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344 pages, Paperback
First published May 4, 2011
In emphasizing the ownership of the means of production, Marx’s theory of the capitalist bourgeoisie focuses on the power of actors who deploy material resources economically with important social and political effects. In oligarchic theory, the focus is on the power of actors who deploy material resources politically with important economic effects.
The efforts at income defense on the part of oligarchs in the American civil oligarchy have unfolded under conditions both of the high rule of law and of participatory democracy. The oligarchic and democratic elements of the system have coexisted far more than clashed. This suggests that there is nothing inherently incompatible about civil oligarchy and liberal democracy as long as oligarchic property and incomes are threatened only by episodic rather than sustained class legislation of the sort attempted in 1894 and 1913. During the long periods between episodes of mass-mobilizational and occasional national crises of war and economic collapse, oligarchs have waged and won a steady battle to defend their incomes. Income defense by oligarchs has necessarily meant pushing the costs of government onto less wealthy strata. That political struggle has been waged by oligarchs — directly and through their agents – as much against the mass affluent as against the remainder of society.
The evidence is strong that wealth plays a significant role in shaping policy outcomes in the United States (Phillips 2002; Hacker and Pierson 2010). Larry Bartels (2005, 2008) and Martin Gilens (2005) show that wealthier constituents exert far more influence over government decisions than Americans of modest means, and that the effects of undifferentiated public opinion on decision makers are almost zero.