Every War Must End (Columbia Classics

by Fred Charles Iklé

"Mission accomplished," George Bush famously proclaimed in reference to the defeat of Saddam Hussein's military organization. However, as recent events in Iraq have once again demonstrated, it is much easier to start a war than it is to end it.

Every War Must End , which Colin Powell credits in his autobiography with having shaped his thinking on how to end the first Gulf War, analyzes the many critical obstacles to ending a war—an aspect of military strategy that is frequently and tragically overlooked. This book explores the difficult and often painful process through which wars in the modern age have been brought to a close and what this process means for the future. Iklé considers a variety of examples from twentieth-century history and examines specific strategies that effectively "won the peace," including the Allied policy in Germany and Japan after World War II.

In the new preface to his classic work, Iklé explains how U.S. political decisions and military strategy and tactics in Iraq―the emphasis on punishing Iraqi leaders, not seeking a formal surrender, and the failure to maintain law and order-have delayed, and indeed jeopardized, a successful end to hostilities.

Genres: Nonfiction, Military Fiction, History, Politics, War, Terrorism, Political Science

208 pages, Paperback

First published April 1, 1971

About the author

Dr. Fred Charles Iklé was a United States Department of Defense official during the presidency of Ronald Reagan who is credited with a key role in increasing U.S. aid to anti-Soviet rebels in the Soviet War in Afghanistan. He successfully proposed and promoted the idea of supplying the rebels with anti-aircraft Stinger missiles, overcoming CIA opposition. Iklé was director for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1973-1977 and later Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Iklé is a Distinguished Scholar with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Iklé's expertise is in defense and foreign policy; nuclear strategy; and the role of technology in the emerging international order. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Reviews

[Davit Petrosyan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Անհնար է կարդալ Ֆրեդ Չառլզ Իկլեի «Ամեն պատերազմ պետք է ավարտվի» (Every War Must End) գիրքն ու ամեն էջն անցնելիս զուգահեռներ չանցկացնել հայ-ադրբեջանական հակամարտության եւ գրքում բերված օրինակների ու վերլուծությունների միջև։

Քոլին Փաուելը, ով Պարսից ծոցի պատերազմի ժամանակ (Gulf War) ԱՄՆ Աշխատակազմի Միացյալ Շտաբների նախագահն էր, նշել է, որ Իկլեի այս գիրքը վճռորոշ ազդեցություն է ունեցել իր մտածողության վրա, թե ինչպես ավարտել պատերազմը, ու նա գրքի որոշ հատվածներ պատճենել ու շրջանառել է իր գործըկներների շրջանում։

Իկլեն իր հայտնի գրքում պնդում է, որ եթե քաղաքական ու ռազմական գործիչները մեծ ժամանակ են ծախսում պատերազմի մեկնարկը պլանավորելու համար, ապա բավարար չափով չեն պլանավորում, թե ինչպես պետք է այն ավարտել՝ նշելով, որ միջոցների ու նպատակների միջև խզումը կարող է բերել շատ անկախատեսելի հետևանքների։

Իկլեն նաև ներկայացնում է՝ պատերազմում, որն է իրական հաղթանակը ու բացատրում, թե ինչպես սկզբնական թվացյալ հաղթանակը ժամանակի ընթացքում կարող է վերածվել պարտության, եւ ինչ է պետք անել, որ ռազմի դաշտում գրանցված հաղթանակը դառնա քաղաքական երկարաժամկետ հաջողություն։

Իկլեն մանրամասն խոսում է ռազմական պլանավորման կարևորության, ինչպես նաև դրա հնարավոր, հաճախ անխուսափելի թերությունների եւ բացթողումներ մասին։ Հեղինակը նաև մատչելի կերպով անդրադառնում է պատերազմին առնչվող բազմաթիվ հասկացությունների՝ «խաղաղություն», «արժանապատիվ խաղաղություն», «զիջողական քաղաքականություն» (appeasement), «զսպում» (deterrence) և այլն։

Մեզ համար նման գրքերը կարող են իսկապես օգտակար լինել, իսկ եթե ներառվեն կրթական ծրագրերում, այդ թվում՝ ռազմական կրթական հաստատությունների, շատ կշահենք։

[Adam Lines · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a timely essay that clearly articulates the ease at which a country starts a war is vastly disproportionate to the ease at which a country can end a war. Showing most countries fail to even consider overall aims, or if they do these aims are quickly lost from sight behind a wall of rhetoric or obfuscation, with the need to "justify" past losses from all sides resulting in unobtainable peace settlements. This is well written and concise, it only falls down in there is potential for a further in-depth investigation into why leaders repeat the same mistakes with war. Suggestions on how to avoid these mistakes are lacking, but that may be linked to the general lack of suitable examples of a war ending without them. Unfortunately, the lessons from this essay does not bode well for the current wars ending any time soon.

[Alexander · Rating 5 out of 5]

One book that sat on my review list far longer than it should have is Every War Must End by Fred Charles Iklé. Gifted to me by my brother last year, it became one of the most important books I read in 2024 because of its sobering relevance to the world we live in now. Wars, Iklé reminds us (taking a page out of Clausewitz perhaps), are not self-contained events. Rather, they are political projects and, too often, they are begun without a clear plan for how they will end.

Written in 1971 just before Iklé entered public service as Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and later as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the book delivers a clear and pointed critique: governments are remarkably adept at starting wars, but dangerously inept at ending them. I don’t find this insight to be radical or even overly critical when you think about it, but the clarity with which Iklé delivers it makes for a timeless contribution to strategic thought. And in 2025 now, watching the prolonged devastation in Ukraine, Israel, and other parts of the world, his warning feels newly urgent.

I found the book’s central thesis to be deceptively simple: once war begins, political leaders often become focused on prosecuting the conflict, thereby losing sight of their initial goals. Victory becomes an evolving and elusive concept, whereas the enemy becomes permanent. As losses mount and tempers harden, the very idea of ending the war, normally done via diplomacy & negotiation, can become politically toxic. Iklé’s message is that such myopia is not just costly; it’s avoidable.

Highlighting examples, one passage stood out to me more than the rest. In 1916, as the First World War dragged on, a member of the British House of Commons stood and offered a warning: “We started the war with the noblest aims. Let us be very careful that in the prosecution of this war we do not allow our objects to degenerate.” That quote continues to follow me since reading Every War Must End while watching debates pertaining to Gaza and Ukraine. These are not simple conflicts—nor should they be oversimplified—but they are still political acts. The cause may be righteous, but righteousness cannot a substitute for strategy.

In Ukraine specifically, Western support remains strong. Yet, years in, there seems to be no clearly articulated or realist end state from an International Relations perspective. What does victory honestly look like at this point? Is it the return of all territory? A DMZ? Regime change in Moscow? These questions remain unanswered — and dangerously unasked. I say this with the burden of experience, having served with NATO and spent time in Ukraine itself. I want Ukraine to succeed. But desire alone does not make a strategy. In the absence of one, war risks becoming a status quo in itself.

The same applies in Israel, where the initial aim of defeating Hamas has begun to blur under the weight of destruction, international scrutiny, and domestic political pressures. Iklé's warning is particularly poignant here: wars that extend too long, or morph too far from their original cause, risk becoming detached from any achievable political objective. They continue not because they are working—but because no one has planned for what comes next.

Iklé does not dismiss the necessity of war. In fact, from a realist’s perspective, he acknowledges its role in preserving national survival and deterring aggression. But he also insists that states must apply the same discipline to planning exits as they do to planning tactical attacks. His chapters on the Cold War and nuclear deterrence are notable for their relevance even today as it comes to a world of cyber threats, proxy wars, and asymmetric conflict. As he writes, “The true failure is not just poor planning, but a refusal to confront uncomfortable political questions until it is too late.”

That idea resonates with me deeply. Especially in a year when geopolitical flashpoints seem to grow, not recede. Ultimately, Every War Must End is not a pacifist’s plea. It is a strategist’s warning. A reminder that without clarity of purpose and foresight of conclusion, even justified wars risk becoming directionless. And when that happens, ideals degrade, strategy crumbles, and the original purpose is lost to the inertia of conflict. For anyone working in this space, I think this is required reading at this point. I don’t know if Nicholas meant for this type of review when he gifted me the book, but here it is. Iklé doesn’t promise answers, but he does ask the right questions. And in a time when war too often becomes the first option, that may be what we need most.

[Yaron · Rating 4 out of 5]

Imagine that you are General Mannerheim leading Finland in the middle of WW2. Your troops have won every battle against the Soviets. But you have just learned that the German Third Army has surrendered in Stalingrad. Defeat against the Soviet Union is now inevitable, yet still years away. What do you do?

Brilliant big picture book that is both descriptive (when planning a war, you must think about how it will end. And make sure the means by which the war is fought matches the ultimate goal)

As well as descriptive: when the first battles of a war is a stalemate, why don't the two sides come to terms? After all, both sides assumed that the war would be more easily winnable when it started. With the new information shouldn't the two sides return to the peace which preceded the war?

Overall, a gripping book. But it doesn't go into depth. And is overly focused (understandably given the scale), on WW1 and WW2

[Brian W · Rating 4 out of 5]

Concise, detailed, historical reference of how nineteenth century wars have begun and have concluded. Incredible look across multiple governments and wars to try and uncover the basic theory for how hard battle is to control once it is started.

[Oğuz Kaan]

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[R · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent.

[Scott Lines · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's a great book, but the language doesn't always make it an easy read.

[FiveBooks · Rating 5 out of 5]

Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin has chosen to discuss Every War Must End by Fred Charles Iklé on FiveBooks as one of the top five on her subject - Terrorism, saying that:

“…This book is a classic from the 1970s, written during the Vietnam War at a time of agonising reappraisal in the US. He makes a very helpful use of history in going back through the endings of major conflicts and explaining that once you get into a war it is both difficult and very important to think about how it ends…”

The full interview is available here: http://fivebooks.com/interviews/audre...

[Bruce · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The English language is without a word of equally strong opprobrium to designate acts that can lead to the destruction of one's government and one's country, not by giving aid and comfort to the enemy [treason:], but by making enemies, not by fighting too little but by fighting too much and too long. Adventurism is much too weak a word-is perhaps the best term to describe this 'treason of the hawks.' "treason can help our enemies destroy our country by making them stronger; adventurism can destroy our country by making our enemies more numerous.

[Zack · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fantastic read:

"The English language is without a word of equally strong opprobrium to designate acts that can lead to the destruction of one's government and one's country, not by giving aid and comfort to the enemy [treason:], but by making enemies, not by fighting too little but by fighting too much and too long. Adventurism is much too weak a word-is perhaps the best term to describe this 'treason of the hawks.' "treason can help our enemies destroy our country by making them stronger; adventurism can destroy our country by making our enemies more numerous.

[Dave Beeman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Once a war is started how do you end it? Most politicians and military men don't think that far in advance. Read this book and learn how. We'll written with excellent examples.