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Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan
With startling revelations, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa rewrites the standard history of the end of World War II in the Pacific. By fully integrating the three key actors in the story - the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan - Hasegawa for the first time puts the last months of the war into international perspective. From April 1945, when Stalin broke the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and Harry Truman assumed the presidency, to the final Soviet military actions against Japan, Hasegawa brings to light the real reasons Japan surrendered. From Washington to Moscow to Tokyo and back again, he shows us a high-stakes diplomatic game as Truman and Stalin sought to outmaneuver each other in forcing Japan's surrender, as Stalin dangled mediation offers to Japan while secretly preparing to fight in the Pacific, as Tokyo peace advocates desperately tried to stave off a war party determined to mount a last-ditch defense, and as the Americans struggled to balance their competing interests of ending the war with Japan and preventing the Soviets from expanding into the Pacific. Authoritative and engrossing, Racing the Enemy puts the final days of World War II into a whole new light.
382 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2005
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895 people want to read
About the author
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
17 books14 followersTsuyoshi Hasegawa is a Japanese-American historian specializing in modern Russian and Soviet history and the relations between Russia, Japan, and the United States. He taught at the University of California, Santa Barbara, where he was director of the Cold War Studies program until his retirement in 2016.
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October 16, 2018
Up until about 10 years ago I accepted that it was the atomic bombs that had forced the surrender of Japan in August 1945. It was about a decade ago that I first heard the argument advanced in this book, which is that the Soviet Union’s entry into the war had a bigger effect in bringing about Japan’s surrender.
The book’s title comes from the notion that Stalin and Truman were racing each other over defeating Japan. Earlier in the Pacific War, eventual Soviet participation had been seen by the US as a way of shortening the war and saving American lives. But by the summer of 1945 Japan had been brought to its knees, and the USA had played by far the biggest role in achieving that outcome (just as the USSR had played by far the biggest role in defeating Nazi Germany). The US no longer felt the Soviet Union would be of much assistance in defeating Japan, and having seen the fate of Eastern Europe, no longer wanted that assistance either. By contrast, Stalin wanted to keep the war going long enough to move his armies from Europe to the Far East and join in, something which would allow him to grab territory from the Japanese. Stalin knew all about the Bomb from his spies within the Manhattan Project, and was desperate to get involved in the war before the Americans forced Japan to surrender.
By this time the Japanese leadership was divided into “peace” and “war” factions, the latter dominated by the Army. The war faction’s tactic at this stage was to resist the invasion of the Japanese homeland in a way that would cause the Americans very heavy casualties. It was hoped this would upset American public opinion to the extent the US would eventually agree to a negotiated settlement, with the Soviet Government acting as a mediator. It’s not inconceivable that this tactic might have worked, had the US been forced to launch a ground invasion.
The above strategy received two major shocks in August 45, the first of which was the Hiroshima bomb. The author argues though, that the Soviet Union’s entry into the war caused the complete wreckage of the war faction’s plans. Not only did Japan now have another formidable enemy to fight, but it raised the possibility of the USSR having a share in the occupation of the country, a frightening prospect.
The book is intensively researched and well-argued. Personally I feel the arguments are persuasive without being completely conclusive. If you are thinking of reading the book, be aware this is not a military history, rather a history of the diplomatic manoeuvrings of the period. I would say that I found the first half a bit of a dry read. The last chapter rehearses a series of counterfactual arguments. The author concludes that, without the atomic bombs, the Soviet entry into the war would have prompted a Japanese surrender, but the reverse situation would not have ended the war in August 1945. Just how many atomic bombs it would have taken to force a Japanese surrender is a question that cannot be answered.
Thought-provoking though a bit dry in parts. A 7/10 rating for me, rounded up to four stars.
The book’s title comes from the notion that Stalin and Truman were racing each other over defeating Japan. Earlier in the Pacific War, eventual Soviet participation had been seen by the US as a way of shortening the war and saving American lives. But by the summer of 1945 Japan had been brought to its knees, and the USA had played by far the biggest role in achieving that outcome (just as the USSR had played by far the biggest role in defeating Nazi Germany). The US no longer felt the Soviet Union would be of much assistance in defeating Japan, and having seen the fate of Eastern Europe, no longer wanted that assistance either. By contrast, Stalin wanted to keep the war going long enough to move his armies from Europe to the Far East and join in, something which would allow him to grab territory from the Japanese. Stalin knew all about the Bomb from his spies within the Manhattan Project, and was desperate to get involved in the war before the Americans forced Japan to surrender.
By this time the Japanese leadership was divided into “peace” and “war” factions, the latter dominated by the Army. The war faction’s tactic at this stage was to resist the invasion of the Japanese homeland in a way that would cause the Americans very heavy casualties. It was hoped this would upset American public opinion to the extent the US would eventually agree to a negotiated settlement, with the Soviet Government acting as a mediator. It’s not inconceivable that this tactic might have worked, had the US been forced to launch a ground invasion.
The above strategy received two major shocks in August 45, the first of which was the Hiroshima bomb. The author argues though, that the Soviet Union’s entry into the war caused the complete wreckage of the war faction’s plans. Not only did Japan now have another formidable enemy to fight, but it raised the possibility of the USSR having a share in the occupation of the country, a frightening prospect.
The book is intensively researched and well-argued. Personally I feel the arguments are persuasive without being completely conclusive. If you are thinking of reading the book, be aware this is not a military history, rather a history of the diplomatic manoeuvrings of the period. I would say that I found the first half a bit of a dry read. The last chapter rehearses a series of counterfactual arguments. The author concludes that, without the atomic bombs, the Soviet entry into the war would have prompted a Japanese surrender, but the reverse situation would not have ended the war in August 1945. Just how many atomic bombs it would have taken to force a Japanese surrender is a question that cannot be answered.
Thought-provoking though a bit dry in parts. A 7/10 rating for me, rounded up to four stars.
February 3, 2011
The American retelling of World War II has the Japanese conceding defeat as a result of the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6th and 9th 1945, respectively. This is widely accepted in our education system. Specialist Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is part of a group of individuals who prefer to take a broader approach to the events that led to the culmination of the war. By examining the triangulation of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan, the author reasons that three sets of relationships were at work in ultimately bringing the Pacific War to a close. These relationships were that of the United States and the Soviets, the Soviets and the Japanese, and the internal turmoil in the Japanese Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki’s cabinet and, without these intricacies, the war would not have ended when it did.
Throughout his Racing the Enemy , Hasegawa pays special attention to the diplomatic meanderings as these three “sub-plots” develop interdependently. The result is that the book moves at a sometimes torpid pace from the assumption of Truman in April of 1945, until Japan’s surrender in September of that year. The book’s introduction takes place prior to Franklin Roosevelt’s death and hinges the book together with 2 major reoccurring themes, that of Soviet/Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 25, 1941 and the agreements between the Soviets and the Americans and British at Yalta on February 11, 1945. These two events are important and are continually referenced. Hasegawa argues that the Neutrality Pact was crucial (particularly in the last months of the war) in that it gave the Japanese a sense of hope in mediating a peace with the Americans through the Soviets. The Neutrality was equally beneficial to the Soviet Union. It kept the Japanese from attacking the Soviet Far East when the Soviets were fighting the Nazis before Germany’s surrender. The ruse of neutrality ensured that the Soviets could jockey for post-war territorial claims and make good on its promise to assist in the allies in defeating Japan, the promise it made at the Yalta Conference. Mention of these agreements continually arise, especially from the Soviet Union as it attempts to play both sides until it has to declare war on Japan on August 9, 1945.
Stressed is Japan’s reluctance to surrender. One contentious issue is the preservation of the foreign concept of kokutai or “the symbolic expression of both the political and the spiritual essence of the emperor system.” Preservation of kokutai plays a large role in the division in the Big Six, Japan’s most influential policy makers. The resulting confrontation over those who favor surrendering “unconditionally” with those who favor a peace more favorable to the preservation of this national essence ends up in a deadlock. Japan’s resulting inaction leads to the climax of Hasegawa’s book and the precarious conditions under which all three powers found themselves starting with the issuing of the Potsdam Proclamation. It are the ideas like kokutai, Roosevelt’s original demands for Japan’s “unconditional surrender, ” and Japan’s retention of Hirohito which are continually analyzed by all sides and seemly encumber the peace process.
“Potsdam: The Turning Point” is indeed the turning point of the book. It is beyond this point that the author delivers the sense of urgency that all parties faced. It is through the Potsdam Conference the Soviets truly realized that their participation in the Pacific War had an air of negligibility and that they may possibly be left out of war spoils. Potsdam instilled a sense of urgency for the Soviets in that for the first time, the atomic bombs entered the picture, lessening the necessity for an American invasion of Japan. Also telling of changed American attitudes, the Potsdam Proclamation was forwarded to Japan without the signature of Soviet representatives.
It is from this point forward that the United States and the Soviet Union begin the race: The United States to get the Japanese to capitulate, via the atomic bombs, and the Soviet Union to enter and secure the land promised to them at Yalta for their intervention before Japan’s surrender. The author is successful at capturing the frenzied pace of all three sides, jumping from camp to camp. The underlying theme being that it was the shock of the Soviet’s August 9th attack, more than the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that weighed in on Japan’s desire for peace. This idea is heavily promoted, especially in the book’s conclusion. The author supports his case through a series of “what if?” scenarios, jumbling up the order of the key factors influencing Japan’s decision to surrender. In all cases, the author finds the Soviet entry into the war more crucial than the atomic bombs in Japan’s surrender. He even suggested that the atomic bombs by themselves could have been a factor in solidifying Japanese resolve, the opposite of their intended effect. This contrasts heavily with commonly accepted belief.
The author’s use of sources is well balanced. He equally employs Russian, American, and Japanese sources. Memoirs, reports, cables, biographies, and secondary sources all find their way into his bibliography. The three scrutinized nations locked into conflict seem to be the perfect marriage for Hasegawa as he has worked with colleagues in all three countries and has attended both the University of Tokyo and The University of Washington. In addition, Hasegawa recalls a four month stay in Moscow for research.
Hasegawa makes a strong case in his argument that Japan’s surrender was heavily influenced by Soviet entry into the war. He does this by carefully following the concurrent sides of the war without losing focus or getting terribly bogged down in the diplomatic interactions and internal disputes. Hasegawa provides counterpoints to some of his assertions, maintaining a nice balance throughout his book despite his firm posture on the importance of the Soviet’s role in the Pacific War.
Throughout his Racing the Enemy , Hasegawa pays special attention to the diplomatic meanderings as these three “sub-plots” develop interdependently. The result is that the book moves at a sometimes torpid pace from the assumption of Truman in April of 1945, until Japan’s surrender in September of that year. The book’s introduction takes place prior to Franklin Roosevelt’s death and hinges the book together with 2 major reoccurring themes, that of Soviet/Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 25, 1941 and the agreements between the Soviets and the Americans and British at Yalta on February 11, 1945. These two events are important and are continually referenced. Hasegawa argues that the Neutrality Pact was crucial (particularly in the last months of the war) in that it gave the Japanese a sense of hope in mediating a peace with the Americans through the Soviets. The Neutrality was equally beneficial to the Soviet Union. It kept the Japanese from attacking the Soviet Far East when the Soviets were fighting the Nazis before Germany’s surrender. The ruse of neutrality ensured that the Soviets could jockey for post-war territorial claims and make good on its promise to assist in the allies in defeating Japan, the promise it made at the Yalta Conference. Mention of these agreements continually arise, especially from the Soviet Union as it attempts to play both sides until it has to declare war on Japan on August 9, 1945.
Stressed is Japan’s reluctance to surrender. One contentious issue is the preservation of the foreign concept of kokutai or “the symbolic expression of both the political and the spiritual essence of the emperor system.” Preservation of kokutai plays a large role in the division in the Big Six, Japan’s most influential policy makers. The resulting confrontation over those who favor surrendering “unconditionally” with those who favor a peace more favorable to the preservation of this national essence ends up in a deadlock. Japan’s resulting inaction leads to the climax of Hasegawa’s book and the precarious conditions under which all three powers found themselves starting with the issuing of the Potsdam Proclamation. It are the ideas like kokutai, Roosevelt’s original demands for Japan’s “unconditional surrender, ” and Japan’s retention of Hirohito which are continually analyzed by all sides and seemly encumber the peace process.
“Potsdam: The Turning Point” is indeed the turning point of the book. It is beyond this point that the author delivers the sense of urgency that all parties faced. It is through the Potsdam Conference the Soviets truly realized that their participation in the Pacific War had an air of negligibility and that they may possibly be left out of war spoils. Potsdam instilled a sense of urgency for the Soviets in that for the first time, the atomic bombs entered the picture, lessening the necessity for an American invasion of Japan. Also telling of changed American attitudes, the Potsdam Proclamation was forwarded to Japan without the signature of Soviet representatives.
It is from this point forward that the United States and the Soviet Union begin the race: The United States to get the Japanese to capitulate, via the atomic bombs, and the Soviet Union to enter and secure the land promised to them at Yalta for their intervention before Japan’s surrender. The author is successful at capturing the frenzied pace of all three sides, jumping from camp to camp. The underlying theme being that it was the shock of the Soviet’s August 9th attack, more than the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that weighed in on Japan’s desire for peace. This idea is heavily promoted, especially in the book’s conclusion. The author supports his case through a series of “what if?” scenarios, jumbling up the order of the key factors influencing Japan’s decision to surrender. In all cases, the author finds the Soviet entry into the war more crucial than the atomic bombs in Japan’s surrender. He even suggested that the atomic bombs by themselves could have been a factor in solidifying Japanese resolve, the opposite of their intended effect. This contrasts heavily with commonly accepted belief.
The author’s use of sources is well balanced. He equally employs Russian, American, and Japanese sources. Memoirs, reports, cables, biographies, and secondary sources all find their way into his bibliography. The three scrutinized nations locked into conflict seem to be the perfect marriage for Hasegawa as he has worked with colleagues in all three countries and has attended both the University of Tokyo and The University of Washington. In addition, Hasegawa recalls a four month stay in Moscow for research.
Hasegawa makes a strong case in his argument that Japan’s surrender was heavily influenced by Soviet entry into the war. He does this by carefully following the concurrent sides of the war without losing focus or getting terribly bogged down in the diplomatic interactions and internal disputes. Hasegawa provides counterpoints to some of his assertions, maintaining a nice balance throughout his book despite his firm posture on the importance of the Soviet’s role in the Pacific War.
June 8, 2011
IN THIS BOOK, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa writes about the circumstances surrounding the end of WWII and the surrender of Japan. He examines the relationship between Stalin, Truman, and the Japanese government. By focusing on the political game that is played between the three, Hasegawa creates a clear picture showing that each respective party is trying to end the war for their own benefit and under the terms most acceptable to them. While revealing the details of these complex relationships, Hasegawa concludes that the timing of the unconditional surrender of Japan was a result of the Soviet Union and their entry into the Pacific theater of WWII.
Hasegawa begins by writing about the Neutrality Pact between the Soviet Union and Japan. This pact serves as one of the main themes in the book with Japan continually trying to keep the Soviet Union from entering the war, all while the Soviets secretly plot to break the pact and enter the war. Hasegawa brings up several other key themes in the early pages as well: U.S.-Soviet cooperation, the unconditional surrender of Japan, the kokutai, and the atomic bombs. All four of these are touched upon lightly in the beginning of the book, only to play into a much larger discussion later. Hasegawa uses this chapter entitled “Triangular Relations and the Pacific War” to set up the rest of his work.
The second chapter of the book starts to bring the war to the forefront. American troops land on Okinawa and the Soviet/Japanese Neutrality Pact is renounced. Hasegawa explains in detail the reasons behind Soviet dismissal of the pact, and reveals that the issue deals with timing as well as the fulfillment of a promise to enter the war with the Americans. An interesting point is that the Japanese are not informed of the Soviet decision until much later into the war. Truman's ascendancy to the Presidency of the United States is also discussed. This is one of the most interesting portions of the book. Hasegawa does an excellent job of incorporating details in the various historical elements he discusses. During a meeting between Truman and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in regards to the Yalta Agreement and Poland, Truman's “Dr. Jekyll” persona comes out. Molotov protests: “I have never been talked to like that in my life,” and Truman responds by saying, “carry out your agreements, and you won't get talked to like that.” The highlight of Truman's hostility in this situation is interesting and Hasegawa's addition of these types of details gives a sense of transference to the book. Soviet deception and their eagerness to extend the war is another topic of this chapter. As the details of the unconditional surrender proposed by the Allied Powers is being toyed with, the Soviets press the Americans to strictly adhere to unconditional surrender, as the terms would make it more difficult for Japan to accept right away.
Unconditional surrender is a major topic throughout the next few chapters. The concept of the kokutai is examined, which is a sticking point with the Japanese. At this time, Japan is looking for Soviet mediation to end the war, and the preservation of the kokutai (or national essence) is one condition that the Japanese insist upon until the very end. This concept is touched upon numerous times and shows how important this ideology and concept of national identity is to the Japanese. The Potsdam Proclamation becomes important at this point as well. The terms of this agreement justify the Soviet war against Japan despite it being a violation of the earlier Neutrality Pact. At this time, Truman also tells Stalin that the American's possess the atomic bomb and will soon be ready to use it. This is where the “race” really begins, and the Soviets being unrestrained preparations to join the war before the American's end it with the atomic bomb. Moscow declares war against Japan, and the wheels are set into motion.
The end of the fourth and entirety of the fifth chapter of the book analyze the atomic bombs and provide a great deal of insight that is not commonly known or accepted. The knowledge that plans exist to drop more than just the 2 bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a sobering reality. Kyoto and even Tokyo are considered as possible targets. The most interesting moments come in regards to Truman. There is a rush to drop the bombs without any attempt to explore the readiness of some Japanese policymakers to seek peace through ultimatum. The bombs are also dropped without Truman's specific order. Finally, Hasegawa discusses Truman's reaction to the successful nuclear attack on Japan. The justifications given for dropping the bomb are complex and calculated. Interestingly, the jubilation that Truman feels is not because of the destruction of Hiroshima but because everything goes as planned. The details which include the concocted story of Japan's prompt rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation, show that few other alternatives to the atomic bomb are thoroughly considered. Truman rushes to drop the bomb; it is too integral to the U.S. solution to be denied.
Japans acceptance of unconditional surrender and the Soviet advance into Japanese territory finishes the book. Hasegawa focuses on the Soviet attack, not the Hiroshima bomb, as the catalyst that convinced political leaders to end the war by accepting the Potsdam Proclamation. Many pages are dedicated to the dispute between those in the Japanese government who wish to end the war, and those who desire to continue fighting. A coup to overthrow the peace party is attempted, but fails due to the powerful support behind the emperor's desire to accept unconditional surrender. The kokutai is preserved in myth only, but Japan surrenders with the emperor's official announcement on August 15th, 1945. Despite surrender, Emperor Hirohito's acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation prompts Stalin to accelerate his military action against Japan. Soviet troops continue to march through Japanese territory in an effort to capture as much land as they possibly can before they are forced to stop. Stalin is determined to capture the Kuril Island chain as promised in the Potsdam Proclamation, but he goes further and investigates the possibility of occupying Northern Hokkaido as well. In the final chapter, Soviet expansionism is thoroughly documented; it continues even after Japan signs the official surrender papers. In some ways, Hasegawa's depiction of Soviet land capturing demonizes Stalin and the Soviet methods. Despite the Kurils being legitimately acquired by Japan as opposed to acquisition by force, Stalin is bent on expansion even at the cost of historical falsification.
Hasegawa concludes his book by “Assessing the Roads not Taken”. This is the most thought provoking portion of the book, and aims to support the authors view that Soviet entry played the leading role in Japan's surrender. Hasegawa again alludes to the expansionist regime of Stalin, and it is not clear why he takes such an aggressive position towards the Russians when he writes that, “the Pacific war was an example of the [Stalin's] leader's expansionistic foreign policy … unless the Russians come to this realization, the process of cleansing themselves of Stalin's past will never be completed.” Overall, the conclusion sufficiently ties the ideas throughout the book together, and systematically presents the alternatives realities that could have transpired during the course of the war. The Pacific War could very well have ended differently had the men involved made different choices … but they did not.
Hasegawa's work in Racing the Enemy is substantial. His depiction and explanation of the Pacific War is both impressive and compelling. His book is among the best, if not at the top of the list, when considering historical accounts of the Pacific War and the surrender of Japan. A tremendous amount of work went into producing a book of such scale, but the author could be more efficient in his account of the facts. The organization of the book, while sufficient, could be better. Portions of the text backtrack at times and this adds unnecessary length to the book. Hasegawa could be more effective in this account. Also, the amount of time spent bracing the importance of Soviet involvement in regards to the surrender of Japan could be strengthened if Hasegawa had presented a more considerable observation of the politics concerning the atomic bomb. The impression left is that Hasegawa sets out to prove a point by substantiating his argument without the same amount of care devoted to proving potential contractors wrong. Hasegawa caters to the idea that if enough evidence can support one argument, then that is enough to prove all the others wrong. But that is not to say that he didn't argue his point correctly. And thus, the beauty of argument. When you argue correctly, you are never wrong.
Hasegawa begins by writing about the Neutrality Pact between the Soviet Union and Japan. This pact serves as one of the main themes in the book with Japan continually trying to keep the Soviet Union from entering the war, all while the Soviets secretly plot to break the pact and enter the war. Hasegawa brings up several other key themes in the early pages as well: U.S.-Soviet cooperation, the unconditional surrender of Japan, the kokutai, and the atomic bombs. All four of these are touched upon lightly in the beginning of the book, only to play into a much larger discussion later. Hasegawa uses this chapter entitled “Triangular Relations and the Pacific War” to set up the rest of his work.
The second chapter of the book starts to bring the war to the forefront. American troops land on Okinawa and the Soviet/Japanese Neutrality Pact is renounced. Hasegawa explains in detail the reasons behind Soviet dismissal of the pact, and reveals that the issue deals with timing as well as the fulfillment of a promise to enter the war with the Americans. An interesting point is that the Japanese are not informed of the Soviet decision until much later into the war. Truman's ascendancy to the Presidency of the United States is also discussed. This is one of the most interesting portions of the book. Hasegawa does an excellent job of incorporating details in the various historical elements he discusses. During a meeting between Truman and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in regards to the Yalta Agreement and Poland, Truman's “Dr. Jekyll” persona comes out. Molotov protests: “I have never been talked to like that in my life,” and Truman responds by saying, “carry out your agreements, and you won't get talked to like that.” The highlight of Truman's hostility in this situation is interesting and Hasegawa's addition of these types of details gives a sense of transference to the book. Soviet deception and their eagerness to extend the war is another topic of this chapter. As the details of the unconditional surrender proposed by the Allied Powers is being toyed with, the Soviets press the Americans to strictly adhere to unconditional surrender, as the terms would make it more difficult for Japan to accept right away.
Unconditional surrender is a major topic throughout the next few chapters. The concept of the kokutai is examined, which is a sticking point with the Japanese. At this time, Japan is looking for Soviet mediation to end the war, and the preservation of the kokutai (or national essence) is one condition that the Japanese insist upon until the very end. This concept is touched upon numerous times and shows how important this ideology and concept of national identity is to the Japanese. The Potsdam Proclamation becomes important at this point as well. The terms of this agreement justify the Soviet war against Japan despite it being a violation of the earlier Neutrality Pact. At this time, Truman also tells Stalin that the American's possess the atomic bomb and will soon be ready to use it. This is where the “race” really begins, and the Soviets being unrestrained preparations to join the war before the American's end it with the atomic bomb. Moscow declares war against Japan, and the wheels are set into motion.
The end of the fourth and entirety of the fifth chapter of the book analyze the atomic bombs and provide a great deal of insight that is not commonly known or accepted. The knowledge that plans exist to drop more than just the 2 bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a sobering reality. Kyoto and even Tokyo are considered as possible targets. The most interesting moments come in regards to Truman. There is a rush to drop the bombs without any attempt to explore the readiness of some Japanese policymakers to seek peace through ultimatum. The bombs are also dropped without Truman's specific order. Finally, Hasegawa discusses Truman's reaction to the successful nuclear attack on Japan. The justifications given for dropping the bomb are complex and calculated. Interestingly, the jubilation that Truman feels is not because of the destruction of Hiroshima but because everything goes as planned. The details which include the concocted story of Japan's prompt rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation, show that few other alternatives to the atomic bomb are thoroughly considered. Truman rushes to drop the bomb; it is too integral to the U.S. solution to be denied.
Japans acceptance of unconditional surrender and the Soviet advance into Japanese territory finishes the book. Hasegawa focuses on the Soviet attack, not the Hiroshima bomb, as the catalyst that convinced political leaders to end the war by accepting the Potsdam Proclamation. Many pages are dedicated to the dispute between those in the Japanese government who wish to end the war, and those who desire to continue fighting. A coup to overthrow the peace party is attempted, but fails due to the powerful support behind the emperor's desire to accept unconditional surrender. The kokutai is preserved in myth only, but Japan surrenders with the emperor's official announcement on August 15th, 1945. Despite surrender, Emperor Hirohito's acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation prompts Stalin to accelerate his military action against Japan. Soviet troops continue to march through Japanese territory in an effort to capture as much land as they possibly can before they are forced to stop. Stalin is determined to capture the Kuril Island chain as promised in the Potsdam Proclamation, but he goes further and investigates the possibility of occupying Northern Hokkaido as well. In the final chapter, Soviet expansionism is thoroughly documented; it continues even after Japan signs the official surrender papers. In some ways, Hasegawa's depiction of Soviet land capturing demonizes Stalin and the Soviet methods. Despite the Kurils being legitimately acquired by Japan as opposed to acquisition by force, Stalin is bent on expansion even at the cost of historical falsification.
Hasegawa concludes his book by “Assessing the Roads not Taken”. This is the most thought provoking portion of the book, and aims to support the authors view that Soviet entry played the leading role in Japan's surrender. Hasegawa again alludes to the expansionist regime of Stalin, and it is not clear why he takes such an aggressive position towards the Russians when he writes that, “the Pacific war was an example of the [Stalin's] leader's expansionistic foreign policy … unless the Russians come to this realization, the process of cleansing themselves of Stalin's past will never be completed.” Overall, the conclusion sufficiently ties the ideas throughout the book together, and systematically presents the alternatives realities that could have transpired during the course of the war. The Pacific War could very well have ended differently had the men involved made different choices … but they did not.
Hasegawa's work in Racing the Enemy is substantial. His depiction and explanation of the Pacific War is both impressive and compelling. His book is among the best, if not at the top of the list, when considering historical accounts of the Pacific War and the surrender of Japan. A tremendous amount of work went into producing a book of such scale, but the author could be more efficient in his account of the facts. The organization of the book, while sufficient, could be better. Portions of the text backtrack at times and this adds unnecessary length to the book. Hasegawa could be more effective in this account. Also, the amount of time spent bracing the importance of Soviet involvement in regards to the surrender of Japan could be strengthened if Hasegawa had presented a more considerable observation of the politics concerning the atomic bomb. The impression left is that Hasegawa sets out to prove a point by substantiating his argument without the same amount of care devoted to proving potential contractors wrong. Hasegawa caters to the idea that if enough evidence can support one argument, then that is enough to prove all the others wrong. But that is not to say that he didn't argue his point correctly. And thus, the beauty of argument. When you argue correctly, you are never wrong.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 2, 2020
In my unlamented youth, it was an article of faith among educated American adults that the American atom bombs, and the bombs alone, compelled Japan’s surrender at the end of the Second World War. Without the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as Harry Truman believed and as Paul Fussell insisted in a famous 1981 article ("Thank God for the Atom Bomb"), the United States would necessarily have invaded the Japanese home islands, losing at least a quarter of a million Americans in so doing. Left-ish scholars and essayists occasionally challenged this view, but with little success. In 2005, however, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa offered a well-researched and clearly written monograph that disrupted the standard historical narrative of the surrender. In Hasegawa’s account, the Imperial Japanese armed forces had by the summer of 1945 acknowledged the likelihood of defeat, but to save their institutional honor they and their allies in the Imperial Cabinet demanded a final military blow against the Americans. More peacefully inclined top officials then hoped they could negotiate a conditional surrender with the Americans, one that preserved the divine prerogatives of the Imperial household. The Soviet declaration of war on August 8th foreclosed both possibilities. The peace faction had wanted the USSR to serve as a third-party mediator in negotiations with the United States, but now all three countries were enemies. The war faction then watched the Red Army crush the last Japanese land force, the Kwantung Army, with its August blitzkrieg into Manchuria. The A-bomb attacks certainly struck a body blow to the Japanese nation-state, and Emperor Hirohito referred to them in his August 15th broadcast, as a way of justifying the surrender to the civilian populace. In the dozen or so public and semi-public statements that the emperor and other officials made on the surrender, however, they were much likelier to refer to the Soviet declaration of war or both the declaration and the Bomb as the justification for surrender than the bombs alone.
For what it’s worth (I think it’s worth a fair amount), scholar Richard Frank, in his 2006 H-DIPLO review essay on RACING THE ENEMY - his densely argued, 38-page, single-spaced review essay - concludes that Japan would have surrendered without either the A-bombs or the Soviet declaration of war. The emperor and Cabinet repeatedly worried in the war’s final weeks about the “domestic situation,” by which they meant the likelihood of a breakdown in civil order if the blockade and bombing continued. On August 11th the United States began bombing Japan’s railroads, which would almost certainly have destroyed the food distribution system and triggered famine and riot in a few weeks. The emperor feared that his household and government would not survive such an upheaval. What the A-bombs did was ensure an earlier surrender, which shortened the war and saved Japanese and other East Asian lives. What the Soviet intervention did was ensure that the armed forces would go along with the surrender and not continue to fight on the continent or, worse, engineer a successful coup. Neither Stalin nor the Bomb, but rather Curtis LeMay, ended the Second World War. What a crap century the twentieth was.
For what it’s worth (I think it’s worth a fair amount), scholar Richard Frank, in his 2006 H-DIPLO review essay on RACING THE ENEMY - his densely argued, 38-page, single-spaced review essay - concludes that Japan would have surrendered without either the A-bombs or the Soviet declaration of war. The emperor and Cabinet repeatedly worried in the war’s final weeks about the “domestic situation,” by which they meant the likelihood of a breakdown in civil order if the blockade and bombing continued. On August 11th the United States began bombing Japan’s railroads, which would almost certainly have destroyed the food distribution system and triggered famine and riot in a few weeks. The emperor feared that his household and government would not survive such an upheaval. What the A-bombs did was ensure an earlier surrender, which shortened the war and saved Japanese and other East Asian lives. What the Soviet intervention did was ensure that the armed forces would go along with the surrender and not continue to fight on the continent or, worse, engineer a successful coup. Neither Stalin nor the Bomb, but rather Curtis LeMay, ended the Second World War. What a crap century the twentieth was.
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November 28, 2020Hasegawa makes a good case. The trouble is the obvious errors he makes, errors that anybody who actually knows the subject shouldn't be making.
For instance, page 18, he claims "Roosevelt immediately declared war". No, he didn't. Roosevelt couldn't declare war, though the declaration is commonly phrased that way: it wasn't a Presidential power; that power belonged to Congress. And it wasn't "immediate": it was the following day. (The same day Japan did, coincidentally; the notorious Fourteen-Part Message, commonly treated as a declaration of war, was, in fact, nothing of the kind.)
For instance, page 76, he calls "S-1" the Manhattan Project. It wasn't. S-1 referred to the atomic bomb, not the project at large.
For instance, page 126, he calls "the exchange of telegrams between Togo and Sato" "the Magic intercepts". They weren't. MAGIC referred to the decryption program and the intelligence derived from it--all of it. He further says "Naval intelligence was responsible for the Magic intercepts". Wrong again. The Army (what would become SIS) and Navy (ONI) both intercepted, and jointly decrypted, Japanese traffic. How does Hasegawa not know this?
For instance, page 140-1, he claims Fat Man "was detonated in Alamagordo". It wasn't in Alamagordo (or the town would be gone), but at the Trinity Site (the test stand). And it wasn't Fat Man, it was the same design: otherwise, Fat Man would never have been available for use. The second part is such an obvious mistake, it's stunning Hasegawa made it.
For instance, page 141, he misspells Admiral Leahy's name....
For instance, page 180, he says 70,000 buildings in Hiroshima were destroyed. He omits to say the majority had nothing to do with war production: the factories were mainly on the outskirts, and largely untouched.
For instance, page 181, he blithely repeats Truman's fabricated 1951 claim of a million casualties, and further says Truman was told this by his military advisors. This is false. The truth, as Truman well knew, based on contemporary documents, was more like 250,000 total U.S. casualties. This was not insignificant, but it amounted to a casualty rate approximately equal that of the invasion of Okinawa--& it went ahead to completion. How does Hasegawa not know this?
For instance, page 264, he states, "Had [Operation] Olympic [the invasion of Japan] been implemented, the result would have been an unprecedented bloodbath.", adding, "The Battle of Shimushu validates this assertion." This is utter nonsense. The Soviet capacity to land on a hostile shore was, if anything, less than Japan's, and Japan did not have a stellar record, contrary to the common public perception. The U.S., on the other hand, by this point had the finest amphibious landing forces and doctrine in history, and would have had control of the skies so complete, even the modern term "air dominance" pales somewhat. How does Hasegawa not know this?
These errors do call in question the caliber of Hasegawa's scholarship and serve to undermine my confidence in the quality of his case.
Page 76, FYI, he mentions Charles Cooke, omitting the commonly used nickname "Savvy", and fails to identify who the CNO was (Ernie King, if memory serves for date of office).
For instance, page 18, he claims "Roosevelt immediately declared war". No, he didn't. Roosevelt couldn't declare war, though the declaration is commonly phrased that way: it wasn't a Presidential power; that power belonged to Congress. And it wasn't "immediate": it was the following day. (The same day Japan did, coincidentally; the notorious Fourteen-Part Message, commonly treated as a declaration of war, was, in fact, nothing of the kind.)
For instance, page 76, he calls "S-1" the Manhattan Project. It wasn't. S-1 referred to the atomic bomb, not the project at large.
For instance, page 126, he calls "the exchange of telegrams between Togo and Sato" "the Magic intercepts". They weren't. MAGIC referred to the decryption program and the intelligence derived from it--all of it. He further says "Naval intelligence was responsible for the Magic intercepts". Wrong again. The Army (what would become SIS) and Navy (ONI) both intercepted, and jointly decrypted, Japanese traffic. How does Hasegawa not know this?
For instance, page 140-1, he claims Fat Man "was detonated in Alamagordo". It wasn't in Alamagordo (or the town would be gone), but at the Trinity Site (the test stand). And it wasn't Fat Man, it was the same design: otherwise, Fat Man would never have been available for use. The second part is such an obvious mistake, it's stunning Hasegawa made it.
For instance, page 141, he misspells Admiral Leahy's name....
For instance, page 180, he says 70,000 buildings in Hiroshima were destroyed. He omits to say the majority had nothing to do with war production: the factories were mainly on the outskirts, and largely untouched.
For instance, page 181, he blithely repeats Truman's fabricated 1951 claim of a million casualties, and further says Truman was told this by his military advisors. This is false. The truth, as Truman well knew, based on contemporary documents, was more like 250,000 total U.S. casualties. This was not insignificant, but it amounted to a casualty rate approximately equal that of the invasion of Okinawa--& it went ahead to completion. How does Hasegawa not know this?
For instance, page 264, he states, "Had [Operation] Olympic [the invasion of Japan] been implemented, the result would have been an unprecedented bloodbath.", adding, "The Battle of Shimushu validates this assertion." This is utter nonsense. The Soviet capacity to land on a hostile shore was, if anything, less than Japan's, and Japan did not have a stellar record, contrary to the common public perception. The U.S., on the other hand, by this point had the finest amphibious landing forces and doctrine in history, and would have had control of the skies so complete, even the modern term "air dominance" pales somewhat. How does Hasegawa not know this?
These errors do call in question the caliber of Hasegawa's scholarship and serve to undermine my confidence in the quality of his case.
Page 76, FYI, he mentions Charles Cooke, omitting the commonly used nickname "Savvy", and fails to identify who the CNO was (Ernie King, if memory serves for date of office).
March 8, 2017
Re-read it for the test and found it lacking in sophistication somehow. Much less exciting than first time reading it.
August 25, 2018
Hasegawa has written a great book, but there are enough caveats to his analyses, that I cannot award the book a full 5 stars. I think that Richard B. Frank's Downfall is more persuasive in his interpretations about the role of atomic weapons and Soviet entry, and I find Frank's thoughts (look for the H-diplo roundtable discussion online for Frank on Hasegawa) to usually be the ones I find most persuasive. Hasegawa has done some excellent research into this period, and his insights into the Soviet sphere are especially illuminating. He also is admirably clear in what his views are and why he thinks what he does.
First, a brief overview of Hasegawa's thesis and what the book is about. This is about the decisions that the Japanese, Americans, and Soviets made leading up to Japan's surrender in September 1945. Hasegawa maintains that Stalin and Truman raced to see who could force Japan's surrender first. In doing so, he gives a good overview of the situation in 1944-1945, and follows the political maneuvering in the USSR, the US, and in Japan itself. He has a good amount of focus on Truman's motivations, including revenge for Pearl Harbor. Stalin's motivations are to grab as much territory as possible from the Japanese. The Japanese wish to not accept an unconditional surrender that would change their political system greatly.
My greatest criticism is that Hasegawa often seems to have decided that his supposition that Truman didn't want the Soviets to enter the war (so he could force surrender by himself) is taken to be true, and he finds ways of reading Truman so that this seems plausible. I think that Truman's actions are far more ambiguous and find the criticism of some sources being displayed with too much bias to have some merit. Michael Kort's book review shows how Hasegawa's treatment of Truman's reaction to Soviet entry into the war suggests that Hasegawa reads too much into Truman's motivations [Hasegawa claims Truman was profoundly disappointed, but a look at the sources shows that Truman didn't appear to be disappointed at all, at least to me and Kort]. It's also odd that Hasegawa freely admits that the Truman administration didn't try to use China to stop Soviet entry into the war. If Truman was so determined to prevent Soviet entry, it seems like he should have jumped at the chance to prevent the Soviets by having the Chinese not come to an agreement with them.
Hasegawa also agrees that the Japanese were not about to surrender if the US had just added that the emperor would be retained (so a conditional "unconditional surrender"). While Hasegawa laments that other possibilities for peace were not always pursued, he states "Without the twin shocks of the atomic bombs and Soviet entry into the war, the Japanese would never have accepted surrender in August." This seems key to me, as the earlier the surrender, the fewer people (mostly non-Japanese Asians) would die under Japanese occupation, and fewer Japanese would starve from a naval blockade and bombing campaign against Japanese railways. Frank makes a great case for this, and I still have not found anyone with a satisfactory reply.
Hasegawa thinks that Soviet entry alone would have caused surrender before November 1, but in such a scenario the Soviets may have taken part of Hokkaido and been a part of the post-war occupation. It is difficult to believe this would have been a good thing for the Japanese, and may have meant more land under Soviet occupation than what actually happened. (The treatment of Japanese POWs by the Soviets does not inspire confidence that the Japanese in Hokkaido would have been treated well.)
One other problem I find with Hasegawa's analysis is how he views atomic weapons. It is certainly true that atomic bombs are much more powerful, but the idea behind them is very similar to strategic bombing, and the decision to attack civilians is never discussed with this full context. It may be true that it is easier to kill lots of people with atomic weapons, but fire bombing and conventional bombing of cities is also quite effective, and the same rationale backs both of them: civilians are military targets because they allow the opposing military to continue fighting. This certainly does not justify dropping the atomic bombs, but I think acknowledging this, adds a bit more balance to the discussion. Also, Alex Wellerstein (of the nuclear secrecy blog) has some excellent articles on Truman and the bomb that make a pretty good case that Truman did not fully understand that Hiroshima was a civilian and military target. He seemed to think it was mostly a military target. This also offers an alternative interpretation to Truman's defense of the bombs afterward.
Overall, I found the book enlightening, even if I found a lot to disagree with. Most of them are simply different interpretations of the same event, and I think for the most part Hasegawa does a good job explaining his view and justifying it as a possible or plausible explanation.
I would still recommend Frank's Downfall for an overview in general. Hasegawa's analysis of the Soviets is what really sets this book apart.
First, a brief overview of Hasegawa's thesis and what the book is about. This is about the decisions that the Japanese, Americans, and Soviets made leading up to Japan's surrender in September 1945. Hasegawa maintains that Stalin and Truman raced to see who could force Japan's surrender first. In doing so, he gives a good overview of the situation in 1944-1945, and follows the political maneuvering in the USSR, the US, and in Japan itself. He has a good amount of focus on Truman's motivations, including revenge for Pearl Harbor. Stalin's motivations are to grab as much territory as possible from the Japanese. The Japanese wish to not accept an unconditional surrender that would change their political system greatly.
My greatest criticism is that Hasegawa often seems to have decided that his supposition that Truman didn't want the Soviets to enter the war (so he could force surrender by himself) is taken to be true, and he finds ways of reading Truman so that this seems plausible. I think that Truman's actions are far more ambiguous and find the criticism of some sources being displayed with too much bias to have some merit. Michael Kort's book review shows how Hasegawa's treatment of Truman's reaction to Soviet entry into the war suggests that Hasegawa reads too much into Truman's motivations [Hasegawa claims Truman was profoundly disappointed, but a look at the sources shows that Truman didn't appear to be disappointed at all, at least to me and Kort]. It's also odd that Hasegawa freely admits that the Truman administration didn't try to use China to stop Soviet entry into the war. If Truman was so determined to prevent Soviet entry, it seems like he should have jumped at the chance to prevent the Soviets by having the Chinese not come to an agreement with them.
Hasegawa also agrees that the Japanese were not about to surrender if the US had just added that the emperor would be retained (so a conditional "unconditional surrender"). While Hasegawa laments that other possibilities for peace were not always pursued, he states "Without the twin shocks of the atomic bombs and Soviet entry into the war, the Japanese would never have accepted surrender in August." This seems key to me, as the earlier the surrender, the fewer people (mostly non-Japanese Asians) would die under Japanese occupation, and fewer Japanese would starve from a naval blockade and bombing campaign against Japanese railways. Frank makes a great case for this, and I still have not found anyone with a satisfactory reply.
Hasegawa thinks that Soviet entry alone would have caused surrender before November 1, but in such a scenario the Soviets may have taken part of Hokkaido and been a part of the post-war occupation. It is difficult to believe this would have been a good thing for the Japanese, and may have meant more land under Soviet occupation than what actually happened. (The treatment of Japanese POWs by the Soviets does not inspire confidence that the Japanese in Hokkaido would have been treated well.)
One other problem I find with Hasegawa's analysis is how he views atomic weapons. It is certainly true that atomic bombs are much more powerful, but the idea behind them is very similar to strategic bombing, and the decision to attack civilians is never discussed with this full context. It may be true that it is easier to kill lots of people with atomic weapons, but fire bombing and conventional bombing of cities is also quite effective, and the same rationale backs both of them: civilians are military targets because they allow the opposing military to continue fighting. This certainly does not justify dropping the atomic bombs, but I think acknowledging this, adds a bit more balance to the discussion. Also, Alex Wellerstein (of the nuclear secrecy blog) has some excellent articles on Truman and the bomb that make a pretty good case that Truman did not fully understand that Hiroshima was a civilian and military target. He seemed to think it was mostly a military target. This also offers an alternative interpretation to Truman's defense of the bombs afterward.
Overall, I found the book enlightening, even if I found a lot to disagree with. Most of them are simply different interpretations of the same event, and I think for the most part Hasegawa does a good job explaining his view and justifying it as a possible or plausible explanation.
I would still recommend Frank's Downfall for an overview in general. Hasegawa's analysis of the Soviets is what really sets this book apart.
August 26, 2015
A really interesting book that has received renewed interest on the 70th anniversary of the Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombings. Much of what Hasegawa says will anger both the standard US view of the atomic bombs rule in ending the Pacific War and the revisionist school of historians.
Starting in the 1960s many started arguing that the Japanese were only days from surrendering when Truman dropped the bombs out of some combo of veiled threats to the Soviets and racism. Ever since then the traditionalists and revisionists have been pretty adamant in their respective cases and left no alternate theories.
Hasegawa argues that while the a-bombs were a total surprise to the Japanese, they did not do much to change the resolve of the military leaders in Japan, in particular the Imperial Army to keep on fighting. What did cripple the power of the army to push forward with what have been almost certain annihilation as a people by the planned US invasion (Operation Olympic) was the entry of the USSR into the Pacific conflict against Japan.
The Japanese leadership knew by the summer of 1945 they were all but defeated, facing possible utter destruction if the US invaded. Their hope was that by inflicting horrific casualties on the US progress thru Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa they could stall the US invasion long enough to use the USSR as a mediator for a negotiated surrender.
They hoped to maintain their remaining military, avoid occupation, self investigate their own war crimes and most importantly keep the emperor/royal house intact as the leader. Unfortunately for the Japanese developments in the US and USSR were taking place that made this very rational plan hopelessly out of line with reality.
Instead of maintaining his long neutrality with Japan, Stalin had decided to enter the war and seize what he had been promised by the Allies during the Potsdam conference weeks before the bombings. Tensions between the US and USSR were rising as both sides knew the real fight was who would get what after WW2 was over. Ending the war as already assumed.
The US on the other hand had developed the atomic bombs and believed they could both force the Japanese to surrender and create a strategic advantage against the Russians.
Hasegawa argues as shocking as the bombs were the declaration of war by Stalin on 08.09.1945 ended their hopes of using the USSR to surrender on better terms.
Hasegawa's key argument would be that until August of '45 the Japanese were defeated, but no where close to surrendering. They had made some momentous strategic gambles to end the war on better terms and they failed. If they had used V-E day or the Fall of Okinawa to come to grips with their looming defeat things might have gone better.
Hasegawa does present strong evidence that the decision making put forth over the years by Truman and his supporters is often disengenuos, verging on dishonest. If the US had made overtures to allow for the maintaining of the emperor in some form of constitutional monarchy the "peace party" in the Japanese leadership might have been able to gain more power.
Stalin, on the other hand, knew about the Manhattan Project and when Truman hinted in July '45 that the US was going to use those bombs to end the war that the USSR had to act fast if it wanted to grab the land, ports and concessions it wanted in the Far East. For years US accounts of the Soviet entry depicted it as atechnical, but meaningless act. No real fighting happened, but the truth is the Red Army was chewing thru the haggard Japanese army in Manchuria for almost three weeks in its race for the goodies. The Soviets fought and seized Japanese territory for 2 days after the war ended formally on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 09.05.2015. Hasegawa notes that the nuclear bombs allowed Japan to create its victim hood mth, but the Soviet grabbing of the Kurils and plans to seize Hokkaido gave right wing Japanese grounds for hating the Russians that still linger on.
Starting in the 1960s many started arguing that the Japanese were only days from surrendering when Truman dropped the bombs out of some combo of veiled threats to the Soviets and racism. Ever since then the traditionalists and revisionists have been pretty adamant in their respective cases and left no alternate theories.
Hasegawa argues that while the a-bombs were a total surprise to the Japanese, they did not do much to change the resolve of the military leaders in Japan, in particular the Imperial Army to keep on fighting. What did cripple the power of the army to push forward with what have been almost certain annihilation as a people by the planned US invasion (Operation Olympic) was the entry of the USSR into the Pacific conflict against Japan.
The Japanese leadership knew by the summer of 1945 they were all but defeated, facing possible utter destruction if the US invaded. Their hope was that by inflicting horrific casualties on the US progress thru Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa they could stall the US invasion long enough to use the USSR as a mediator for a negotiated surrender.
They hoped to maintain their remaining military, avoid occupation, self investigate their own war crimes and most importantly keep the emperor/royal house intact as the leader. Unfortunately for the Japanese developments in the US and USSR were taking place that made this very rational plan hopelessly out of line with reality.
Instead of maintaining his long neutrality with Japan, Stalin had decided to enter the war and seize what he had been promised by the Allies during the Potsdam conference weeks before the bombings. Tensions between the US and USSR were rising as both sides knew the real fight was who would get what after WW2 was over. Ending the war as already assumed.
The US on the other hand had developed the atomic bombs and believed they could both force the Japanese to surrender and create a strategic advantage against the Russians.
Hasegawa argues as shocking as the bombs were the declaration of war by Stalin on 08.09.1945 ended their hopes of using the USSR to surrender on better terms.
Hasegawa's key argument would be that until August of '45 the Japanese were defeated, but no where close to surrendering. They had made some momentous strategic gambles to end the war on better terms and they failed. If they had used V-E day or the Fall of Okinawa to come to grips with their looming defeat things might have gone better.
Hasegawa does present strong evidence that the decision making put forth over the years by Truman and his supporters is often disengenuos, verging on dishonest. If the US had made overtures to allow for the maintaining of the emperor in some form of constitutional monarchy the "peace party" in the Japanese leadership might have been able to gain more power.
Stalin, on the other hand, knew about the Manhattan Project and when Truman hinted in July '45 that the US was going to use those bombs to end the war that the USSR had to act fast if it wanted to grab the land, ports and concessions it wanted in the Far East. For years US accounts of the Soviet entry depicted it as atechnical, but meaningless act. No real fighting happened, but the truth is the Red Army was chewing thru the haggard Japanese army in Manchuria for almost three weeks in its race for the goodies. The Soviets fought and seized Japanese territory for 2 days after the war ended formally on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 09.05.2015. Hasegawa notes that the nuclear bombs allowed Japan to create its victim hood mth, but the Soviet grabbing of the Kurils and plans to seize Hokkaido gave right wing Japanese grounds for hating the Russians that still linger on.
April 11, 2008
I started out enjoying the book but I couldn't finish it. It got bogged down in minutia - too many details of everyone who attend every meeting and ...
June 26, 2024
I first discovered this book when it was referenced on Khan Academy, in the article 'READ: Nuclear Weapons', in Unit 7, in the course 'World History Project - Origins to the Present'. The article states that the author, a Japanese American historian at the University of California, Santa Barbara, outlines a more complex argument about the use of nuclear weapons in this book. The author shows how the Soviet Union played both sides to attempt to gain territories in Asia during World War II. He proposes that Japan did not unconditionally surrender because of the American's atomic bombs. He believes they surrendered because the Soviet Union had entered the war against Japan. The article quotes the author from p.5 of this book: "…Stalin was an active participant, not a secondary player, as historians have hitherto depicted, in the drama of Japan’s surrender. He was engaged in skillful Machiavellian diplomacy to manipulate Japanese desires for negotiated peace to his own ends. He was involved in intense negotiations with the Americans and reacted decisively to American maneuvers. He bullied the Chinese into accepting the Soviet terms, and ruthlessly pursued diplomacy and military operations to secure the territories to which he felt entitled. The study also casts the Americans use of the atomic bomb in a wider setting. The bomb provided a solution to the previously unsolvable dilemma that faced Truman: to achieve Japan’s unconditional surrender before Soviet entry into the war. Truman issued the Potsdam Proclamation, not as a warning to Japan, but to justify the use of the atomic bomb. I challenge the commonly held view that the atomic bomb provided the immediate and decisive knockout blow to Japan’s will to fight. Indeed, the Soviet entry into the war played a greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender".
December 28, 2025
This is a scholarly book, not for the faint of heart. Not that it will scare you, but that it will seem boring if you’re not ready for the journey. Hasegawa does a good job of providing supporting evidence to the contention that Japanese surrender in World War 2 was a product of multiple shocks in early August 1945, not just the atomic bombs. As I page through the reviews on this site, that appears to be a shock too many, but to folks who studied Japanese history it is a well established fact. In essence, while the bombs eliminated the technological argument for continuing the war, the entry by the Soviets into the war eliminated all diplomatic options.
Now many will use this as a pivot to say that a Russia declaration without Hiroshima would have been sufficient to end the war. It’s always hard to argue counter factual theories, but this feels unlikely, at least not with the way surrender played out in history. As far as which of the events counted “the most” for surrender, the truth is that all of them timed together maximized impact and led a hardened polity to reverse course dramatically.
Good book, fairly dry even by academic standards. I am glad to see that it didn’t veer off into the Area Studies trend of overly grandiose claims of impact.
Now many will use this as a pivot to say that a Russia declaration without Hiroshima would have been sufficient to end the war. It’s always hard to argue counter factual theories, but this feels unlikely, at least not with the way surrender played out in history. As far as which of the events counted “the most” for surrender, the truth is that all of them timed together maximized impact and led a hardened polity to reverse course dramatically.
Good book, fairly dry even by academic standards. I am glad to see that it didn’t veer off into the Area Studies trend of overly grandiose claims of impact.
July 15, 2020
A true three-sided evaluation of the last weeks of the Pacific War. Hasegawa is uniquely prepared for this study: He is a Japanese-born, US-based professor of Russian history. Especially the Japanese and Russian side are much underresearched in the West, and here the book shines in its depiction of Stalin's crafty power politics for the Far East and the struggle of the Japanese peace party and war party within the government. Sadly, its assessment of US intentions - that the United States were extremely focused on the nuclear bomb and wanted to drop it to win the war before the Soviets could join seems unsupported by the contemporary evidence, and thus Hasegawa's main hypothesis - that of a "race" between the US dropping the bomb and the Soviets joining the war - falls away. Besides that, however, the book has much merit.
August 26, 2023
Good, retelling of the Japanese, American, and Soviet diplomatic manauevers in the last 3 months of WW II. Hasegawa takes the stance that Japan may not have surrendered without the Atomic Bombs, it took both the Soviet attack and the A-bombs. He also pokes holes in the oft-cited USBSS statement that Japan would've surrendered prior to November 1st 1945 even without the A-bomb or USSR declaration of war. Hasegawa shows this statement was unsupported by anything other a vague post-war comment by one of the Japanese leaders.
The book reinforces my belief that US and Japanese leaders were both stupid and had a disregard for human life. The Japanese Leadership knew they had lost, they were only fighting to perserve the emperor and prevent a Allied occupation of Japanese soil. To achieve this they were willing to accept months of blockade and bombing. And throwing away hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives.
In only when their "friend" Stalin, who they absurdly counted on to broker a peace declared war, and the US dropped 2 A-bombs did they relent and surrender.
Meanwhile, Truman, Byrnes, and the JCS continued FDR's moronic "Unconditional Surrender" demand. Despite the advice of MacArthur, Hoover, Grew, and Stimson, they refused to modify the surender terms to include the continuance of the Emperor. Had they done so, its quite possible the Japanese would've surrendered before the A-Bombs.
This book lays out all the facts in clear well-written manner. The final chapter where the author goes over several counter-factuals, and discussions his conclusions, was well-presented.
The book reinforces my belief that US and Japanese leaders were both stupid and had a disregard for human life. The Japanese Leadership knew they had lost, they were only fighting to perserve the emperor and prevent a Allied occupation of Japanese soil. To achieve this they were willing to accept months of blockade and bombing. And throwing away hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives.
In only when their "friend" Stalin, who they absurdly counted on to broker a peace declared war, and the US dropped 2 A-bombs did they relent and surrender.
Meanwhile, Truman, Byrnes, and the JCS continued FDR's moronic "Unconditional Surrender" demand. Despite the advice of MacArthur, Hoover, Grew, and Stimson, they refused to modify the surender terms to include the continuance of the Emperor. Had they done so, its quite possible the Japanese would've surrendered before the A-Bombs.
This book lays out all the facts in clear well-written manner. The final chapter where the author goes over several counter-factuals, and discussions his conclusions, was well-presented.
December 8, 2018
This is a phenomenally well-researched book by the only historian to tackle the subject of the end of WWII who could read the three key languages, English, Russian, and Japanese. The result of his digging through the three nations' archives and the fact that he was writing in 2005 after many more documents of the era were declassified make for a more complete view of all the negotiations, plotting, and fighting that brought about the end of the war. And it is not revisionism to say that the atomic bomb played a much smaller role than Americans were led to believe from the beginning. It is simply that more information is now available. This is a fascinating, occasionally complicated examination of history that we thought we all knew.
July 1, 2025
Simply wrong that Russian entry into the Pacific War was the primary factor in ending the war. Hirohito's imperial rescript cites the Bomb.
Don't wave the second rescript, the one to the Kwantung Army, in my face. It was written later, and to allow it to save face.
I've read Frank, Gallicchio and Giangreco
Don't wave the second rescript, the one to the Kwantung Army, in my face. It was written later, and to allow it to save face.
I've read Frank, Gallicchio and Giangreco
August 4, 2017
A gripping account of the last few months of the Second World War, almost exclusively from a diplomatic point of view. If you're looking for details on the battles or eyewitness accounts from ground-level you won't find them here, this is a book about relations between the highest officials of the US, Japan and the Soviet Union.
February 21, 2019
As the war in the Pacific is going on, the Soviet Union and the US are working towards an end to the war. Although Japan is trying to work with the Soviets towards the same end. Unfortunately, for those who have studied history, about 98% of this is already known...and it’s a VERY DRY read. The other 2% almost makes it worth it.
October 12, 2020
A very detailed account of the end of World War 2 in Asia. Argues persuasively that Japan surrenders largely because of Soviet entry into the war and less because of atomic bombs. Several areas I was unaware about as a non-expert, especially Soviet/US tension on the Asian front and debates at Postdam about this.
April 14, 2021
A detailed reevaluation of the end of the Pacific War. Hasegawa uses old sources and new ones found in Japan and Moscow to argue that the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not necessary for the capitulation of Imperial Japan. The entry in to the war by the Soviets was far more important.
September 5, 2021
This was a intriguing look into an aspect of WWII that is rarely touched upon. It thoroughly punctures the myth that the bombs ended the war and explores the complex and often petty decisions that led to the war continuing as long as it did. A great read and a necessary exploration in a greater view of the war.
March 13, 2017
A thoroughly researched, thoughtful study that shatters the American-held myth that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were decisive in Japan's unconditional surrender.
March 25, 2019
This book has a lot of content and sometimes—at least for me—too much content, but overall it is expertly researched and argued.
October 7, 2023
Well researched and really great details, but it is incredibly dense. Take notes while you're reading or else you might forget who is who and what is going on.
December 11, 2024
Invaluable to my history assessments but the author is not a nice man.
February 12, 2016
In the American mind, the end of the Pacific War is clear. Sure, there might be debates on the morality of dropping the bomb, but the standard narrative is that the bomb made the final push to convince Japan to surrender and saved both American and Japanese lives. Hasegawa Tsuyoshi brings in Soviet and Japanese primary sources to offer an alternative view: The U.S. and U.S.S.R were, for a few reasons in an unannounced race to push Japan to surrender on their own terms.
To anyone who has some experience in Japanese primary sources, it's not news that the Suzuki cabinet was pushing Russia to mediate a conditional surrender. What Hasegawa does that's very unique is show the connections between these diplomatic talks between the Soviets and Japan and ongoing negotiations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.. Stalin stalled diplomatic processes with Japan in order to negotiate territories with the U.S., as per the Yalta agreement. Truman, skeptical after Stalin's maneuvers in Poland, attempted to keep Russia out. After the successful development of the atomic bomb, Truman found a way to end the war as quickly as possible and oust Stalin from the Potsdam Proclamation, while Stalin rushed to enter the Eastern Army into Manchuria to gain a claim on the spoils of war. Meanwhile, Japan still hoped for Russian mediation, unaware of the bigger picture.
After Russia's invasion of Manchuria, the Japanese militarist logic for continuation of the war became unsustainable. All that was left was a neverending debate on how to end the war and the fate of the Imperial institution. Fortunately, actors in the peace party managed to maneuver and deceive their way into suing for peace, ultimately incurring Hirohito's intervention. On August 15, Japan announced surrunder. However, the war did not end there. Hasegawa's final chapter delves into an oft-overlooked Soviet invasion of the Kuril and Sakhalin islands, illustrating the Soviets' mad scramble for war loot. For almost a month after Japan had announced surrunder, before the treaties were signed on September 2, Stalin tried to gain as much territory as possible before America could claim it, foreshadowing the imminent Cold War.
By delineating the focus of the end of the Pacific War from the U.S. and Japan, the author illustrates the ulterior motives of all the flawed actors. Stalin advocated for unconditional surrender in order to prolong the war and secure its entry, while Truman could have cynically wanted an excuse to drop the bomb and end the war on American terms, leaving postwar managemetn outside of Soviet terms. Meanwhile, Japan's barely functioning militarist government quibbled over the details of surrender and inadvertently prolonged the war.
Hasegawa shows that many diplomatic alternatives existed in all three sides, which could have provided a different end to the war without the use of the bomb. While, I didn't always appreciate the use of conjecture and questioned the usefulness alternate history in the conclusion, the primary sources accumulated in this book greatly support the author's narrative. This book is one of the best, non-moralistic accounts on the process of ending the Pacific War and wholeheartedly recommend it.
To anyone who has some experience in Japanese primary sources, it's not news that the Suzuki cabinet was pushing Russia to mediate a conditional surrender. What Hasegawa does that's very unique is show the connections between these diplomatic talks between the Soviets and Japan and ongoing negotiations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.. Stalin stalled diplomatic processes with Japan in order to negotiate territories with the U.S., as per the Yalta agreement. Truman, skeptical after Stalin's maneuvers in Poland, attempted to keep Russia out. After the successful development of the atomic bomb, Truman found a way to end the war as quickly as possible and oust Stalin from the Potsdam Proclamation, while Stalin rushed to enter the Eastern Army into Manchuria to gain a claim on the spoils of war. Meanwhile, Japan still hoped for Russian mediation, unaware of the bigger picture.
After Russia's invasion of Manchuria, the Japanese militarist logic for continuation of the war became unsustainable. All that was left was a neverending debate on how to end the war and the fate of the Imperial institution. Fortunately, actors in the peace party managed to maneuver and deceive their way into suing for peace, ultimately incurring Hirohito's intervention. On August 15, Japan announced surrunder. However, the war did not end there. Hasegawa's final chapter delves into an oft-overlooked Soviet invasion of the Kuril and Sakhalin islands, illustrating the Soviets' mad scramble for war loot. For almost a month after Japan had announced surrunder, before the treaties were signed on September 2, Stalin tried to gain as much territory as possible before America could claim it, foreshadowing the imminent Cold War.
By delineating the focus of the end of the Pacific War from the U.S. and Japan, the author illustrates the ulterior motives of all the flawed actors. Stalin advocated for unconditional surrender in order to prolong the war and secure its entry, while Truman could have cynically wanted an excuse to drop the bomb and end the war on American terms, leaving postwar managemetn outside of Soviet terms. Meanwhile, Japan's barely functioning militarist government quibbled over the details of surrender and inadvertently prolonged the war.
Hasegawa shows that many diplomatic alternatives existed in all three sides, which could have provided a different end to the war without the use of the bomb. While, I didn't always appreciate the use of conjecture and questioned the usefulness alternate history in the conclusion, the primary sources accumulated in this book greatly support the author's narrative. This book is one of the best, non-moralistic accounts on the process of ending the Pacific War and wholeheartedly recommend it.
March 13, 2012
I had not heard of this book until the conclusion was including in a "Taking Sides" book assigned for one of my university classes. I added to my reading list for a research paper on the decision to use the atomic bomb.
Published in 2005, "Racing The Enemy" cites Richard Frank's Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire from 1999 and is in turn cited by Max Hastings' Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45 from 2008. Hasegawa takes a view on the end of the war against Japan contrary to both Frank and Hastings, thinking less of the atomic bombs and more of the Soviet Union joining the war against Japan.
Hasegawa tries hard to argue his thesis and provides a good focus on Soviet-Japanese relations, including Japan's naive (and possibly downright delusion) belief that they could negotiate with the Soviets and how it affected their decisions. But ultimately I'm not convinced, and more importantly neither is Hastings. Of course, Frank is American (and so am I), Hastings is British, and Hasegawa is Japanese so all may be reaching different conclusions from mostly the same evidence because they are seeing it through different cultural lenses.
A bigger criticism I have of the book than its thesis or conclusions is simply that I found it a dry read, especially compared to Frank and Hastings. Admittedly, I may be in part "bombed out" on the topic due to the research for and writing of my research paper that it impaired my reading of this book.
If you haven't read any of the 3 books I mentioned in this review, I think reading them in the order they were published (Frank then Hasegawa then Hastings) might be the best way to mentally digest the arguments being made.
Published in 2005, "Racing The Enemy" cites Richard Frank's Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire from 1999 and is in turn cited by Max Hastings' Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45 from 2008. Hasegawa takes a view on the end of the war against Japan contrary to both Frank and Hastings, thinking less of the atomic bombs and more of the Soviet Union joining the war against Japan.
Hasegawa tries hard to argue his thesis and provides a good focus on Soviet-Japanese relations, including Japan's naive (and possibly downright delusion) belief that they could negotiate with the Soviets and how it affected their decisions. But ultimately I'm not convinced, and more importantly neither is Hastings. Of course, Frank is American (and so am I), Hastings is British, and Hasegawa is Japanese so all may be reaching different conclusions from mostly the same evidence because they are seeing it through different cultural lenses.
A bigger criticism I have of the book than its thesis or conclusions is simply that I found it a dry read, especially compared to Frank and Hastings. Admittedly, I may be in part "bombed out" on the topic due to the research for and writing of my research paper that it impaired my reading of this book.
If you haven't read any of the 3 books I mentioned in this review, I think reading them in the order they were published (Frank then Hasegawa then Hastings) might be the best way to mentally digest the arguments being made.
September 15, 2014
Very well argued example of revisionist (to my mind, although Hasegawa does criticize some elements of the older revisionist position) but very heavy on emphasizing Soviet entry into the war as the key element in the decision by Japan to surrender.
Even if I had not read other works, the chapter on "Potsdam: the Turning Point" is heavily conclusionary. Cf. especially "Racing the Enemy: A Critical Look" by Michael Kort, The Historical Society, Boston U, Vol. Vii, No. 3.
I was going to transcribe detailed notes but gave up.
Basically Hasegawa took a look at the vast panoroma of the war and strategic decisions and might have beens, Counter-factuals with a vengeance. As I remarked to myself before, the arguments sound like the might-have-beens of Gettysburg.
The book, however, is well worth reading to understand the revisionist point of view and to get a view as to the power politics of the period. Which everyone, everyone, practiced...
Even if I had not read other works, the chapter on "Potsdam: the Turning Point" is heavily conclusionary. Cf. especially "Racing the Enemy: A Critical Look" by Michael Kort, The Historical Society, Boston U, Vol. Vii, No. 3.
I was going to transcribe detailed notes but gave up.
Basically Hasegawa took a look at the vast panoroma of the war and strategic decisions and might have beens, Counter-factuals with a vengeance. As I remarked to myself before, the arguments sound like the might-have-beens of Gettysburg.
The book, however, is well worth reading to understand the revisionist point of view and to get a view as to the power politics of the period. Which everyone, everyone, practiced...
September 20, 2015
"In this groundbreaking book, Hasegawa argues that the atomic bombs were not as decisive in bringing about Japan's unconditional surrender as Soviet entry into the Pacific war. Few have so thoroughly documented the complex evasions and Machiavellinism of Japanese, Russian, and, especially, American leaders in the process of war termination" - Herbert P. Bix, Pulitzer Prize-winning author
I've learnt that the Americans were desperate to use and to justify the use of the uranium bombs against Japan when hard evidence for alternatives clearly exist, I've also realized that the Soviets cunningly twisted certain historical truths to justify the breaking of their non-aggression treaty with the Japanese in order to fulfill their claims according to the Yalta agreements. I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in the last days of WWII, or for those who wondered how the Cold War started
I've learnt that the Americans were desperate to use and to justify the use of the uranium bombs against Japan when hard evidence for alternatives clearly exist, I've also realized that the Soviets cunningly twisted certain historical truths to justify the breaking of their non-aggression treaty with the Japanese in order to fulfill their claims according to the Yalta agreements. I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in the last days of WWII, or for those who wondered how the Cold War started
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September 13, 2015An influential book looking at the US, Soviet, and Japanese actions in the final days of World War II. Hasegawa shows that within both the US and the Japanese commands, there were deep divisions about how the end of the war should be handled. Hasegawa further argues that the Soviet declaration of war against Japan, and subsequent invasion of Manchuria, was more influential on the eventual Japanese decision for unconditional surrender than were the use of the atomic bombs. An influential book looking at the US, Soviet, and Japanese actions in the final days of World War II. Hasegawa shows that within both the US and the Japanese commands, there were deep divisions about how the end of the war should be handled. Hasegawa further argues that the Soviet declaration of war against Japan, and subsequent invasion of Manchuria, was more influential on the eventual Japanese decision for unconditional surrender than were the use of the atomic bombs.
February 11, 2014
Read this for a grad class and loved it!
Wonderful, if insanely dense, play-by-play of US-USSR-Japanese relations regarding the Pacific War, culminating in the dropping of the atomic bomb and the Japanese surrender.
Anyone who gives a hoot about history has probably encountered the historiography/debate surrounding the use of the atomic bomb, but few sources, at least in my own experience, come at it from such a international perspective. All three nations are examined in detail, and it truly reads like an intense, yet intellectual, action movie. If you think you're at all interested, you've gotta read it!
Wonderful, if insanely dense, play-by-play of US-USSR-Japanese relations regarding the Pacific War, culminating in the dropping of the atomic bomb and the Japanese surrender.
Anyone who gives a hoot about history has probably encountered the historiography/debate surrounding the use of the atomic bomb, but few sources, at least in my own experience, come at it from such a international perspective. All three nations are examined in detail, and it truly reads like an intense, yet intellectual, action movie. If you think you're at all interested, you've gotta read it!
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