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God, Death, and Time
This book consists of transcripts from two lecture courses Levinas delivered in 1975-76, his last year at the Sorbonne. They cover some of the most pervasive themes of his thought and were written at a time when he had just published his most important―and difficult―book, Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence. Both courses pursue issues related to the question at the heart of Levinas's ethical relation. The Foreword and Afterword place the lectures in the context of his work as a whole, rounding out this unique picture of Levinas the thinker and the teacher. The lectures are essential to a full understanding of Levinas for three reasons. First, he seeks to explain his thought to an audience of students, with a clarity and an intensity altogether different from his written work. Second, the themes of God, death, and time are not only crucial for Levinas, but they lead him to confront their treatment by the main philosphers of the great continental tradition. Thus his discussions of accounts of death by Heidegger, Hegel, and Bloch place Levinas's thought in a broader context. Third, the basic concepts Levinas employs are those of Otherwise than Being rather than the earlier Totality and Infinity : patience, obsession, substitution, witness, traumatism. There is a growing recognition that the ultimate standing of Levinas as a philosopher may well depend on his assessment of those terms. These lectures offer an excellent introduction to them that shows how they contribute to a wide range of traditional philosophical issues.
320 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1992
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About the author
Emmanuel Levinas
151 books402 followersEmanuelis Levinas (later adapted to French orthography as Emmanuel Levinas) received a traditional Jewish education in Lithuania. After WWII, he studied the Talmud under the enigmatic "Monsieur Chouchani", whose influence he acknowledged only late in his life.
Levinas began his philosophical studies at Strasbourg University in 1924, where he began his lifelong friendship with the French philosopher Maurice Blanchot. In 1928, he went to Freiburg University to study phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. At Freiburg he also met Martin Heidegger. Levinas became one of the very first French intellectuals to draw attention to Heidegger and Husserl, by translating Husserl's Cartesian Meditations and by drawing on their ideas in his own philosophy, in works such as his The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, De l'Existence à l'Existant, and En Découvrant l’Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger.
According to his obituary in New York Times,[1] Levinas came to regret his enthusiasm for Heidegger, because of the latter's affinity for the Nazis. During a lecture on forgiveness, Levinas stated "One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger."[2]
After earning his doctorate Levinas taught at a private Jewish High School in Paris, the École Normale Israélite Orientale, eventually becoming its director. He began teaching at the University of Poitiers in 1961, at the Nanterre campus of the University of Paris in 1967, and at the Sorbonne in 1973, from which he retired in 1979. He was also a Professor at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. In 1989 he was awarded the Balzan Prize for Philosophy.
Among his most famous students is Rabbi Baruch Garzon from Tetouan (Morocco), who learnt Philosophy with Levinas at the Sorbonne and later went on to become one of the most important Rabbis of the Spanish-speaking world.
In the 1950s, Levinas emerged from the circle of intellectuals surrounding Jean Wahl as a leading French thinker. His work is based on the ethics of the Other or, in Levinas' terms, on "ethics as first philosophy". For Levinas, the Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as is done by traditional metaphysics (which Lévinas called "ontology"). Lévinas prefers to think of philosophy as the "wisdom of love" rather than the love of wisdom (the literal Greek meaning of the word "philosophy"). By his lights, ethics becomes an entity independent of subjectivity to the point where ethical responsibility is integral to the subject; hence an ethics of responsibility precedes any "objective searching after truth".
Levinas derives the primacy of his ethics from the experience of the encounter with the Other. For Levinas, the irreducible relation, the epiphany, of the face-to-face, the encounter with another, is a privileged phenomenon in which the other person's proximity and distance are both strongly felt. "The Other precisely reveals himself in his alterity not in a shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness."[3]. At the same time, the revelation of the face makes a demand, this demand is before one can express, or know one's freedom, to affirm or deny.[4] One instantly recognizes the transcendence and heteronomy of the Other. Even murder fails as an attempt to take hold of this otherness.
In Levinas's later thought following "Totality and Infinity", he argued that our responsibility for the other was already rooted within our subjective constitution. It should be noted that the first line of the preface of this book is "everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality."[5] This can be seen most clearly in his later account of recurrence (chapter 4 in "Otherwise Than Being"), where Levinas maintai
Levinas began his philosophical studies at Strasbourg University in 1924, where he began his lifelong friendship with the French philosopher Maurice Blanchot. In 1928, he went to Freiburg University to study phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. At Freiburg he also met Martin Heidegger. Levinas became one of the very first French intellectuals to draw attention to Heidegger and Husserl, by translating Husserl's Cartesian Meditations and by drawing on their ideas in his own philosophy, in works such as his The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, De l'Existence à l'Existant, and En Découvrant l’Existence avec Husserl et Heidegger.
According to his obituary in New York Times,[1] Levinas came to regret his enthusiasm for Heidegger, because of the latter's affinity for the Nazis. During a lecture on forgiveness, Levinas stated "One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger."[2]
After earning his doctorate Levinas taught at a private Jewish High School in Paris, the École Normale Israélite Orientale, eventually becoming its director. He began teaching at the University of Poitiers in 1961, at the Nanterre campus of the University of Paris in 1967, and at the Sorbonne in 1973, from which he retired in 1979. He was also a Professor at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. In 1989 he was awarded the Balzan Prize for Philosophy.
Among his most famous students is Rabbi Baruch Garzon from Tetouan (Morocco), who learnt Philosophy with Levinas at the Sorbonne and later went on to become one of the most important Rabbis of the Spanish-speaking world.
In the 1950s, Levinas emerged from the circle of intellectuals surrounding Jean Wahl as a leading French thinker. His work is based on the ethics of the Other or, in Levinas' terms, on "ethics as first philosophy". For Levinas, the Other is not knowable and cannot be made into an object of the self, as is done by traditional metaphysics (which Lévinas called "ontology"). Lévinas prefers to think of philosophy as the "wisdom of love" rather than the love of wisdom (the literal Greek meaning of the word "philosophy"). By his lights, ethics becomes an entity independent of subjectivity to the point where ethical responsibility is integral to the subject; hence an ethics of responsibility precedes any "objective searching after truth".
Levinas derives the primacy of his ethics from the experience of the encounter with the Other. For Levinas, the irreducible relation, the epiphany, of the face-to-face, the encounter with another, is a privileged phenomenon in which the other person's proximity and distance are both strongly felt. "The Other precisely reveals himself in his alterity not in a shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness."[3]. At the same time, the revelation of the face makes a demand, this demand is before one can express, or know one's freedom, to affirm or deny.[4] One instantly recognizes the transcendence and heteronomy of the Other. Even murder fails as an attempt to take hold of this otherness.
In Levinas's later thought following "Totality and Infinity", he argued that our responsibility for the other was already rooted within our subjective constitution. It should be noted that the first line of the preface of this book is "everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality."[5] This can be seen most clearly in his later account of recurrence (chapter 4 in "Otherwise Than Being"), where Levinas maintai
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
August 27, 2017
A wonderful text. Highly recommended to...well, everyone.
March 11, 2019
Levinas's provides an interesting reversal to the Heideggerian diagnosis on Death. Through a survey of other thinkers like Kant,Bergson,Fink and Bloch, Levinas posits an escape from the vision of Death as inalienable angst of Da-sein(Being-There). Instead, Levinas turns towards a communal direction, The Other. The critique is laid bare, Death only exists in submerging into the experience of the Other's death, the possession and emotion which the "I" arrives at in the death of loved ones creates the relation outside the order of Being. This relation of spontaneous affectivity constitutes the entrance of Ethics, The infinity in our finitude. The heart of this relation in absolute difference being the idea of God as such.
One can see Levinas valuable insight as an escape from the silent anti-ethics at the heart of any questioning of Being presents. Here the idea of God as what cannot be ever expressed properly(yet must be expressed), the excess that constitutes all testimony and genuine questioning with no answers in sight, enters the picture. Through this, Levinas answers the Heideggerian aversion to God as the symbol of the metaphysics of present ontic beings. Being isn't the term that has been defaced by the idea of God, it is the very opposite.
As valuable as criticizing Heidegger's individualistic escape from community and obligation are. I feel that Levinas's return to an almost Romantic conception of Alterity constitutes his own escape from history. His exploded Kantian subjectivity can only go as far as a Justice that is always to come, a Justice that has to come by virtue of our dealings with others. All in all, I just wish Levinas took a more radical approach to Ethics than just an obligation outside the rational metaphysics of presence. What is missing is the element of universality(which he dismisses in Hegel). For all of the radical demeanor at the surface, there looms a paralyzing conformism in our transcendent ethical nature, an almost puzzling refusal to engage with History, a trait that will carry over into another thinker in the Deconstructionist vein, Derrida.
One can see Levinas valuable insight as an escape from the silent anti-ethics at the heart of any questioning of Being presents. Here the idea of God as what cannot be ever expressed properly(yet must be expressed), the excess that constitutes all testimony and genuine questioning with no answers in sight, enters the picture. Through this, Levinas answers the Heideggerian aversion to God as the symbol of the metaphysics of present ontic beings. Being isn't the term that has been defaced by the idea of God, it is the very opposite.
As valuable as criticizing Heidegger's individualistic escape from community and obligation are. I feel that Levinas's return to an almost Romantic conception of Alterity constitutes his own escape from history. His exploded Kantian subjectivity can only go as far as a Justice that is always to come, a Justice that has to come by virtue of our dealings with others. All in all, I just wish Levinas took a more radical approach to Ethics than just an obligation outside the rational metaphysics of presence. What is missing is the element of universality(which he dismisses in Hegel). For all of the radical demeanor at the surface, there looms a paralyzing conformism in our transcendent ethical nature, an almost puzzling refusal to engage with History, a trait that will carry over into another thinker in the Deconstructionist vein, Derrida.
March 23, 2023
In the work, I can say that Levinas wrote mostly in opposition to Heidegger's `being and time`. Because all theses are aimed at refuting existence and time.
If I were to use a short definition about the book, I would call it "absolute uncertainty". because while death is a certainty for every living thing, there is a tremendous uncertainty about when it will happen. Heidegger and Levinas also examine man's relationship with death in this cycle of absolute uncertainty. especially a person has very, very difficult to accept death, especially when it comes to his own self. and a person who accepts this and worries about it allows a huge destruction to begin to occur on himself. I can say that I saw myself at this point. it was really strange to be reading things that have been on my mind for so long in a book. and Heidegger and Levinas (I include Heidegger, because the thesis should be evaluated together with the anti-thesis), is the actual state of death the death of ben? or the death of the other? they started their fight and they drew swords against each other in this challenge. Levinas says that since death is a phenomenon that cannot be experienced, we experience it sensually with the death of another. Heidegger, on the other hand, says that death is only the death of ben. as it cannot be said, he says that the effect caused by the death of the other cannot be an experience. at this point, as I agree with Heidegger, I have a Heideggerian thought since I accepted that death is the reality of merging into nothingness. because the making of life meaningful actually comes from the fact that death consists of nothing. Levinas, on the other hand, considers death as an exception rather than nothing. although it is a very logical determination in essence, the philosophy of death is a movement seems very difficult to me.
If I go out of the book at this point and touch on Heidegger's rightness in my own opinion, the philosophy of nothingness is a very, very important action for the "new" and "re". motion does not provide this, because it is restlessness. it is very difficult not to remember Nietzsche at this point. because every new superior will create a human being. matter is changing, a new person must appear to make sense of it. immortality means a great collapse because for man. death is important for the sustainability of the struggle for the upper man.
Actually, Levinas wrote this book, but I told him about Heidegger, whom he usually opposes, and confirmed it. because I would say it made me understand Heidegger more clearly. from this point of view, this book contains a very good opposition.
If I were to use a short definition about the book, I would call it "absolute uncertainty". because while death is a certainty for every living thing, there is a tremendous uncertainty about when it will happen. Heidegger and Levinas also examine man's relationship with death in this cycle of absolute uncertainty. especially a person has very, very difficult to accept death, especially when it comes to his own self. and a person who accepts this and worries about it allows a huge destruction to begin to occur on himself. I can say that I saw myself at this point. it was really strange to be reading things that have been on my mind for so long in a book. and Heidegger and Levinas (I include Heidegger, because the thesis should be evaluated together with the anti-thesis), is the actual state of death the death of ben? or the death of the other? they started their fight and they drew swords against each other in this challenge. Levinas says that since death is a phenomenon that cannot be experienced, we experience it sensually with the death of another. Heidegger, on the other hand, says that death is only the death of ben. as it cannot be said, he says that the effect caused by the death of the other cannot be an experience. at this point, as I agree with Heidegger, I have a Heideggerian thought since I accepted that death is the reality of merging into nothingness. because the making of life meaningful actually comes from the fact that death consists of nothing. Levinas, on the other hand, considers death as an exception rather than nothing. although it is a very logical determination in essence, the philosophy of death is a movement seems very difficult to me.
If I go out of the book at this point and touch on Heidegger's rightness in my own opinion, the philosophy of nothingness is a very, very important action for the "new" and "re". motion does not provide this, because it is restlessness. it is very difficult not to remember Nietzsche at this point. because every new superior will create a human being. matter is changing, a new person must appear to make sense of it. immortality means a great collapse because for man. death is important for the sustainability of the struggle for the upper man.
Actually, Levinas wrote this book, but I told him about Heidegger, whom he usually opposes, and confirmed it. because I would say it made me understand Heidegger more clearly. from this point of view, this book contains a very good opposition.
August 15, 2014
An interesting and helpful companion (like a long footnote) to the masterthought that is Otherwise than Being.
September 6, 2014
Difficult, fascinating, and very much worth the effort.
July 10, 2019
I read half of this book—the death and time lectures—for the purpose of seeing a critique of Heidegger. To be succinct, Levinas proposes, contra Heidegger, that time details death rather than the obverse. The death of the other is what introduces me to death, what reveals my guilt and responsibility in their death universally. The phenomenology of the face unravels the ethical which takes priority over the ontological (once more contra Heidegger). There is a hope which is teleologically ordered by a dialectical materialism utopia (?). Okay...so Levinas is the freaking man. I love him. Nonetheless, his dismissal of Heidegger’s doctrine of Dasein as being-toward-death and replacement with his own doctrine of the infinite experienced in the death of the other seems more like an extension and contribution to Heidegger than a total repudiation or substitution (as he claims). I see what Levinas does in trying to get out of Heidegger’s phenomenology of Finitude by laying out the possibility for hope in the infinite but I also cannot help but think that Levinas is culpable of “interpreting death through the lens of life [or time]” (Heidegger’s accusation toward Christian theology). Levinas totally gets it when he says that the death of the other introduces us to responsibility and to consider the ethical within the spectrum of time, and I think this is a considerable critique of Heidegger’s emphasis on the “mineness” and appropriation of being in the resolute anticipation of death. Death does not just isolate and individuate, it also shatters us phenomenologically when experienced in the face of the the Other.
November 4, 2019
Sezgi ve fenomenolojik düşünmede zamanın anlaşılmasında ölüm düşüncesi veya şüphe götürmezliği Levinas bakış açısından dile geirilmiş.
November 10, 2020
Ho letto solo la prima parte, per un esame.
August 4, 2022
Martin Heidegger ve Immanuel Kant çatışması ancak bu kadar güzel dile getirilebilirdi, dediğim eser.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews