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Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism
Suicide terrorism is rising around the world, but there is great confusion as to why. In this paradigm-shifting analysis, University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape has collected groundbreaking evidence to explain the strategic, social, and individual factors responsible for this growing threat.
One of the world’s foremost authorities on the subject, Professor Pape has created the first comprehensive database of every suicide terrorist attack in the world from 1980 until today. With striking clarity and precision, Professor Pape uses this unprecedented research to debunk widely held misconceptions about the nature of suicide terrorism and provide a new lens that makes sense of the threat we face.
Suicide terrorism is not primarily a product of Islamic fundamentalism.
The world’s leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka–a secular, Marxist-Leninist group drawn from Hindu families.
Ninety-five percent of suicide terrorist attacks occur as part of coherent campaigns organized by large militant organizations with significant public support.
Every suicide terrorist campaign has had a clear goal that is secular and to compel a modern democracy to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland.
Al-Qaeda fits the above pattern. Although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation per se, one major objective of al-Qaeda is the expulsion of U.S. troops from the Persian Gulf region, and as a result there have been repeated attacks by terrorists loyal to Osama bin Laden against American troops in Saudi Arabia and the region as a whole.
Despite their rhetoric, democracies–including the United States–have routinely made concessions to suicide terrorists. Suicide terrorism is on the rise because terrorists have learned that it’s effective.
In this wide-ranging analysis, Professor Pape offers the essential tools to forecast when some groups are likely to resort to suicide terrorism and when they are not. He also provides the first comprehensive demographic profile of modern suicide terrorist attackers. With data from more than 460 such attackers–including the names of 333–we now know that these individuals are not mainly poor, desperate criminals or uneducated religious fanatics but are often well-educated, middle-class political activists.
More than simply advancing new theory and facts, these pages also answer key questions about the war on
• Are we safer now than we were before September 11?
• Was the invasion of Iraq a good counterterrorist move?
• Is al-Qaeda stronger now than it was before September 11?
Professor Pape answers these questions with analysis grounded in fact, not politics, and recommends concrete ways for today’s states to fight and prevent terrorist attacks. Military options may disrupt terrorist operations in the short term, but a lasting solution to suicide terrorism will require a comprehensive, long-term approach–one that abandons visions of empire and relies on a combined strategy of vigorous homeland security, nation building in troubled states, and greater energy independence.
For both policy makers and the general public, Dying to Win transcends speculation with systematic scholarship, making it one of the most important political studies of recent time.
One of the world’s foremost authorities on the subject, Professor Pape has created the first comprehensive database of every suicide terrorist attack in the world from 1980 until today. With striking clarity and precision, Professor Pape uses this unprecedented research to debunk widely held misconceptions about the nature of suicide terrorism and provide a new lens that makes sense of the threat we face.
Suicide terrorism is not primarily a product of Islamic fundamentalism.
The world’s leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka–a secular, Marxist-Leninist group drawn from Hindu families.
Ninety-five percent of suicide terrorist attacks occur as part of coherent campaigns organized by large militant organizations with significant public support.
Every suicide terrorist campaign has had a clear goal that is secular and to compel a modern democracy to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland.
Al-Qaeda fits the above pattern. Although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation per se, one major objective of al-Qaeda is the expulsion of U.S. troops from the Persian Gulf region, and as a result there have been repeated attacks by terrorists loyal to Osama bin Laden against American troops in Saudi Arabia and the region as a whole.
Despite their rhetoric, democracies–including the United States–have routinely made concessions to suicide terrorists. Suicide terrorism is on the rise because terrorists have learned that it’s effective.
In this wide-ranging analysis, Professor Pape offers the essential tools to forecast when some groups are likely to resort to suicide terrorism and when they are not. He also provides the first comprehensive demographic profile of modern suicide terrorist attackers. With data from more than 460 such attackers–including the names of 333–we now know that these individuals are not mainly poor, desperate criminals or uneducated religious fanatics but are often well-educated, middle-class political activists.
More than simply advancing new theory and facts, these pages also answer key questions about the war on
• Are we safer now than we were before September 11?
• Was the invasion of Iraq a good counterterrorist move?
• Is al-Qaeda stronger now than it was before September 11?
Professor Pape answers these questions with analysis grounded in fact, not politics, and recommends concrete ways for today’s states to fight and prevent terrorist attacks. Military options may disrupt terrorist operations in the short term, but a lasting solution to suicide terrorism will require a comprehensive, long-term approach–one that abandons visions of empire and relies on a combined strategy of vigorous homeland security, nation building in troubled states, and greater energy independence.
For both policy makers and the general public, Dying to Win transcends speculation with systematic scholarship, making it one of the most important political studies of recent time.
352 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2005
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October 1, 2016
What nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is ... to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland...
And
The data shows that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world's religions. In fact, the leading instigators of suicide attacks are the Tamil Tigers, a Marxist-Leninist group ... who are adamantly opposed to religion. This group committed 76 of the 315 incidents, more suicide attacks than Hamas.
are what I learnt from this book. The author supports these views with various stats and reports, and has more to say on the topic, but, to me, this seemed to be the gist of the book.
I really hope that one day I won't be influenced by mass media and won't find facts like this surprising.
February 10, 2011
Robert Pape's study is an important contribution to our understanding of suicide terrorism. He explores the recent evolution and deployment of suicide terrorism as a political tactic.
Some key points: Islamic terrorism is not the only exemplar of suicide terrorism; much suicide terrorism has "popular" support; suicide terrorism is often aimed at forcing occupying forces--especially democracies--to leave the territory that terrorists consider their home territory; perhaps most controversial, suicide terrorism can work, with occupying forces on numerous occasions retreating.
With respect to the latter point, he notes the following (page 61): "The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works. Even more troubling, the encouraging lesson that terrorists have learned from the experience of suicide terrorist campaigns since 1980 are not, for the most part, products of wild-eyed interpretations or wishful thinking." Nonetheless, suicide terrorism is no silver bullet; it works sometimes (as with the United States' withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s), but not always.
Pape argues that (page 21) "The logic of suicide terrorism is aimed at political coercion. . . . Suicide terrorist campaigns are primarily nationalistic, not religious, nor are they particularly Islamic." Other reviewers have raised relevant questions about this statement. Nonetheless, Pape emphasizes, rightly, that suicide terrorism is a political tool.
His policy prescription? It is from a realist poisition and may not convince the reader (as it does not convince me): withdraw from those countries where the United States (and other countries) are perceived as occupiers and use "off-shore balancing" tactics. That is, to quote Pape (page 247): ". . .our objective should be to withdraw all American combat forces from the region expeditiously. . .while working with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf states to ensure that they maintain the critical infrstructure for a rapid return of U. S. forces should that prove necessary." While I have some sympathy for the United States maintaining a low profile, we are leaning upon weak reeds if we depend upon the Iraqi etc., governments to serve as our surrogates/allies.
At any rate, this is a provocative book and well worth reading as a means of thinking about the political logic of suicide terrorism.
Some key points: Islamic terrorism is not the only exemplar of suicide terrorism; much suicide terrorism has "popular" support; suicide terrorism is often aimed at forcing occupying forces--especially democracies--to leave the territory that terrorists consider their home territory; perhaps most controversial, suicide terrorism can work, with occupying forces on numerous occasions retreating.
With respect to the latter point, he notes the following (page 61): "The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works. Even more troubling, the encouraging lesson that terrorists have learned from the experience of suicide terrorist campaigns since 1980 are not, for the most part, products of wild-eyed interpretations or wishful thinking." Nonetheless, suicide terrorism is no silver bullet; it works sometimes (as with the United States' withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s), but not always.
Pape argues that (page 21) "The logic of suicide terrorism is aimed at political coercion. . . . Suicide terrorist campaigns are primarily nationalistic, not religious, nor are they particularly Islamic." Other reviewers have raised relevant questions about this statement. Nonetheless, Pape emphasizes, rightly, that suicide terrorism is a political tool.
His policy prescription? It is from a realist poisition and may not convince the reader (as it does not convince me): withdraw from those countries where the United States (and other countries) are perceived as occupiers and use "off-shore balancing" tactics. That is, to quote Pape (page 247): ". . .our objective should be to withdraw all American combat forces from the region expeditiously. . .while working with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf states to ensure that they maintain the critical infrstructure for a rapid return of U. S. forces should that prove necessary." While I have some sympathy for the United States maintaining a low profile, we are leaning upon weak reeds if we depend upon the Iraqi etc., governments to serve as our surrogates/allies.
At any rate, this is a provocative book and well worth reading as a means of thinking about the political logic of suicide terrorism.
April 20, 2022
“The stationing of tens of thousands of American combat troops on the Arabian Peninsula from 1990 to 2001 probably made al-Qaeda suicide attacks… including the horrible crimes committed on September 11, 2001, from five to twenty times more likely.” WHAT.
Pape’s methodical, data-driven theory on suicide terrorism is hugely enlightening, even for those who fancy themselves knowledgeable about the implications of American involvement in the Middle East. Once again, I’m shocked at how ignorant American/western policy makers have been in their dealings in the region.
Pape’s methodical, data-driven theory on suicide terrorism is hugely enlightening, even for those who fancy themselves knowledgeable about the implications of American involvement in the Middle East. Once again, I’m shocked at how ignorant American/western policy makers have been in their dealings in the region.
January 3, 2023
الإرهاب الانتحاري يتصاعد في جميع أنحاء العالم ، ولكن هناك ارتباك كبير حول السبب. نظرًا لأن العديد من هذه الهجمات - بما في ذلك ، بالطبع ، هجمات 11 سبتمبر 2001 - تم ارتكابها من قبل إرهابيين مسلمين يعتنقون دوافع دينية ، فقد يبدو من الواضح أن الأصولية الإسلامية هي السبب الرئيسي. لقد غذى هذا الافتراض الاعتقاد بأنه لا يمكن تجنب أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر المستقبلية إلا من خلال التحول الشامل للمجتمعات الإسلامية ، وهو سبب أساسي للدعم العام الواسع في الولايات المتحدة للغزو الأخير للعراق.
ومع ذلك ، فإن الصلة المفترضة بين الإرهاب الانتحاري والأصولية الإسلامية مضللة وربما تشجع السياسات الداخلية والخارجية التي من المحتمل أن تؤدي إلى تفاقم الوضع الأمريكي وإلحاق الأذى بالعديد من المسلمين دون داع.
لقد قمت بجمع قاعدة بيانات لكل تفجير وهجوم انتحاري في جميع أنحاء العالم من عام 1980 حتى عام 2003 - 315 هجومًا بالإجمال . وهي تتضمن كل هجوم قام فيه إرهابي واحد على الأقل بقتل نفسه أو نفسها أثناء محاولته قتل الآخرين ؛ يستثني الهجمات التي تصرح بها حكومة وطنية ، على سبيل المثال من قبل كوريا الشمالية ضد الجنوب. قاعدة البيانات هذه هي أول عالم كامل للهجمات الإرهابية الانتحارية في جميع أنحاء العالم. لقد جمعت وتحققت بشكل مستقل من جميع المعلومات ذات الصلة التي يمكن العثور عليها باللغة الإنجليزية واللغات الأخرى (على سبيل المثال ، العربية والعبرية والروسية والتاميلية) مطبوعة وعلى الإنترنت. المعلومات مستمدة من الجماعات الإرهابية الانتحارية نفسها ، ومن المنظمات الرئيسية التي تجمع مثل هذه البيانات في البلدان المستهدفة ، ومن وسائل الإعلام الإخبارية حول العالم. أكثر من مجرد "قائمة قوائم" ، ربما تمثل قاعدة البيانات هذه الدراسة الأكثر شمولاً وموثوقية للهجمات الإرهابية الانتحارية المتوفرة الآن.
تظهر البيانات أن هناك علاقة قليلة بين الإرهاب الانتحاري والأصولية الإسلامية ، أو أي من ديانات العالم. في الواقع ، المحرضون الرئيسيون على الهجمات الانتحارية هم نمور التاميل في سريلانكا ، وهي جماعة ماركسية لينينية ينتمي أعضاؤها إلى عائلات هندوسية لكنهم يعارضون الدين بشدة. وقد ارتكبت هذه المجموعة 76 من أصل 315 عملية انتحارية .
ما تشترك فيه جميع الهجمات الإرهابية الانتحارية تقريبًا هو استراتيجي محدد: إجبار الديمقراطيات الحديثة على سحب القوات العسكرية من الأراضي التي يعتبرها الإرهابيون وطنهم. نادرًا ما يكون الدين هو السبب الجذري ، على الرغم من استخدامه غالبًا كأداة من قبل المنظمات الإرهابية في التجنيد وفي جهود أخرى لخدمة الهدف الاستراتيجي الأوسع.
.
Robert Pape
Dying To Win
Translated By #Maher_Razouk
ومع ذلك ، فإن الصلة المفترضة بين الإرهاب الانتحاري والأصولية الإسلامية مضللة وربما تشجع السياسات الداخلية والخارجية التي من المحتمل أن تؤدي إلى تفاقم الوضع الأمريكي وإلحاق الأذى بالعديد من المسلمين دون داع.
لقد قمت بجمع قاعدة بيانات لكل تفجير وهجوم انتحاري في جميع أنحاء العالم من عام 1980 حتى عام 2003 - 315 هجومًا بالإجمال . وهي تتضمن كل هجوم قام فيه إرهابي واحد على الأقل بقتل نفسه أو نفسها أثناء محاولته قتل الآخرين ؛ يستثني الهجمات التي تصرح بها حكومة وطنية ، على سبيل المثال من قبل كوريا الشمالية ضد الجنوب. قاعدة البيانات هذه هي أول عالم كامل للهجمات الإرهابية الانتحارية في جميع أنحاء العالم. لقد جمعت وتحققت بشكل مستقل من جميع المعلومات ذات الصلة التي يمكن العثور عليها باللغة الإنجليزية واللغات الأخرى (على سبيل المثال ، العربية والعبرية والروسية والتاميلية) مطبوعة وعلى الإنترنت. المعلومات مستمدة من الجماعات الإرهابية الانتحارية نفسها ، ومن المنظمات الرئيسية التي تجمع مثل هذه البيانات في البلدان المستهدفة ، ومن وسائل الإعلام الإخبارية حول العالم. أكثر من مجرد "قائمة قوائم" ، ربما تمثل قاعدة البيانات هذه الدراسة الأكثر شمولاً وموثوقية للهجمات الإرهابية الانتحارية المتوفرة الآن.
تظهر البيانات أن هناك علاقة قليلة بين الإرهاب الانتحاري والأصولية الإسلامية ، أو أي من ديانات العالم. في الواقع ، المحرضون الرئيسيون على الهجمات الانتحارية هم نمور التاميل في سريلانكا ، وهي جماعة ماركسية لينينية ينتمي أعضاؤها إلى عائلات هندوسية لكنهم يعارضون الدين بشدة. وقد ارتكبت هذه المجموعة 76 من أصل 315 عملية انتحارية .
ما تشترك فيه جميع الهجمات الإرهابية الانتحارية تقريبًا هو استراتيجي محدد: إجبار الديمقراطيات الحديثة على سحب القوات العسكرية من الأراضي التي يعتبرها الإرهابيون وطنهم. نادرًا ما يكون الدين هو السبب الجذري ، على الرغم من استخدامه غالبًا كأداة من قبل المنظمات الإرهابية في التجنيد وفي جهود أخرى لخدمة الهدف الاستراتيجي الأوسع.
.
Robert Pape
Dying To Win
Translated By #Maher_Razouk
November 12, 2009
I first of heard of this book by way of the immutable Scott Horton at antiwar.com/radio / http://www.kaosradioaustin.org/statio...
When I realized that Ron Paul used it as a primary source when he countered the ridiculous claims by Rudy Guiliani that "they hate us for our freedoms" and over-used anti-logic about Islamic fundamentalism.
Well researched and well presented prose details a picture that many of glaze over in the haze of media propaganda. I had some disagreement with the final chapter and Afterword that somehow the US still has moral claims to intervene and simply should reform its modus operendi.
Overall a refreshing read and I am glad I took the to complete it.
When I realized that Ron Paul used it as a primary source when he countered the ridiculous claims by Rudy Guiliani that "they hate us for our freedoms" and over-used anti-logic about Islamic fundamentalism.
Well researched and well presented prose details a picture that many of glaze over in the haze of media propaganda. I had some disagreement with the final chapter and Afterword that somehow the US still has moral claims to intervene and simply should reform its modus operendi.
Overall a refreshing read and I am glad I took the to complete it.
March 23, 2016
Do we want to end the seemingly endless cycle of attacks and counter-attacks in our endless war against Muslim extremists? Or maybe we want to just talk tough and keep invading countries the result of which thus far has been devastating in countless ways? Or do we want to try something crazy and new and pull out of the Middle East militarily?
9/11 was a response to American occupation of Saudi Arabia and not some bullshit fantasy that they hate us for our freedoms. How do I know this? Because this is what those maniacs said.
I like what the author said about not proving something by showing something with facts and research. This book does that and I highly recommend it to anyone wishing to better understand the current situation of the Muslim world and the West.
9/11 was a response to American occupation of Saudi Arabia and not some bullshit fantasy that they hate us for our freedoms. How do I know this? Because this is what those maniacs said.
I like what the author said about not proving something by showing something with facts and research. This book does that and I highly recommend it to anyone wishing to better understand the current situation of the Muslim world and the West.
April 5, 2007
Suicide terrorists are not mostly Muslim, and they don't all do it because of religious reasons. Rather, the motives are more nationalistic and sophisticated than we think, and are often part of a larger campaign. Fascinating and accurate account of every single known suicide bombing attack in recent history and their effect on society. It's hard being the only one to have read this book.
October 12, 2024
yo soy como una democracia
July 28, 2026
I've never trusted his research, since he's usually bent the interpretations to always fit in with his theories and thesis, from the air war to terrorism.
When you focus way too much on late 60s air hijackings and hardcore secular Marxist-Leninists in Palestine and the Japanese Red Army into the 70s, maybe you'll serious question things when Pape has said over the years that suicide terror is strictly secular and divorced from Islamic fundamentalism.
And it dated badly with the 1982 Beirut bombing
and Huntington won the argument that cultural and religious reasons are at the core of things
and hardcore Marxist-Leninists are just a secular subset that was heavily funded and peculiar to the late 1960s to mid 1970s.
It didn't help when you had propaganda mixed in with the facts like Harry Rositzke vs Ray S. Cline battling it out.
//////
The usually reliable but politically odd Edward S. Herman wrote:
Alexander's collaborator, Ray S. Cline, is a central figure in the terrorism industry, an early proponent of the Soviet network theory, and a leading member and spokesman of the "far right". For a long time he was a senior associate at CSIS, adjunct professor of International Relations at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, and an instructor at the Defense Intelligence School. Cline was affiliated with many other members of the terrorism industry. During World War II, Cline served as a naval intelligence officer and worked for the OSS in Kunming, China, with John Singlaub, Mitchell Livingstone WerBell III, Richard Helms, and Howard Hunt.
Cline was later deputy CIA station chief in South Korea in the early 1950s. From 1958 to 1962, he was the CIA's station chief in Taiwan, and from 1962 to 1966 was the agency's deputy director for intelligence. He later became director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1969-73), where he helped coordinate the CIA's destabilization and eventual overthrow of the Allende government in Chile.
In addition to his long-standing ties to the U.S. government, Cline has been closely connected to repressive regimes and the international ultra-right. We have noted his leadership of a Moon-sponsored organization. While stationed in Taiwan, Cline was probably involved in channeling counterpart funds from the U.S. embassy to provide the initial financing for the Asian People's Anti-Communist League in 1954 and the preparatory meeting of WACL in 1958.
Cline has attended and participated in several WACL meetings. With Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, Cline formed Taiwan's notorious Political Warfare Cadres Academy, which has trained officers from right-wing nations worldwide in counterinsurgency techniques. One of the best known graduates of the academy is Roberto D' Aubuisson.
In addition to his long-standing ties to the U.S. government, Cline has been closely connected to repressive regimes and the international ultra-right. We have noted his leadership of a Moon-sponsored organization. While stationed in Taiwan, Cline was probably involved in channeling counterpart funds from the U.S. embassy to provide the initial financing for the Asian People's Anti-Communist League in 1954 and the preparatory meeting of WACL in 1958.
Cline has attended and participated in several WACL meetings. With Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, Cline formed Taiwan's notorious Political Warfare Cadres Academy, which has trained officers from right-wing nations worldwide in counterinsurgency techniques. One of the best known graduates of the academy is Roberto D' Aubuisson.
Cline has also worked with the far-right in the Philippines. After relocating the offices of WACL to the Nippon Star Trading Company complex in Manila in late 1986, John Singlaub met with Cline, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, and General Luis Villa-Real. Villa-Real, the president of WACL's Philippine chapter, played a central role in the creation of right-wing death squads in that country. Both Cline and Singlaub were identified by the 'Philippine Daily Inquirer' as aiding the forces behind the 1986 coup attempt against the Aquino government.
Cline's ties to the U.S. far right are also noteworthy. He was in various capacities on the boards of organizations tied to the so-called China Lobby, such as the Committee for a Free China and the Coalition for Asian Peace and Security.
He was president of the National Intelligence Studies Center, a conservative and intelligence-linked think tank, and he has been active in the right-wing Association of Former Intelligence Officers. Cline has given interviews to the John Birch Society's 'Review of the News' on two separate occasions (April 22, 1981, and March 27,1985). Lyndon LaRouche's followers cultivated a friendly relationship with Cline, and Cline "continued to chat with them throughout the early 1980s." He is also on the board of directors of the Nathan Hale Foundation and serves on the editorial board of Yonah Alexander's journal, Terrorism.
Cline has been heavily involved in the risk analysis business, working sometimes as a collaborator with Yonah Alexander. He explains, "I am trying to sell my knowledge of the political environment in foreign countries."
His clients include several major oil companies (which he has advised not to invest in mainland China), and a number of defense firms, including General Dynamics (a major contributor to CSIS) and Hewlett-Packard.
Cline has also created a number of "political risk scenarios" for companies doing business with South Africa, scenarios that claim that the South African government's "sophisticated leadership could be an engine for growth."
In addition to his ties to Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Africa, Cline once helped a Chicago arms manufacturer sell arms to the military regime in Turkey.
We described earlier the nature of a work which Cline and Alexander wrote together, which expounds a simpleminded rightwing version of the establishment model. When Cline previewed his thesis that the Soviet Union was masterminding worldwide terrorism at a 1980 meeting of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, he was sharply attacked by three of his colleagues.
Howard Bane, who had only recently retired as the CIA's Moscow station chief, said, "We've got to get Cline off this Moscow control of terrorists. It's divisive. It's not true. There's not one single bit of truth to it."
Retired CIA officer Harry Rositzke concurred: "It's that far-right stuff, that's all. It's horseshit."
Finally, Conrad Hassel, the FBI's director for antiterrorism instruction, and now head of the Wackenhut Corporation's antiterrorism division, observed, "If you want to believe in the conspiracy theory of terrorism, well, you've got it, but there's no evidence for it."
Cline has been an outspoken proponent of disinformation and direct manipulation of the press by the CIA. In testimony before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Cline defended the use of such covert devices as black propaganda and the funding of journalists, arguing that "the First Amendment is only an amendment."
Despite his CIA background, extensive connections with the extreme right at home and abroad, his open disregard for free speech and the rules of evidence, and the heavily propagandistic character of his writings, Cline has been a frequent guest on ABC's "Nightline," speaking on terrorism and defending the U.S. government's use of Nazi war criminals as missile scientists ("Nightline," October 18, 1984).
////
Acrually I liked Ray S. Cline work, when he wasn't bullshitting some of the time, at times he was acutely objective and makes for interesting reading.
////
Not fond of his methodology either
Australian Army Research Center
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism
This article is based on an address to the Australian Defence Force Academy by Robert Pape, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. In his address, Dr Pape presents the results of his comprehensive demographic research into the phenomenon of suicide terrorism.
Many of his research findings challenge key assumptions and prevailing conventional wisdom on the origins of suicide bombers and their strategic goals.
In particular, Pape concludes that Islamic fundamentalism does not provide the primary motivation for the majority of suicide bombers, many of whom have secular identities and aspirations.
Accordingly, suicide terrorism constitutes a coherent campaign of calibrated violence rather than the manifestation of irrational religious fervour.
.....
The Chicago Project is the first to compile a complete dossier on al-Qaeda suicide attackers from 1995 to early 2004. During that period there were 71 individuals who killed themselves in carrying out these attacks.
Of those 71, we know the names, nationality and other socio-economic data for 67. The largest number—34—comes from Saudi Arabia, and the majority are from the Persian Gulf, where the United States first began to station combat forces in 1990.
It is important to underscore the fact that 1990 was a watershed year in the US deployment to the Persian Gulf. Before 1990, the West had some advisers with side arms in the Persian Gulf, but combat forces had not been stationed in this part of the world since the Second World War.
Which countries, then, do not provide recruits for al-Qaeda suicide attacks? Suicide attackers do not tend to come from:
1 Iran
Iran has an Islamic fundamentalist population with over 70 million people, three times the size of Saudi Arabia.
2 Sudan
An Islamic fundamentalist population about the same size as Saudi Arabia and with a brand of Islamic fundamentalism so congenial to bin Laden he chose to live there for three years in the 1990s.
3 Pakistan
The largest Islamic fundamentalist country on the planet with 149 million people.
Iraq and Suicide Terror
Iraq is a prime example of the strategic logic of suicide terrorism. Before the US-led invasion in March 2003, Iraq had never experienced a suicide terrorist attack in its history. Since then, suicide terrorism has been doubling every year that the 170 000-strong Western combat forces have been stationed there.
There is a widespread belief that there is no logic and consistency to the suicide attacks—yet the facts make nonsense of this view.
The Chicago Project has tracked the suicide attacks, taking great care to separate these from other attacks that are also occurring. What is striking is that the geography and targets of the attacks have been remarkably consistent, even as the attacks have been doubling from year to year.
The insurgents are following a fairly standard model of insurgency. Year after year, 50 to 60 per cent of the attacks are consistently in the capital city, with the rest evenly distributed around the country.
This is one of the most common insurgent patterns, as these elements seek to convince the population that the government cannot protect them.
If the government cannot protect the capital cities, it is clearly incapable of protecting other cities and towns. Further, more than 75 per cent of the attacks were against military and political targets such as government buildings, police convoys, police stations, recruiting stations and Western combat troops.
Only 15 to 25 per cent of the attacks were against local Iraqi civilians not working for the Iraqi government.
News stories that describe attacks in Iraq against civilians will very often identify those civilians as standing in line waiting to work for the government or security organs inside Iraq. It is also important to emphasise that there have been attacks against mosques. Of the over 190 attacks, a grand total of 13 were against mosques.
What this pattern suggests is a fairly clear goal to prevent the establishment of a government in Iraq under the control of the United States. To achieve this, Iraqi terrorists attack targets they hope will undermine the Iraqi population’s confidence in the Iraqi Government and its ability to maintain order.
Although there are multiple causes, it is the presence of American ground forces in Iraq that is mainly responsible for fuelling the support for suicide terrorism.
Today, there are 13 different terrorist organisations in the Sunni Triangle, four of which use suicide terrorist attacks. Some are quite religious, some are quite patriotic. Some use foreign suicide attackers, some only Iraqi suicide attackers. Where these organisations agree is that they want Western combat forces out of Iraq. They view these forces as the power behind the throne. In
January 2004, Zarqawi said he was going to use suicide attacks against the Iraqi security organs and Western agents in Iraq because they are ‘the eyes, ears and hands of the American occupier.’
Who are the Iraqi suicide attackers? Right now their identity is murky, which is normal in the opening years of a suicide terrorist campaign. The identities typically come later.
While we can only identify about 12 to 15 per cent of the Iraqi suicide attackers, this data shows they come from two main groups: Iraqi Sunnis and Saudis.
The next largest grouping is from Syria, followed by Kuwait. The attackers come either from Iraq itself or the immediately adjacent border areas.
There is not a single instance of an Iranian suicide attacker. There are none from Pakistan and none from Sudan. Given the evidence from the Chicago Project, this fits—it is perfectly consistent with the strategic logic of suicide terrorism.
Demographics of Suicide Terrorists
The Chicago Project has studied 462 suicide terrorists and provides reasonably good primary demographics data for the group as a whole. There is also relatively sound socio-economic data for the Arab attackers.
This data provides some fresh insight into past cases. Prior to this effort, our understanding of that famous suicide terrorist group in Lebanon, Hezbollah, was quite thin. We knew that it was an umbrella organisation and that Islamic fundamentalism obviously mattered.
Many speculated that Hezbollah attackers must be poor, uneducated religious fanatics. We now know that these suicide attackers come from a far broader range of backgrounds.
Perhaps the most important aspect is the ideology of the attackers—we can identify the ideology for 38 of the 41 Hezbollah suicide attackers:
20 per cent (8) were Islamic fundamentalist
71 per cent (27) attackers were secular; communists or socialists from groups such as the Lebanese Communist Party
3 were Christian—one a Christian high school teacher with a Bachelor of Arts degree
[okay then! - 27 Communists - 8 Islamic - 3 Christian]
The project collected hundreds of recruiting pictures of suicide attackers. It is striking to see them in Western clothes with Western make-up—hardly the image of the Islamic fundamentalist. This is not the image that would be projected if the aim were to recruit Islamic fundamentalists.
The project also found interesting characteristics concerning the suicide attackers overall. Interestingly, female attackers are almost always older than male attackers. Female bombers are commonly presented as young women who are easily swayed.
However, any comparison of the ages of male and female attackers shows that about 46 per cent of female attackers are over the age of 24. These are not young adolescent girls; these are mostly mature, fully formed personalities, adult mature women.
The socio-economic data on the Arab attackers adds an interesting perspective. These attackers are much more educated than many expect.
Only 10 per cent have primary education or less compared to almost half in their respective societies; 54 per cent have some degree of post-secondary education, compared to only a small fraction in their surrounding societies.
Income provides a different perspective again: the attackers are overwhelmingly working class or middle class, not unemployed. A total of 17 per cent occupy the bottom rung of society or are unemployed compared to a third in their societies as a whole, and 76 per cent are working or middle class.
They are technicians, mechanics, waiters, police, ambulance drivers, security guards, and teachers. Many quit their jobs just a few days or a few weeks before their attacks.
Both secular and religious attackers have the same income distribution, and religious attackers are more highly educated.
Suicide attackers are not—and have not been from the beginning—mainly poor, uneducated religious zealots, but well-educated workers from both religious and secular backgrounds.
Conclusion
The main cause of the threat we face is the sustained presence of US and Western combat forces on the Arabian Peninsula. In 2001, there were 12 000 American combat soldiers on the Peninsula: 5 000 inside Saudi Arabia, 7 000 in other countries. Today, over 170 000 Western combat forces occupy Iraq and other countries on the Arabian Peninsula.
As this presence has increased, suicide terrorism—first by Iraqis and then by al-Qaeda—has been surging. This does not mean that the Coalition should simply ‘cut and run’.
The stability of this region is crucial to that of the entire Middle East and Iraq, in particular, holds oil assets vital to the global community. On the other hand, Coalition forces should not simply stay and die; the longer Western combat forces remain on the Arabian Peninsula, the greater the risk of the next 9/11, 7/7, Bali bombings or worse.
In my book, Dying to Win, I map out a new approach, a new military strategy for the Persian Gulf. I call this strategy ‘offshore balancing’.
The core of the idea is not to have military forces stationed ashore on the Arabian Peninsula, but to have them offshore, poised and ready to intervene in a military crisis.
This strategy is quite similar to the military strategy the West used for decades before 1990. In the 1970s and 1980s the West successfully maintained its core interests in the Persian Gulf without stationing a single combat soldier on dry land
Instead, an alliance was formed with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and even critics of the war in Iraq should see the benefits of this policy. The US has numerous aircraft carriers stationed off the coast of the Arabian Peninsula as a matter of course, and readily available airpower which is far more effective than it was 30 years ago.
Finally, in the 1970s and 1980s the United States maintained a system of bases without ground troops, but bases through which troops could rapidly deploy in a crisis.
The US should be moving to an offshore balancing strategy with a phased withdrawal of ground troops from the Persian Gulf over the next three to four years.
//////
blech
June 6, 2024
A PROVOCATIVE AND INFORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF SUCH TERRORISM
Robert Anthony Pape Jr. is professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He wrote in the first chapter of this 2005 book, “I have compiled a database of every suicide bombing and attack around the globe from 1980 through 2003---315 attacks in all. It includes every attack in which at least one terrorist killed himself or herself while attempting to kill others; it excludes attacks authorized by a national government, for example North Korea against the South. This database is the first complete universe of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide… The data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism , or any one of the world’s religions… Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland. Religion is rarely the root cause, although it is often used as a tool by terrorist organizations in recruiting and in other efforts in service of the broader strategic objective.” (Pg. 3-4)
He adds, “Since September 11, 2001, the United States has responded to the growing threat of suicide terrorism by embarking on a policy to conquer Muslim countries---not simply rooting out existing havens for terrorists in Afghanistan but going further to remake Muslim societies in the Persian Gulf…the close association between foreign military occupations and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied regions should make us hesitate over any strategy centering on the transformation of Muslim societies by means of heavy military power… the sustained presence of heavy American combat forces in Muslim countries is likely to INCREASE the odds of the next 9/11. To win the war on terrorism, we must have a new conception of victory. The key to lasting security lies not only in rooting out today’s generation of terrorists who are actively planning to kill Americans, but also in preventing the next, potentially larger generation from rising up.” (Pg. 6-7)
He outlines, “The strategic logic of suicide terrorism is aimed at political coercion. The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks … occur in clusters as part of a larger campaign by an organized group to achieve a specific political goal… Suicide terrorist campaigns are primarily nationalistic, not religious, nor are they particularly Islamic… Further, all of the target states have been democracies, which terrorists see as more vulnerable to coercion than other types of regimes… There is a disturbing reason why suicide terrorism has been rising rapidly: over the past two decades, suicide terrorists have learned that this strategy pays.” (Pg. 21-22)
He continues, “suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupations… Religion plays a role. However, modern suicide terrorism is best understood as an extreme strategy for national liberation against democracies with troops that pose an imminent threat to control the territory the terrorists view as their homeland.” (Pg. 23)
He summarizes, “At its core, suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion, a means to compel a target government to change policy… suicide terrorism attempts to inflict enough pain on the opposing society to overwhelm its interest in resisting the terrorists’ demands, and so induce the government to concede, or the population to revolt against the government… Suicide terrorists’ willingness to die magnifies the coercive effects of punishment in three ways. First, suicide attacks are generally more destructive than other terrorist attacks… Second, suicide attacks are an especially convincing way to signal the likelihood of more pain to come… Third, suicide terrorist organizations are better positioned than other terrorist groups to heighten expectations of escalating future costs by deliberately violating norms in the use of violence… by breaching taboos concerning legitimate targets, and by broadening recruitment to confound expectations about the limits of possible terrorists… it suggests the attackers cannot be deterred… Americans would have to expect that future al-Qaeda attackers would be equally willing to die.” (Pg. 27-29)
He acknowledges, “The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works. Even more troubling, the encouraging lessons that terrorists have learned from the experience of suicide terrorist campaigns since 1980 are not, for the most part, products of wild-eyed interpretations or wishful thinking. They are, rather, quite reasonable assessments of the relationship between terrorists’ coercive efforts and the political gains that the terrorists have achieved in many of these cases.” (Pg. 61)
He points out, “of the thirteen suicide terrorist campaigns that were completed during 980-2003, seven correlate with significant policy changes by the target state toward the terrorists’ major political goals… Even a 50 percent success rate is remarkable: international military and economic coercion generally works less than a third of the time, and is especially rare for groups with few other options.” (Pg. 64-65)
He argues, “Suicide terrorism rarely evolves from tiny bands of ordinary terrorists, but instead commonly arises from broad-based nationalist liberation movements, those that typically have pursued guerilla warfare and found that a guerilla strategy is inadequate to achieve their nationalist aspirations… suicide terrorist groups are … deciding whether to use suicide attack as an extension of a broader guerilla warfare strategy.” (Pg. 93)
He suggests, “If al-Qaeda’s truly transnational support were to dry up tomorrow, the group would remain a robust threat to the United States. However, if al-Qaeda no longer drew recruits from the Sunni Muslim countries where there is a heavy American military presence or where the government receives strong U.S. support, the remaining transnational network would pose a far smaller threat and might well simply collapse.” (Pg. 125)
He summarizes, “My theory argues that national resistance to foreign occupation, a democratic political system in the occupying power, and a religious difference between the occupied and occupying societies are the main causal factors leading to the rise of suicide terrorist campaigns… It also explains why a DIFFERENCE in the predominate religion of the two societies… is a main cause for why some foreign occupations by a democratic state escalate to suicide terrorism and others do not.” (Pg. 126)
He notes, “The prevalence of team suicide attacks strongly indicates the presence of altruistic motives among a significant number of suicide attackers. Even if all suicide attackers had some personal motive to die, suicide attackers who work together as a team must also be motivated, at least partly, to achieve a collective purpose, the completion of a group mission that serves a cause beyond their own personal death.” (Pg. 186)
He points out, “In general, suicide attackers are rarely socially isolated, clinically insane, or economically destitute individuals, but are most often educated, socially integrated, and highly capable people who could be expected to have a good future. The profile of a suicide terrorist resembles that of a politically conscious individual who might join a grassroots movement more than it does the stereotypical murderer, religious cult member, or everyday suicide.” (Pg. 200)
He concludes, “Although many had hoped that American and Western counterterrorism efforts would have reduced the threat, the facts show otherwise… the West’s strategy for the war on terrorism is fundamentally flawed… the strategic logic of suicide terrorism---along with the presence of Western combat forces in Iraq and on the Arabian peninsula---remains the core factor driving the threat we face.” (Pg. 251-252) He adds, “[This book] suggests a simple, effective strategy… a return to our traditional policy of ‘offshore balancing’ in the Persian Gulf.” (Pg. 261)
This is a very thought-provoking analysis, that will be “must reading” for anyone interested in the subject of terrorism.
Robert Anthony Pape Jr. is professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He wrote in the first chapter of this 2005 book, “I have compiled a database of every suicide bombing and attack around the globe from 1980 through 2003---315 attacks in all. It includes every attack in which at least one terrorist killed himself or herself while attempting to kill others; it excludes attacks authorized by a national government, for example North Korea against the South. This database is the first complete universe of suicide terrorist attacks worldwide… The data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism , or any one of the world’s religions… Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland. Religion is rarely the root cause, although it is often used as a tool by terrorist organizations in recruiting and in other efforts in service of the broader strategic objective.” (Pg. 3-4)
He adds, “Since September 11, 2001, the United States has responded to the growing threat of suicide terrorism by embarking on a policy to conquer Muslim countries---not simply rooting out existing havens for terrorists in Afghanistan but going further to remake Muslim societies in the Persian Gulf…the close association between foreign military occupations and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied regions should make us hesitate over any strategy centering on the transformation of Muslim societies by means of heavy military power… the sustained presence of heavy American combat forces in Muslim countries is likely to INCREASE the odds of the next 9/11. To win the war on terrorism, we must have a new conception of victory. The key to lasting security lies not only in rooting out today’s generation of terrorists who are actively planning to kill Americans, but also in preventing the next, potentially larger generation from rising up.” (Pg. 6-7)
He outlines, “The strategic logic of suicide terrorism is aimed at political coercion. The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks … occur in clusters as part of a larger campaign by an organized group to achieve a specific political goal… Suicide terrorist campaigns are primarily nationalistic, not religious, nor are they particularly Islamic… Further, all of the target states have been democracies, which terrorists see as more vulnerable to coercion than other types of regimes… There is a disturbing reason why suicide terrorism has been rising rapidly: over the past two decades, suicide terrorists have learned that this strategy pays.” (Pg. 21-22)
He continues, “suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupations… Religion plays a role. However, modern suicide terrorism is best understood as an extreme strategy for national liberation against democracies with troops that pose an imminent threat to control the territory the terrorists view as their homeland.” (Pg. 23)
He summarizes, “At its core, suicide terrorism is a strategy of coercion, a means to compel a target government to change policy… suicide terrorism attempts to inflict enough pain on the opposing society to overwhelm its interest in resisting the terrorists’ demands, and so induce the government to concede, or the population to revolt against the government… Suicide terrorists’ willingness to die magnifies the coercive effects of punishment in three ways. First, suicide attacks are generally more destructive than other terrorist attacks… Second, suicide attacks are an especially convincing way to signal the likelihood of more pain to come… Third, suicide terrorist organizations are better positioned than other terrorist groups to heighten expectations of escalating future costs by deliberately violating norms in the use of violence… by breaching taboos concerning legitimate targets, and by broadening recruitment to confound expectations about the limits of possible terrorists… it suggests the attackers cannot be deterred… Americans would have to expect that future al-Qaeda attackers would be equally willing to die.” (Pg. 27-29)
He acknowledges, “The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works. Even more troubling, the encouraging lessons that terrorists have learned from the experience of suicide terrorist campaigns since 1980 are not, for the most part, products of wild-eyed interpretations or wishful thinking. They are, rather, quite reasonable assessments of the relationship between terrorists’ coercive efforts and the political gains that the terrorists have achieved in many of these cases.” (Pg. 61)
He points out, “of the thirteen suicide terrorist campaigns that were completed during 980-2003, seven correlate with significant policy changes by the target state toward the terrorists’ major political goals… Even a 50 percent success rate is remarkable: international military and economic coercion generally works less than a third of the time, and is especially rare for groups with few other options.” (Pg. 64-65)
He argues, “Suicide terrorism rarely evolves from tiny bands of ordinary terrorists, but instead commonly arises from broad-based nationalist liberation movements, those that typically have pursued guerilla warfare and found that a guerilla strategy is inadequate to achieve their nationalist aspirations… suicide terrorist groups are … deciding whether to use suicide attack as an extension of a broader guerilla warfare strategy.” (Pg. 93)
He suggests, “If al-Qaeda’s truly transnational support were to dry up tomorrow, the group would remain a robust threat to the United States. However, if al-Qaeda no longer drew recruits from the Sunni Muslim countries where there is a heavy American military presence or where the government receives strong U.S. support, the remaining transnational network would pose a far smaller threat and might well simply collapse.” (Pg. 125)
He summarizes, “My theory argues that national resistance to foreign occupation, a democratic political system in the occupying power, and a religious difference between the occupied and occupying societies are the main causal factors leading to the rise of suicide terrorist campaigns… It also explains why a DIFFERENCE in the predominate religion of the two societies… is a main cause for why some foreign occupations by a democratic state escalate to suicide terrorism and others do not.” (Pg. 126)
He notes, “The prevalence of team suicide attacks strongly indicates the presence of altruistic motives among a significant number of suicide attackers. Even if all suicide attackers had some personal motive to die, suicide attackers who work together as a team must also be motivated, at least partly, to achieve a collective purpose, the completion of a group mission that serves a cause beyond their own personal death.” (Pg. 186)
He points out, “In general, suicide attackers are rarely socially isolated, clinically insane, or economically destitute individuals, but are most often educated, socially integrated, and highly capable people who could be expected to have a good future. The profile of a suicide terrorist resembles that of a politically conscious individual who might join a grassroots movement more than it does the stereotypical murderer, religious cult member, or everyday suicide.” (Pg. 200)
He concludes, “Although many had hoped that American and Western counterterrorism efforts would have reduced the threat, the facts show otherwise… the West’s strategy for the war on terrorism is fundamentally flawed… the strategic logic of suicide terrorism---along with the presence of Western combat forces in Iraq and on the Arabian peninsula---remains the core factor driving the threat we face.” (Pg. 251-252) He adds, “[This book] suggests a simple, effective strategy… a return to our traditional policy of ‘offshore balancing’ in the Persian Gulf.” (Pg. 261)
This is a very thought-provoking analysis, that will be “must reading” for anyone interested in the subject of terrorism.
December 19, 2016
A parody study of a true believer. Fanaticism and pseudo-logic primes, the rest could and should go to heck.
"THE TARGETS OF modern suicide terrorist campaigns have been democratic states which have stationed heavy combat troops on the territory that the terrorists viewed as their national homeland." No. Those with the homeland are the pan-arabism supporters, which are secular and want to use ethnicity as a support for a larger, more powerful union. What hysterical white old men call terrorists in 2016 are islamists who try to resurrect the caliphate. For a bureaucrat like Pape, there is no difference: dark skinned people who try to blow up his big screen TV or raise the gas prices so he won't be able to buy the next Summer cruise de luxe version. Pan Arabs would include all Arabs. Islamists, even the most lax, will not include christian Arabs.
Add the self-gratification with the "democratic states". Well, given enough time, even half the time it took the "Western nations" and the caliphate might become more democratic than theocratic compared with Ireland, France or the Bible Belt States.
Add that in the case of Europe, the so called terrorists are born and raised in Europe and the whole book becomes a mere rant.
"THE TARGETS OF modern suicide terrorist campaigns have been democratic states which have stationed heavy combat troops on the territory that the terrorists viewed as their national homeland." No. Those with the homeland are the pan-arabism supporters, which are secular and want to use ethnicity as a support for a larger, more powerful union. What hysterical white old men call terrorists in 2016 are islamists who try to resurrect the caliphate. For a bureaucrat like Pape, there is no difference: dark skinned people who try to blow up his big screen TV or raise the gas prices so he won't be able to buy the next Summer cruise de luxe version. Pan Arabs would include all Arabs. Islamists, even the most lax, will not include christian Arabs.
Add the self-gratification with the "democratic states". Well, given enough time, even half the time it took the "Western nations" and the caliphate might become more democratic than theocratic compared with Ireland, France or the Bible Belt States.
Add that in the case of Europe, the so called terrorists are born and raised in Europe and the whole book becomes a mere rant.
June 22, 2016
"Suicide terrorist groups are [not] religious cults isolated from the rest of their society, ... Rather, suicide terrorist organizations often command broad social support within the national communities from which they recruit, because they are seen as pursuing legitimate nationalist goals, especially liberation from foreign occupation."
If you still believe that suicide terrorist groups are always intact with religious fundamentalism at play, you should consider reading this books. Robert Pape spends most of his life to study suicide terrorists groups and classified using statistics. The reason to use suicide as a method merely to induce more fears, to create a sense of terror and strike the very line of social structure. He is also implying some arguments that people who join terrorist groups are not just because they're brainwashed but also having slight motivation to drive anger towards something. They're just angry induced cocktail met with modern dilemma of existential angst.
If you still believe that suicide terrorist groups are always intact with religious fundamentalism at play, you should consider reading this books. Robert Pape spends most of his life to study suicide terrorists groups and classified using statistics. The reason to use suicide as a method merely to induce more fears, to create a sense of terror and strike the very line of social structure. He is also implying some arguments that people who join terrorist groups are not just because they're brainwashed but also having slight motivation to drive anger towards something. They're just angry induced cocktail met with modern dilemma of existential angst.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 29, 2025
Pape’s thesis—that suicide terrorism is primarily a rational response to military occupation rather than religious fanaticism—becomes increasingly problematic when examined alongside psychological evidence presented in works like Lankford’s “The Myth of Martyrdom,” which I have just read. Pape’s repeated emphasis on the Tamil Tigers as a secular template obscures the theological mechanisms that differentiate Islamic suicide operations from other forms of political violence. His analysis fails to adequately address how Islamic concepts of shahada (martyrdom) and jihad provide constitutive paths that transform suicidal ideation into religiously sanctioned action. Pape’s rational-actor model cannot adequately explain the dimensions of groups like Al-Qaeda or the takfiri logic that renders mass civilian casualties theologically permissible.
A regularly cited piece of work, but one that feels flawed and biased.
A regularly cited piece of work, but one that feels flawed and biased.
December 8, 2013
Interesting Quote:
The close association between foreign military occupations and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied regions should make us hesitate over any strategy centering on the transformation of Muslim societies by means of heavy military power...we should recognize that the sustained presence of heavy American combat forces in Muslim countries is likely to INCREASE the odds of the next 9/11."
-Robert Pape, Dying to Win
"American military policy in the Persian Gulf was the pivotal factor leading to September 11. Although Islamic fundamentalism mattered, the stationing of tens of thousands of American combat troops on the Arabian peninsula from 1990-2001 probably increased the risk of al-Qaeda suicide attacks against Americans, including the events of September 11, 2001, ten to twenty times."
-Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win
The close association between foreign military occupations and the growth of suicide terrorist movements in the occupied regions should make us hesitate over any strategy centering on the transformation of Muslim societies by means of heavy military power...we should recognize that the sustained presence of heavy American combat forces in Muslim countries is likely to INCREASE the odds of the next 9/11."
-Robert Pape, Dying to Win
"American military policy in the Persian Gulf was the pivotal factor leading to September 11. Although Islamic fundamentalism mattered, the stationing of tens of thousands of American combat troops on the Arabian peninsula from 1990-2001 probably increased the risk of al-Qaeda suicide attacks against Americans, including the events of September 11, 2001, ten to twenty times."
-Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win
August 24, 2016
درس روبرت بيب كل العمليات الانتحارية بين ١٩٨٠ و ٢٠٠٣، عددها ٣١٥ عملية.
استثنى منها العمليات المدعومة من قبل الحكومات مثل عمليات كوريا الشمالية ضد جارتها الجنوبية.
تظهر قاعدة البيانات هذه ضعف الارتباط بين العمليات الانتحارية والأصولية الاسلامية.
فنمور التاميل وهي حركة ماركسية لينينية قامت بعمليات انتحارية اكثر من حركة حماس بواقع ٧٦ عملية من أصل ٣١٥.
تشترك كل العمليات الانتحارية في كونها تسعى لهدف دنيوي وهو اجبار الديمقراطيات الحديثة لسحب قواتها من أراضي يعتبرها الارهابيين موطناً لهم.
الدين نادراً ما يكون السبب الجذري للعمليات الإرهابية الانتحارية مع أن الدين يستخدم كوسيلة لتجنيد الأفراد.
الارتباط بين الاحتلال الأجنبي والعمليات الانتحارية لا يعني أن الدين لا يلعب أي دور، ولكنها تبين خطأ الفكرة السائدة التي تعتبر الكراهية الدينية والأصولية الإسلامية هي مصدر هذه العمليات.
كتاب مهم جداً، لكنه مُرهق للغاية
استثنى منها العمليات المدعومة من قبل الحكومات مثل عمليات كوريا الشمالية ضد جارتها الجنوبية.
تظهر قاعدة البيانات هذه ضعف الارتباط بين العمليات الانتحارية والأصولية الاسلامية.
فنمور التاميل وهي حركة ماركسية لينينية قامت بعمليات انتحارية اكثر من حركة حماس بواقع ٧٦ عملية من أصل ٣١٥.
تشترك كل العمليات الانتحارية في كونها تسعى لهدف دنيوي وهو اجبار الديمقراطيات الحديثة لسحب قواتها من أراضي يعتبرها الارهابيين موطناً لهم.
الدين نادراً ما يكون السبب الجذري للعمليات الإرهابية الانتحارية مع أن الدين يستخدم كوسيلة لتجنيد الأفراد.
الارتباط بين الاحتلال الأجنبي والعمليات الانتحارية لا يعني أن الدين لا يلعب أي دور، ولكنها تبين خطأ الفكرة السائدة التي تعتبر الكراهية الدينية والأصولية الإسلامية هي مصدر هذه العمليات.
كتاب مهم جداً، لكنه مُرهق للغاية
March 16, 2012
This is something I thing everyone should read in light of the events on and following 9/11
This idea that somehow the attacks were motivated simply by religious indoctrination is both a flawed and dangerous idea. It's easy for someone like Bin Laden to have won over poor and abused people using God or Allah as a scale tipper, but the real reason are strictly political and territorial in nature.
This book explain this in a clear and concise, a fairly readable format. If you don't "get it" after reading this, perhaps you should consider your own indoctrination.
This idea that somehow the attacks were motivated simply by religious indoctrination is both a flawed and dangerous idea. It's easy for someone like Bin Laden to have won over poor and abused people using God or Allah as a scale tipper, but the real reason are strictly political and territorial in nature.
This book explain this in a clear and concise, a fairly readable format. If you don't "get it" after reading this, perhaps you should consider your own indoctrination.
November 12, 2007
This book examines the known facts about suicide terrorism, using data about suicide bombers ages, social class, education and motivation. Pape offers convincing evidence that suicide bombers are not, as a rule, motivated by desperate personal circumstances but by military or economic occupation or domination of their territory. An excellent read, and a must-read book if we want to truly deal with terrorism.
February 14, 2013
Initially, Dying to Win seemed fascinating, and I still think its central thesis -- that suicide terrorism shouldn't be thought of as "a religious thing", but rather as something carried out for nationalistic reasons -- is thought-provoking.
However, the book quickly became incredibly repetitive, to the extent that I began to wonder if Robert Pape had enough material to warrant a whole book on this subject.
However, the book quickly became incredibly repetitive, to the extent that I began to wonder if Robert Pape had enough material to warrant a whole book on this subject.
January 8, 2015
Interesting theory that I whole heartedly believe but as others have said, highly repetitive. Also, he constantly uses "statistics" that are very ineffectual or boring. So many times I skipped a section that is statistics heavy mostly because the sample size is so small to make even the most educated guess irrelevant.
I would immensely love for the author to write an update with the last 12 years included and its effect on his thesis.
I would immensely love for the author to write an update with the last 12 years included and its effect on his thesis.
January 25, 2012
Does anyone else feel like the episode of South Park satirizing Jersey Shore was using the logic presented in Pape's book?
January 24, 2017
It's a pity that the conversation between this guy and Sam Harris' never happened. I feel like they would have both a lot to learn from each other.
June 8, 2020
Robert Pape does a superb job analyzing why terrorist groups turn to suicide attacks and a fine job offering prescriptions for how states can safeguard against these attacks.
Pape systematically dismantles the many erroneous explanations offered for why terrorists commit suicide attacks and why terrorist groups use these methods. Suicide terrorists bear no common demographics across income, education level, religion, or even gender. There is similarly no relationship between the frequently-cited reasons why individuals commit suicide and why terrorists commit suicide. Many victims or suicide express mental health problems, substance abuse, depression, a lack of social support, and view suicide as a way to end this existence. Suicide terrorists commit altruistic suicide meaning they do so in pursuit of a larger goal, in their view, for the common good. Most suicide terrorists, at the time of this writing, were not Islamic fundamentalists, contrary to popular assertion. Nor do terrorist groups seek maximalist goals of world domination. Rather, their goals are often specific, secular and nationalist. This is Pape’s most important contribution to the study of terrorist as our understanding of the causes or terrorism should dictate our response. The target of terrorists’ ire is not our society but our policies, specifically our occupation of foreign lands and stationing of U.S. troops abroad. This, Pape argues, should instruct American policy makers to consider the negative impact our military presence causes on terrorists desire to commit attacks against us as greater than the perceived gain of democratization or the Muslim world.
Most troubling is that terrorist groups are somewhat effective in achieving partial if not total victory of their goals. That being said, removing the conditions/grievances that terrorists use to recruit (if possible to achieve without significantly harming otherwise vital US interests) would be an effective means of reducing their capacity to incite against us.
Pape systematically dismantles the many erroneous explanations offered for why terrorists commit suicide attacks and why terrorist groups use these methods. Suicide terrorists bear no common demographics across income, education level, religion, or even gender. There is similarly no relationship between the frequently-cited reasons why individuals commit suicide and why terrorists commit suicide. Many victims or suicide express mental health problems, substance abuse, depression, a lack of social support, and view suicide as a way to end this existence. Suicide terrorists commit altruistic suicide meaning they do so in pursuit of a larger goal, in their view, for the common good. Most suicide terrorists, at the time of this writing, were not Islamic fundamentalists, contrary to popular assertion. Nor do terrorist groups seek maximalist goals of world domination. Rather, their goals are often specific, secular and nationalist. This is Pape’s most important contribution to the study of terrorist as our understanding of the causes or terrorism should dictate our response. The target of terrorists’ ire is not our society but our policies, specifically our occupation of foreign lands and stationing of U.S. troops abroad. This, Pape argues, should instruct American policy makers to consider the negative impact our military presence causes on terrorists desire to commit attacks against us as greater than the perceived gain of democratization or the Muslim world.
Most troubling is that terrorist groups are somewhat effective in achieving partial if not total victory of their goals. That being said, removing the conditions/grievances that terrorists use to recruit (if possible to achieve without significantly harming otherwise vital US interests) would be an effective means of reducing their capacity to incite against us.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 26, 2018
this is a dissection of a number of suicide bombing campaigns from around the world, highlighting the motivations and reasoning behind these actions, and then suggesting a course of action for the US that would deal with this issue in a sensible way. The main issue is that this book ends in 2005, with mention of the 7/7 London attacks, the failed attacks two weeks later and the exponential increase in suicide attacks in Iraq between 2003 and 2005; obviously this leaves the question open as to whether or not what has happened since has been a result of US policy not changing as suggested (which appears on the surface to be a logical conclusion), or if the changes have occurred because of other factors. An updated book would be good...
April 22, 2021
Spent weeks reading this. Longest one this year, I may add. It's for school stuff, analytical paper for our understanding society, culture, and politics.
Pape's research helped me to understand why this phenomena occurs. It broadened my perspective in a way that I became aware of why they sacrifice their lives. It can be categorized in three forms: Egoistical, Altruistic, and Fatalistic.
I've respect Pape's thorough research but one thing that I didn't like is his repetitiveness.
Pape's research helped me to understand why this phenomena occurs. It broadened my perspective in a way that I became aware of why they sacrifice their lives. It can be categorized in three forms: Egoistical, Altruistic, and Fatalistic.
I've respect Pape's thorough research but one thing that I didn't like is his repetitiveness.
December 21, 2019
I guess it is brave to say in the US that American occupation breeds suicide terrorism so we should give some points for saying that. Proposed solutions range from energetic independence, removing troops aaaand.... drums.... building a Mexic border fence. The gist of it? Oil is important. Nothing else matters
January 25, 2024
A thorough study on the world of suicide terrorism, delving deep into the topic from different angles politically, socially, and personally.
A great read for debate lovers who are interested in counter arguments against the stereotypical narrative of the relationship between fundamental islam and terrorism.
A great read for debate lovers who are interested in counter arguments against the stereotypical narrative of the relationship between fundamental islam and terrorism.
June 18, 2017
An awesome book that sheds light on a much misunderstood topic. At times it gets a bit redundant but Mr. Pape hammers home the main point. Suicide terrorists are predominantly opposed to foreign occupation, not simply harbor ing strong hatred of the West.
October 26, 2020
“Some are driven by social prestige, some are out for revenge, and others are driven by religion... However, what cuts across these various personal situations is the common motive to end the threat of foreign occupation”.
June 16, 2017
Very well researched
This is a book that is well researched, and sheds light on the topic of suicide terrorism in a new way.
It was a paradigm shifter for me.
This is a book that is well researched, and sheds light on the topic of suicide terrorism in a new way.
It was a paradigm shifter for me.
April 11, 2022
This read like a doctoral student took his thesis and published it. Interesting but very dense and you trudge through it.
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