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Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.
584 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2003
108 people are currently reading
3689 people want to read
About the author
Thomas Metzinger
32 books258 followersThomas Metzinger is a German philosopher. He currently holds the position of director of the theoretical philosophy group at the department of philosophy at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz and is an Adjunct Fellow at the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies.
He has been active since the early 1990s in the promotion of consciousness studies as an academic endeavor.
In 2003 he published the monograph Being No One. In this book he argues that no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. He argues that the phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model."
Metzinger is praised for his grasp of the fundamental issues of neurobiology, consciousness and the relationship of mind and body. However, his views about the self are the subject of considerable controversy and ongoing debates.
Excerpted from Wikipedia.
He has been active since the early 1990s in the promotion of consciousness studies as an academic endeavor.
In 2003 he published the monograph Being No One. In this book he argues that no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. He argues that the phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model."
Metzinger is praised for his grasp of the fundamental issues of neurobiology, consciousness and the relationship of mind and body. However, his views about the self are the subject of considerable controversy and ongoing debates.
Excerpted from Wikipedia.
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Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
January 8, 2012
Consciousness is a monster subject. I've tried approaching it from an entirely scientific perspective, but our neuroscience just isn't advanced enough: Christof Koch's "Quest for Consciousness" comes as close as we can get, and it just doesn't cut it for me. On the other extreme, there's hand-wavy philosophy which I can't stand. Metzinger's approach is perfect: he uses just the right amount of analytical philosophy to jump from neuronal correlates of consciousness to build the entire picture of consciousness.
His theory is amazingly detailed, and extremely satisfying in that it fits an enormous number of observations. It changed the way I think about myself and my free will- the theory can be highly disturbing for people who believe in high individuality and objectivism, especially since it leaves very little room for interpretation.
This book is a much heavier read than his more recent "The Ego Tunnel", but the additional rigor is totally worth it in my opinion: some prior conditioning in neuroanatomy and philosophy is required.
His theory is amazingly detailed, and extremely satisfying in that it fits an enormous number of observations. It changed the way I think about myself and my free will- the theory can be highly disturbing for people who believe in high individuality and objectivism, especially since it leaves very little room for interpretation.
This book is a much heavier read than his more recent "The Ego Tunnel", but the additional rigor is totally worth it in my opinion: some prior conditioning in neuroanatomy and philosophy is required.
Currently reading
April 15, 2009In about 20 minutes I manage to read 4 pages. Then I realize I'm really confused, set the bookmark back about 3 pages. This book is really that dense.
Oddly enough, even at this snails pace, every day I seem to have fascinating new insights into the nature of consciousness.
This book is also a more modern treatment of the phenomenology theories of the likes of Ponty, Heidegger etc but in much more clear and precise (nearly mathematical) language.
Oddly enough, even at this snails pace, every day I seem to have fascinating new insights into the nature of consciousness.
This book is also a more modern treatment of the phenomenology theories of the likes of Ponty, Heidegger etc but in much more clear and precise (nearly mathematical) language.
Read
July 9, 2013Difficult, dense, but ultimately worth the trouble. Metzinger is amazing on some levels and hopelessly mental on others. I am glad he is part of the world but prefer to visit his mental locale only rarely.
January 15, 2022
I come across this bok after reading daniel dennett's paper "Why and How Does Consciousness Seem the Way it Seems?,This book is very academic in nature This book discussed on very hard topic like phenomenal self model model,transparency in perception, qualia, virtual self, self as a model, phenomenal model of the intentionality relation ,his theory is same as hume's bundle theory of perception, and anatta of budhhism, main problem with this theory for me is that it makes pathological state like depersonalization and derealization as ideal and as self is not real than obvious consequences is apathy to everyday activities,I think self is more like socio cultural entity and primary reason for our personhood,
I am not convinced that there is no self as Dan zahavi critisize metzinger theory" in his Being No One,In that book, Metzinger took the self to be a process independent ontological substance that might exist all by itself , that is, in isolation from the rest of the world and since he denied the existence of such an entity he concluded that no such things as selves exist. But the only reason to accept his and conclusion would be if his respective notions of self were the only ones available
For both Husserl and Sartre, an understanding of what it means to be a self calls for an examination of the structure of experience, and vice versa. In other words, their claim would be that the investigations of self and experience have to be integrated if both are to be understood. Indeed for both of them the self referred to is not something standing beyond or opposed to the stream of experiences but is rather a crucial aspect of our experiential lifes
Dan zahavi argued that "there is subjectivity of experience and a minimal sense of self, not only when I realize that I am perceiving a candle, but whenever there is perspectival ownership, whenever there is first-personal presence or manif estation of experience. It is this pre-refl ective sense of self which provides the experiential grounding for any subsequent self-ascription, ref l ective appropriation, and the matic self-identification. Had our experiences been completely anonymous when originally lived through, any such subsequent appropriation would become inexplicable.
Thus, rather than saying that the self does not exist, I think the self-skeptics should settle for a more modest claim. They should qualify their statement and instead deny the existence of a special kind of self"
We all have sense of mineness means ownership of our experience ,Antonio damasio also argue that self is primary for Concious experience, without self we don't feel experience as our own and our body is just not in vet but is primary reason for affect which leads to Concious experience
I am not convinced that there is no self as Dan zahavi critisize metzinger theory" in his Being No One,In that book, Metzinger took the self to be a process independent ontological substance that might exist all by itself , that is, in isolation from the rest of the world and since he denied the existence of such an entity he concluded that no such things as selves exist. But the only reason to accept his and conclusion would be if his respective notions of self were the only ones available
For both Husserl and Sartre, an understanding of what it means to be a self calls for an examination of the structure of experience, and vice versa. In other words, their claim would be that the investigations of self and experience have to be integrated if both are to be understood. Indeed for both of them the self referred to is not something standing beyond or opposed to the stream of experiences but is rather a crucial aspect of our experiential lifes
Dan zahavi argued that "there is subjectivity of experience and a minimal sense of self, not only when I realize that I am perceiving a candle, but whenever there is perspectival ownership, whenever there is first-personal presence or manif estation of experience. It is this pre-refl ective sense of self which provides the experiential grounding for any subsequent self-ascription, ref l ective appropriation, and the matic self-identification. Had our experiences been completely anonymous when originally lived through, any such subsequent appropriation would become inexplicable.
Thus, rather than saying that the self does not exist, I think the self-skeptics should settle for a more modest claim. They should qualify their statement and instead deny the existence of a special kind of self"
We all have sense of mineness means ownership of our experience ,Antonio damasio also argue that self is primary for Concious experience, without self we don't feel experience as our own and our body is just not in vet but is primary reason for affect which leads to Concious experience
May 6, 2017
A difficult book that did not fully reward the investment.
Metzinger raises some fascinating suggestions, in particular that our consciousness cannot exist without ignorance of its mechanisms. He calls this property "transparency." Think a window - you can see things through it, but you can't see the window itself. Just so, consciousness allows for awareness of the world, but not of its own mechanisms. There are also interesting discussions of how consciousness intersects with ethics, and deft use of neurological case studies to narrow down what we can and cannot experience.
But I came away from "Being No One" without feeling that I'd learned much. Metzinger doesn't hold the reader's hand. He refers back to concepts he's introduced long before (e.g. "constraint 8") without re-explanation or giving a page number. This makes the more involved arguments very difficult to follow. Several times, Metzinger argues that the structure of consciousness makes it impossible for anyone to fully accept his theory of it. This prickly defense is uncalled for. I am certain his theory is believable, but Being No One's sprawling style keeps the reader from internalizing it.
The simpler arguments aren't all persuasive, either. The claim that gives the book its title - that we don't have selves - is tossed off. As you'd expect, it involves defining a "self" as something with long-term stability, then dispatching that stability. Like Deleuze, Metzinger tells us what we take for an object is in fact a flow, and we have only moment-to-moment "phenomenal selves." So why do we feel so strongly that we have a stable self? Metzinger does not try hard to address that.
I intend to try his follow-up The Ego Tunnel, which I'm told is essentially a tighter distillation of Being No One. I'm hopeful that with less room to breathe, Metzinger will be clearer and snappier.
Metzinger raises some fascinating suggestions, in particular that our consciousness cannot exist without ignorance of its mechanisms. He calls this property "transparency." Think a window - you can see things through it, but you can't see the window itself. Just so, consciousness allows for awareness of the world, but not of its own mechanisms. There are also interesting discussions of how consciousness intersects with ethics, and deft use of neurological case studies to narrow down what we can and cannot experience.
But I came away from "Being No One" without feeling that I'd learned much. Metzinger doesn't hold the reader's hand. He refers back to concepts he's introduced long before (e.g. "constraint 8") without re-explanation or giving a page number. This makes the more involved arguments very difficult to follow. Several times, Metzinger argues that the structure of consciousness makes it impossible for anyone to fully accept his theory of it. This prickly defense is uncalled for. I am certain his theory is believable, but Being No One's sprawling style keeps the reader from internalizing it.
The simpler arguments aren't all persuasive, either. The claim that gives the book its title - that we don't have selves - is tossed off. As you'd expect, it involves defining a "self" as something with long-term stability, then dispatching that stability. Like Deleuze, Metzinger tells us what we take for an object is in fact a flow, and we have only moment-to-moment "phenomenal selves." So why do we feel so strongly that we have a stable self? Metzinger does not try hard to address that.
I intend to try his follow-up The Ego Tunnel, which I'm told is essentially a tighter distillation of Being No One. I'm hopeful that with less room to breathe, Metzinger will be clearer and snappier.
to-keep-reference
February 26, 2016En su Being No One, Thomas Metzingerl propone una versión basada en los estudios del cerebro: Platón tenía razón —con la salvedad de que no hay nadie (ningún sujeto que observe) en la caverna—. En realidad, la caverna se proyecta (toda su maquinaria) en la pantalla: el teatro de sombras funciona como la autorrepresentación (automodelo) de la caverna. En otras palabras, el mismo sujeto observador es una sombra, el resultado del mecanismo de representación: el "Yo" ocupa el lugar del modo en que el organismo humano se experimenta a si mismo, en que se aparece ante sí mismo, y no hay nadie detrás del velo de la autoapariencia, ninguna realidad sustancial...
Visión de Paralaje Pág.192
Visión de Paralaje Pág.192
Want to read
March 4, 2010Moving this from "currently reading" back to my "to read" shelf. After 6+ months I've managed to make it to page 92 (out of nearly 600). The parts I understand are fascinating, but it takes me about 30 minutes of complete, focused concentration to make it through a page. By far the most difficult book I've ever tried to read. I'm sure I'll come back to this one, but for next little while, bring on the fluff.
Want to read
October 26, 2013Seen in Blindsight appendix
June 22, 2018
This is a fascinating and important book. Not an easy read by any means. It requires a knowledge of philosophy in general and philosophy of mind In particular. I recommend it.
Read
October 22, 2025Me parece muy reveladora y esclarecedora la idea de que la mente humana se comporta como (es) una red neuronal. Me parece una forma muy interesante de abordar el tema de la auto consciencia, del “yo”, del problema del “alma” en filosofía. ¿Por qué parece que hay dos entes: el cuerpo/la mente, que hay dos “yo”?
La neurociencia contemporánea sugiere que el “yo” (la mente, la autoconsciencia, el alma) es en realidad un modelo predictivo de nuestro cerebro, de “nosotros mismos”. Nuestro cerebro funciona como una red neuronal que no solo aprende a anticipar el mundo, sino también a anticipar su propio comportamiento y reacciones (me refiero, nuestro “cuerpo” (nosotros, por genética, por cultura) ya tiene unas preferencias: le gusta el chocolate, es introvertido, valora más el dinero o la familia etc. pero eso “no lo sabes” lo vas descubriendo a medida que vivimos experiencias, y vamos entrenando ese modelo: el sistema se reajusta, se descubre, y aprende qué le motiva, qué le hiere, qué valora. Incluso los sueños parecen cumplir un papel en este aprendizaje, generando escenarios aleatorios para evitar que el cerebro “sobreentrene” con la rutina diaria, manteniéndolo flexible y capaz de adaptarse a lo inesperado.
¿Y por qué ocurre esto? En este sentido, desarrollar metacognición y autoconciencia es una forma de evolución: una estrategia natural para que la mente se autocalibre, se comprenda y mejore su capacidad de vivir en un entorno cambiante. El alma (o el yo) es una “alucinación”/modelo predictivo útil y profundamente real, porque es la interfaz a través de la cual el sistema se autointerpreta y actúa.
Es decir, nuestro “yo”, nuestra “mente”/“alma”/“autoconsciencia” se puede entender como un modelo matemático de nosotros mismos (“cuerpo”) creado por nuestro cerebro usando una red neuronal que es alimentada con datos de nuestro día a día.
La neurociencia contemporánea sugiere que el “yo” (la mente, la autoconsciencia, el alma) es en realidad un modelo predictivo de nuestro cerebro, de “nosotros mismos”. Nuestro cerebro funciona como una red neuronal que no solo aprende a anticipar el mundo, sino también a anticipar su propio comportamiento y reacciones (me refiero, nuestro “cuerpo” (nosotros, por genética, por cultura) ya tiene unas preferencias: le gusta el chocolate, es introvertido, valora más el dinero o la familia etc. pero eso “no lo sabes” lo vas descubriendo a medida que vivimos experiencias, y vamos entrenando ese modelo: el sistema se reajusta, se descubre, y aprende qué le motiva, qué le hiere, qué valora. Incluso los sueños parecen cumplir un papel en este aprendizaje, generando escenarios aleatorios para evitar que el cerebro “sobreentrene” con la rutina diaria, manteniéndolo flexible y capaz de adaptarse a lo inesperado.
¿Y por qué ocurre esto? En este sentido, desarrollar metacognición y autoconciencia es una forma de evolución: una estrategia natural para que la mente se autocalibre, se comprenda y mejore su capacidad de vivir en un entorno cambiante. El alma (o el yo) es una “alucinación”/modelo predictivo útil y profundamente real, porque es la interfaz a través de la cual el sistema se autointerpreta y actúa.
Es decir, nuestro “yo”, nuestra “mente”/“alma”/“autoconsciencia” se puede entender como un modelo matemático de nosotros mismos (“cuerpo”) creado por nuestro cerebro usando una red neuronal que es alimentada con datos de nuestro día a día.
February 5, 2024
another acid head buddhist
writing a turd of a book
////////
Amazone
utterly pretentious
Brevity is the essence of wit. How true. Metzinger's book shows just how true this adage is.
"This book was written for readers" Metzinger imperiously informs us at the outset.
He should have qualified this phrase by referring to "readers of drivel," and not otherwise intelligent and observant people.
This book is ineffably BORING. Don't look for the clarity of Doidge or Gladwell here, boy. You ain't gonna find it.
And to add insult to injury, Metzinger trots out non-existent words like "processuality" (p. 23) and phrases like "not approaching syntacticity" (p. 32). OMG.
You've got to be kidding me!
If God changed his mind and decided to flood the earth once more, I'd go find this book, cuz it would still be dry.
And I'd like to know how I can get my money back for my 700 pages of nonsense. I tell ya: if the price of horse manure ever goes up, this book will be worth a fortune.
casey
September 20, 2023
Maybe the best book written on the challenging subject of consciousness. Yes, this book is dense. I read at a snail's pace and researched the studies in it as they came up. Metzinger doesn't placate with flowery prose. This is not a "self-help" book or a "self-realization" book. There is no call to write gratitude lists or manifest your reality. This is an academic study of the highest order and a challenge to read and comprehend. Ultimately though, it was a very rewarding yet challenging experience.
Highly recommend to those who are interested in this subject and are up to the task to take the time. Check preconceptions and biases at the door. For most, I would suggest maybe starting with 'Ego Tunnel' and then moving to Being No One.
Highly recommend to those who are interested in this subject and are up to the task to take the time. Check preconceptions and biases at the door. For most, I would suggest maybe starting with 'Ego Tunnel' and then moving to Being No One.
September 4, 2023
Hard core philosophy of mind by one of its noted practitioners. With dollops of relevant cognitive neuroscience. After 1000 pages or so of dense jargon soaked verbiage with lots of twisted self-agonizing over ways of defining terms and finding ways forward I am not convinced I actually know anything I didn't know already. And the hard questions remain unanswered and largely untackled.
'Self' as 'just' more internal self-representation. Sure. What else could it - or I - possibly be? I still want it to persist for as long as possible and have some fun in the meant time.
But if you are still clinging to alternative primitive notions then this IS the book for you.
'Self' as 'just' more internal self-representation. Sure. What else could it - or I - possibly be? I still want it to persist for as long as possible and have some fun in the meant time.
But if you are still clinging to alternative primitive notions then this IS the book for you.
August 15, 2020
Revolutionary.
Want to read
January 29, 2023Best Books on the Neuroscience of Consciousness recommended by Anil Seth @five_books https://bitly.com/3liCcH9
AA A - Roy to do "Metzinger" Need ANF FOLDER
AA A - Roy to do "Metzinger" Need ANF FOLDER
May 28, 2024
His book “The Ego Tunnel” is the next place to go. He totally changed the way i think about consciousness.
May 29, 2024
Confusing and controversial book. It's hard to tell where the scientific facts and where the philosophy and speculation are.
April 21, 2012
like what I have read and understood...but will never finish
February 17, 2015
Turgid and somewhat prolix... so be prepared for a slow cook. But well worth it!
Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews