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Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War
An incisive account of the Persian Gulf War, Storm Over Iraq shows how the success of Operation Desert Storm was the product of two decades of profound changes in the American approach to defense, military doctrine, and combat operations. The first detailed analysis of why the Gulf War could be fought the way it was, the book examines the planning and preparation for war. Richard P. Hallion argues that the ascendancy of precision air power in warfare—which fulfilled the promise that air power had held for more than seventy-five years—reflects the revolutionary adaptation of a war strategy that targets things rather than people, allowing one to control an opposing nation without destroying it.
386 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 1992
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About the author
Richard P. Hallion
73 books1 followerRichard P. Hallion is Senior Adviser for Air and Space Issues, Directorate for Security, Counterintelligence and Special Programs Oversight, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 31, 2021
The only two chapters that prove the argument he is trying to make - that air power was the primary reason for the coalition’s victory in the Gulf War - are chapters 6 and 7. Even then, a lot of the analysis here merely proves that the air war was extensive (eg. providing statistics about the number of air strikes per day) without proving its effectiveness (eg. did these air strikes destroy its targets.) To be fair, the author does evaluate this eventually, and explains (quite compellingly) why the air strikes were effective, so maybe I’m just being overly impatient.
December 9, 2025
Wonderfully contextualized with several chapters describing the history of strategic air campaigns. The failures over Vietnam are well articulated, though a more thorough accounting of the WWII campaigns would have described how the enormous expenditure of matériel by the Germans was a win in its own right.
The description of the late 1970s sag in military confidence and performance was interesting. It had not been clear to me before exactly how poorly run it was at that time and how much effort had to be expended to turn it into a decent fighting force again.
Extremely ironic to hear the author discussing the capabilities of drones in an appendix, wherein drones of all types are the primary weapon of war, quite unexpectedly, just a few decades later.
The description of the late 1970s sag in military confidence and performance was interesting. It had not been clear to me before exactly how poorly run it was at that time and how much effort had to be expended to turn it into a decent fighting force again.
Extremely ironic to hear the author discussing the capabilities of drones in an appendix, wherein drones of all types are the primary weapon of war, quite unexpectedly, just a few decades later.
June 12, 2017
I've inserted my book review for my history class. Overall, it was an interesting book [despite being written a year after the Gulf War ended].
The book is about how Air Power essentially won the first Gulf War. The author begins by looking at air warfare in the major wars of this century as well as some of the 'minor conflicts' that occurred. Hallion discusses how despite air power being used to great effect in various wars/conflicts, it was often seen as being less of a determining force than evidence would indicate to be the case. After Vietnam, the US military went through a period of introspection and reduction; the 'loss' in Vietnam seen as being a paralyzing agent. Neither did failed military forays in the late 70s help stem this poor perception of the military's competency; regardless, Hallion points out that those in charge of the military did not want to experience 'another Vietnam' so they began searching for ways to win future conflicts with the forces at hand. President Reagan's presidency in the 1980s was seen as being very helpful in turning things around for the military; this was because Reagan's attitude and pride in the military was quite infectious and he supported military equipment programs whose detractors and critics claimed would never work in a real battle. As the military experimented and planned for battle with the Warsaw Pact nations, they were able to combine the forces of the three branches [Air Force Army, and Navy] to better utilize the weapons at hand. It was due to the military build-up of the 1980s, the development of the new weapons to be used by frontline troops, and studying prior 'mistakes' to develop new tactics combining the use of air and land forces that allowed the Coalition Forces to destroy the Iraqi military after 39 days of aerial attack followed by four days of ground attack supported by air power.
Major points of the book:
1. It is better to emphasize an offensive air doctrine throughout the course of a war that focuses on conducting intensive air operations as deep into enemy territory as practicable as opposed to following a defensive air doctrine where you wait for the enemy to attack you
2. The goal of long-range global air power and precision weaponry is to strike deep into enemy territory with the intent to destroy both the means and intent to resist by attacking both military targets and targets necessary for the opponent's war machine to function and by not attacking civilian targets
3. The three ‘primary missions’ of air missions are [1] air superiority, [2] strike, and [3] battlefield air support
4. Military force should be applied decisively, not as a means of sending signals to the opposition [i.e. – if you’re going to fight a war, fight it to win it!]
5. Air superiority is the most important contest in terms of winning a battlefield – no other operations can be sustained if the battle for air superiority is lost
Tie-in to the course:
Storm over Iraq ties in to this course because of [1] its broad look at airpower over the past eightysome years as well as [2] how it specifically focuses on how air power was used in the First Gulf War. The author discusses how massed air power in the First World War allowed various breakthroughs to occur that broke the stalemate at the front lines and forced German capitulation. During the Second World War, American precision bombing of German industrial and military targets effectively prevented the German War Machine from being able to fight because Germany could no longer build the weapons necessary for its survival. In the Pacific Theater, islands were turned into air bases to allow the B-29 bomber to bomb Japan at will; these attacks further eroded the ability of the Japanese to wage war. In Korea, air power prevented the North Koreans from conquering South Korea. In Vietnam, air power was used for close air support throughout the course of the war, and when North Vietnam left the peace table in 1972 Nixon ordered Linebacker I and II; these bombing missions effectively destroyed the North's ability to wage war and forced them back to the table to continue the peace talks. Despite the 'loss' in South Vietnam, the American Air Force anticipated the new fighters being developed would radically change aerial conflicts. Israel used air power to devastate the Arab nations in each of the conflicts it faced; the major lesson the Americans learned from Israel's battles was what would [could] happen if a military power waged a war with the intent to win that war instead of hamstringing the military forces like what happened in Vietnam. The British utilized air power in the form of Harrier jump jets and missiles to wage war against Argentina over the Falkland Islands in the early to mid 1980s. In each event, the military learned new lessons as well as relearned forgotten lessons from past conflicts on the appropriate use of air power.
In regard to the first Gulf War, the author discusses how the many new systems introduced and used by the US military in this conflict functioned above and beyond the expectations of the military and far beyond the wildest expectations of their detractors. The F-117 Stealth aircraft were very important to the use of Air Power in the Gulf War - they were able to hit multiple targets with each aircraft as opposed to the multiple non-stealth aircraft necessary to hit one target. The F-117 was able to destroy much if not most of the Iraqi defenses against air attack in the opening hours and days of the war, allowing the conventional aircraft to operate practically at will across the nation. Precision bombing allowed military targets to be destroyed with minimal civilian casualties. This can be contrasted directly with the 'precision bombing' of the US Army Air Force in WWII - even though military and industrial targets were selected thousands of civilians were still killed during the bombing raids into Germany. Nuclear-proof bunkers were no guarantee of safety from the precision bombing, either. Bombs would and did pierce the sides and roofs of bunkers, the explosion destroying bunkers from within. The Coalition Air Forces decimated the Iraqi military - once a unit was below fifty percent combat capable it was left alone because it could no longer wage effective warfare. The ground forces were content to let the Coalition Air Force bomb the Iraqi forces for as long as was deemed necessary; by the time the ground forces did invade the Iraqi survivors were surrendering en masse to the ground troops. The leaders of the Coalition Forces were worried about the number of casualties escalating once the ground forces moved into Kuwait and Iraq; their worries were groundless. The air attack had literally destroyed the Iraqi military's morale as much as it had their ability to fight, showing how important it was to have control of the air space above a battlefield and what overwhelming air power can do in terms of waging and winning a war.
The book is about how Air Power essentially won the first Gulf War. The author begins by looking at air warfare in the major wars of this century as well as some of the 'minor conflicts' that occurred. Hallion discusses how despite air power being used to great effect in various wars/conflicts, it was often seen as being less of a determining force than evidence would indicate to be the case. After Vietnam, the US military went through a period of introspection and reduction; the 'loss' in Vietnam seen as being a paralyzing agent. Neither did failed military forays in the late 70s help stem this poor perception of the military's competency; regardless, Hallion points out that those in charge of the military did not want to experience 'another Vietnam' so they began searching for ways to win future conflicts with the forces at hand. President Reagan's presidency in the 1980s was seen as being very helpful in turning things around for the military; this was because Reagan's attitude and pride in the military was quite infectious and he supported military equipment programs whose detractors and critics claimed would never work in a real battle. As the military experimented and planned for battle with the Warsaw Pact nations, they were able to combine the forces of the three branches [Air Force Army, and Navy] to better utilize the weapons at hand. It was due to the military build-up of the 1980s, the development of the new weapons to be used by frontline troops, and studying prior 'mistakes' to develop new tactics combining the use of air and land forces that allowed the Coalition Forces to destroy the Iraqi military after 39 days of aerial attack followed by four days of ground attack supported by air power.
Major points of the book:
1. It is better to emphasize an offensive air doctrine throughout the course of a war that focuses on conducting intensive air operations as deep into enemy territory as practicable as opposed to following a defensive air doctrine where you wait for the enemy to attack you
2. The goal of long-range global air power and precision weaponry is to strike deep into enemy territory with the intent to destroy both the means and intent to resist by attacking both military targets and targets necessary for the opponent's war machine to function and by not attacking civilian targets
3. The three ‘primary missions’ of air missions are [1] air superiority, [2] strike, and [3] battlefield air support
4. Military force should be applied decisively, not as a means of sending signals to the opposition [i.e. – if you’re going to fight a war, fight it to win it!]
5. Air superiority is the most important contest in terms of winning a battlefield – no other operations can be sustained if the battle for air superiority is lost
Tie-in to the course:
Storm over Iraq ties in to this course because of [1] its broad look at airpower over the past eightysome years as well as [2] how it specifically focuses on how air power was used in the First Gulf War. The author discusses how massed air power in the First World War allowed various breakthroughs to occur that broke the stalemate at the front lines and forced German capitulation. During the Second World War, American precision bombing of German industrial and military targets effectively prevented the German War Machine from being able to fight because Germany could no longer build the weapons necessary for its survival. In the Pacific Theater, islands were turned into air bases to allow the B-29 bomber to bomb Japan at will; these attacks further eroded the ability of the Japanese to wage war. In Korea, air power prevented the North Koreans from conquering South Korea. In Vietnam, air power was used for close air support throughout the course of the war, and when North Vietnam left the peace table in 1972 Nixon ordered Linebacker I and II; these bombing missions effectively destroyed the North's ability to wage war and forced them back to the table to continue the peace talks. Despite the 'loss' in South Vietnam, the American Air Force anticipated the new fighters being developed would radically change aerial conflicts. Israel used air power to devastate the Arab nations in each of the conflicts it faced; the major lesson the Americans learned from Israel's battles was what would [could] happen if a military power waged a war with the intent to win that war instead of hamstringing the military forces like what happened in Vietnam. The British utilized air power in the form of Harrier jump jets and missiles to wage war against Argentina over the Falkland Islands in the early to mid 1980s. In each event, the military learned new lessons as well as relearned forgotten lessons from past conflicts on the appropriate use of air power.
In regard to the first Gulf War, the author discusses how the many new systems introduced and used by the US military in this conflict functioned above and beyond the expectations of the military and far beyond the wildest expectations of their detractors. The F-117 Stealth aircraft were very important to the use of Air Power in the Gulf War - they were able to hit multiple targets with each aircraft as opposed to the multiple non-stealth aircraft necessary to hit one target. The F-117 was able to destroy much if not most of the Iraqi defenses against air attack in the opening hours and days of the war, allowing the conventional aircraft to operate practically at will across the nation. Precision bombing allowed military targets to be destroyed with minimal civilian casualties. This can be contrasted directly with the 'precision bombing' of the US Army Air Force in WWII - even though military and industrial targets were selected thousands of civilians were still killed during the bombing raids into Germany. Nuclear-proof bunkers were no guarantee of safety from the precision bombing, either. Bombs would and did pierce the sides and roofs of bunkers, the explosion destroying bunkers from within. The Coalition Air Forces decimated the Iraqi military - once a unit was below fifty percent combat capable it was left alone because it could no longer wage effective warfare. The ground forces were content to let the Coalition Air Force bomb the Iraqi forces for as long as was deemed necessary; by the time the ground forces did invade the Iraqi survivors were surrendering en masse to the ground troops. The leaders of the Coalition Forces were worried about the number of casualties escalating once the ground forces moved into Kuwait and Iraq; their worries were groundless. The air attack had literally destroyed the Iraqi military's morale as much as it had their ability to fight, showing how important it was to have control of the air space above a battlefield and what overwhelming air power can do in terms of waging and winning a war.
May 15, 2020
Okay but has flaws. It takes a while to arrive at the actual review of air power in the Gulf War, which in fairness is well-covered. However, the book’s overall conclusions about the might of air power in combat have not held up.
The Gulf War was an anachronism: a modern army outfitted with precision weapons and superior technology pitted against an army woefully outmatched in doctrine, equipment, and training. The playing field has been leveled too much for this to happen again. “Lesser” armies of today now understand and employ asymmetric tactics, which have worked to great effect against more powerful adversaries. Armies of Iraq’s size circa 1991 (4th largest in the world) are either now technologically competitive with the United States or have nuclear weapons as a deterrent. We are past the days of troop and tank formations wandering the open desert waiting to be picked apart by a B-52 bombing run.
The author is too eager to take the lessons of the successful air war in the Gulf and apply them as universal truths. An early indication of this troubled thesis was assigning worth to sortie numbers in Kosovo (which unlike he claims, did nothing to expedite Milosevic’s departure) while simultaneously claiming sortie numbers were a poor method of measuring success in Vietnam. It can’t be both!
One can read the review of the air war (Ch. 6 and Ch. 7) and get everything they need from the book.
The Gulf War was an anachronism: a modern army outfitted with precision weapons and superior technology pitted against an army woefully outmatched in doctrine, equipment, and training. The playing field has been leveled too much for this to happen again. “Lesser” armies of today now understand and employ asymmetric tactics, which have worked to great effect against more powerful adversaries. Armies of Iraq’s size circa 1991 (4th largest in the world) are either now technologically competitive with the United States or have nuclear weapons as a deterrent. We are past the days of troop and tank formations wandering the open desert waiting to be picked apart by a B-52 bombing run.
The author is too eager to take the lessons of the successful air war in the Gulf and apply them as universal truths. An early indication of this troubled thesis was assigning worth to sortie numbers in Kosovo (which unlike he claims, did nothing to expedite Milosevic’s departure) while simultaneously claiming sortie numbers were a poor method of measuring success in Vietnam. It can’t be both!
One can read the review of the air war (Ch. 6 and Ch. 7) and get everything they need from the book.
April 1, 2025
Disclaimer: My review doesn't belong to this book! It is about Iran-Iraq 1980-1988's aerial combat
من کتاب خاطرات خلبان آزاده تیمسار قاسم امینی رو مطالعه کردم ولی چون کتاب ایشون " بلندای آسمان وطن" از انتشارات سوره مهر در پلتفرم گودریدز هنوز ثبت نشده مجبور شدم این کتاب را انتخاب کنم.
تیمسار خلبان قاسم امینی را چند شب پیش در مهمانی تولدشان دیدم و به من گفتن که کتاب شان چاپ شده ولی کتابی که هزار صفحه بوده رو حدود ۴۰۰ صفحه سانسور کردن و به اصطلاح به مذاق یک سری افراد خوش نیامده.
خاطره دیدار ایشون و شاهزاده رضا پهلوی در گردان شکاری وليعهد خیلی خاطره زیبایی بودش و همین گونه خاطرات ایشان در کشور ايالات متحده آمریکا و دوره آموزشی F-4 Phantom نیز بسیار جالب و دوست داشتنی بودش، این که رفتار آمریکایی ها چقدر با مردم ایران (بویژه خلبانان شکاری نیروی هوایی شاهنشاهی)صمیمی و مثل خانواده خودشان با ایشون بوده.
تحمل شش تا هفت سال اسارت تیمسار، عموی نازنینم(اصطلاحی که ما خانواده های ارتشی به کار می بریم، و تحمل شکنجه ها و با وجود اینکه نیروی های ارتش بعثی عراق تلاش بر گرفتن اطلاعات از تیمسار را در دوره اسارت داشتن ولی ایشون که تربیت شده ارتش شاهنشاهی ایران بودن به هیچ عنوان کلامی به نیرو های دشمن نگفتن ولی با وجود تحمل این همه سختی پس از بازگشت به سرزمین آریایی خیلی در حق ایشان بدی و ظلم کردن.
این دیدگاه را تقدیم به همه سربازان و خلبانان شکاری شهید این خاک کهن من جمله پدربزرگ شهیدم و پدربزرگ مادریم تیمسار شیرافکن همتی و خود شخص عزیز تیمسار خلبان امینی می کنم.
بهار سال ۱۴۰۴ April 1st 2025
ایران Iran
من کتاب خاطرات خلبان آزاده تیمسار قاسم امینی رو مطالعه کردم ولی چون کتاب ایشون " بلندای آسمان وطن" از انتشارات سوره مهر در پلتفرم گودریدز هنوز ثبت نشده مجبور شدم این کتاب را انتخاب کنم.
تیمسار خلبان قاسم امینی را چند شب پیش در مهمانی تولدشان دیدم و به من گفتن که کتاب شان چاپ شده ولی کتابی که هزار صفحه بوده رو حدود ۴۰۰ صفحه سانسور کردن و به اصطلاح به مذاق یک سری افراد خوش نیامده.
خاطره دیدار ایشون و شاهزاده رضا پهلوی در گردان شکاری وليعهد خیلی خاطره زیبایی بودش و همین گونه خاطرات ایشان در کشور ايالات متحده آمریکا و دوره آموزشی F-4 Phantom نیز بسیار جالب و دوست داشتنی بودش، این که رفتار آمریکایی ها چقدر با مردم ایران (بویژه خلبانان شکاری نیروی هوایی شاهنشاهی)صمیمی و مثل خانواده خودشان با ایشون بوده.
تحمل شش تا هفت سال اسارت تیمسار، عموی نازنینم(اصطلاحی که ما خانواده های ارتشی به کار می بریم، و تحمل شکنجه ها و با وجود اینکه نیروی های ارتش بعثی عراق تلاش بر گرفتن اطلاعات از تیمسار را در دوره اسارت داشتن ولی ایشون که تربیت شده ارتش شاهنشاهی ایران بودن به هیچ عنوان کلامی به نیرو های دشمن نگفتن ولی با وجود تحمل این همه سختی پس از بازگشت به سرزمین آریایی خیلی در حق ایشان بدی و ظلم کردن.
این دیدگاه را تقدیم به همه سربازان و خلبانان شکاری شهید این خاک کهن من جمله پدربزرگ شهیدم و پدربزرگ مادریم تیمسار شیرافکن همتی و خود شخص عزیز تیمسار خلبان امینی می کنم.
بهار سال ۱۴۰۴ April 1st 2025
ایران Iran
June 8, 2022
This is a history mostly focusing on the operational art of the air war over Iraq during the first Gulf War. It is not profoundly detailed, but is very accessible for those who know little about air warfare and its modern history.
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