A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies

Stanford Nuclear Age Series

by Martin J. Sherwin, Robert Jay Lifton (Foreword by)

Continuously in demand since its first, prize-winning edition was published in 1975, this is the classic history of the development of the American atomic bomb, the decision to use it against Japan, and the origins of U.S. atomic diplomacy toward the Soviet Union. In his Preface to this new edition, the author describes and evaluates the lengthening trail of new evidence that has come to light concerning these often emotionally debated subjects. The author also invokes his experience as a historical advisor to the controversial, aborted 1995 Enola Gay exhibit at the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution. This leads him to analyze the impact on American democracy of one of the most insidious of the legacies of the political control of historical interpretation. Reviews of Previous Editions "The quality of Sherwin's research and the strength of his argument are far superior to previous accounts." ― New York Times Book Review "Probably the definitive account for a long time to come. . . . Sherwin has tackled some of the critical questions of the Cold War's origins―and has settled them, in my opinion." ―Walter LaFeber, Cornell University "One of those rare achievements of conscientious scholarship, a book at once graceful and luminous, yet loyal to its documentation and restrained in its speculations." ― Boston Globe

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Japan, World War II, War, American History, Audiobook

424 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1975

About the author

Martin J. Sherwin was a Pulitzer Prize-winning American historian whose scholarship focused on the history of the development of atomic energy and nuclear proliferation.

Sherwin received his B.A. from Dartmouth College and his Ph.D. in history from the University of California, Los Angeles. He was the long-time Walter S. Dickson professor of English and American history at Tufts University until his assumption of emeritus status in May 2007. He was also a University Professor at George Mason University.

He received numerous awards and grants besides those listed here.

He and co-author Kai Bird shared the Pulitzer Prize for Biography in 2006, for their book entitled American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Reviews

[stephanie · Rating 5 out of 5]

one of the best books that asks the question: was dropping the bomb on hiroshima necessary? what about nagasaki? what ramifications did they have for the world sphere?

american war vets will tell you the bomb was dropped to save millions of young american lives, because japan wasn't going to surrender and an invasion of the main island was going to have to happen. other people will tell you the bomb was dropped because it was easy. others will say that it was dropped to show the soviets exactly what we had.

sherwin argues, quite convincingly, that truman decided to drop the bomb because stalin had signed a pact agreeing to intervene in the pacific sphere if the war was not over by a certain date. that day was set two or three days after japan's complete surrender after nagasaki.

i think that both issues were at play - keeping the soviets out (so we could negotiate the peace we wanted, without having to give anything to stalin - who had a pretty bad relationship with truman as opposed to FDR) and ending the war that seemingly wasn't going to end until the japanese were wiped off the face of the earth. (japanese propaganda fueled this - they were in a much worse state than we were led to believe, because as we all know, the japanese did not believe in a white flag.)

interesting debate, anyway, and an excellent book to get you started in the debate.

[George · Rating 4 out of 5]

A powerful study of the development of the first atomic bomb. Especially strong on the relationships between the scientists, military people, and political figures involved in the process. Thoroughly documented and very readable.

[Jason Chavez · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not a easy book to read but an important one on the history of the atomic bomb, the characters that surrounded the reason to build it and the decision for its use.

[Grant · Rating 5 out of 5]

A, if not the, classic study of American decision-making leading up to the use of atomic bombs against Japan during World War II. Sherwin's particular strengths are his very balanced tone and the inclusion of the points of view of military, civilian, and scientific leaders. He is also excellent in describing the processes involved.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the most important technological breakthroughs of the twentieth century was the development of the atomic bomb. I've read several books that covered this topic from many different angles and it is repeated here. But there is more focus on the controversial decision to use it on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies by Martin J. Sherwin develops the story of the development and then the use of the Bomb with the intent of forcing the Japanese government to recognize that they could not possibly win the war and make them realize that their only sensible choice was to accept unconditional surrender demanded by the allies. The author presents a number of the better-known options that were being considered including invasion of the Japanese home islands, a naval embargo to keep them isolated, or using the atom bomb. From what the American military had experienced in capturing Iwo Jima and Okinawa they were predicting American casualties of over a million that would be unacceptable back home and even more than that of the Japanese including civilians; whereas a naval embargo and continued bombing would result in much lower casualties but the public support of continuing this indefinitely would quickly fade. The use of the Atomic Bomb was expected to shock Japan's leaders and prompt them to quickly surrender. But after no response for a couple of days, the decision to drop a second bomb was made. After another few days, Emperor Hirohito is said to have forced the decision to surrender though even then there were many of the militarists wanting to fight on. Did they make the right decision? The discussions continue even today. Having read personal accounts of the logical arguments of that time as well as actual soldiers who were poised to start the anticipated bloody invasion, and having talked to a few who were actually there waiting for orders, it is hard to say there was a clear cut best strategy. But it appears that using the Bomb was probably the best of several poor choices. As the author points out it is still controversial today. Well researched and kept my interest throughout.

[Greg Brown · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent, if somewhat outdated by being 50 years old. Sherwin provides a brisk look at the fractured decision processes around the bomb's development and use. He skips most of the technical details (read Rhodes' masterpiece for that), cataloging how the changing diplomatic situation shaped the plans for the nuclear program, and vice-versa.

As for the big question—how did we decide to drop the bomb on Japan—it reminded me a lot of Sherwin's later (even better) Cuban Missile Crisis book. In both cases, decisions were arrived at before anyone had time to ask the questions, simply because they grew out of assumptions that were too baked in at that point. Thankfully for us all in the '60s, the Kennedy Administration had the time and attention to re-evaluate things before deciding to strike. Truman simply didn't have the capacity or interest, and the actual decision-makers were marginally more flexible.

[Bookish Minh · Rating 3 out of 5]

⭐️⭐️⭐️.5

[James Crawford · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is another of the books dealing with the atomic bombing of Japan, but it also relates this to the post-war arms race.

Although the book itself is quite good, I'm only going to point out a few things that I found significant.

In relation to Secretary of War Stimson and his role:

”By March he was convinced that its development raised issues that 'went right down to the bottom facts of human nature, morals and government.'”

The book also notes that, unlike some others in the leadership, he “harbored no crude hatred or racial antagonism for the Japanese people. Nor was he blind to moral considerations that might affect world public opinion.”

A direct quote from him: “The same rule of sparing the civilian population should be applied as far as possible to the use of any new weapon.”

”No one could think of any way to employ the new weapon that offered the same attractive combination of low risk and high gain as a surprise attack.”

This was noted in relation to the discussion about whether or not to just have a demonstration in a relatively unpopulated area. Not also that it uses the term “surprise attack” which is exactly the same term used to describe Pearl Harbor some years earlier.

As to why the bomb was not used on Germany but on Japan, the book notes that the European war was already almost over. Putting the bomb together was safer to do on a Pacific island than in Europe. It would also be a US bomb delivered by a US plane in a war theater that was almost exclusively the US's.

There was another of the many committees, this one called the Franck Committee, that was against a surprise dropping of the atomic bomb. They thought it was inadvisable on moral, political and diplomatic terms.

The book also stresses the psychological effects the atomic bombing would have on the Japanese leadership, and notes that one of the purposes of all the firebombings was “...to weaken the will of the people and government to continue the war.”

As I have read elsewhere, Stimson was the one to strike Kyoto off the list of a-bomb targets. What I didn't read elsewhere was that, six weeks after he made his decision, others wanted to put Kyoto back on the target list and he refused again to allow that to happen. He said that “...the bitterness which would be caused by such wanton act might make it impossible during the long postwar period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than the Russians.” In other words, he wanted Japan to side with the US after the war rather than with the Russians.

In relation to future a-bombs, three were expected to be produced in September and seven or more in December. If the Japanese had not surrendered, and if Truman held to his own position, it's probable that more atomic bombs would have been dropped on Japan.

(The general plan was, if Operation Olympic was to go forward, which was the actual invasion of Kyushu, some nine atomic bombs would be available. Three would be dropped on the three beachs US troops were to land on; three more a little more inland to destroy any concentrations of Japanese troops, and three held in reserve to be used if any massive movement of Japanese troops was detected rushing to the area. This was also planned before any one had any idea about the effects of lingering radiation on the soldiers.)

[Julio The Fox · Rating 5 out of 5]

For those of you going ga-ga over Christopher Nolan's OPPENHEIMER, or just J. Robert Oppenheimer himself and the agony he supposedly suffered over the dropping of the atom bomb, his atom bomb, over Hiroshima, leaving at least 120,000 civilians dead I urgently recommend this classic by Martin Sherwin. I once had the pleasure of meeting Martin at a small talk he gave at UCLA hosted by another giant of American history, Robert Dallek (FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, LONE STAR RISING, FLAWED GIANT), and the obligatory JFK biography). Ah, the pleasures and perks of a classical education! Sherwin had already won his spurs as a historian by publishing this tsunami of a book in 1975 on why the United States decided to build an atomic weapon and then use it in Asia. Relax, Oppenheimer apologists. Oppie had little to do with the decision. He was a genius but just a factotum. Sherwin's case is that the Manhattan Project had everything to do with establishing U.S. hegemony over the post-war world, even if it meant destroying a portion of that world. The major concern for the Washington boys, in both Europe and Asia, was not the Axis powers but the Soviet Union. A U.S.S.R. that conquered Germany and entered the Pacific War would threaten that hegemonic project. The Allied landings in Europe in 1944, from France to Italy, assured the bomb would not have to be used against Germany, but there was still Asia, not Japan but Asia, to worry about. Sherwin makes a persuasive case that first Roosevelt and then Truman were determined to keep the Pacific an American lake. The bombing of Hiroshima was not driven by military considerations but by "atomic diplomacy". The Soviet entry into the Pacific War, by way of the swift conquest of Manchuria, settled the issue, as far as Truman was concerned. That mushroom cloud over Hiroshima was a giant roar! to the Russians that they would have no say over the occupation of Japan and best give up dreams of staying in Manchuria. No one in the U.S. government expressed opposition to this devilish plan, although Eisenhower went on to call the bombing "unnecessary" and McArthur warned the world, at the Japanese surrender ceremony aboard the U.S.S. Missouri that "Armageddon is at hand". The U.S. occupation forces in Japan under McArthur installed a pro-American regime in Tokyo whose American-written constitution foreswore the use of nuclear weapons, thus far. However, the diplomatic point, an exclamation point written with uranium, had been made. According to the late Daniel Ellsberg there were 24 times after Nagasaki in which the U.S. considered using nuclear weapons to settle local conflicts from Viet Nam to India and Pakistan to Cuba. Atomic diplomacy, brilliantly dissected by Sherwin in this masterpiece, still hangs over the world today, from Korea to Ukraine.

[Dan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Over turns some very widely held beliefs about the development of the atom bomb. Einstein's role was minimal; U.S. and British concern about post-war relations with the Soviets was a major factor in the decision to use the bomb; and perhaps most shocking of all is that casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan - often cited as justification for using the bomb against the Japanese - were nowhere near the number of killed by the destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. A must read.

[Andlandm · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good history of the arguments about the usage, diplomatic relations, and future uses for the atomic bomb being developed during WWII. It shows Truman forced to make major diplomatic decisions at the beginning of his presidency as Roosevelt had left him totally out of the loop. A bit dry and tedious at times as it goes through government agencies and people, but well worth reading.

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

A really wonderful book about the creation and use of the atom bomb. If you are looking for an in depth exploration of the Manhattan Project and it's aftermath in a political, not scientific way, this is the book for you!

[Derek · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dispels the notion of discontinuity between Roosevelt and Truman. Instead, Sherwin's very convincing and compelling narrative is one of continuity between the two administrations regarding the development and use of the atomic bomb.

[Meihan Liu · Rating 5 out of 5]

I got the impression that the origins of the Cold War could be dated back to as early as 1942, when Roosevelt and Churchill achieved consensus about the Anglo-American nuclear monopoly both during and after the war.

[Nanci Svensson · Rating 3 out of 5]

Freak show! Half man, half chair, half hilarious! Recommended!

[Hongfei Shi · Rating 5 out of 5]

it is very good to read, I read it three times.