Eisenhower from underneath many other officers who were at that time higher-ranking than he was) and also knew what Roosevelt wanted and knew above all that Roosevelt wanted a Chief of Staff who would fight. At the same time, Marshall was not good at overall battle plans and strategy. Larrabee also touches on Marshall's working relationships with Secretary of War Henry Stimson and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Overall I thought that this was one of the stronger sections of the book.
KING
Ernest King was initially the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, then later the Chief of Naval Operations, replacing Admiral Harold Stark following the latter's retirement. But Stark is largely absent from the narrative. Larrabee admits that there was not a clear delineation of responsibilities between Stark and King. So how did they resolve conflicts? How influential was Stark? Did the two men get along? The demarcation of duties is not clear, and Larrabee makes no attempt to explain it. With King being notoriously foul-tempered and difficult to work with, I wondered how that went. Equally left out of the equation is Navy Secretary Frank Knox. While Stimson, his counterpart at Army, gets a good deal of attention in the Marshall section, Knox gets virtually nothing. Again, did King get along with him? How were conflicts resolved? Knox died of a heart attack in 1944, and Under Secretary James Forrestal then took over. Larrabee does profile him in detail, but it is strange that Knox was largely ignored. Also, King did not see any action during the war; how did he feel about that? Larrabee does not tell us.
ARNOLD
The next section, about the Army Air Forces' Henry Arnold, was also unsatisfying. As he did with the FDR section, Larrabee veers off, instead spending a long time talking about the Battle of Ploesti. Arnold was not involved in this battle, yet it takes up a lot of the space that Larrabee devotes to him. While there are some maps elsewhere in the book, it could have used one here, as this is one the areas where Larrabee went into great detail to describe the bombings. I never got a good sense of Arnold's personality, although one of Larrabee's side jaunts was a mini-biography of Assistant Secretary of War Robert Lovett, and that part was quite good. Larrabee also diverts to talking about Charles Lindbergh and how, thanks somewhat to FDR's antipathy towards him, he was more or less sidelined from active service in the war. Larrabee is clearly sympathetic to Lindbergh, saying that his reputation as being pro-Nazi is way overblown, and that he remained loyal to the U.S. This really seemed odd, especially given that this part was supposed to be about Arnold. Finally, on page 254, Larrabee writes that Arnold "...was not central and essential to the war in the way King and Marshall were." Then why did Larrabee include him?
VANDEGRIFT
General Archer Vandegrift is the Marines' contribution to Larrabee's book. This section is mostly taken over by the Battle of Guadalcanal. Larrabee really goes into detail on this bloody, long battle that occurs on an island. Vandegrift was directly involved in the battle, but much of this section is actually more geared towards the Navy Admirals who had to work in conjunction with the Marines to help support the operation. This is yet another section where: 1) FDR is barely in it, and 2) I wanted to know much more about the title character than Larrabee provided.
MacARTHUR
This was the best section of the book in my view. Not only was General Douglas MacArthur's personality and actions discussed in detail, but Larrabee does a very good job on straddling the difficult line between not taking a hatchet to MacArthur's reputation and in the process recognizing some of his brilliance, but also not for a second buying into the hagiography that already surrounded him by then and only grew during and after the war. Larrabee is objective. Despite this, MacArthur really does come across as an egomaniac who had an unquenchable love for the limelight while possessing a penchant for quickly blaming anyone and everyone else for anything that went wrong. He came across as ill-informed about battle plans, and had poor intelligence. FDR is more prominent here, and Larrabee shows the complicated, difficult relationship between the two men. Essentially, they used each other for their own purposes.
NIMITZ
I found this to be a largely uneven section on Admiral Chester Nimitz, who was Chief of the Pacific Fleet. While this does contain a fair amount of details about Nimitz, there is just as much about two of his direct subordinate Admirals, Raymond Spruance and William Halsey. Most of this section is about two battles: Midway and Leyte Gulf. As in the earlier chapter about Arnold, this part needed some maps. Larrabee spends a lot of time on both battles, but there are no accompanying maps. One theme that did come through quite clear is that the Japanese Navy made many mistakes, and easily could have (and probably should have) inflicted far worse damage on the U.S. Pacific Fleet than it did.
EISENHOWER
This is by far the longest section. Unfortunately, like a few of the earlier chapters, the main character gets lost in the shuffle. In this case, there are three reasons for this: 1) Much time and attention is devoted to the Normandy invasion on D-Day (this part is very detailed and also very good); 2) Eisenhower's subordinates George Patton and Bernard Montgomery take up a lot of writing space; 3) Larrabee himself served in this theatre and talks about some of his own experiences making his way through France and Germany. This was a good section in that the mix of detailed knowledge plus personal remembrances brings a sense of vividness to it. Larrabee shares some personal anecdotes that make this more than just a retelling of a war. But Eisenhower himself seems relegated to the sidelines throughout much of it. The chapter overall is good, especially when Larrabee details the prima donna antics of Montgomery, but I do wish Eisenhower had been featured more.
STILWELL
This chapter was mixed for me. Having read Barbara Tuchman's book about him, I at least knew who General Joseph Stilwell was. He was a highly respected officer, yet he didn't quite get along with FDR and others high up in the War Department, and he was relegated to the Burma/India/China theatre, which got the least attention of all of the theatres of the war. Here, Larrabee is very strong on Stilwell's hard-bitten, salty character and his work ethic. He spreads the story into more of an overarching one about FDR's mishandling of the situation with China and its Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek. In a book that is mostly pro-Roosevelt, this is one area where Larrabee is fairly critical of the President. One sentence where Larrabee really misses the mark though, comes on page 578 when he writes "...the President's treatment of General Stilwell remains the darkest blot on his record as Commander in Chief." While FDR did mistreat Stilwell, nowhere in this book is there a single mention of the hideous executive order that FDR signed imprisoning Japanese Americans into detention centers. How Larrabee never mentions this is beyond me. It was a war measure, so it does belong in the scope of this book. Even if I otherwise liked this book, this glaring omission is enough on its own to result in a big demerit.
LeMAY
The final chapter is on Curtis LeMay of the Army Air Forces. I found this to be one of the worst sections because LeMay's own story is so overshadowed by detailed talk of the emerging Air Force, and the bombing raids both over Germany and Japan, that I did not come away from this really knowing hardly anything more about him (which admittedly is not a lot) than I did prior to reading the chapter.
EPILOGUE
FDR finally returns here, as Larrabee writes about his leadership during wartime. Yet there are a few (quite important) things missing. First, and Larrabee himself admits this, is that he by design did not cover FDR's management of the home front. I can give him the benefit of the doubt by saying that I understand that he solely wanted to focus on the military aspects of the war, but isn't that sort of an incomplete picture when what was happening inside the U.S. itself is almost totally ignored? Second, where is Admiral William Leahy? This guy was the chair of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and had close proximity to FDR throughout most of the war. He is barely mentioned here, only a few times, and those mostly in passing. I think the lack of inclusion of Leahy is a significant oversight. Finally, speaking of significant oversights, Larrabee does not discuss - at all - FDR's failing health throughout 1944 and into 1945. How did that affect his performance as Commander in Chief? Larrabee, surprisingly in my view, never ventures down this path.
While Larrabee clearly devoted a lot of time to this book, and turned in some good work on certain chapters, overall this work left me mostly disappointed. Between the omissions as stated above, the detailed battle descriptions, the lack of maps in certain sections, and the minimizing of FDR himself throughout much of the book, this was not what I wanted nor expected the book to be about. That doesn't mean that it is a bad book. It is not. But I didn't think it was a good one either.
Grade: C