This is a thorough and sophisticated study of one of the most critical current issues in world politics. Bruce Porter examines Soviet policy and behaviour in Third World conflicts in the postwar period, focusing particularly on five examples: the Yemeni civil war, the Nigerian civil war, the Yom Kippur war, the Angolan civil war, and the Ogaden war. Aiming to illuminate various complex tactical and operational aspects of the USSR's policy in local conflicts, the author draws on a wide and eclectic range of sources. He pays close attention to the Soviet role as arms supplier and diplomatic actor in relation to both US policy and the dynamics of the local conflict, and he concludes with a careful consideration of the effectiveness of Soviet policy and of the implications for the United States.
This work essentially covers five Soviet Russian incursions/interventions in Third World countries during the 1960's and 1970's. I read this book because I wanted to understand if there was some consistency between Soviet Russian policy and contemporary Russian foreign policies. It seems that the underlying reason for intervention always comes back to prestige and legitmacy. As the leader of the Communist world (although China and Tito would have disputed this claim, and probably later Albania and Romania), the USSR sought to assert its post-WWII military might abroad with the goal of earning prestige as a national liberator of nations at risk of being consumed by Western Imperialism. The USSR, however, was always keenly aware that any foreign intervention, no matter how benelevolent is wished to appear, was at risk of losing prestige if it chose to intervene in a conflict in which the power it backed ended up on the losing side of a conflict. Especially after the 1967 Six Day War, the USSR was especially careful not enter into conflicts in which the the faction backed the USSR showed strong signs of being the eventual victor. Alongside the desire to gain prestige in the international community, the USSR primarily played the role of the anti-imperialist, anti-Western option. This desire to stand apart from and above Western models of diplomacy and conflict resolution seems always to be a constant in Russian international affairs. As a nation with a long history of political, military, and economic ups and downs, Russian foreign policymakers are always on the look-out to reassert their place in the international order. This tendency is again playing out in the Russian foreign policy agenda in its contemporary security agenda. This difference now, though, is that Russian geopolitical moves seem less thought-out and implications for failure, or even quagmire, have not been considered. While the pattern of Russian intervention in its near abroad is the same, the measured, careful (if naive) considerations for intervention seemed to have been dropped for a more free-willing, damn-the-consequences approach to international affairs.