After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy

by Robert O. Keohane

This book is a comprehensive study of cooperation among the advanced capitalist countries. Can cooperation persist without the dominance of a single power, such as the United States after World War II? To answer this pressing question, Robert Keohane analyzes the institutions, or "international regimes," through which cooperation has taken place in the world political economy and describes the evolution of these regimes as American hegemony has eroded. Refuting the idea that the decline of hegemony makes cooperation impossible, he views international regimes not as weak substitutes for world government but as devices for facilitating decentralized cooperation among egoistic actors. In the preface the author addresses the issue of cooperation after the end of the Soviet empire and with the renewed dominance of the United States, in security matters, as well as recent scholarship on cooperation.

Genres: International Relations, Politics, Political Science, Nonfiction, Economics, Grad School, History

320 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1984

About the author

Robert O. Keohane (b. 1941) is an American scholar of international relations, best known for his work on neoliberal institutionalism. His numerous books include After Hegemony (1984) and Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (2002). Currently a professor at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Keohane has received numerous awards for his scholarship. Among these, he was honored with the Centennial Medal of the Harvard Graduate School in 2012. Keohane received his bachelor's degree in 1961 from Shimer College, a Great Books school where he now sits on the Board of Trustees. He received his graduate education at Harvard, where he completed his Ph.D. in 1966. (from Shimer College Wiki)

Reviews

[Vheissu · Rating 5 out of 5]

A classic liberal "institutionalist" explanation of cooperation in a world of independent, sovereign states.

In brief, interdependence among states brings both costs and benefits. In order to minimize the costs while maximizing the benefits, states cooperate with each other in international institutions. These institutions provide a forum for bargaining, a centralized bureaucracy for surveillance of compliance, and a dispute resolution mechanism. Such cooperation persists even in the absence of a hegemon or world government because it benefits states to do so.

[Christina · Rating 4 out of 5]

The cornerstone of neoliberal thought (along with Keohane and Nye's Power and Interdependence). The idea that institutions prosper long after hegemony's fall because states want them to is an interesting and poignant proposition. In observing the world today, and the stress the UN has come under because of US unilateralism, it is clear to see that Keohane is right on target.

[Zhenyao Li · Rating 5 out of 5]

系统理论最经典的名著，作者利用经济理论解释政治问题如臻化境，这是很难培养的能力。但GPE quintessential是政治和经济的交集，财富和权力的平衡，这本书指出两方理论都需要高度明晰。
Krasner的HST所带来的一个解释问题是霸权后的开放的原因，这也是这本书最核心的关切。在现实主义的阴影下，如何建立在此之上指出合作的可能性是这本书的用意所在。Mearshihemer指出这个理论不够ambitious，但是不可否认的是他将重复博弈引用到国际关系当中德解释性。关于科斯定理的假设的论述同样十分十分精彩，恰恰是制度给了科斯定理三个假设的条件。
一个caveat是，作者并非盲目详细system-level approach，因为这类似于微观经济学的理性人假设，国际关系中权力并非完全对称，因此在实际分析中由内向外仍然是一种解释途径。

[Mike Edwards · Rating 3 out of 5]

One of the early liberal-institutionalist works that would ultimately destroy realism's stranglehold on the field of international relations. The book argues that states cooperate much more than they compete, and he looks at why this might be the case. The book feels a bit outdated now, although the basic analysis and his fundamental challenges to realism are still relevant.

[Kathryn Jonell · Rating 2 out of 5]

The chapters by Keohane were reasoned and organized, but I thought that Waltz was extremely meandering in finding his point and greatly obscured what he was trying to explain.

[Serge · Rating 5 out of 5]

A roadmap for the post hegemonic world

This book makes a persuasive case for continuing to invest in American liberal order institutions such as the IMF and the WTO, even though the world has become multilateral. Strategic cooperation continues to be reward reaped by those willing to abide by the political and monetary regimes that benefit advanced industrial nations. The alternative is anarchy and Leonard argues for a mix of realism and rational egoism. I heard Kissinger's voice in this neo-Realpolitik understanding of where opportunity lies in this populist raging, protectionist leaning broken world. Coercive cooperation might still be the answer.

[Kylea · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was one of those books you had to read twice to understand. It discussed very interesting topics, but the phrasing and the political science jargon made it a difficult read for someone who isn't in that field. Good examples are frequently used, but it took me several hours and taking notes for me to wade through the chapters so I could barely understand it.

[Pinto Buana · Rating 4 out of 5]

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[Skandi · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think this text is overrated and a bit dry. I did find the chapters on the oil crises of the 1970s very interesting.

[Gillian Vilela · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read for class

[Sluglife420 · Rating 1 out of 5]

Complex interdependency my nuts

[Rolf · Rating 2 out of 5]

As Sun Tzu (and Zach de la Rocha) say, know your enemy.

Snarkiness aside, this is an important text in understanding neoliberalism.

[Raj Agrawal · Rating 3 out of 5]

[Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it. This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique – only as some words on how I engaged with this book for the purposes of building a theoretical framework on strategy.]

-- Assigned chapters 3, 4, and 6 for School of Advanced Air & Space Studies curriculum --


Keohane presents an alternative to the requirement for a hegemon as the foundation for cooperation between states – international regime(s). While he recognizes that a hegemon may be required as part of the initial construction of an international regime, he does not believe a hegemon is required once the regime is in place and has established parameters for cooperation between states. Throughout the three assigned chapters, the author builds an argument for what a hegemon ought to be, how self-interest can actually fuel cooperation, and how an international regime (or set of regimes) can maximize gains for all states who subordinate themselves to the established regime(s).

The author offers that a hegemon must have the permission of other states to remain such. While military power is an essential requirement of a hegemon, it also needs the tacit acceptance by other states to maintain its status. Having a hegemon may “contribute to order in world politics…but it is not a sufficient condition and there is little reason to believe that it is necessary” (46). While the author looks at the two examples of the US and the UK, he does not adequately defend his proposition. This defense is crucial to the rest of his argument; otherwise, his argument would have been solely focused on the benefits of international regimes. This would have been a great contribution on its own without trying to discount the need for a hegemon at the foundation of the international structure.

Chapter 4 presents the idea of cooperation, where “intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination” (51-52). States can still operate within the concept of realism, with self-interest as its primary motivator, within the context of cooperation. Cooperation may in fact help a state gain more from the international system than trying to acquire gain on its own. Perhaps cooperation is a more positive term for what otherwise might fall into coercion – the latent power of the hegemon acting as a shadow over diplomacy. There is no way to test this theory without first removing the hegemon from the equation. Structure may very well require a supporting authority, as realists might argue.

Regimes are made up of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, defined by the author on pages 57-59. The implementation of a regime requires the acceptance of states, and will maximize gains through its use. The errors in this idea lie in the assumption of valuation – all states do not see the world equally, nor do they see loss/gain equally. What may be gain for one state may be valued as a loss by another – unless gain is purely material. The author explains asymmetric information away by suggesting that diplomacy and the intermediary effects of the regime would build trust between self-interested states. I tend to be pessimistic about this proposal. Nevertheless, I am willing to accept that regimes may make transactions more trustworthy than they otherwise might be, build a history of predictability between states, and allow for the mitigation of corruption and deceit. However, this would be with a hegemon at the foundation of such an order.

[Joe · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is a bit dated in its hope in international "regimes" as described by Keohane. It reflects a blind faith, common in the late 1980s and 1990s, that international organizations will provide the requisite stability for global security and prosperity. Now that we know this is not true, with the weakening of organizations such as the UN, NATO, and even OPEC (with the advent of an increased production from the US), it is still a decent reference as a snapshot in time. Hegemony, even limited, seems to still wield enough power to hold most regimes at bay or at least in check.

[Mark · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well-written tour de force by Keohane which uses game theory to set up a post-hegemonic society where cooperation is funneled through IGOs. There are lots of potential applications for foreign policy analysts as well as those aiming to work for an IGO.

[Clayton · Rating 4 out of 5]

A classic response to the power theories. Albeit it still rests on naive materialist assumptions of human/state behavior.

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[Will · Rating 4 out of 5]

Keohane's foundational text on neoliberaliism, in which he lays out his theory that cooperation can be formed without the need of a hegemon.

[Nelson · Rating 2 out of 5]

These are quite dangerous thoughts, I think. Wishing for a hegemonous single world power. Who has ever held great power and not abused it? Practically unreadable.

[Kallinikos · Rating 3 out of 5]

good except that it often he feels he’s explaining various aspects of rational choice theory without really using it to explain much about international regimes outside of a passing reference